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ABSTRACT
We sought to establish how young people’s process of household formation differs across 
countries. Our particular focus was on departures from the parental home and returns to it. We 
used large micro datasets to explore the determinants of these flows, with specific attention to 
economic factors.
We presented international evidence on the differences in living arrangements and departure 
rates, and reviewed the problem and the literature. We realised that home-leaving had found 
limited space in the economic literature until only very recently, while previous research mainly 
consisted of descriptive cross-sectional studies of living arrangements, with rare cross-country 
quantitative analyses. We therefore highlighted the areas of research that required further 
analysis.
Since there are large differences in household structure within Europe and in comparison to 
the US, we posited a simple theoretical framework and estimated a dynamic model of departure 
from home with multiple destinations. Using several datasets (ECHP, BHPS, SOEP, NLSY) we 
analysed how the determinants of departure compare and whether the differences in residential 
decisions can be explained by looking at children’s and parents’ income and labour market 
situation. Our results suggest that, for Southern Europeans, economic circumstances are 
significant but their effects are small, while for the UK and the US the effects of economic 
variables are much larger, with potential income being a more important covariate than current 
income.
Finally, we examined young people’s return to the parental home. After presenting basic 
descriptive statistics showing high return rates across countries for unmarried youth, we showed 
that the role of economic factors is important in the UK and the US, indicating that returning to 
the family appears to provide a fall-back solution for young unmarried people. We found 
significant differences between countries, as well as between genders and between married vs. 
unmarried youth.
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1 Introduction
One in three Italian men in their early to mid-thirties still live with their parents. In Denmark 
and the Netherlands, only one in forty men in that age group still live in the parental home. It is 
hard to find statistics that show more striking differences within Europe. Southern European 
men and women stay at home much longer than their counterparts in Northern European 
countries and in the United States.
The purpose of this thesis is to improve the understanding of the process of departure of 
young people from the parental home and shed some light on their return back into the parental 
home, hereafter referred to as “departure” and “return” respectively. The focus is on Europe 
since there are large differences in household structure between countries, but we also 
compare the European experience to the North-American situation.
Over the past decade social scientists have devoted a fair amount of research to young 
people’s living arrangements, and the press has drawn attention to this issue.1 In the economic 
literature, however, the analysis of household formation has found minimal space until very 
recently, while the articles in social sciences other than economics have mostly been descriptive 
in nature with rare use of any statistical or econometric techniques. Moreover, virtually none of 
the published papers in economics or other social sciences attempt cross-country quantitative 
analyses, only a few estimate dynamic models within a country, while many are cross-sectional 
studies of living arrangements. After a review of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature, 
we find that there are some areas of the existing knowledge that require further analysis, thus 
justifying and motivating our research effort.
We think it is important to adopt a similar analytical framework for different countries in order 
to make results comparable, which is why we study the various datasets using models as 
similar as possible. The emphasis of this work is on the analysis of the effects of economic 
variables on departure and return, so particular attention is spent, for example, on considering 
the different roles that current and potential income play for a youth who is still living in the 
parental home. Although we do not aim at expanding the economic model, our conclusions 
suggest that certain income variables should be more important in the models.
1.1 The problem statement
There are strikingly large differences in household structure between European countries 
and between Europe and North America. While at the age of 30 just 56% of Italian and Spanish 
males were living outside the parental home in 1995-6, 88% or more were doing so in France, 
Belgium, UK, Netherlands, Denmark and Finland. For women we find a very similar pattern. 
What are the factors that determine departure from the parental home? Is it just cultural factors 
or do income and employment make a difference?
The large differences in living arrangements also come about because of dissimilar timings 
of destinations chosen. In Southern European countries the overwhelming reason for departure
1 See, for example, The Econom ist (1997), The Econom ist (2000), USA Today (2002).
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from home is going to live with a partner (as a married couple). In other European countries and 
in the US, young people very often leave for reasons other than partnership. Departures for 
non-partnership reasons happen, in all countries, at younger ages than departures for non­
married partnership, which in turn happen earlier than departure to married-partnerships.
The importance of this analysis can be seen by looking at how living arrangements are 
interrelated with employment: in Italy, only 74% men aged 30-34 who still live with their parents 
are employed, while 93% of those living without their parents are employed. From a different 
point of view, of all 30-34 year old Italian men who are not employed, 63% live at home, while 
only 27% of those employed live at home (see Tables 2.5 and 2.6 in chapter 2).
These simple descriptive statistics motivate some of the goals of our work, namely the need 
firstly to look at the differences between destinations upon departure from home, and, secondly, 
to consider the relationship between income and living arrangements decisions.
It is useful to introduce here some of the fundamental definitions used in this study, while a 
more thorough analysis is in appendix to chapter 2. In this study we will focus on children, by 
which we mean any individual who, in a survey, is living in the same household (“living at 
home”) as at least one of his natural or adoptive parents and we intend to study the process of 
“departure from home”, ie, the risk that, at the time of the following survey, the child (who is 
living with his parent(s) in a survey) is observed living without any of his parents. Upon 
departure from home, the person may be observed living in any of several destinations (living 
alone or with friends, living with a partner, leaving for study purposes). The last part of this 
thesis focuses on “returns home”, ie the process where a person currently not living with any of 
his parents will be observed living with one or both of his parents in the subsequent survey.
In the literature, while there are some studies that distinguish between adult children leaving 
for partnership and leaving to live alone/with friends, not enough attention is devoted to the 
differences between destinations upon departure from home (eg, in terms of different roles of 
covariates and of whether the pooling of destinations would be statistically acceptable), and 
most of the research in this area uses a dichotomous framework (living in the parental home 
versus living outside the parental home) rather than competing risks. One of the first issues that 
we will be exploring is whether the determinants of departure from home are different depending 
on the destination. We believe that this investigation is an important preliminary step before 
moving on to the analysis of the significance and the importance of the determinants of 
departure from home. This aim can be summarised in the form of a hypothesis that may be 
subjected to formal statistical testing.
Hypothesis 1
The determinants of leaving home are the same for all destinations: leaving home to 
live with a partner and leaving home to live without a partner are not distinct 
destinations and can be pooled together.
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It is generally acknowledged, that the home leaving process differs significantly amongst 
European countries. This is partly due to reports in the media showing very striking differences 
in the shares of youth living with “mamma” in Southern Europe compared to Northern Europe.2 
This, however, does not say much about the determinants of home leaving across countries: the 
determinants could be exactly the same (for example, if income increases departure rates in the 
same way in all countries, Southern Europeans may leave later because their income at 
younger ages is lower), or be different (in which case Southern Europeans are less likely to 
leave home, even given the same personal characteristics, so that lower incomes in the South 
would not be the cause of lower departure rates).
Very little empirical work has addressed this issue, because very few cross-country 
comparative analyses have been done. Comparing the results of different papers, based on 
different models and techniques, is difficult.
We are therefore interested to see whether the determinants of home-leaving differ amongst 
countries. We focus primarily on economic and financial covariates and on labour market 
conditions, because on the basis of the existing literature we expect these to be important 
variables affecting young people’s decision to leave the parental home.
Hypothesis 2
Young people’s departure from home in Southern European countries is affected by 
own and family current financial circumstances in the same way as in 
Central/Northern Europe and the US, ie, the effects of the covariates are not different 
from one another.3
Our literature review in the next chapter will show that some papers have considered the 
possibility that young people may, to some extent, disregard current income when deciding to 
leave the parental home, and rather focus on their expected income once outside the parental 
home, ie, what we could call their “potential income”. The results in the literature seem tentative, 
and no papers are actually comparing the results when using actual income to the ones of a 
model with potential income. We are therefore interested to see whether there is a relationship 
between young people’s “potential income” and their departure and whether this relationship 
differs across countries. For this purpose, we state a third hypothesis, which will be subjected to 
formal statistical testing. Additionally, we will compare the effect of current income to the effect 
of potential income in each dataset to see how the effects differ in each case.
2 This phenomenon is also im mediately apparent to a casual observer who travels abroad or d iscusses the issue with 
foreigners.
3 In other words, the hypothesis is saying that a given change in own income for a Southerner changes the risk of 
leaving home by the same amount than a comparable change in own income changes the risk of a youth in other 
countries. The statistical test will be performed by comparing the estim ates for the effects of income in the different 
countries.
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Hypothesis 3
Potential financial circumstances are as important to young people in Southern 
European countries as to youth in Central/Northern Europe and the US.
Although there is research on departure from home, the literature on returns to the parental 
home is extremely small, and therefore our analysis of the return process needs to start from 
more basic issues. Firstly, there is no evidence on whether people return home more often in 
some countries than in others. Secondly, it is not known whether the effect of economic and 
financial circumstances is significant in determining return home. Thirdly, we do not know how 
the effect of different variables, and particularly of economic and financial covariates, may differ 
between countries. We state these three basic questions in the form of hypotheses.
Hypothesis 4a
The probability of return to the parental home is the same across countries.
Hypothesis 4b
Economic and financial circumstances are not determinants of young people’s return
to the parental home.
Hypothesis 4c
The determinants of young people’s return to the parental home are the same across
countries (with special consideration for economic and financial variables).
All of the hypotheses listed above will be tested against the data in chapters 3, 4 and 5, after 
estimations of the models for each dataset.
1.2 The professional significance of the study and methodology
The reasons for conducting this study, as we shall be explaining in further detail after 
reviewing the existing literature, are the following:
1. econometric research on young people’s departure from, and return to, the parental home 
is patchy, results are not well established (even for the same country) and comparisons across 
countries are very difficult;
2. the results of some of the studies are based on models that are weak from an econometric
point of view, for example because cross-sections are used rather than panel datasets;
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3. the importance of the estimates of most studies remains unclear because the authors 
failed to convey the magnitude of their results, particularly in comparison to previous research;
4. the methods chosen for this study improve on the ones used by most other researchers, 
and the results will therefore be stronger than many of those found in the literature;
5. some of the datasets used in this work are relatively new (the ECHP is not a very widely 
used survey, in spite of its potential usefulness for comparative research) or have not been used 
before for the purposes of studying of young people’s moves in and out of the parental home.4
The microeconometric analysis of departure from the parental home will be undertaken using 
multinomial models in order to distinguish between different destinations upon departure from 
home. The analysis of the return home can be performed using a dichotomous model. Important 
econometric issues such as endogeneity and standard errors will be explored as well. We will 
conduct a thorough cross-country comparison, thus offering an important methodological 
improvement on the existing literature.
The methodology representative of the model that I estimate will be considered in detail at 
later points, particularly in chapter 2 and in the first parts of chapter 3 and 5. The datasets used 
are explained at the beginning of chapters 3 and 4.
The definitions used for child, parent, home, and related terms are considered in chapter 2 
(and a very detailed breakdown is in the appendix to chapter 2). To help the reader at this 
stage, by “departure of children from home” we mean the analysis of the changes in living 
arrangements of an individual (“child”) who is living in the same household as at least one of his 
natural or adoptive parents in any one survey. While he is living with his parents, the child is 
considered to be living at “home”. If in the subsequent survey the child has changed lodgings 
and is no longer living with any of his parents, we consider that he has moved out of the 
parental home and into one of possible destinations (see chapter 2). After the child has moved 
out of the home, the event of “return home” means moving back into an accommodation 
arrangement with either or both parents.
1.3 Outline of the dissertation
The structure of this dissertation is as follows:
Chapter 2 starts by presenting several sets of descriptives by country, age and gender, to 
show how some European countries have witnessed a change in family structure in the last few 
decades and how strikingly different family structures currently are across countries. The 
magnitude of the differences can be rather surprising: for example, while the median son in 
Nordic Europe leaves the parental home at the age of 21, the median Italian or Spanish son
4 For example, the German Socio Econom ic Panel has been used only once, in one working paper, for the analysis of 
departure from the parental home.
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leaves home at 28 or 29. Having documented the facts, we then turn to a critical review of what 
is currently known on the process of young people’s departure from home to provide the 
background to this study. We conduct a survey of the literature on a theoretical and on an 
applied level. Although we aim to be selective by focusing only on the relevant works, we also 
want to be more precise and exhaustive than other researchers who have overlooked some 
important parts of the literature. We take particular care in covering the economic and 
econometric research in our area, and also try to include the most important works from the 
sociological or demographic literature. We find that, in spite of what may be believed, most 
countries have been covered by some research, but that the majority of papers belong to the 
sociological literature (and often fail to refer to previous economic or demographic research on 
this topic), whereas econometric works are few; similarly, cross-country comparisons are the 
exception, or, when they exist, they are a collection of statistics by age and gender. In the final 
part of the review we shift emphasis towards the flow of children back into the parental home, 
and explain that the literature on this topic is minimal and therefore identify some relevant basic 
research questions. At the end of the review, we clearly identify the deficiencies in our current 
knowledge and explain the significance of addressing some of them. We then introduce the 
model on which our subsequent applied chapters will be based, and refer to the previous 
papers by John Ermisch (Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) and Ermisch (1999)) that developed 
them. The chapter then discusses important empirical and econometric issues that need to be 
considered, including the important of potential income as opposed to current income. After 
indicating the consensus points and the unanswered questions in this area of research, we 
express the importance of our research and link the shortcomings found in the literature to the 
research objectives set out in this introductory chapter. These research objectives, expressed 
as the hypotheses that can be subjected to formal statistical testing, will be explored in the three 
empirical chapters that follow.
The primary focus of chapter 3 is a comparative analysis of young Europeans’ departure 
from the parental home. We introduce the ECHP data used in the empirical analysis and explain 
the empirical model, which builds on the review of the models undertaken in the previous 
chapter. The empirical analysis delivers interesting results for the Southern European countries, 
which feature large sample sizes, and some general results for the rest of the EU. The main 
result for the South is that the role of income and employment variables can be significant, but 
the effects are small in absolute levels, although they can in some cases be considered 
important in relative terms given the low average departure rates exhibited by young people in 
Southern Europe. The results tend to be less well determined for the rest of Europe than for the 
South (this is partly due to the small sample sizes for Northern Europe, where most young 
people leave home at young ages and are no longer at risk).
Chapter 4 therefore focuses on three national datasets, for the UK, the US and Germany, 
that we hope may improve the results found using the ECHP and provide an insight into young 
people’s departure from home in the United States. The empirical model used in the previous 
chapter is expanded in several ways. Firstly, we analyse student departures along with
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departures alone or with a partner. Secondly, we take advantage of the wealth of variables 
available in the various panels to introduce important covariates that the ECHP panel did not 
offer. Thirdly, the length of these datasets allows us to conduct a more thorough analysis. The 
datasets used in this chapter also appear to be of generally better quality, which clearly 
improves the level and robustness of our findings. A clear set of results emerges for the UK, the 
US and Germany, indicating that income and labour market variables are both significant and 
important, and that there are important differences that depend, for example, on genders and 
destinations. We show how the results of our empirical models indicate that these three 
countries share common features as to the process of young people’s departure from the 
parental home. We also see how potential income is often a much more significant and 
important determinant of departure from home than current, actual income. This result is in clear 
contrast to what we observe for Southern Europe, where the effects of such covariate was 
marginal and therefore likely to be uninteresting for policy purposes.
In Chapter 5 we turn our attention to the issue of young people’s return to the parental home. 
Given that the research in this areas is scarce, we start by focusing on more basic issues, such 
as a comparison of return rates in the different datasets, which are the same panels used in the 
previous empirical chapters. We analyse the descriptive statistics and show that there are 
significant differences between countries . We then proceed to the econometric analyses, which 
we perform only on a subset of the countries because the low return rates demand relative large 
sample sizes, and some of the datasets do not appear suitable for such analysis. (For example, 
the German SOEP exhibits surprisingly low rates of return to the parental home.) While the 
results for Southern Europe are not well determined and would deserve further analysis, our 
econometric estimates for the US and the UK show that the role of economic factors is, once 
again, crucial: income and employment variables are significant and very important for the US 
and the UK, and suggest that, perhaps surprisingly, the parents can provide an effective safety 
net for children who find themselves in financial difficulty when outside the parental home.
Chapter 6 provides a synopsis of the main findings of each chapter in the framework of the 
research objectives of this work. We then explain how our findings differ from what was known 
at the beginning of this research work and highlight our original contributions to the knowledge 
and understanding of the issues analysed. The chapter ends with our conclusions and with 
suggestions for directions for future research.
1.4 Delimitations of the study
This dissertation is based on the analysis of microdata for different countries, estimated 
separately. Because these datasets differ in quality, objectives and structure, some of the 
models include somewhat different sets of covariates and the observation periods are not the 
same. In particular, the US dataset is a youth cohort that started in 1979 when most of the youth 
in the dataset were in their late teens. By the early 1990s, these youth were aged above 30. By
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contrast, the German panel started in 1983, and those for the UK and EU in the early 1990s, 
and they all always had individuals in every age group. This means that the results presented 
are valid only for one particularly cohort for the US over a period of years (and nothing can be 
said for more recent cohorts), while the German results relate to several cohorts over more than 
15 surveys. At the other end of the spectrum, the analysis on the very short EU panel applies to 
several cohorts over very few years. Although the process of departure from home in the US 
dataset had largely ended by the early 1990s, which is when our EU panel started, we believe 
that the results remain fairly comparable between models and countries. In this dissertation, we 
discuss how these issues may affect the results but will not attempt to quantify such effects, 
even if it is possible that the determinants of home leaving may differ over time. Future 
extensions of our analysis should take into account macroeconomic or regional covariates (and, 
particularly, differences in welfare benefits for young people) in a more efficient way and also 
consider how the determinants of departure and returns have changed over time in each 
country.
We do not expand the existing economic theory explaining young people’s departure from, 
and return to, the parental home, but we do aim to improve the econometric analysis of the 
home-leaving process and we believe that our empirical results can offer interesting and 
important considerations for further theoretical work in this area.
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2 Overview of the facts and review of the literature
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is /) to present an empirical overview of the process of young 
people’s departure from the parental home, of their subsequent living arrangements and of the 
risk of their return home, /'/) to make a critical survey of the literature and of the econometric 
issues involved, and then //'/) to identify the deficiencies in the current knowledge, therefore 
preparing the field for our own analyses in subsequent chapters.
In section two we present some descriptive data on the living arrangements of young people 
in many countries and over the last few decades of the 20th century. This will give the reader an 
overview of the wide differences that exist between countries and a stimulus to understand 
more about the reasons behind them.
The main results of the literature on departure from home, divided between theoretical and 
empirical work, are presented in section three. This chapter contains a somewhat more detailed 
review of the literature than what is found in the literature in general, which is motivated by the 
fact that, although there has been some recent research on children’s departure from home, no 
single work presents a satisfactory review of the literature. We will comment briefly on the most 
important datasets used in the literature, although the datasets used this dissertation will be 
explored in greater depth in the empirical chapters. Section four focuses on literature on returns 
to the parental home.
An overview of the analytical methods used in the literature and of some important 
econometric issues are explored in the subsequent section five, and they will be referred to 
again in our empirical analyses in the next chapters.
A sixth section highlights the essential points examined in this chapter, firstly by explaining 
what we would expect to find in an empirical analysis of ours, given the review of the applied 
and theoretical literature, and spells out both the results that seem fairly established -  even if 
there may be no “consensus” - and the shortcomings found in the current literature.
In the appendices to this chapter we detail the definitions used in this work when referring to 
young people’s living arrangements and to departures, including “child”, “parent”, and 
“destinations”, and present more details of the model in Ermisch (1999) and others who 
explored the methodologies that we shall be using in the chapters that follow.
2.2 Facts
There are strikingly large differences in household structure between European countries 
(Kiernan (1986), Fernandez Cordon (1997), lacovou (1998), Billari et al. (2001)), and between 
Europe and North America. While at the age of 30 just 56% of Italian and Spanish males were 
living outside the parental home in 1995-6, 88% or more were doing so in France, Belgium, UK, 
Netherlands, Denmark and Finland. The figures for women are uniformly slightly higher for all 
countries so the same pattern applies.
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These large differences, which arise from disparities in the patterns of young people’s 
departure from home, are due to dissimilar timings of departure and destinations chosen. In 
Southern European countries, for example, the overwhelming reason for departure from home 
is going to live with a partner (as a married couple). In other European countries and in the US, 
young people very often leave for reasons other than partnership (eg, to start a new job) and go 
to live alone or with friends. Departures for non-partnership reasons happen, in all countries, at 
younger ages than departures for partnership reasons. Moreover, the age of marriage varies by 
countries and gender (males in Northern Europe marry earlier than their counterparts in 
Southern Europe), and the age when people start cohabitating relationships is much lower in 
Northern Europe than in the South, but in the latter region unmarried relationships are fairly 
uncommon.1
There are also significant differences in behaviour within each country, for example between 
men and women, or different socio-economic groups.
The contrasts between countries are so great that it is possible to draw broad distinctions 
between Northern and Southern European countries:
1) people leave home later in the South and, when they do, they tend to move straight into 
partnerships; by contrast,
2) in the North, young people leave earlier and they generally have high probabilities to go to 
live alone or with friends.2
2.2.1 Young people’s living arrangements in the 1990s
Since men tend to leave the parental home later than women, at each age the share of men 
living in the parental home is higher than the corresponding share of women. This appears 
clearly from any of the tables presented below.
Table 2.1 shows the shares of young Europeans and US Americans choosing different living 
arrangements.3 Living arrangements have been divided in eight groups, so that some striking 
differences across countries and age groups can stand out. The groups are the following:
Home: living with their parent(s), without a partner and without a child of theirs;
Home with child, living in the parental home without a partner but with children;
Home with partner, living in the parental home with a (married or unmarried) partner (with or 
without children);
Out alone: living outside the parental home and without anybody else;
Out with child: living outside the parental home with at least one own child, but no partner;
Out with friends [or other relatives or others]: living outside the parental home with other 
people, but not with a partner or a child of theirs;4
Out with unmarried [partner]: living outside the parental home with an unmarried partner;
1 In this paragraph, “Southern Europe” means Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, while all other countries are generically 
included in “Northern Europe”. W e will be making a clearer distinction later.
2 This is true for both men and women. Moreover, in all countries women leave earlier than men to enter partnerships, 
but only in some countries women leave earlier to live on their own or with friends.
3 The datasets used in this table and in other parts of this chapter (ECHP, BHPS, GSOEP, NLSY) are described in
subsequent chapters 3 and 4 where they will we used for m icroeconometric analyses.
4 Ie, being a single parent takes precedence over living with friends.
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Out with spouse: living outside the parental home with a married partner.
From the table we can see that, for any age group, the share of youth living with parents are 
higher in the South than in Northern countries (the Scandinavian countries have the lowest 
figures). A graphical overview of the proportion of youth living in the parental home (all three 
groups in the table classified as "at home”) is presented in
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, where the differences across countries are immediately 
recognisable.
The table shows that, in the 18-23 age group, a significant share of Northern Europeans are 
in partnerships (between 10 and 27%, depending on the country), while in the South, apart for a 
non-negligible share of Greek women (16%), most young people delay partnership formation 
until their late 20s (partnership rates are around 5-6% for women and 1-2% for men). In nearly 
all countries, females tend to enter partnerships 2-3 years earlier than men. In the 24-29 age 
group, living with a partner becomes much more usual in the South, too.5
The figures also show that living alone or with friends (equivalent to living without parents 
and without a partner), which used to be rather unusual a few decades ago, particularly for 
women, has become more common in the last few decades in Northern Europe, while this living 
arrangement is still relatively rare in Southern Europe.
The table also indicates that non-traditional living arrangements (living with friends/others or 
as a single parent) are very rare in Southern Europe and more common in Northern Europe, 
and sometimes fairly usual: for example, around 10% of UK females in the age group 24-34 live 
outside the parental home with a child of theirs, but without a partner.6
Furthermore, although living with a partner is the most common destination living 
arrangement for young Europeans from their late 20s, the transition into partnerships happens 
differently in Southern Europe compared to the rest of Europe. In the South, around 80% of 
home leaves enter a partnership, while elsewhere there is mostly an intermediate step where 
children leave home to live without a partner, which is what happens for ca 60-70% of them. 
This topic will be explored in further detail in the empirical chapters where the risk of entering 
the different destinations will be analysed.7
It is also possible to see how different the attitude (and behaviour) towards unmarried 
cohabitations is within Europe. While only one in ten Southern European and Irish males in their 
mid- to late 20s live with an unmarried partner, one in three does so in other European 
countries. For those aged less than 30 in the Scandinavian8 countries, unmarried partnerships 
outnumber married partnerships. At later ages, married relationships are prevalent, but it is not
5 Despite a non-negligible share of Southern Europeans living with their partners but still remaining in the parental 
home, the overall picture presented is still true.
6 Information on people living in institutions is scarce in censuses and in surveys. The shares of young people in such 
accomm odation are insignificant, and remain very small for all people below 60 years of age (share for all people below 
60 living in institutions in 1990 was less than 1%), and increases significantly only for the old and very old population 
A lders and Manting (1999).
7 Youth leaving home for non-partnership destinations: highest shares are in Norway (68 women out o f 100, 72 men), 
Sweden (63, 71), Finland (55, 60); lowest shares are in Flemish Belgium (16, 20), Spain (15, 25), Italy (15, 30). This is 
reported in Mulder et al. (2002), table 6 (no data for Greece and Portugal), which also shows that Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic show a pattern sim ilar to Southern Europe.
8 Given the strong differences in the process of departures from home -  also at the descriptive level -  we sometimes 
refer to Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland as “Nordic” countries to highlight how extreme the 
patterns of departure from home appea in those countries.
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possible to tell whether this is because couples decide to get married after a few years living 
together, or whether cohabitations started at older ages are more often registered with marriage 
from the start, or perhaps whether younger cohorts get married relatively less than older ones.
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Table 2.1- Living arrangements of young people in Europe (1994-1997) and the US 
(cohort data) ______________________
GR / S P A
Home 83.6 95.6 95.6 90.5 76.7
(0.7) (03) (03) (05) (1.2)
Home w/child 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
(00) (00) (0.0) (0.1) (00)
Home w/partner 2.0 0.3 1.5 4.0 5.5
(0.3) (0.1) (0.2) (03) (07)
Out alone 10.2 1.0 0.3 0.1 7.0
(06) (0-2) (0.1) (01) (07)
Out w/child 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0) (00) (00) (00) (0.0)
Out w/friends 2.3 1.9 1.1 2.5 2.6
(03) (0 2) (02) (03) (0.5)
Out w/unmarried 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.4 5.0
(0.2) (0.1) (01) (0.1) (0.6)
Out w/spouse 1.1 0.8 1.3 2.4 3.1
(0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (03) (0.5)
Size 2,522 4,391 4,503 3,173 1,223
Home 61.5 71.6 68.0 61.6 38.3
(10) (07) (0.7) (10) (1.4)
Home w/child 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
(0.1) (00) (0.0) (01) (00)
Home w/partner 4.6 2.6 3.2 5.6 6.6
(0.4) (0.2) (03) (0.5) (07)
Out alone 6.5 4.0 2.1 1.5 13.7
(0.5) (0.3) (0.2) (0 3) (1.0)
Out w/child 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Out w/friends 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.8
(0.3) (02) (02) (0.3) (0.5)
Out w/unmarried 1.7 1.2 1.8 1.0 14.0
(0.3) (02) (0.2) (0.2) (10)
Outw/spouse 23.0 18.4 22.8 27.8 24.6
(0.8) (0.6) (07) (0.9) (1.2)
Size 2,583 4,487 4,073 2,303 1,259
Home 26.4 28.5 32.7 22.9 17.1
(1.1) (0.9) (0.9) (1.1) (1.2)
Home w/child 0 0 0.1 0 0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (00) (00)
Home w/partner 6.4 3.3 4.1 3.7 8.8
(0.6) (0.3) (04) (0.5) (09)
Out alone 7 6.2 2.6 1.3 9.3
(06) (0.5) (0.3) (0.3) (09)
Out w/child 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.5
(0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.2)
Out w/friends 1.2 1.3 1.2 2.5 1.9
(0.3) (0.2) (02) (0.4) (0.4)
Out w/unmarried 1.4 1.6 3.1 1.6 8.8
(03) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.9)
Outw/spouse 57.4 58.9 56.1 67.9 53.6
(12) (0.9) (1.0) (1.2) (1.6)
Size 1,601 2,805 2,494 1,523 949
MEN
F D LUX B UK IRL NL DK FIN US
18-23 
81.6 87.1 91.4 92.4 75.6 93.5 72.8 61.5 60.7 54.6
(07) (05) (1.7) (08) (07) (05) (10) (14) (1.6) (03)
0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
(00) (00) (04) (00) (0.0) (0.1) (0.0) (00) (00) (00)
0.4 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.0 1.4 0.2 1.1
(0 1) (0.1) (03) (03) (02) (01) (00) (0.3) (01) (0.1)
9.1 6.5 0.8 2.7 8.0 2.2 19.7 23.3 20.9 13.1
(05) (0.4) (05) (05) (05) (03) (09) (1.2) (14) (0.2)
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
(00) (00) (00) (00) (01) (00) (00) (00) (0.0) (00)
3.3 1.7 3.5 0.3 5.5 2.6 0.8 1.5 1.8 13.8
(03) (0.2) (1.1) (02) (04) (03) (0.2) (0.3) (04) (02)
4.7 2.6 0.3 2.1 6.4 0.8 5.4 11.2 14.4 2.8
(04) (03) (03) (04) (0.4) (02) (05) (09) (12) (01)
0.9 1.3 3.2 1.7 3.3 0.5 1.2 1.1 2.0 14.2
(0.2) (02) (10) (0.4) (03) (01) (0.3) (03) (05) (0.2)
3,075 3,752 281 1,234 3,325 2,980 1,818 1,212 906 32,442
24-29
31.0 33.8 32.7 41.1 27.2 51.0 18.2 7.1 13.8 17.5
(08) (07) (2.5) (1.4) (07) (1.1) (08) (07) (13) (0.2)
0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4
(00) (0.0) (00) (00) (0.1) (00) (00) (00) (01) (00)
0.2 3.6 2.1 1.4 1.1 0.4 0.0 1.7 0.4 1.1
(0.1) (03) (0.8) (03) (0.2) (0.1) (0.0) (04) (02) (0.1)
16.6 22.9 13.9 11.5 11.6 9.5 21.6 29.3 24.6 22.5
(07) (0.6) (1.9) (09) (0.5) (0.6) (0.9) (1.3) (1.6) (0.2)
0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.5
(0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (00) (0.2) (0.2) (0.0)
1.9 2.9 2.4 1.0 7.1 4.3 1.2 2.4 1.6 10.2
(0.2) (02) (0.8) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.2) (0.4) (0.5) (0.2)
23.0 12.8 16.3 11.4 17.9 4.3 25.7 39.7 37.0 7.0
(08) (0.5) (2.0) (0.9) (06) (0.4) (1.0) (1.4) (18) (0.1)
27.1 23.7 32.7 33.5 34.5 30.5 33.1 19.4 22.2 40.8
(0.8) (06) (2.5) (13) (0.8) (1.0) (10) (1.1) (15) (0.3)
3,056 4,884 341 1,238 3,657 2,060 2,084 1,263 745 38,415
30-34
12.3 11.9 12 8.8 11.7 22.3 2.7 2.7 6.3 8.8
(07) (0.5) (1.8) (0.9) (0.6) (1.2) (0.4) (0.5) (09) (0.2)
0.1 0 0.7 0 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0.4
(0.1) (0.0) (0.5) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
0.8 2 3.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0 0 0.2 0.8
(0.2) (0.2) (10) (0.3) (0.1) (0.2) (0.0) (0.0) (0.2) (0.1)
16.5 25.3 9.7 13.4 13.4 9.6 16.6 26 17.4 25.8
(08) (07) (1.6) (10) (0.6) (08) (0.9) (14) (14) (0.3)
0.3 0.4 0 0 0.5 0 0.2 0.7 0.2 1.4
(0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1) (0.3) (0.2) (0.1)
1.5 1.7 0.9 0.1 3.7 4 0.9 1.2 0.5 5
(03) (0.2) (0.5) (0.1) (04) (06) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.1)
19.9 9 10.4 13.2 11.5 1.9 17.1 30.3 22 6.4
(0.9) (0.4) (1.6) (1.0) (0.6) (0.4) (10) (1.5) (1.5) (0.2)
48.5 49.8 62.5 63.9 58.5 61.8 62.6 38.9 53.4 51.4
(11) (0.8) (2.6) (14) (0.9) (14) (1.2) (1.6) (1.8) (0.3)
2,035 4,045 343 1,109 2,863 1,251 1,568 980 751 ;25,740
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GR / S P
WOMEN
A F D LUX e UK IRL NL DK FIN US
Home 69.1 90.1 90.1 82.9 59.9
18-23
69.0 67.9 74.4 79.8 52.8 78.8 55.3 45.6 39.1 39.7
(09) (0.5) (0.5) (0.7) (1.5) (0.8) (08) (26) (11) (0.9) (0.8) (1.2) (1.4) (1.7) (03)
Home w/child 0.1 0.5 1.1 2.1 1.6 0.6 1.1 0.6 1.1 2.9 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2
(0 1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (04) (0.1) (02) (05) (03) (0.3) (05) (00) (0.0) (0-0) (0.1)
Home w/partner 2.1 1.0 1.7 4.5 5.2 0.6 1.2 3.6 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 1.8 0.9 1.2
(03) (0.2) (02) (04) (0.7) (0 1) (02) (1.1) (03) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (04) (0.3) (0.1)
Out alone 7.4 1.1 0.4 0.5 10.1 10.1 11.5 3.8 1.9 8.6 3.0 18.6 21.1 23.6 8.2
(0.5) (0.2) (0.1) (0 1) (09) (0.5) (0 5) (1.1) (04) (05) (03) (09) (12) (1.5) (0.2)
Out w/child 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 1.3 0.5 1.3 0.3 1.2 4.7 1.9 0.0 1.2 2.6 4.4
(0.1) (0.1) (00) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (03) (04) (0.3) (0.0) (0.3) (0.6) (0.1)
Out w/friends 5.4 0.9 1.7 2.1 2.7 2.8 2.8 1.1 0.5 5.6 4.6 1.1 1.8 0.4 10.2
(0.4) (0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (05) (0.3) (03) (0.6) (02) (0.4) (0.4) (0.2) (0.4) (0.2) (0-2)
Out w/unmarried 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 7.4 11.7 6.5 2.8 6.4 13.9 2.5 17.0 23.8 26.9 5.0
(0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (08) (0.6) (04) (10) (07) (06) (0.3) (09) (1.2) (1.5) (0.1)
Out w/spouse 14.6 5.4 4.0 6.8 11.9 4.7 7.8 13.3 7.7 10.6 3.2 7.9 4.7 6.6 27.2
(0.7) (0.3) (0.3) (0.5) (1.0) (04) (0.4) (2.0) (0.8) (0.5) (03) (0.6) (0.6) (0.9) (0.2)
Size 2,774 4,261 4,198 2,716 1,127 3,156 3,707 290 1,236 3,279 2,588 1,774 1,198 822 31,843
Home 26.5 47.8 47.1 37.5 17.9
24-29
16.2 15.0 16.2 15.9 11.1 31.2 4.2 2.4 4.3 8.3
(0.9) (0.8) (0.8) (1.1) (1.2) (0.7) (0.5) (1.9) (1.0) (0.5) (1.1) (0.4) (0.4) (0.8) (0.1)
Home w/child 1.8 0.5 2.9 2.7 1.8 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.9 6.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.9
(0.3) (0.1) (0 3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (02) (06) (0.0) (01) (0.0) (0.1)
Home w/partner 1.6 2.3 4.6 8.0 4.4 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.7 1.1 0.3 0.2 1.0 1.3
(03) (0.2) (0.3) (0.6) (06) (0.2) (02) (05) (0.3) (0.1) (02) (01) (0.1) (0-4) (01)
Out alone 5.2 2.8 1.6 2.5 9.7 12.9 18.8 10.5 7.3 7.6 4.6 14.3 15.3 17.8 15.6
(0.4) (03) (0.2) (0.3) (09) (06) (0.6) (1.6) (07) (0.4) (0.5) (0.7) (10) (1.4) (0-2)
Out w/child 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.8 4.8 2.8 4.6 1.0 2.7 9.7 6.4 2.0 4.9 6.9 8.8
(0.1) (0.1) (01) (0.2) (0.6) (0.3) (03) (05) (04) (0.5) (0.6) (03) (06) (0.9) (0.1)
Out w/friends 2.0 0.7 1.7 1.1 0.6 1.7 3.0 1.9 0.4 3.8 5.2 1.0 0.9 0.5 5.8
(0.3) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0-2) (0.7) (02) (0.3) (0.5) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.1)
Out w/unmarried 1.8 1.3 3.5 1.5 15.8 24.7 13.8 15.9 14.3 16.3 4.6 26.8 46.1 36.1 7.4
(0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (1.1) (0.8) (0.5) (1.9) (0.9) (0.6) (05) (0.9) (1.3) (18) (0.1)
Out w/spouse 60.5 44.2 38.1 45.9 44.9 40.5 43.2 53.2 58.2 49.8 40.7 51.4 30.2 33.3 50.0
(1.0) (0.8) (0.8) (1.1) (1.5) (0.9) (0.7) (2.6) (1.3) (0.8) (1.1) (1.0) (1.2) (1.8) (0-3)
Size 2,481 4,222 3,837 2,108 1,095 3,017 4,913 382 1,439 3,881 1,891 2,407 1,374 713 37,694
Home 6.1 14.9 16.3 10.5 5.9
30-34
3.9 2.8 3.1 4.1 2.6 10.6 0.5 2 0.8 3.2
(0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (0.8) (07) (0.4) (0.3) (0.9) (0.6) (0.3) (0.9) (0.2) (0.5) (0.3) (0.1)
Home w/child 0.7 0.5 4.3 2.6 1.6 0.8 0.1 1.3 0 0.3 0.7 0.1 0 0 2
(0.2) (0.1) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.2) (0.1) (0.6) (0.0) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1)
Home w/partner 2.7 2.6 3.8 6.3 4.8 0 0.8 2.9 1 0.5 1.3 0 0.1 0 1.1
(0.4) (0.3) (0.4) (06) (0.7) (0.0) (0.1) (0.9) (03) (0.1) (0.3) (0.0) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1)
Out alone 4.7 4.2 2 1.5 6.8 9.3 12.9 11.8 6.9 7.6 3.4 7.6 7.7 11.5 16.1
(0.5) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.8) (0.6) (05) (1.7) (0.7) (0.5) (0.5) (0.6) (0.9) (1.2) (0.2)
Out w/child 1.9 2.1 1.4 4 5 4.1 8.8 5.2 6.5 9.6 8 3.4 7.5 7.2 12.1
(0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.5) (0.7) (0.4) (05) (1.2) (07) (0.5) (0.8) (0.4) (0.9) (1.0) (0.2)
Out w/friends 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.1 1.4 1.2 1.2 0 0.3 1.9 3.3 0.2 1.1 0 3
(0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.4) (0.2) (0.2) (0.0) (0.2) (0.2) (0.5) (0.1) (0.4) (0.0) (0.1)
Out w/unmarried 0.7 1.3 3.3 1.7 6.7 18.4 9 9.6 11 11.5 3.2 13.6 28.5 20.9 5.9
(0.2) (0.2) (04) (0.3) (0.8) (0.9) (0.5) (1.6) (0.9) (0.6) (0.5) (0.8) (1.5) (1.5) (0.1)
Out w/spouse 82.8 73.9 68.3 73.1 67.7 62.4 64.3 66.2 70.2 66 69.6 74.5 53.1 59.6 56.5
(0.9) (0.8) (0.9) (1.1) (1.4) (1.1) (0.8) (2.5) (1.3) (0.8) (1.3) (1.1) (1.7) (1.9) (0.3)
Size 1,728 2,792 2,553 1,564 1,042 2,049 3,912 349 1,203 3,138 1,216 1,704 881 689 25,438
Percentage shares - Source: Author’s calculations on European Com munity Household Panel (ECHP), weighed; author’s 
calculations on main (non-boosted) National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) sample. Abbreviations: Greece (GR), Italy 
(I), Spain (E), Portugal (P), Austria (A), France (F), Germany (D), Belgium (B), Luxembourg (LUX), United Kingdom (UK), 
Ireland (IRL), the Netherlands (NL), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), United States (US).
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Figure 2.1-Shares of males living with parents in EU countries in 1995
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Shares are expressed in percentages. Source: own calculations on ECHP data.
Figure 2.2 -Shares of females living with parents in EU countries in 1995
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Shares are expressed in percentages. Source: own calculations on ECHP data.
9 In this and in the next graph, for easier visual representation, the percentages calculated as moving averages (average 
of three adjacent age groups, eg the percentage for age 22 is the average of ages 21, 22 and 23)
28
2.2.2 Cross-over ages of departure from home and time trends
An alternative way to look at the differences between countries is to consider the age at 
which the median child has left the parental home10 or, if the data do not allow this (for example, 
because only cross-sections with no retrospective information are available), the age at which 
more than 50% of children are living outside the parental home.11 These values, called “cross­
over ages” or median ages of departure, have been collected from various sources and 
calculated from the datasets used in the subsequent chapters and are presented in Table 2.2. 
The same kind of information for the ECHP data can be read from
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, by considering the age at which each country’s curve cross the 
50% line.
These figures give a very immediate idea of the delay of departure in Southern Europe 
compared to Northern Europe, and of the wide differences also existing in Eastern Europe, 
where Poland, for example, is very close to the Southern European pattern, while Lithuania and 
Slovenia are more similar to the Scandinavian countries .
Although figures for several decades ago are not readily available for the whole of the EU, 
the existing evidence shows that the proportion of young people living with their parents has 
generally gone up since the early 1980s in all Southern European countries, and some of the 
others (eg, France), but not everywhere (the Netherlands, for example). In the 1990s the trend 
has continued in Europe and possibly expanded to the US, so that some concern for this 
unusual phenomenon has been voiced in the press (see, for example. The Economist (1998), 
The Economist (2000), USA Today (2002)).
One of the reasons often identified behind this trend is the increase in the age of marriage 
from 26.0 in 1980 to 28.7 in 1994 for men, and from 23.3 to 26.3 for women.12 Since getting 
married has traditionally represented the main reason for leaving home, the increase in the age 
of marriage appears to be the main driving factor behind the sharp increase in the proportion of 
youth living with their parents. Although other factors worked to offset the effect of delay in the 
age at marriage, eg, an increase in the share of young people leaving home to live without a 
partner and the growing importance of unmarried cohabitation (Alders and Manting (1999), the 
net effect is that today the average child leaves home later than in the past.
Table 2.2 indicates that in all Southern European countries the median age of departure had 
risen from the first to the second of the cohorts surveyed, for both genders.13 For Scandinavian 
countries such as Sweden, Finland and Norway the increase was marginal, and only small for
10 That is, the age at which 50% of the children have left home.
11 When the cross-over ages are taken from the cross-sections, they indicate the year when for the first time more than 
50% of young people of a certain age or age group are living outside the parental home. Such values somewhat 
overestimates the median age o f leaving the parental home when, for relatively low rates of departure from home, return 
rates to the parental home are high.
12 Average for all EU countries (Eurostat (1997)).
13 Cross-over ages for birth cohort 1950-54 are reflected, roughly, in the living arrangements o f Southern European 
youth in 1976-1980 and those for the 1960-64 cohort are reflected in the living arrangements for 1986-1990. Therefore, 
the increase in the share o f youth living with parents in the 1990s suggests that the later cohorts tend to leave home 
later and have higher cross-over ages. The data presented in Table 2.2 may not be directly comparable, particularly as 
the figures reflect both period and cohort effects.
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Germany and other countries in Continental Europe. In Eastern Europe, most countries did not 
experience a significant increase of cross-over ages between the two cohorts.14
14 Recent research on Eastern Europe and ex-USSR states showed that the trend in the transition econom ies from the 
early 1990s was characterised in nearly all countries by longer cohabitation with the parents, due to higher shares of 
youth remaining in education and higher youth unemployment. In the same period, marriage and fertility rates dropped 
sharply (MONEE Project (2000)). The same source showed that in the 1990s, the variation in the living arrangements of 
young people amongst ex-USSR-block countries was not as extreme as in the EU, although there was a clearly large 
variation in patterns o f coresidence o f youth with their parents: for example, in the mid- to late 1990’s, in the age group 
25-29 only 14% of youth were living with the ir parents in Estonia, 31% were in Hungary, 32% in Russia, 38% in Poland, 
55% in Azerbaijan and 64% in Bulgaria, with sim ilar pattern for younger age groups.
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Table 2.2 -  Cross-over ages for independent living
MEN
Birth cohort 
1950-54
MEN
Birth cohort 
1960-64
WOMEN 
Birth cohort 
1950-54
WOMEN 
Birth cohort 
1960-64
NORDIC AND 
NORTHERN 
EUROPE 
Sweden 23.9 23.5 21.0 21.1
Finland 20.7 22.0 19.4 19.8
Norway - 21.0 19.5 19.2
Netherlands 21.4 21.8 19.5 19.6
France 21.6 21.8 20.5 20.0
Germany 21.8 22.3 20.0 20.6
Belgium/Flanders 22.5 23.5 21.1 21.5
Austria* - 21.8 - 19.9
Switzerland* - 21.5 - 19.2
UK* - 22.4 - 20.3
SOUTHERN
EUROPE
Spain 24.8 25.9 23.1 23.3
Italy 25.6 27.5 22.5 23.8
Portugal 23.7 24.9 21.8 22.4
EASTERN EUROPE
Hungary 24.6 24.9 21.4 21.3
Czech rep. 20.2 20.1 18.9 18.8
Slovenia 21.2 20.8 20.9 20.8
Poland 24.4 26.0 22.3 22.5
Latvia 22.9 24.8 21.4 21.5
Lithuania 18.9 20.5 19.2 20.3
US - - 18.7 18.8
US (Whites) ** - 22.0 - 21.0
US (Hispanics) ** - 23.9 - 22.4
US (Blacks) ** - 24.0 - 21.7
USA 20.0 20.1 19.3 19.6
ASIA
Japan 21.7A 22.4# 23.6A 23.8#
ChinaA - 24.9 24.0
South KoreaA 26.6 23.5
Cross-over age is the median age of departure from the parental home in years and fractions of 
years.
- = not available.
Sources: (*): collected by Billari et al. (2001) (1956-65 cohort for Austria, 1955-1964 for Switzerland, 1958 for United 
Kingdom);
** PSID (lacovou (2002).
# Suzuki (2001) for Japan (calculated on 1994 cross-sectional data)
A Zeng et al. (1994), with slightly different periods and calculations made on census data.
All other countries: Fam ily and Fertility Surveys (cross-over ages computed in de Jong Gierveld (2001))
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Results for later periods are not available as cross-over ages calculated from cohort data, 
but cross-sectional descriptions of living arrangements can be useful to infer whether the trend 
has continued. The figures reported in Table 2.3 below (taken from the descriptive sociological 
literature on young people in Europe), compared to the numbers in Table 2.1 (calculated from 
the datasets used in this dissertation) show that cohabitation rates have gone up in all countries 
from the 1980s to the 1990s, and particularly in southern European countries, where the shares 
of youth in their late 20s and early 30s living with their parents have increased by more than 
30% for women and by 20-30% for men. Table 2.3 shows that a pattern of longer cohabitation in 
the parental home appears to have taken place between the mid 1980s and the mid-1990s. 
These statistics and the descriptive works (eg, for Italy, Rossi (1997), p. 632, and for France, 
Goldscheider et al. (1999), p. 646) highlight that the generations born after 1960 were 
responsible for most of the increase. The decrease in the share of males living at home in the 
age group 18-19 seems to point to a slight reversal of the trend in the 1990s experienced by the 
youngest cohorts, but this requires further investigation.
Table 2.3 -  Shares of young European adults living with parents, 1986 and 1994
Men, 20-24 Women, 20- 24 Men, 25-29
Women, 25- 
29
1986 1994 1986 1994 1986 1994 1986 1994
Central
Europe 59.9 61.2 37.9 41.3 23.1 24.7 9.4 11.4
France 56.9 61.8 36.4 41.6 19.3 22.5 8.4 10.3
Germany 64.8 64.6 42.8 44.6 27.4 28.8 11.0 12.7
United
Kinqdom 57.2 56.8 33.8 37.0 21.9 20.8 8.6 10.8
Southern
Europe 87.1 90.9 71.1 81.3 51.3 65.3 28.8 44.3
Spain 88.1 91.5 76.1 84.3 53.2 64.8 35.3 47.6
Greece 76.5 79.3 52.3 62.3 53.8 62.6 23.8 32.1
Italy 87.8 92.2 70.4 82.4 49.6 66.0 25.5 44.1
(Shares of age group total, means for groups of countries are weighed) 
Source: Fernandez Cordon (1997), p. 580.
For the US, the proportion of men aged 25-34 living with their parents has increased by 41% 
from 1960 to the mid-1990s (see table below), while women in the same age group saw a rise 
of 15%. For men and women aged 18-24 the increase was of 11% and 34% respectively.
The cohort born in the period 1960-1970 (aged 18-24 - approximately - in 1985 and 25-34 in 
1995)) has had particularly high rates of residence in the parental home, and subsequent 
cohorts have been somewhat less likely to live with their parents. This contrasts with the 
European experience, where each subsequent cohort has experienced longer delays to leave 
the parental home.
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Table 2.4 - Young US Adults Living At Home: 1960 to Present
Men (18-24) Men (25-34) Women (18-24) Women (25-34)
1960 52.4 10.9 34.9 7.4
1970 54.3 9.5 41.3 6.6
1980 54.3 10.5 42.7 7.0
1985 59.7 13.3 47.8 8.0
1990 58.1 15.0 47.7 8.1
1995 58.4 15.4 46.7 8.5
2000 57.1 12.9 47.1 8.3
Sources: CPS (1985 onwards), U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population, PC80-2-4B, 
"Persons by Family Characteristics," table 4; 1970 Census of Population, PC(2)-4B, table 2; 1960 Census 
of Population, PC(2)-4B, table 2.
2.2.3 Housing and work decisions of European youth
The following set of tables shows further descriptive statistics for European countries in the 
mid-1990s, calculated from the ECHP, revealing the cross-country differences in terms of 
activity behaviour and living arrangements of young people.
We have already shown that Southern Europeans leave much later. But do Northern 
Europeans, who leave early, do so to enter partnerships or to live alone/with friends? Table 2.1, 
based on ECHP data, already showed that both genders enter partnerships earlier in the North 
than in the South, and that there are wide differences between countries within each “region”. 
Northern people in their mid-30s are more likely to be living with a partner than Southerners; the 
gap is small for females, and rather large for men. In general, men stay single longer in the 
South. The same table also shows that, amongst the youth who have a child and/or are married, 
the share of those still living with their parents is not a trivial number in Southern Europe (while 
this is extremely small percentage in the North), which may indicate that having a spouse is in 
fact not a sufficient condition to leave the parental home.
Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 show that there seems to be quite a strong correlation between 
living outside the parental home and having a job. In most countries, and certainly in the South, 
men who are not living with their parents are much more likely to be working, and men who are 
working are significantly more likely not to be living with their parents. Of course, this says 
nothing about the direction of the causality, if there is any causal link at all, and does not rule out 
any endogeneity between the two.15
For women, however, there does not seem to be such a strong correlation overall, as women 
who live outside the parental home are sometimes less likely to be working than those who are 
still in the parental home. There is no obvious rationale for this, although it may be possible that 
some women who leave the parental home to enter a relationship may become inactive if the 
husband is working, or that women who do not find it easy to land a job may have higher 
propensity to get married.
15 Aassve et al. (2005) show that, after controlling for heterogeneity and selection, there appears to be a causal effect 
between leaving home and poverty in the ECHP, particularly in Scandinavian countries.
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Table 2.5 - Employment status of young people by living arrangements: share of youth 
employed at time of survey (EU: 1994-1997; US: cohort data)
[ GR / S P A F
MEN
G LUX B UK IRL NL DK FIN US
18-23 35.9 27.7 29.1 50.9 61.3 25.2
Living at home 
52.9 38.4 26.4 66.9 51.2 36.6 56.7 26.6 64.8
(30) (35) (3.4) (32) (39) (20) (23) (9.4) (4.1) (1.4) (38) (2.8) (24) (3.0) (0.4)
24-29 71.2 55.7 58.6 76.6 81.6 61.6 67.5 75.2 73.8 80.7 71.0 77.8 80.6 55.1 76.3
(16) (15) (1.4) (1.4) (1.7) (1-2) (0.9) (3.0) (1.6) (0.8) (1.7) (1.2) (1.2) (2.1) (0.2)
30-34 81.3 74.4 71.0 72.2 89.7 70.9 78.1 96.4 97.5 78.2 65.2 85.2 93.5 54.8 74.5
(1.3) (1.0) (11) (1.4) (1.2) (1.3) (07) (11) (0.5) (0.8) (1.7) (1.0) (0.8) (20) (0.3)
18-23 27.6 54.7 62.0 81.7 69.4
Living outside the parental home 
42.2 70.4 92.1 56.8 58.2 63.3 34.9 54.2 35.9 62.3
(10) (0 8) (0.8) (07) (1.4) (1.2) (0.8) (1.8) (1.6) (1.1) (1.0) (1.5) (2.1) (19) (04)
24-29 89.7 91.1 82.1 95.7 86.6 84.1 78.9 96.3 83.1 85.5 76.6 86.5 79.5 62.4 76.3
(0.7) (0.5) (0.8) (0.5) (1-3) (1.4) (1.0) (18) (1.8) (1.3) (1.3) (2.0) (4.9) (3.8) (0.5)
30-34 96.0 93.2 85.9 95.5 94.7 90.0 91.0 98.1 93.4 89.0 81.9 95.2 87.2 85.2 77.0
(0.8) (0.8) (1.2) (0.9) (1.4) (2.4) (1.3) (2.4) (2.7) (2.0) (2.1) (3.7) (8.9) (4.3) (0.8)
GR / s P A F
WOMEN
G LUX B UK IRL NL DK FIN US
18-23 22.9 20.7 16.6 37.3 59.5 15.2
Living at home 
51.3 37.0 17.0 67.7 41.3 31.5 50.5 18.2 63.8
(1.5) (2.1) (1.9) (2.4) (2.8) (1.3) (1.5) (6.0) (2.3) (1.2) (2.6) (2.0) (1.9) (2.1) (0.4)
24-29 52.4 44.4 43.5 68.6 79.7 49.4 68.9 88.8 65.8 80.7 67.7 85 58.1 30.3 72.9
(13) (1.1) (1.2) (1.4) (1.5) (1.2) (0-7) (18) (1.4) (0.7) (1.5) (0.8) (1.4) (1.8) (0.2)
30-34 67.1 56.7 50.0 78.4 71.4 67.4 72.2 77.2 71.3 75.4 52.5 52.3 100.0 62.5 67.5
(1.2) (1.1) (1.1) (1.2) (1.5) (12) (0.7) (23) (1.4) (0.8) (1.6) (1.3) (0.0) (1.9) (0.3)
18-23 26.7 22.7 27.9 58.8 60.4
Living outside the parental home 
38.1 56.7 57.4 45.4 49.7 54.1 42.7 49.4 26.9 56.0
(1-0) (07) (07) (1.0) (18) (1.2) (1.0) (3.4) (1.7) (1.3) (1.1) (1.7) (2.6) (2.1) (0.4)
24-29 45.7 44.8 40.6 71.3 71.0 68.2 66.7 68.6 71.2 62.7 59.8 67.3 63.6 51.5 64.1
(1.7) (1-0) (1.1) (1.4) (2.5) (2.4) (1.9) (5.8) (3.1) (2.3) (1.8) (4.5) (9.3) (6.7) (0.7)
30-34 49.6 49.5 38.1 71.8 69 67.8 64.8 55.4 70.3 62.3 51.1 57.0 76.2 68.6 64.2
(3-3) (2.0) (2.0) (2.3) (4.0) (6.1) (4.0) (10.4) (5.8) (4.6) (3.6) (13.2) (16.1) (16.4) (1.2)
Source: Author’s calculations on ECHP data, weighed using cross-sectional individual weights; author’s 
calculations on main (non-boosted) NLSY sample.
Abbreviations: Greece (GR), Italy (I), Spain (E), Portugal (P), Austria (A), France (F), Germany (D), Belgium 
(B), Luxembourg (LUX), United Kingdom (UK), Ireland (IRL), the Netherlands (NL), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), 
United States (US).
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Table 2.6 - Living arrangements of young people by employment status: share of youth 
living in the parental home at time of survey (EU: 1994-1997; US: cohort data)
MEN
! GR / S P A F G LUX B UK IRL NL DK FIN US
Employed
18-23 88.3 92.4 93.9 91.6 80.5 73.1 84.6 83.2 86.5 79.0 92.5 73.7 63.9 53.5 56.8
(0.9) (05) (04) (07) (1.9) (1.1) (09) (33) (12) (1.2) (08) (15) (2.4) (2.1) (0.4)
24-29 60.8 63.8 64.0 62.2 43.4 25.4 33.9 29.4 39.7 27.3 49.4 16.8 9.0 12.8 19.0
(2.1) (12) (13) (27) (34) (20) (1.5) (7 8) (33) (19) (2.6) (2.7) (2.0) (2.5) (0.3)
30-34 29.2 27.1 32.6 21.4 24.9 10.9 12.1 16.3 9.8 11.0 19.0 2.3 2.9 4.3 9.7
(36) (2 3) (2.1) (35) (5.9) (2.5) (1.7) (11.7) (4.1) (1.7) (26) (1.9) (1.7) (22) (03)
Not employed
18-23 83.7 97.4 98.4 97.9 85.5 85.5 92.1 98.9 95.9 72.1 95.3 72.3 61.5 64.0 54.2
(1.3) (0.4) (0.3) (03) (1.3) (13) (06) (1.0) (1.1) (1.0) (05) (2.0) (2.0) (3.0) (0.4)
24-29 84.5 93.5 85.2 91.7 52.8 52.8 47.9 78.3 53.4 34.5 56.7 27.0 8.5 16.6 18.9
(0.8) (0.5) (0.7) (0.6) (1.6) (1.2) (08) (2.4) (1.7) (09) (1.3) (1.2) (09) (1.6) (0.2)
30-34 69.5 63.7 54.7 69.0 40.5 30.9 28.3 26.8 3.8 21.8 36.1 7.7 1.4 17.5 11.0
(1.2) (10) (11) (1.3) (1.7) (1.3) (0.8) (2.5) (06) (09) (1.6) (0.8) (0.4) (1.5) (03)
WOMEN
GR / S P A F G LUX B UK IRL NL DK FIN US
Employed
18-23 68.0 90.9 88.7 84.4 66.3 48.9 68.1 70.3 63.5 63.7 81.0 47.9 47.9 31.1 48.3
(1.0) (0-5) (06) (0.9) (2.3) (1.2) (1.2) (3.6) (1.6) (1.3) (1.1) (1.7) (2.1) (19) (04)
24-29 32.9 50.4 56.3 47.3 26.4 13.4 17.1 21.6 16.1 15.8 41.4 5.7 2.4 3.2 13.9
(1.3) (10) (1.1) (1.9) (2.5) (1.2) (1.0) (39) (19) (1.0) (2.1) (0.9) (07) (10) (0.3)
30-34 12.3 20.0 29.7 20.9 12.7 4.7 4.2 9.8 5.2 4.0 12.9 0.6 2.8 0.8 6.6
(1.1) (1.1) (1.2) (1.9) (1.8) (0.9) (05) (2.4) (1.3) (0.6) (1.5) (0.3) (1.2) (0.7) (02)
Not employed
18-23 72.3 91.8 93.8 92.8 67.2 76.7 72.7 84.4 87.5 45.3 87.8 59.8 46.8 42.7 40.3
(1.7) (0.9) (09) (0.8) (1.8) (1.8) (1.0) (33) (2.1) (1.2) (1.0) (2.1) (2.2) (3.6) (0.4)
24-29 27.3 50.7 53.4 50.5 18.3 25.4 15.7 7.1 19.8 7.0 33.4 2.1 3.0 7.5 9.7
(13) (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1-4) (1.2) (07) (1.6) (1.3) (05) (1.4) (0.4) (06) (1.3) (0.2)
30-34 6.4 15.8 20.6 15.6 11.4 4.8 3.0 3.8 5.0 2.2 12.2 0.7 0.0 1.0 5.8
(0.9) (1.0) (13) (1.1) (1.2) (0.7) (0-4) (1.4) (0.7) (0-3) (1.3) (0.3) (0.0) (04) (0.2)
Source: Author’s calculations on ECHP data, using cross-sectional individual weights; author’s calculations on 
main (non-boosted) NLSY sample.
Abbreviations: Greece (GR), Italy (I), Spain (E), Portugal (P), Austria (A), France (F), Germany (D), Belgium 
(B), Luxembourg (LUX), United Kingdom (UK), Ireland (IRL), the Netherlands (NL), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), 
United States (US).
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2.2.4 Country similarities
The analogies found in the descriptive analyses, as well as, indeed, some significant part of 
the empirical literature on the home-leaving process, tend to group countries based on their 
similarity in terms of young people’s behaviour, or of cultural factors (including religion) or of the 
features of the welfare states.16
In the analysis that follows we consider a simplified taxonomy to facilitate our analyses and 
discussions, as we suspect the determinants of household formation to be different across 
Europe but possibly similar within certain group of countries. Following the distinctions in 
lacovou (1998) and lacovou (2001), we consider three broad European groups: Southern 
Europe (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal), Nordic Europe (Denmark, Sweden, Finland), while all 
other countries are included in Northern (or Continental) Europe. In the discussion of the results 
we will consider whether Ireland in fact belongs to the Southern European group and whether 
the UK is very different from the rest of Continental Europe and similar to the US. For example, 
the importance of current own income, parental wealth and labour market situation in the 
determination of departure from home may be limited in a country where the welfare state is 
well developed and housing benefits, say, are easy to receive for young people, whereas, when 
young people have limited access to welfare and the family is traditionally vested with a 
subsidiary role to that of social expenditure, those covariates may be crucial.17
An analysis of the descriptive statistics presented earlier shows that although Southern 
European countries and Nordic countries feature living arrangements that are pretty clearly 
different from the other countries and fairly consistent within each group, so that the taxonomy 
explained earlier is warranted, some Northern European countries (particularly Austria, Belgium 
and Ireland)18 seem to share some of the features of the Southern countries. It may therefore be 
possible that, although the taxonomy may seem fairly accurate at the outset, in practice there 
are other factors in play that tend to blur the distinction between groups of countries.
Furthermore, some authors have conducted some simple correlation analyses to show that 
there appears to be a significant relationship between some exogenous and predetermined 
variables, such as religious beliefs and availability of welfare support, and living arrangements 
of young people at the national level, concluding that cultural and welfare factors appear to 
affect young people’s decision to leave home, lacovou (2002), for example, presents simple 
two-dimensional graphs to show that there is a possible positive correlation between the share 
of population that is catholic (or orthodox) and the age of departure from home.
16 Some authors have used the welfare state taxonomy proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990) and Esping-Andersen 
(1999) to show that European countries can be classified into different groups on the basis of the characteristics of their 
social transfer programs, and, to some extent, on the basis o f the role o f the fam ily and the features of the labour 
market. A  conservative (or continental) regim e, with insurance-based (requiring previous employm ent for eligibility 
eligible) benefits: France, Belgium, Germany and Austria (“Northern Europe” from now on); a social-dem ocratic (or 
Nordic) regim e, characterised by high levels of state support with benefits targeted towards the individual in need rather 
than the family: Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland) and the Netherlands (“Nordic” countries from now 
on); a liberal regime (with m inimal welfare benefits): US and, to some extent, the UK; and a southern European regim e: 
Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece plus Ireland, characterised by strong fam ily values, very im portant fam ily support 
networks and a lim ited availability o f social safety net, with (lim ited) social expenditure focusing on the fam ily unit (or the 
household head) rather than the individual in need.
17 This point will be considered further in section 2.6.1.
18 Furthermore, the UK does not stand out particularly from the other countries in Northern Europe.
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2.3 Literature review  on departure from  the parental home
The analysis of household formation has found limited space in the theoretical and empirical 
economic literature until very recently. Although this topic has been explored in other social 
sciences, the sociological and demographic single-country and cross-country studies have often 
been somewhat descriptive in nature (eg, by relying on static analyses rather than dynamic 
models). Research in this area is difficult because detailed information is needed on both 
children and parents for more than one period (ie, cross-sectional data would not be very 
suitable for quantitative analysis).
We will firstly review the existing theoretical literature19. We will then consider the applied 
research and explain the models used, the handling of different destinations, the explanatory 
variables included in the empirical analysis and the effects of these covariates found in the most 
important papers. This will show that several empirical methods have been used, and the 
results differ significantly amongst datasets, thus implying that the mechanisms behind young 
people’s departure from home are complex and not homogeneous across countries.
2.3.1 Theoretical literature
Becker (1991 )’s work, and the economics of the family literature in general, do not focus on 
the specific issue of children’s departure from home. There is, however, a large amount of 
potentially useful theoretical literature on marriage, which could be used to understand the 
reasons for leaving home for partnership reasons. Becker (1973) and Becker (1974) analysed 
marriage behaviour using economic principles and studied the effect of, amongst other 
variables, wages on the probability of marriage. Marriage behaviour is found to depend on the
gains from marriage, and changes in own earnings and earnings differential between men and
20women affect marriage behaviour.
However, this literature may shed some light only on what determines departure from home 
for marriage, but it is only of limited use to explain departure without a spouse and departure 
with an unmarried partner. Indeed, the literature on marriage is becoming less and less relevant 
to the analysis of departure from the parental home for several reasons. Firstly, whereas in the 
past the vast majority of youth left the parental home in order to get married and move in with 
their spouse, nowadays increasing shares of young people are leaving home to go to live alone 
or with friends, and this is particularly true in the Northern European countries and in the US. 
Secondly, more and more couples decide to cohabit rather than marry, especially for the first 
few years of the relationship.21 For Southern Europe, where long relationships (without 
cohabitation) before marriage have become the norm, and virtually no datasets provide
19 The basic fram ework shared by these papers is presented in section 2.5.1.
20 A  review of references on the marriage literature and its importance can be found in Aassve (2000), ch. 2. The 
literature on migration may also be useful in the context of this work, but we will not be considering it here for reasons 
sim ilar to the ones explored in section 2.4.
21 Although the models for marriage may still be applicable in the latter case, marriage and cohabitation are certainly not 
equivalent, because the decision to cohabit likely requires a lower level o f com m itm ent if break-up is relatively easy and 
not expensive (for example, because the young couple decides to live in rented accommodation). This low level of 
com m itm ent means that the early stages of cohabitation (in Northern and Nordic Europe, for example) are akin to 
cohabitation with friends, require less commitment, thus making traditional theoretical models of marriage less 
applicable.
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information on whether young people have a non-cohabiting partner and what the financial 
situation of this person is, empirical analysis of marriage becomes in any case quite difficult.22
Apart from the works on marriage, the literature focusing on young people’s departure from 
the parental home is not well-developed. In particular, there seems to be little awareness of the 
importance of the reasons that may be behind departure from home (partnership formation, 
need of independence and privacy - or conflict with parents-, work, study), and the theoretical 
developments are limited.
Hill and Hill (1976) (along with further work in Hill (1977)) and McElroy (1985) are the first 
works to recognise that both the child and his parents are involved jointly in the child’s decision 
of where to reside. In Hill and Hill (1976), it is shown to be optimal for the child to reside in the 
parental household as long as the maximum that he is willing to pay for enjoying such 
arrangement is more than the minimum that his parents are willing to accept for him to reside 
with them. The maximum that the child is willing to pay is the difference between the utility that 
he gets when living with his parents and the maximum utility that he could get in any other 
possible living arrangement. Hill (1977) expands this model to include the joint decisions of 
marriage, work and study and derives the signs of the effects of a few important variables on the 
different decisions. McElroy (1985) analyses the joint determination of market work and 
household membership for young American males under the assumption of a Nash-bargaining 
model between parents and children, and finds that parents insure their sons against poor 
labour market opportunities by allowing them to remain in the parental home when market 
wages are low: in such case, the child will achieve a higher utility by co-residing rather than 
living on his own. In her model, when cohabiting, the son chooses to work as long as his wage 
is not too low, whereas when he lives outside the parental home, he will always choose to 
work.23
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) analyse transfers 
between parents and children, either in the form of coresidence or financial transfers. They use 
an overlapping-generations model incorporating game-theoretic interactions among parents, 
children and the government to study how an increase in welfare benefits for young people 
affects the provision and composition (coresidence vs. financial transfers) of parental support. 
Their theoretical framework, however, is complex and no analytical representations are feasible, 
nor can qualitative results be obtained. Their model, however, implies that, because transfers 
are less expensive during coresidence, the value to the children of the transfer will be higher 
during cohabitation, although the true parental expenditure for the transfer will actually be higher 
when children are not in the parental home, if the consumption of the two generations are 
normal goods in the parents’ utility function. The authors also note that sudden changes in 
parents’ income will have a limited effect on the levels of transfers to children, because parents 
can smooth their income, while a sudden transitory decrease in children’s income will have a 
significant effect on transfers because children cannot smooth consumption.
22 In Southern Europe, financial reasons along with traditional and cultural factors prevent young couples from entering 
cohabitation and make m arriage a much more important comm itm ent than in other European countries. To some extent, 
because the duration from dating to getting married in Southern Europe is so long, Southern Europeans’ long-standing 
relationships even before m arriage and living together may be much stronger than cohabitation in Northern Europe.
23 In McElroy (1985)’s model, the difference between the child ’s utility when living with his parents and the maximum 
utility in any other living arrangement represents the threat point o f the bargaining model.
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Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) and Ermisch (1999) present a model of young people’s 
decision to live apart from their parents where they predict the impact of income and housing 
market variables. By making some assumptions on the utility functions of children and parents 
(in particular, they assume that children’s privacy is a normal good, ie, children demand more 
privacy as their income increases), they can derive predictions about the impact of the price of 
housing, child’s and parents’ income on the probability that a young adult lives away from their 
parents.
Manacorda and Moretti (2002) and Manacorda and Moretti (2006) present a model of 
bargaining between children and parents, with and without altruism, using different functional 
assumptions to those of other authors, but drawing similar conclusions. They, too, consider the 
possibility that parents care for their children (child’s welfare is a normal good for the parents), 
but also explicitly include co-residence with children in the parents’ utility function, because they 
believe that co-residence increases parental utility. Whether parents’ privacy is a normal good 
or not, however, is an empirical question which could be answered, for example, by looking at 
the effect of parental resources on children’s departure, after including a set of controls:24 the 
authors find that parental income is associated with a large positive effect on children’s co­
residence.25 They also present empirical evidence that shows how parents in Italy are happier 
when cohabiting with their children (children, however, seem indifferent towards co-residence), 
while evidence from other countries, such as the UK and the US, shows that cohabitation is 
associated with lower “happiness” for both parties.26
Aassve (2000) develops a search theoretic model of marriage and includes results that are 
useful in the analysis of departure from the parental home: for example, he derives the expected 
signs of the effect of some income variables on departure. He concludes that the child’s own 
income has an ambiguous effect on the destination when leaving home. Higher own income 
allows the youth to be able to afford their own accommodation and thus become independent 
earlier and live on their own,27 but it also makes them more likely to attract partners, thus
po
accelerating partnership formation. Therefore, higher income will make departure from home 
faster, but the destination cannot be established from the theoretical model.29
Some recent papers show that family structure may be endogenous to credit market 
constraints and labour market conditions. Fogli (2000) develops a general equilibrium 
overlapping-generations model that captures the relationship between family structure, 
employment protection and credit market imperfections. She finds that the family structure 
arises from (exogenous) credit market imperfections, and labour market rigidities emerge as the 
outcome of a dynamic and repeated bargaining process between generations, so that high 
parental job security is linked to late youth emancipation, as young people remain in the 
parental household and benefit from sharing of housing and household consumption. Diaz and
24 If privacy is not a normal good, parents may use their own resources to delay children's departure from home.
25 The authors explain that they eschew the problem of parental resources’ endogeneity by instrumenting them using a 
major reform in retirem ent rules that took place in the 1990s.
26 Kluve (2004) tests this on the ECHP data and also finds confirmation of this effect for Southern Europe.
27 He calls this “self-re liance effect” : young adults are more likely to leave the parental home as their own income 
increases. This is som etim es also called “ independence effect” in the literature.
28 To clarify: a woman, say, with higher income will be less dependent on a possible husband and m ight choose to delay 
marriage and live on her own (s e lf-re lia n c e  e ffe c t), but will be more likely to receive marriage offers, thus accelerating 
partnership formation (g o o d -c a tch  effect). These effects, however, exist for both genders.
A lthough the model he subsequently estimates is sim pler than the one he develops in his theory, Aassve finds that 
the empirical evidence shows a positive effect o f own income on partnership formation for both men and women.
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Guillo (2000) present a model in which labour supply of the mother and emancipation of the 
children are jointly determined: when children live at home, the mother’s job search efforts are 
lower, because the mother’s opportunity cost of working outside the home is greater than when 
the children stay at home; when the mother is not working, the child can receive a higher utility 
by staying at home because his mother provides home services (so his consumption of the 
“home good” is larger when living with his parents). The authors argue that these results are 
consistent with the evidence for Spain, where young adults stay until late in the parental home 
until an old age, and unemployment is a problem that mainly affects young adults and married 
women. Ichino et al. (2004) introduce some constraints on the children’s choices, in terms of 
irreversibility of the departure decision, and also focus on both the father’s and the child’s job 
security as a relevant explanatory factor for departure from home.
Jellal and Wolff (2003) build on Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
(1994) to develop a model of intergenerational co-residence and transfers within the family, 
where parents and children can exchange money, services and co-residence. Instead of merely 
relying on a pure altruistic explanation (where the children most likely to live with their parents 
are the poorest ones), the authors assume asymmetric information (parents do not know their 
children’s privacy cost of living at home), and show that, if parents are induced to make 
transfers to discipline children and to offer them incentives to reveal their true privacy cost, then 
only the children who remain at home have the advantage of an informational rent, and this rent 
is greater for children who have a lower privacy cost. Thus, their model argues in favour of a 
self-interested motivation for children’s to remain in the parental home, with a strong incentive 
for a child to behave as if he were forced to live with his parents.
Overall, the theorical literature shows that own income and earnings are considered to be 
very important determinants of departure. Moreover, there is some indication that future (ie, 
potential) resources need to be taken into consideration, rather than merely current earnings 
and income. It is recognised that parental income is important, too, because children may 
receive financial transfers from their parents. This shows how our initial hypotheses, as set out 
in the first chapter, are important and deserve empirical investigation.
2.3.2 Applied literature
There are a few studies on young people’s departure from the parental home, although most
are in the sociological or demographical areas, and the few economic and/or econometric ones 
appeared relatively late, especially at the end of the 1990s or later.
The most significant and rigorous quantitative analyses can be found for the United States 
(McElroy (1985), Aquilino (1991), Avery et al. (1992), Buck and Scott (1993), Whittington and 
Peters (1996), Aassve (2000), Card and Lemieux (2000)), Great Britain (Ermisch and Di Salvo 
(1997), Ermisch (1999)), Italy (Aassve et al. (2001), Manacorda and Moretti (2006)), Malaysia 
(Johnson and DaVanzo (1998)), Spain (Holdsworth (2000)), Canada (Card and Lemieux
(2000)).
More descriptive or tentative research is found for Australia (Young (1975), Young (1975), 
Haurin et al. (1997)), France (Laferrere and Bessiere (2003), Laferrere (2005)), Germany
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(Gartner (2000) and Jacob and Kleinert (2007)), Great Britain Kerckhoff and Macrae (1992)),30 
Indonesia (Witoelar (2006a)), Italy (Ichino et al. (2004)), Latin America (De Vos (1989)), the 
Netherlands (de Jong Gierveld (2001)), Scotland (Jones (1995)), Spain (Martinez and Ruiz- 
Castillo (1998)), Sweden (Asberg (1999), Nilsson and Strandh (1999)), the United States 
(Borsch-Supan (1986), Haurin et al. (1993)). In some cases, such as in Witoelar (2006b), the 
focus is on the wider topic of household separation when an adult member of the household 
moves out.
Most of these works are cross-sectional studies. In the economic literature, panel datasets 
have been used only for the US (Whittington and Peters (1996)), the UK (Ermisch and Di Salvo 
(1997) and Ermisch (1999)), Spain (Holdsworth (2000)) and Italy (Aassve et al. (2001)), and 
only more recently for the ECHP (lacovou (2002) and Le Blanc and Wolff (2005)).
Comparisons over countries exist in the sociological and demographic literature: Kiernan 
(1986) analyses the ages of leaving home in six Western European countries; Yi, Coale, Choe, 
Zhiwu and Li (1994) compare ages of leaving home for several OECD and East Asian 
countries), Billari et al. (2001) collect cross-over ages and percentages of youth at home at 
various ages for a very wide range of European countries, de Jong Gierveld (2001) presents 
cross-over ages and an analysis of the most frequent destinations upon home leaving for many 
European countries (including Eastern European countries) and the US using data from Family 
and Fertility Surveys and comparing the behaviour of the 1950-54 and the 1960-64 birth 
cohorts, providing very insightful figures. All these papers are, however, fairly qualitative and 
descriptive in nature, as they typically present only the shares of youth living independently at 
each age, age-specific departure rates or cross-over ages. Cross-country quantitative analyses 
on individual data are performed in only three publications, Holdsworth (2000) and Aassve et al. 
(2005) and Le Blanc and Laferrere (2004).31
A limited number of PhD dissertations have also been written on this topic:
Hill (1977) is the first thesis to address young people’s living arrangements: the author 
presents a theoretical model of young people’s decisions to leave the parental home, get 
married, study and work, which she then estimates with a collection of models on US data -  her 
PSID sample is relatively small in size and the econometric techniques limited, but the model is 
nevertheless quite interesting, because it allows her to use microeconometric theory to derive 
the expected signs of several variables;
Baanders (1998) contains a good review of (mostly) sociological and demographic works, 
and qualitative analyses on Dutch data, including her own survey of high-school students in 
several Dutch cities, and the analysis of secondary data. She finds that the normative 
expectations of parents play a decisive role in shaping children’s intention to move out of the 
parental home, while financial considerations, and particularly the subjective assessment of 
one's income situation, are most important in the translation of intention into actual behaviour 
(departure).
30 Kerckhoff and Macrae (1992) is atypical because it includes a multinom ial model o f the reasons for leaving home, 
where the relevant sample is all children who have left home, and a descriptive analysis of living accommodation by 
reasons for leaving home.
31 lacovou (2001 )’s working paper also includes cross-country analyses. Le Blanc and Laferrere (2004) pool all countries 
into one probit model where they include country dummies, but no interaction dummies, thus constraining the 
coefficients on the variables to be the same. These works and their findings are discussed later in this dissertation.
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Jurado Guerrero (1999) focuses on Spanish and French data and provides a very thorough 
description of the welfare support and housing opportunities available for Spanish and French 
youth in the 1990s; she also estimates a dichotomous model of the probability of living outside 
the parental home in 1993-4 conditional on living with the parents in 1985.
Aassve (2000) applies duration modelling techniques to US NLS data to study household 
formation; while focusing on partnership formation and dissolution, he also addresses the issue 
of departure from the parental home, albeit mainly as an intermediate step before marriage; his 
main results show the importance of own income (it speeds up departure, both as current and 
predicted income), and parental income (it delays departure).
Soro-Bonmati (2001) uses German, Italian and Spanish datasets to show that the patterns of 
departure from the parental home statistically differ by country and that labour market status 
appears to be a significant explanatory factor.
2.3.2.1 Empirical models
Most empirical papers estimate a model of living arrangements in a standard utility 
maximisation framework. The main choice for a child is between living with one’s parents and 
living outside the parental home. Given the nature of the empirical issues, the most commonly 
used models are dichotomous or multinomial (ie, different destinations are allowed for), or 
duration models when longer panels or retrospective histories are available to the authors. In 
practice, however, even with long panels, a large number of studies have used simple methods, 
such as pooled probits (with year dummies) rather than random effects probits. Some 
researchers have chosen cross-sectional models (on one wave or on pooled waves),32 even 
when panel data had been available.
A wealth of modelling techniques are found in the most important literature on young adult’s 
departure from home:
Dichotomous models (logit, probit: Flaurin et al. (1993), Haurin et al. (1994), Whittington and 
Peters (1996), Haurin et al. (1997), Asberg (1999), Ermisch (1999), Ichino et al. (2004), Jacob 
and Kleinert (2007), Manacorda and Moretti (2006); two-stage probits (with selection terms for 
having already left the parental home):34 Aassve et al. (2005), Aassve et al. (2001)); fixed- 
effects probit: Le Blanc and Wolff (2005);; conditional logit (panel) (Ermisch (1999)); pseudo­
panels35 (Card and Lemieux (2000), Manacorda and Moretti (2000));
Multiple destinations (Competing risks) (Multinomial logit: Avery et al. (1992); Multinomial 
probit: McElroy (1985), Giannelli and Monfardini (2000); Duration models: Buck and Scott 
(1993), Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997), Aassve (2000), Holdsworth (2000)).
32 le, current living arrangements, rather than changes in living arrangements conditional on living with parents at tim e t- 
1 .
33 The list below includes the most im portant papers in each group or subgroup - papers not included in this list used 
probit or logits or, in few cases, m ultinom ial m ultinom ial logits. Studies based on tim e-series data are rare (cf. Asberg 
(1999), p. 119, is a notable exception).
See Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981).
35 This m ethodology treats the averages within the cohorts as observations in a panel making it is possible to investigate 
changes in behaviour at the individual level even in the absence of panel data. This technique is used when no 
individual data are available but, for example, census information for regions, or when instead of a panel only 
independent samples o f cross-sections of the population are collected overtim e.
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Some of these techniques are perhaps controversial, such as choosing dichotomous instead 
of multiple destinations, and we will discuss the pros and cons in the next section and in later 
parts of this dissertation. The use of fixed/random effects panel models is fairly rare in the 
literature: we cover this issue briefly in this chapter, too. The various econometric issues 
involved are discussed after the literature review, in section 2.5 below.
Simultaneous models: In addition to the models above, several researchers have used a 
more complex approach by choosing to model departure jointly with other decisions, such as 
the decision to marry, or study, or work, or several of these at the same time. Hill (1977) 
presents and estimates equation of home leaving and also a simultaneous model of marriage, 
departure from home, study and work, estimated on the US PSID. The results from her 
multiequational model, however, do not seem to be particularly different from the ones where 
only departure is studied.36 The second stage of the model is made up of four OLS equations, 
rather than dichotomous ones, even if the dependent variables are all dichotomous.
McElroy (1985) estimates a model of joint determination of market work and household 
membership for young American males, based on Nash-bargaining between parents and 
children. She first estimates equations of market wage, reservation wage, indirect utility when 
living in the parental home, and indirect utility when not living in it, and then estimates the 
implied trinomial probit model, where the relevant states are “living with parents and working”, 
“living with parents and not working” (including the unemployed), and “working not living with 
parents”. The identifying assumptions include the fact that parental income does not affect utility 
when living outside the parental home (but it may affect utility at home and reservation wage) 
and that utility at home is affected if the mother is working.37 She compares these results with 
the estimates of single equation probits, where living in the parental home is the dependent 
variable and hours worked is an explanatory variable, and viceversa. She shows that when 
hours worked is taken as exogenous and used as an explanatory variable, it does not appear to 
be significant, and similarly for living arrangements being assumed exogenous, thus concluding 
that the probits would be misspecified and taking these variables as predetermined would lead 
to wrong results. She only used, however, a cross-section of out of school, never married, white,
o o
19-24 years old males: these males are presumably different from those who choose to marry: 
thus, firstly, any conclusions would only be applicable to males with those characteristics, but 
more importantly, since these are self-selected males who have chosen not to marry nor do 
further studies, the estimated coefficients are likely to be inconsistent even for people with those 
characteristics. She estimates a multinomial model, rather than a two-equation model, to handle 
the joint determination of work and living arrangements.
36 Table 5.3 and table 5.4 o f her work contain the estimates of the reduced-form model for departure from home for 
males and females respectively, while table 6.1 and table 6.2 contain the sim ultaneous model results for departure, 
again for males and females. The coefficients that are significant in table 5.3 are also significant in table 6.1 (father’s 
education, number o f siblings), or, if they are significant in only one set o f results, we see upon inspection of the 
standard errors that the coefficients o f one equation appear not to be very different from the ones in the other. This is 
the case of a dumm y indicating receipt of non-labour income, a measure of lack of space in the accommodation, city 
size and a race control. Also, the set o f covariates in the two models differ, to some extent because some of the controls 
used in the reduced-form  model are not part of the first-stage estimation of the structural model.
37 The assumption that parental income does not affect utility when children live away from home is at odds with the
literature that focuses on the possibility o f financial transfers from parents to children.
38 She uses observations from the 1971 National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men, matched with the Mature W omen
(1971, 1972) and Mature Men (1972) to retrieve information on the parents.
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Martinez and Ruiz-Castillo (1998) present a model with three probits for living outside the 
parental home, studying, and working, which they estimate using a two-stage method on a 
cross-section of Spanish data. They state that the endogenous treatment of the three decisions 
is warranted by the empirical evidence on the basis of the very significant, and positive,
39instrumented work dummy in the second stage. In the second stage model they choose to use 
an OLS equation, rather than a dichotomous model, despite the dependent variable being 
dichotomous. There is no distinction made for different destinations upon departure from home, 
nor do they include marriage/partnership as a further equation in their model.
Similarly to McElroy (1985), Giannelli and Monfardini (2000) used a multinomial model 
(multinomial probit) to analyse the joint determination of work and living arrangements.40
Other researchers address the potential endogeneity problems without estimating a 
simultaneous model: Haurin et al. (1993) are aware of the potential simultaneous determination 
of household formation, marriage and fertility and therefore treat marital status and children as 
endogenous variables and instrument them.
2.3.2.2 Destinations studied
Although numerous papers include all destinations into one generic departure from home,41 
more advanced papers differentiate between departures (competing risks). A correct 
categorisation of destinations is crucial, otherwise coefficients would be estimated incorrectly, or 
the results would be impossible to interpret. However, there is no standard way to analyse the 
different destinations that young people may choose on leaving home, although, broadly 
speaking, the destinations upon departure from the parental home are often grouped into two: 
1) departures to live without a partner, and 2) departures to live with a partner, plus, sometimes, 
student departures.
In the literature that has distinguished between different destinations there are some 
important points to learn.
Avery et al. (1992) (see their table 2) show that not accounting for different destinations 
makes it impossible to interpret the coefficients of the crucial variables correctly: own and family 
income, for example, appear to have different effects by destination, since they find that family 
income has no effect on singles departures, but a positive effect on departures into 
partnerships, but when the two destinations are aggregated, the coefficient is not significant 
anymore. It would thus be wrong to estimate a dichotomous model to conclude that family 
income has no effect on departure. The effect of own income is positive for both destinations, 
but its coefficient is nearly four times larger for partnerships; using only one destination, the 
coefficient is somewhat half-way between the coefficients of the separate destinations.
39 For identification they do not use regional unemployment rate in the departure equation, but it is arguable that this 
variable may also affect the risk o f departure from home, because if influences the security o f any current job 
arrangements.
40 They consider “study" to be the alternative state to “work” and they exclude from their sample anyone who is neither 
employed nor a student. For women, this restriction is probably too strong, as they may be living with a husband and 
choose to be inactive.
41 See the ones listed under “dichotomous m odels” in section 2.3.2.1.
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Buck and Scott (1993) focus onto leaving into Marriage vs. Independent Living and find 
different trends over time in the propensities to move to the two destinations, with strong decline 
in the risk of marriage and no clear tendency for the hazard of moving into independing living to 
change over the period. The effect of some of the covariates appears to depend on the 
destination: changes in family income only increase the hazard of men moving out alone; own 
income increases men’s risk of moving out into marriage but not of moving out alone, and has 
no effect on women; annual work hours increase women’s risk of moving out into marriage, but 
not of moving out alone, and have no effect on men. Such results are particularly interesting as 
they indicate that economic variables can have quite a different impact on destinations and 
genders.
Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) estimate a competing risk hazard model where the possible 
destination are Alone, with Friends/others, with Partner. The estimates show that the first two 
destinations share very similar estimates, particularly for men and for the most relevant 
variables: tests scores, a proxy for earnings, has a significant positive coefficient for both and 
the magniture is similar; a parental non-manual occupation and having no job also have a 
positive effect on departure. By contrast, men’s departures into partnership are not affected by 
test scores, by parental occupation, whereas having no job has a significantly negative effect 
(instead of positive), and higher unemployment rate has a negative effect (rather than not being 
significant). For women, the authors find some differences between leaving alone and leaving 
with friends, and again they see that estimates for departures with a partner stand out for being 
very different compared to the other two destinations.
lacovou (2002) estimates a model with single destinations and then a multinomial model 
where the destinations are Leaving as a single, Leaving to a partnership and Leaving for 
Education. She reports that the Wald test rejects the pooling of the three destinations into a 
single one and also observes how the estimates on certain key covariates would clearly be 
misleading if the destinations were pooled, particularly for the Southern countries, where leaving 
with a partner is negatively related to parental socio-economic status, while leaving into 
education is positively related to it.
Mulder et al. (2002), for the US, find no significant impact of child’s income on leaving home 
to live with a partner, and a significant negative effect on departures without a partner, and 
observe that being in education, or otherwise not working, results in a lower risk of departure, 
with the effect being more negative for union formation.
In spite of the importance of dealing with different destinations correctly, it is very rare to find 
empirical papers reporting the results of statistical tests in support of these aggregations, or 
tests not rejecting the decision to leave the “left for unknown destinations” youth or those who 
leave for educational purposes outside the model.42
A listing of all possible destinations would be as follows:
42 In the datasets considered in this dissertation, it is mostly the case that aggregation of “single” and “partnered” 
departures is rejected by the data. In chapter 4 we also show that, although the student destination has significantly 
different coefficients from the other destinations and cannot therefore be aggregated with those, the data typically allow 
us to leave it out. The decision to ignore the “left for unknown destination” youth is warranted because the hypothesis of 
IIA for such destination cannot be rejected by the data: the estimation results o f the single and partnered destinations do 
not change significantly if we include or exclude a further “unknown destination”, but the coefficients for this residual 
destination are difficult to interpret and often not very interesting (see Ghidoni (2000); these results are, however, not 
included in th is dissertation).
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(0) No departure
(1) Living as a single person (not for educational purposes)
(2) Living as a single person (for educational purposes, possibly in an institution)
(3) Living with others, but without a partner (not for educational purposes)
(4) Living with others, but without a partner (for educational purposes)
(5) Living with an unmarried partner (not for educational purposes)
(6) Living with an unmarried partner (for educational purposes)
(7) Living with a married partner (not for educational purposes)
(8) Living with a married partner (for educational purposes)
(9) Living in an institution (military barracks, hospital, prison)
(10)Left for unknown destination43
(11)Attrition of the youth, parents or whole family
Because such a model would be too complex and because there is typically no significant 
difference between some of these destinations, several categories are often aggregated. It is 
not customary for researchers to distinguish between unmarried and married partners, and it is 
sensible to group student departures without a partner ((2) and (4)) together into one category 
(“leaving for educational purposes”),44 and to group (6) with (5), and (8) with (7), or, possibly, all 
four of these together as "partnership destinations’’.45 It is possible to introduce further 
destinations or make further considerations, eg if the youth goes to live with other relatives 
(“extended family”), say, or if the parents or the youth are no longer living at the time of the 
interview. After the above aggregations, the following classification would result:
(A) No departure (0)
(B) Living as a single person (not for educational purposes) (1)
(C) Living with others, but without a partner (not for educational purposes) (3)
(D) Leaving for educational purposes, but without a partner (2, 4)
(E) Living with a partner (for educational purposes or not) (5, 6, 7, 8)
(F) Attrited: Left for unknown destination/Attrition of the whole family/Youth
dead/Parents dead/institutionalised (unless students) (9, 10, 11)
Most researchers further aggregate living alone (B) and living with others (C) into one “non­
partnership destination” (“living alone”, or “living independently”, or, in this thesis, “single 
departures” or “single"). (F) is almost never used as a separate category, but those who use a 
dichotomous model can easily include it in their “left home” category, as opposed to their “still 
living with their parents” group.46
43 Eg, the original household is interviewed and we know the youth has left, but the youth herself is not interviewed and 
the destination cannot be established with certainty.
44 W hether to include in this group youth who are moving in with a partner a n d  studying (groups (6) and (8)) is possible 
but probably not very sensible. A lso note that some datasets do not fo llow  people who move into student 
accommodation (institution).
45 Unmarried partnerships, however, in some older surveys, would not be registered, so the data could only distinguish 
between married partnerships and other arrangements (unmarried partnerships would be treated as “ living with others”).
46 The reason for not merely discarding unknown destinations that this may bias the results of the other destinations. To 
be safe, a researcher should estimate the model including the unknown destination group as a further category and then 
test whether dropping it changes the coefficients of other destinations (using a test for independence o f irrelevant 
alternatives, or IIA); such a test should also be performed before dropping departures as a student (see Long and 
Freese (2001)).
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There are problems in the definition of departure and partnership, however, as indicated by 
Aassve (2000) (pp. 61-64; pp. 219-220), partnership formation is difficult to define, and neither 
the date when the couple started dating nor the date of their marriage are satisfactory choices to 
sanction the beginning of a relationship. The preferred choice in this dissertation is a definition 
of partnership based on cohabitation, ie, whether the young person is living in the same 
household as a person that is classified as his or her partner.47 The problems with this definition 
(potential instability of unmarried relationships, lack of starting date of relationship and of other 
retrospective information, limited information available on partners in some datasets (particularly 
the NLSY)) are not a major cause of concern when the analysis focuses on departure from 
home, rather than the decision to get married.
Departure as a student may be a category that is intertwined with the university education 
system of the country. If the education system offers a wide range of university courses close to 
most people’s home towns, then one can expect that student departures will be reduced, as 
students are able to reside with their parents while attending university courses. At the same 
time, a limited student grants system would likely reduce student departures from home as 
students have fewer means to become independent.48 Although departure rates would be 
affected by the structure of student support and of the education system, it is not clear how this 
would affect markedly the quality of the results when one considers the sign and magnitude of 
covariates for a given country. One will need to keep this point in mind when interpreting the 
results, particularly when comparing countries.
Overall, when competing risks are considered, the common distinction in the literature is 
therefore between departures to live without a partner and departures to live with a partner, plus 
(possibly) student departures. These three possible destinations are the framework that we will 
apply in the present study whenever the datasets make it possible.
2.3.2.3 Effects o f explanatory variables
Applied research uses a wide variety of explanatory variables to explain the probability of 
leaving the parental home. We discuss here in depth only those variates that are particularly 
relevant.
Demographic characteristics
Age
As older age may increase both the desire for privacy, and maturity and ability to cope on 
one’s own, most authors find that age increases the probability of independent living, but often
49at a declining rate. Most models include an age variable in the departure equation, as a linear, 
squared or cubed covariate, or, less often, as age group dummies.
47 Som etimes the datasets contain specific questions on partnerships, eg, in the NLSY, “Do you live with another adult 
as a partner?”, and sim ilarly in the BHPS, SOEP and ECHP; in other cases, such relationships can also be found in the 
relationship file that contains the relationships of every individual to everybody else in his household (as in the ECHP 
and the NLSY).
48 Social norms (eg: is it appropriate to leave home if not for marriage reasons?) would also be linked to whether 
students leave home or not -  however this would fall into the wider issue o f social norms and departure from home.
49 Am ongst the exceptions is Aassve et al. (2001).
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Gender
Females have a higher risk of departure, often because of earlier marriage,50 and in some 
countries they also leave earlier to live on their own or with friends (lacovou (2001)). Some 
authors use a female dummy and pool males and females data together, while others separate 
the two samples, but rarely provide a formal test to justify this, although in practice coefficients 
mostly appear to be different in magnitude.
Race
Virtually only models for the US have included this variable as an intercept dummy. Haurin et 
al. (1994) find that hispanics leave less often, while blacks and whites do not differ. Buck and 
Scott (1993) find that black are less likely to leave home for a relationship destination, but for 
other destinations the risk is the same as the base group (whites). Whittington and Peters 
(1996) believe this may be due to differences in wage potential, rather than race. Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin (1993) show that in NLS data young black men are 50 percent less likely to receive 
financial transfers while outside home so they leave much less.
Household structure and household history; Household size, number of siblings and order of 
birth', such controls are occasionally included, and there is some evidence that children from 
larger families show a higher risk of departure (Kerckhoff and Macrae (1992)51, possibly due to 
overcrowding, while Holdsworth (2000) finds that having at least another sibling significantly 
increases the risk of departure and explains this as the occasional need for one child to stay 
with their parents to care for them. Hill (1977) finds that the number of siblings significantly 
increases the risk of departure for males, but not for females. Some find no effect of number of 
siblings or birth-order (Haurin et al. (1994); lacovou (2001)). Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) and 
Holdsworth (2000) find that having had a child before the age of 18 increases the risk of 
departure into partnership for both sexes. Living without both natural partners is associated with 
an earlier age of departure (Aquilino (1991), Holdsworth (2000) for having a step-parent, Avery 
et al. (1992), Buck and Scott (1993) and Ermisch (1999) show that living with only one parent 
increases departure into non-partnership destinations, but decreases the risk of marriage 
departures.
Geographical factors: Regional dummies, Rural area
Along with regional dummies, an indicator of rural or urban area is sometimes used 
Holdsworth (2000)). Buck and Scott (1993) find that people in large cities tend to marry later.
Whittington and Peters (1996) explain that rural wages are, on average, lower than urban 
wages, which negatively affects independence, but rural cultural effects favour earlier marriage, 
so that the overall effect is close to zero or somewhat in favour of earlier departures.
50 Husbands are at least two years older than wives in most countries.
51 Some use a standardised measure of household size, which gives children a sm aller weight (eg, the McClements 
Equivalence Scale, cf. Taylor (1999)).
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Labour market status and income
The general results are that young people in employment are more likely to leave the 
parental home. Additionally, higher levels of income make departure more likely. Being 
unemployed generally decreases the probability of departure, although some authors find that a 
spell of unemployment may increase departure rates (eg, for job search reasons). Most of the 
papers reviewed focus on whether income variables affect residence outside the parental 
household or not, and in which direction, but they have found it very difficult to estimate 
coefficients (and elasticities) precisely and to assess their magnitude.
Own income
Own earnings are mostly a significant covariate (but, possibly, an endogenous one) and 
increase the probability of living outside the parental household, presumably because it gives 
the youth the resources to set up their own household. This is a very general result, although it 
appears that the effect of income is higher for partnership destinations and for men. Some of the 
papers that include this variable are the following.
Avery et al. (1992) find that, in a model where genders are pooled and employment status 
also enters as a dummy, own income increases the risk of departure to all destinations, and the 
effect on partnership destinations is nearly three times larger than on non-partnership ones.
Aassve (2000) reports that own income increases departure to both destinations for both 
sexes in the US NLS.
Ermisch (1999) finds that own income is significant and positive for partnership and non­
partnership destinations.
Aassve et al. (2005) find a very strong effect of earnings for Southern European countries, 
and some evidence for France, Germany and Ireland.
Buck and Scott (1993) find only a positive effect of own income for US men’s marriage 
destination, and no effect for female and for men’s non-partnership destinations.
Le Blanc and Laferrere (2004) use ECHP data to find that, in a binominal model, departure 
from home is generally positively related to the children’s income.
Mulder et al. (2002), however, find no significant impact of child’s income on leaving home to 
live with a partner in the US, and a significant negative effect on departures without a partner. 
For West Germany and the Netherlands the signs are rather mixed: no overall significance for 
Germans (but 10% significant and negative for women leaving with a partner), and positive 
effect for all Dutch men with slightly negative effect for women leaving with a partner. However 
their findings on employment status are interesting (see section further below).
Measures of non-labour income are used more rarely, partly because there is little variation 
in young people’s non-labour non-transfer income (eg, capital income, rental income, etc) and 
because transfer income, such as welfare receipts, are somewhat endogenous in the same way 
as labour income is. Nevertheless, Martinez and Ruiz-Castillo (1998) find that non-labour 
income (including welfare payments) increases departure risk for Spanish females.
49
Potential earnings
Several authors use predicted wages rather than current earnings as an explanatory 
variable, because employment status is likely to be jointly determined with the decision to live in 
the parental home or not (many young people leave home having found a job or expecting to 
find one, but may well not be employed while living with their parents at one point in time).
Potential earnings appear to have a positive effect, but the meaning and magnitude of this 
effect is rarely investigated. Moreover, the estimated standard errors are usually not corrected 
for the use of a predicted variable.52
Haurin et al. (1993) find that potential wage has an extremely significant effect (very high t- 
statistics) on departure.
Whittington and Peters (1996) predict the child’s expected wage (in logs) from a log wage 
regression for each sex on a standard set of family background and other socio-economic 
covariates. This covariate has a large and significant positive effect and the coefficient is “about 
40% larger for young men, an indication that they are more responsive than young women to 
changing wage opportunities”.
Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) use school test scores as a proxy of “permanent income” and 
find that higher scores increase men’s hazard into all destinations and women’s risk into 
partnership and living with friends.53
Aassve et al. (2001) for Italy find a very significant effect (t-statistics equal to 4 and 6) of 
potential wages, but their departure equation does not control for child’s age and they do not 
correct standard errors, so the effect is not clear.
Own employment status
Most authors find that the effect of being in employment is positive for men’s partnership 
destinations, and usually positive for men’s non-partnership destinations. For women, the effect 
is not so clear, possibly because male’s earnings and employment may be more important than 
women’s for partnership destinations. Such employment dummy, however, is not included as 
often as earnings/income are: many papers include only income, some include income and 
employment status, while it is rare to find employment status but not a measure of earnings. 
Some of the papers that include employment status are the following.
Avery et al. (1992) find that employment significantly increases the risk of departure to all 
destinations (but they pool genders together).
Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) show that not being employed increases women’s hazard into 
all destinations, but the effect on men varies by destination: it is positive for exits alone or with 
friends, but negative for exits into a partnership destination.
Ermisch (1999) finds that being unemployed increases the risk of departure alone or with 
friends in the UK (in a model where he pools genders).
52 See section 2.5.4 below.
53 They find no significant effect on wom en’s probability to go and live alone. The effect on m en’s partnership destination 
has a t-stat o f ca. 1.7, which is significant at the 10% level in a two-tailed test, but at the 5% level in a one-tailed test, 
and the latter test is more appropriate, since we have strong expectations that the effect of own income cannot be 
negative. The statistical significant o f this effects appears to have been m istakenly ignored in the original paper and in 
subsequent reviews.
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Aassve et al. (2001) find, for Italy, a very large significant increase in the risk of departure for 
being in employment, but this effect may partly include an age effect, since no age covariate is 
included in the departure equation. Aassve et al. (2005) find similar results for other Southern 
European countries. In both papers, however, earnings quartile and employment status are only 
interacted and do not appear on their own, so their effects are combined.
Mulder et al. (2002), who find no earnings effect on US children’s departures, do find that 
being in education, or otherwise not working, results in a lower risk of departure, with the effect 
being more negative for union formation and for males than for females. They find, however, no 
large employment effect for Dutch and West German children, although the coefficients are 
often significant and of the expected signs.
Some papers use a dummy for student status to capture the effect of current income. A 
limited number of papers use dummies for every (but one) possible position in the labour 
market: employed, self-employed, unemployed, inactive (not student), student, but this may 
make the model more unstable, while relying on a distinction between unemployed and inactive 
which may be somewhat blurred amongst young people.54
Current unemployment status/recent unemployment spells
Instead (or, sometimes, along with) employment status, some empirical models use 
unemployment status (with the residual categories typically being inactive or being a student).
Ermisch (1999) finds that having been unemployed in the past year increases departures 
without a partner, as if the youth had to move out to find a job, but this dummy has no effect on 
partnership destinations.
Aassve et al. (2001) find that an unemployment spell in the previous five years reduces 
departure for Italian men.
Holdsworth (2000) finds that young people who have experienced periods of unemployment 
or inactivity are less likely to leave to live with a partner, but more likely to leave for other 
reasons.
Satisfaction with own financial situation
Aassve et al. (2001) use a dummy to capture bad financial situation as reported by the child. 
For men, bad financial situation reduces departure, but only in a model where they use 
predicted wage rate instead of own income. For women, this dummy has the opposite effect 
than on men in both their specifications, even if the authors also include own income quartile 
and labour market status, which could suggest that bad financial situation may somehow 
encourage women to get married (since marriage is the main destination upon exit -  the model, 
however, is dichotomous).
54 See, for example, Gartner (2000).
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Household and parental information: income, wealth, labour market situation55
Household income is a variable often used in the analysis of children’s departure from 
home.56 The reasons for its inclusion were explained in the theoretical section 2.3.1, where we 
noticed that it is not clear what direction the effect of parental resources are expected to have. 
Richer parents may want to help children set up their own household (to gain more privacy, if 
the sign of marginal utility of privacy is positive), although some researchers have suggested 
that parents may prefer to reside with their children. By contrast, children may find living in the 
parental home more comfortable than living on their own or with others, and this may offset their 
demand for privacy. These effects offset each other somewhat, and we can only observe the 
net effect if we only have a single measure of parental well-being. In practice, parental 
resources may assume different forms, and the predicted effects of each may be identified 
when using appropriate data and assumptions.
Household income is typically calculated as total household income minus child’s income, 
which is then sometimes standardised using the household size (minus one, the child).
The effects found typically vary by country and by gender, and, while most authors seem to 
agree that parental income is a significant covariate, there is no agreement on this.
In some papers, higher parental earnings are associated with lower risk of departure (ie, 
longer cohabitation) (Whittington and Peters (1996) for US children in their late teens; Ermisch
(1999) for the UK finds a negative effect; Aassve (2000) finds a negative effect for both genders 
and marriage and non-marriage destinations in the US NLS; Manacorda and Moretti (2000) find 
a very strong effect of parental income in Italy to reduce departures;57 Aassve et al. (2005) for 
Southern Europe in a probit model). Avery et al. (1992) find a negative effect of parental income 
on partnership destinations for both genders, but no effect on non-partnership destinations.
In a smaller number of papers, higher parental earnings are generally associated with higher 
risk of departure (shorter co-residence) (DaVanzo and Goldscheider (1990) for the US; 
Whittington and Peters (1996) for US children in their 20s,58 Aassve et al. (2001) for 
Netherlands and Germany). Laferrere (2005), on a cross-section from the French Housing 
survey, considers that the effect can be non-linear and either positive or negative, depending on 
the theoretical model, and finds that empirically parental income has a positive effect on 
independence on the youngest (aged 18-22) but a negative one for ags 23-29, but the effects 
are relatively small. In a binomial model for the ECHP, Le Blanc and Laferrere (2004) find 
mostly no effect of parental income on departure; however, when the effect is significant, the 
sign tends to be positive, although the magnitude is small relative to child’s income.
Greater parental resources are found to have no effect on departure rates only in a limited 
number of cases (Aassve et al. (2001) for Denmark). Aassve et al. (2001), who include a self- 
reported measure of family financial well-being along with family income, report that whether the 
household finds it “difficult to make ends meet” has no effects in any of their models for Italy 
(while family income has a negative sign). Mulder et al. (2002) report mostly no significant effect
55 The most common covariates related to parents are for income, wealth, labour market, education and socio-econom ic 
status. O ther potentially useful information, such as parental health, age, cultural values, etc., is not comm only used in 
the empirical models.
56 For simplicity, we will from now on refer to “household income” as “parental incom e”.
57 “A  one million lira rise in parents' annual income tends to increase the probability that children live with their parents 
by between 3 and 3.5 percentage points” (Manacorda and Moretti (2000)).
58 The effect for women is double that for men.
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of parental income for the US, West Germany and the Netherlands, except for Dutch children 
going to live without a partner.
The results, in any case, are not clear-cut, as some authors find that parental income has a 
different effect on different destinations (Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) (parental wealth - proxied 
by fathers in non-manual occupations -  increases departures into partnership and decreases 
exits into other destinations), Buck and Scott (1993), Avery et al. (1992)). When departure for 
education is treated as a separate destination, parental income and education have been found 
to be positively associated with risk of departure into education.
The mechanisms involved in the transfers between parents and children are potentially quite 
complex, and this is confirmed empirically: Whittington and Peters (1996) show that not only the 
magnitude but also the direction of the effect may depend on the age of the child: they find that 
higher parental income discourages children’s departure when the children are in their late 
teens, but encourage it at older ages, and this is true for both genders, although the effect on 
females is double that on males, de Jong Gierveld (2001) show that parents’ transferable 
material resources (as gifts or money, but also as proxied by the father’s job) increase the 
children’s propensity to leave, while non-transferable material resources (eg, space in the 
parental household, provision of meals and housework, etc) have the opposite effect. 
Holdsworth (2000) finds the same result for Spain and the UK59 when looking at the effect of a 
dummy indicating whether the young person’s mother was working when the child was aged 16 
(her rationale is that a non-working mother is able to provided more non-transferable material 
resources in the form of housework). Laferrere (2005) also found that the quality of the parental 
accommodation, and its proximity to good areas, reduces departure and is actually of 
magnitude greater than the effect of parental income.
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) study the probability of transfers from parents to children 
who are not living with them and find, for the US, that the probability of financial transfers is 
negatively related to current child income and anticipated income levels and not responsive to 
changes in parental income. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) analyse a sample of US female 
children show that parents appear to treat children’s earnings and welfare benefits as equivalent 
when determining the amount of financial transfers to their children, while changes in parental 
earnings have almost no effect on parents’ propensity to support their children financially. The 
implication of their results is that current parental income may be less crucial than parental 
transferable resources in affecting children’s departure. In particular, if parental income shows 
high transitory variations over time while permanent income is stable, the significance of current 
income would be small because current income would not provide a good measure of 
permanent income.
Ichino et al. (2004) find that having an unemployed father (or a father with a relatively high 
probability of becoming unemployed in the next 12 months) at the time of one survey increases 
the child’s likelihood of living independently at the time of the subsequent interview. The 
magnitude of the effects is important: children of unemployed fathers have a risk of departure
59 Children of UK working m others leave more to partnerships destinations; their Spanish counterparts leave more into 
other destinations
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higher by 8.8 percentage point. For employed fathers, when the expected probability of 
unemployment increases by 10 percentage points, their child’s departure risk increases by 0.4 
percentage points -  this effect is not large in absolute terms but it represents an 8% rise from 
the average risk of departure of 5%.60 The authors explain that parental job insecurity may also 
mean that the father can offer limited networking opportunities to help his child land a job.61
Household and parental information: socio-economic and educational status
Some authors include parental education levels, occupation or socio-economic class, which, 
however, may capture cultural effects along with economic effects, even when some (imperfect) 
measure of parental resources is also included in the model (Aquilino (1991), Kerckhoff and 
Macrae (1992), Holdsworth (2000), Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997)). Aquilino (1991) finds that 
children with more highly educated mothers and fathers in higher occupational categories are 
more likely to leave home to study; Kerckhoff and Macrae (1992) show that children of well- 
educated parents are more at risk of leaving home for education rather than for marriage.62
Insofar as socio-economic status captures cultural values and parental expectations, we can 
expect the effects to vary significantly by country and gender: for example, Holdsworth (2000) 
finds that, for British children, having a highly educated father increases the risk of leaving for 
non-partnership reasons and decreases the risk of leaving into partnership destinations; by 
contrast, she finds that in Spain, a highly educated father delays home leaving into all 
destinations. Holdsworth (2000) also observes some effect of interacting age with various 
parental education dummies.63 Haurin et al. (1994) and Haurin et al. (1997) find no effect of 
religion.
Ermisch (1999) controls for owning the current accommodation as a proxy for permanent 
income or wealth but do not find clear results. Number of rooms per person has only borderline 
significance in Buck and Scott (1993) and the quality of the dwelling is never significant in 
Aassve et al. (2001)
Household geographical mobility in the years previous to the survey are usually not included 
in empirical analyses. (DaVanzo and Goldscheider (1990) show that a child’s previous 
departure from home is with higher departure risk.
Labour market situation (at the macroeconomic level)
The availability of work, in the local area or further away, can be expected to be a significant 
factor in the decision to leave the parental home. Several authors use unemployment rates and 
the results generally show that higher unemployment rates tend to delay exit from home 
significantly.
60 Having a father with a high probability o f unemployment (60% or more) increases the risk of departure by 4.4 
percentage points, which could represent a 100% increase in the risk.
In spite of this interesting result, their model is weak because the variables traditionally used in this analysis, which 
they include as controls, are not significant: child ’s age, working status, student status, years of schooling, family 
income, fam ily wealth and macro-regional dumm ies are all not significant, while the female dumm y is only significant at 
the 10% level.
62 Because many papers do not separate departure for education from other destinations, it is d ifficult to draw general 
results, although these findings seem plausible.
63 The children of more educated fathers in Spain leave home less frequently up to their m id-20s, and then their 
departure risk becomes higher than other children’s; in Britain, she found that children of better educated fathers were 
more likely to leave independently than other children, and they were less likely to leave into partnerships.
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Aassve et al. (2001) find some effect for Italian men (the risk of departure is reduced by 0.3 
percentage points for each percentage point of increase in regional unemployment rate), but no 
effect for women. Card and Lemieux (2000) use the employment-population ratio of 25-45-year- 
old people of the same gender for Canada and the US, and find very strong effects:64 for a one 
point increase in the employment rate, the probability of US males living with their parents falls 
by ca. 0.38 percentage points (standard error is 0.19, implying that this estimate is not very 
precise); for Canadians, the fall is of ca. 0.472 percentage points (standard error 0.238, again 
quite large). For women, there is no effect in the US, while for Canada the effect is strong: the 
fall in the probability of living with parents is 1.479 points (standard error is .262).
Giannelli and Monfardini (2000) find that the local unemployment rate significantly increases 
the probability of staying in the parental home and study for women, but not for men. Thus, the 
effect on living arrangements is an indirect one that acts via the choice to study rather than 
work.
Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) find that higher (non-gender-specific) regional unemployment 
reduces significantly men’s partnership hazard, but cannot find any effect on other destinations 
for men and on any destination for women.
Buck and Scott (1993), for the US, find a marginally significant negative effect of 
unemployment on non-partnership destinations and no effect on marriage destinations, but they 
can find no effect of county unemployment.
Some authors, however, find no effect: Whittington and Peters (1996) use state 
unemployment rate and its deviation from the US national rate, and find no significant effects in 
any of their models. For the UK, Ermisch (1999) tried to include the unemployment rate in the 
travel-to-work area of residence, but this was dropped from the final model as it was never 
significant.
Housing market situation
Several papers use information on the cost of housing to test if higher costs make it more 
expensive for children to set up an independent household, although the theoretical results 
explained in Ermisch (1999) show that this is not necessarily so, because housing costs effect 
the parents’ accommodation decisions, too. The results are significant only half of the time, and 
seem to differ by gender and/or destination, so that no general conclusion can be drawn 
Ermisch (1999) finds that housing costs have a negative effect on departures but only for 
partnership destinations, Haurin et al. (1993) and Haurin et al. (1994) find a negative effect, 
Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) and Martinez and Ruiz-Castillo (1998) find a negative effect by 
only for females. Whittington and Peters (1996) and Haurin et al. (1997) find no effect for 
Australia.
64 See their table 4.9.
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Tax and welfare system
Whittington and Peters (1996) show that the US AFDC tax subsidies have a significant 
effect:65 they see that a group of covariates measuring the level of tax deductions arising from 
the presence of a child in the household shows some significance, but the signs are 
unexpected, so the result is puzzling and its interpretation is difficult. The reason may be the 
complex mechanism through which AFDC affects co-residence, in particular the fact that this 
subsidy may have competing and opposite effects: since the child may, under some 
circumstances, claim the AFDC tax exemption is she does not live with her parents, her 
probability of departure from home may depend positively on the value of the exemption; her 
parents, however, have an incentive to keep the child with them if the child can be claimed as a 
dependent, which means that increases in the subsidy may reduce the risk of the child leaving.
Le Blanc and Laferrere (2004) focus on the effect of housing subsidies on French students’ 
decision to reside with their parents in the early 1990s and find that housing allowances 
increase departure risk but also that around half of the total allowance expenditure represents a 
windfall gain for parents and children since many would have left home without the allowance.
2.3.2.4 Effects of variables by country/welfare systems
The overview of the results found in the literature divided by variables, as in the previous 
section, hides the fact that the significance and the effects of some variables vary by country. In 
this section we therefore summarise the main results in the literature by groups of countries, 
using the grouping that we tentatively introduced at the beginning of this chapter on the basis of 
the descriptive statistics and the generic literature overview.
Southern Europe
Research on Southern Europe presents fairly consistent results but it appears that 
dichotomous models fail to capture the differences in departure determinants and leaving 
patterns, and we believe that multinomial models are preferably to be used. Generally, there 
appears to be a significant effect of personal income and employment status on children’s 
departure from home, with a clearer effect for men (alone or partnership destination) than for 
women (partnership destination) (Holdsworth (2000), Aassve et al. (2001), lacovou (2001), 
Martinez and Ruiz-Castillo (1998)). Parental resources, typically income, slow down departure 
towards all destinations (Aassve et al. (2001), Manacorda and Moretti (2002), Manacorda and 
Moretti (2006); Ichino et al. (2004) finds a similar effect of father’s job insecurity). Martinez and 
Ruiz-Castillo (1998) find that housing costs delay departure in Spain, while other works do not 
include this covariate. When potential income is used (Aassve et al. (2001)), the effect found is 
much smaller than the effect of current income.
Current income and employment status are significant determinants of departure from home 
(but the magnitude of their effect is not always made clear), and parental income is typically 
statistically significant and negative, although the importance of own resources is much smaller 
for women moving into partnership destinations. The results are quite clear for Italy and Spain,
65 The AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) is a tax exemption (a sort o f subsidy, or negative tax on income) 
for dependents (eg, children, or a spouse).
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but the findings for Portugal and Greece are not as strong. Greece also features higher rates of 
departures of young women that are not consistent with the patterns found in the other Southern 
countries.
Northern Europe
The literature on Northern Europe (excluding the UK) is limited and relates primarily to 
France and Germany. It is not clear how homogeneous Northern Europe is, as Ireland, Belgium 
and Austria, in particular, show differences in the descriptive statistics from the other countries 
in that group.
There is some significant effect of own employment status (lacovou (2001), and Gartner
(2000) finds that the number of years since Germans have started work affects departure 
positively), but the effects, especially for men, are considerably smaller than in Southern 
Europe, and own income is possibly mostly not significant (Aassve et al. (2005) only find a 
positive effect of income for France and Ireland), lacovou (2001) who pools all Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany and the UK together, finds a significant, positive effect of own income for 
moves into education but no effect on any other destination.
There appears to be no strong effect of parental income, although Aassve et al. (2005) find a 
positive effect for males in Ireland and Germany, and lacovou (2001) finds a positive effect for 
departures into education. This could indicate that the effect of parental income is very different 
from what is observed for Southern Europe.
No models with potential earnings exist for these countries.
Nordic Europe
The Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands feature the highest departure rates of youth 
from the parental home amongst European countries.
The limited, tentative literature on Nordic countries shows that that own income has a weak 
positive effect on departure (lacovou (2001), and the same results is found by Asberg (1999) 
using potential income) but Aassve et al. (2005) did not find any effect of employment or own 
income). Having experienced difficulties in the labour market appears to delay departure 
(Nilsson and Strandh (1999)). Parental income may accelerate departure slightly (lacovou
(2001) and, for men, but not for women, Nilsson and Strandh (1999), who also find that the 
social class of parents is important for both genders). Aassve et al. (2005) find some effect of 
parental income for the Netherlands, but not for Denmark), de Jong Gierveld (2001) show that 
parents’ transferable material resources increase the children’s propensity to leave, while non- 
transferable material resources (eg, space in the parental household, provision of meals and 
housework, etc) have the opposite effect in the Netherlands.
United Kingdom
The UK stands out somewhat from the Northern European countries, and it is distinctively 
different from the Nordic countries. This is consistent with the classification by Esping-Andersen 
illustrated earlier.
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Own resources are important, and so are potential earnings, although not all works show 
significant effects of income for all genders and destinations.
Ermisch (1999) find that own income encourages departure and that being unemployed 
increases the risk of departure alone or with friends in the UK (in a model where he pools 
genders), which is consistent with the findings for a similar model on a UK different dataset 
(Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997). Not being employed increases women’s hazard into all 
destinations, but the effect on men varies by destination: it is positive for exits alone or with 
friends, but negative for exits into a partnership destination (Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997).
Aassve et al. (2005), however, find only a weak effect of employment and income (for the 
highest quartile) on the departure risk of UK children, and the effect is apparent only for the 
highest quartiles of income. They suggest that employment and income may not be crucial 
determinants of departure.
Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) also find that higher (non-gender-specific) regional 
unemployment reduces significantly men’s partnership hazard, but cannot find any effect on 
other destinations for men and on any destination for women.
Parental income has no clear sign on departure. Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) use 
information on whether the child’s father was in a non-manual occupation and find that this 
dummy increases departure rates to live with friends for both genders (and to live alone, for 
men) by approximately 20-30%, and reduces departures into partnerships. Ermisch (1999) use 
parental income and find a weak, negative but not very significant effect on departure rates.
United States
The US does not fit in any of the patterns found in Europe. In particular, there seems to be a 
very high rate of mobility out of the parental home. Own resources are quite important, but so 
are potential wages. Parental resources are significant covariates but there are doubts on the 
direction of their effect.
Avery et al. (1992) find that personal income increases departure rates for all destinations, 
and so do Haurin et al. (1993) and Aassve (2000), amongst others. A positive effect of potential 
income is reported by Haurin et al. (1994), Whittington and Peters (1996) and Aassve (2000). 
Buck and Scott (1993), however, find that own income has only a small effect on partnership 
departures, but no effect otherwise, but they also find that full-time employment has a strong 
positive impact on departure.
Card and Lemieux (2000) (using a pseudo-panel) find that state employment rates increase 
departures significantly, thus showing that labour market effects on departures are strong. Hill 
(1977) and Whittington and Peters (1996), however, find no effect of unemployment rates.
Whittington and Peters (1996) report that the effect of parental income is significant, but its 
direction changes over time: it increases coresidence for children until their late teens, after 
which higher parental income increases children’s departure. Aassve (2000) finds that parental 
income delays departure. Avery et al. (1992) find that parental income slows down departures to 
partnership destinations, but has no effect on non-partnership destinations.
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Overall, the literature only partially confirms the classification of countries that distinguishes 
between Southern Europe, Northern Europe and Nordic Europe. While Southern Europe is 
clearly a peculiar group, the differences between Northern Europe and Nordic Europe, however, 
are not clear, and there appears to be some dishomogeneity within each group. The US does 
not fit in any of the European patterns.
2.3.3 What do we learn from the literature?
The theoretical literature has developed a limited number of models that, in most cases, 
compare the utility of the child in the case of coresidence with his utility when living apart from 
his parents, with parents being able to make financial transfers in both living arrangements. In 
some cases, the labour market search process is part of the model, in other cases welfare 
elements and credit market constraints are also included in the analysis. It is clear that parental 
resources are important (since they determine the quality of living conditions if living with the 
parents and because financial transfers are a function of such resources), and, of course, the 
child’s own resources, as well as the features and the conditions of the labour market, are key 
to the departure decision process.
The applied literature has attempted to quantify the significance of these and many other 
factors in the determination of departure. Most applied research looks at only two cases, living 
with parents versus living without parents, and mostly as a static model (ie, current variables are 
used to explain current arrangements on a cross-section of data). Some models study 
competing risks (moving into different destinations), and some use panel datasets and very few 
changes in living arrangements. The studies using panels in a dynamic framework and different 
destinations are extremely uncommen in the literature.
What is found to be significant in the applied literature? With respect to financial and labour 
market covariates, those who are employed and on higher incomes are in general the ones with 
the highest probability of leaving home. Some authors did find, though, that a spell of 
unemployment may increase departure rates, and they suggest that this may be due to job 
search reasons and the inability to find a job using the family network. Most of the papers 
reviewed focus on whether income and other variables affect departure or not and in which 
direction, but they do not seem to analyse the size of the coefficients or the marginal 
effects/elasticities.
Potential income is investigated in several papers, but it is not explicitly compared to current 
income using the same model and data, thus missing out on the possibility to actually show how 
their role differs in significant and importance and whether the impact of other variables is 
different depending on whether actual or potential income is used.
Higher parental income is typically associated with lower risk of departure but in some 
papers the effect is opposite. When competing risks are studied, then different destinations are 
sometimes associated with opposite signs for the effect of parental income.
The effect of labour market conditions is mixed. In some cases higher unemployment rates 
reduce departure rates, but the effect are small in absolute levels (expect for Canada) and
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typically the results are not well established: for one paper reporting a negative effect, there is 
another one reporting no effect or merely a marginal small one, as highlighted for the US, the 
UK and Italy. For the UK case, however, the works by Ermisch seem to point out that allowing 
for different destinations upon departure could well be the key to explain differences in the effect 
of labour market conditions.
Do the results in the literature show some consistency across similar countries?
There seems to be agreement that own income increases departure and parental resources 
decrease it in Spain and Italy, at least in terms of statistical significance.
For the UK the literature mostly shows a significant positive effect of income but significance 
is somewhat borderline and may be true only for the highest levels of income or for departures 
into partnerships.
In the rest of Europe, the results show only weak effects, or none, of resources on departure.
The literature for the US offers mixed results but mostly showing a positive effect of income 
on departures; the evidence found for parental income is seems to show that it may slow down 
departure, especially to partnership destinations. There is no consensus on the effect of 
unemployment rates, and only one paper finds that they slow down departures.
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2.4 Literature review on return to the parental home
2.4.1 Empirical literature
The literature includes very few studies of the process of young people’s return to the 
parental home, and we could only find three main works that study this topic: one in the 
sociological literature (Kerckhoff and Macrae (1992)) one in the economic literature (Ermisch 
(1999)), and one in the demographic literature (DaVanzo and Goldscheider (1990)). Only the 
last of these, however, focuses on returns as the main topic of the paper, while the other two 
present very simple, exploratory regression results. A handful of other papers include 
descriptive statistics, and these are briefly introduced in this section.66
Becker (1974)’s work and the economics of the family literature do not focus on the specific 
issue of children’s return to the parental home, and there are no theoretical models. Ermisch
(1999) presented a model of young people’s decision to live apart from their parents based on a 
comparison of utility levels across living situations, which he used to study departure from 
home, and implicitly adopted the same framework to perform an empirical analysis of the 
determinants of British children’s return to the parental home. The basis for the empirical 
analyses of all other authors was, implicitly, the same utility comparison framework.
Young (1987) studied young Australians’ departure from the parental home and their return 
home using descriptive statistics. She concluded that return rates had increased over time 
because home leavers in recent years were less likely to leave in order to enter marriage. Since 
return rates for those who have left to non-marriage destinations have always been high, this 
composition effect accounted for the increase in the rate of return. She found that early leavers 
were more likely to return home than those who had left home at older ages, and that returns 
home were associated with unemployment and financial difficulties.
Hartley (1993) conducted a small qualitative study using the Australian Institute of Family 
Studies’s 1990 Becoming Adult Study dataset, and showed that, in the early 1990s, young 
people were more likely to be living with their parents than previously, more likely to be partly 
dependent financially on parents even if they have left home, and more likely to leave and return 
home at least once as their circumstances change. As reasons for the first return home, 
respondents had highlighted financial problems (45%), reasons to do with job or education 
decisions (34%), housing problems (25%) and broken relationships (21%) (more than one 
reason could be given).
Jones (1995) used the 1981 survey of the NCDS to calculate the probability of return by 
reason for leaving home. Whereas the overall rate of return was 29%, only 11% of those who 
had left to live as married had returned, 27% those having left to set up on own, and around 
50% of those who had left home for ‘problem’ reasons (frictions at home, poor accommodation, 
etc.), to begin studies or to take up a job. Her results indicated that sometimes, once the 
“legitimate reasons for being away from home no longer exist, a return home may be an
66 W e do not consider the large literature on divorce or, more generally, union dissolution (see, for example, Ermisch 
and Francesconi (2000) as a recent empirical example). Although the term ination o f a partnership may lead to a young 
person’s return home, in practice most young adults do not return home after a relationship ends. Moreover, the vast 
majority o f those returning home are people who were not living with a partner. For these reasons, in this work we focus 
on the risk o f return o f those w ithout a partner.
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expected option, and another reason will be needed for another move away (Jones (1995). p. 
64). Her results based on the Scottish Young People’s Survey (SYPS) are very similar (Jones
(1995). p. 67), and she also reports the results of interviews with those who cannot return home: 
these indicate that frictions (“we don’t get on”) and parents’ financial (“parents can’t afford”) and 
accommodation circumstances (“no room for me”) are significant factors underlying the 
impossibility of returning home (Jones (1995). p. 78). In Jones’ and Young’s research, it is 
apparent that sometimes, but particularly in the case of family conflict, young people’s return 
depends on the family of origin making the first move if a child is to return home.
DaVanzo and Goldscheider (1990) used data from the 1970s waves of the US National 
Longitudinal Survey (for youth aged 17% to 25) to perform a statistical analysis of returns to the 
parental home. They estimated logistic models for married and unmarried young people 
separately, and found return rates of 6% and 14%, respectively. They found that labour market 
events were very important to explain returns home, alongside other events that may have 
happened in the months between two surveys (getting married, leaving school). They included 
several economic factors (but no unemployment rates nor macroeconomic/regional variables) 
and found that, for those not married at time t-1, own income had a clear negative effect on 
returns before t, losing a job had a very significant positive effect, and getting a job some 
positive effect, too; parental financial support also significantly and positively affected the rate of 
return; having recently left home made returns more likely; having recently become a parent 
increases the risk of return. For those married, the end of marriage was the single most 
important determinant of return home, and own income had a negative effect, but only for 
males; similarly to unmarried youth, having recently left home increased the risk of return;67 
having recently become a parent increased the risk of return. Own income generally reduced 
the risk of return. The authors also pointed out that a significant share of youth returned home 
after completing their studies or serving in the armed forces. The authors’ interpretation was that 
a cost-benefit analysis appeared to underlie returns home, since new parents returned more, 
and so did those who had been receiving parental financial support while away from home; in 
some cases, the parental home appeared to serve as a “normal base of operations”, for 
example when the youth had found a new job or finished education.
Kerckhoff and Macrae (1992) use the British NCDS (1958 cohort sample) and show that 
around half of the youth who had left for job, education or for family frictions have then returned 
home, while only a quarterly of those who had left to gain independence and only 10% of those 
who had left for marriage actually return home at any point in the future. Those who move to 
semiautonomous or temporary living arrangements return more, but living arrangements 
typically reflect the reasons for leaving home and therefore, once controlling for reasons for 
leaving home, they have only little additional explanatory power on the probability of return. In 
the authors’ preferred logistic equation to explain returns, the most significant variables are the 
reasons for having left home, child’s age at departure from home (older children return less) and 
number of months of unemployment since entering the labour force (which increases returns),
67 The authors do not interpret this finding, which could possible mean that a relationship was more likely to end in its 
early stages.
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while those variables such as father’s occupation and quality of school attended are only 
significant in simpler specifications that do not include the reasons for having left home.68
Ermisch et al. (1997) also use the British NCDS and include some statistics on young 
people’s return to the parental home. They found that around one in five of the sample members 
had returned home at least once before the age of 33 (ie, when the historical information ends). 
They observed that the risk of return varied significantly by first destination: just more than half 
of those who left as students had returned home at least once, and around 40% of those who 
left to live with friends had returned. The corresponding share of those who had left to live with a 
partner was much lower. They also found that most returns had occurred within two years of 
departure from home.
Ermisch (1999) presented a model of young people’s decision to live apart from their parents 
based on a comparison of utility levels across living arrangements, which he used to study 
departure from home, and implicitly adopted the same framework to perform an empirical 
analysis of the determinants of British children’s return to the parental home. Overall return 
rates were 2.7% for those aged 30 or less, but the rate was higher for those below 25 (5.7%). 
Since people who are living with a partner are much less likely to return home (return rates in 
the 16-30 group were 0.5% for those married, 2.7% for those cohabiting, and 6.2% for those 
living without a partner), he only used people without a partner in the estimation. Higher house 
prices appeared to significantly increase the risk of return home (which is consistent with a price 
inelastic parents’ housing demand): one standard deviation higher house prices increased the 
risk of return by ten percentage points. A spell of unemployment during the year increased 
returns by ten percentage points; for this reason, he suggested that the cross-section evidence 
of children living with their parents being more likely to be unemployed comes about because 
unemployed people without a partner are quite likely to return home. Own income appeared to 
have a negative effect, but the results were less robust: in a model restricted to individuals aged 
16-24, income was significant, but it was not in a model including all to those aged 16-30. Other 
controls either had no effect or the coefficients were significant only for one sample. For 
example, females had roughly half the return risk of males in the 16-24 year old sample (men’s 
risk was 13.4%, women’s was 6.9%), but the dummy was not significant for the 16-30 sample; 
having a child (and therefore being a lone parent) almost cancelled the risk of returning home in 
the 16-24 year old sample, but the dummy was not significant for the 16-30 group.
Goldscheider et al. (1999) use the first wave (1987-88) of the National Survey of Families 
and Households (NSFH) to study children’s return to their parents’ household. The panel 
includes adults of all ages and the retrospective information on their living arrangements could 
be used by the authors to study the change in behaviour over time for different cohorts over the 
period 1925-1985. Amongst the findings, there is a continuous increase in the hazard of 
returning home for more recent cohorts, with the hazard being almost a smooth line (see their 
Figure 1), and no obvious dependence of this increase on changed socio-economic patterns or 
other observables. What stands out, however, is that, after controlling for cohort, gender, class
68 They do not include any controls for the duration of residence outside the parental home, nor ch ild ’s current age. Also, 
it may possible that the reasons for leaving home are actually determ ined by individual characteristics, which may lead 
to m ulticollinearity in the return home equation when both the reasons for departure and those individual variables are 
included.
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and family structure, it is the reason for leaving home that that has the strongest effect on the 
risk of returning home, along with the decrease in the age of departure (children who leave 
home earlier are more likely to return). Young adults who leave home for education or to take up 
a job or to become indendent have a higher risk of returning home compared to those who 
leave for marriage. Since these routes have become more and more usual reasons for leaving 
home, the return rates have accordingly increased.
Nilsson and Strandh (1999) (see their table 3) describe the probability of young adults to 
return home in Sweden, using a dataset taken from official records of residence for a very large 
sample of people born in 1973.69 They find that ca. 11% of first-time leavers return home, that 
women are less likely to return home and that, for both genders, difficulties in the labour market 
or university student status increase the probability of returning home compared to those being 
in employment. They also report that the longer a child has been living outside the parental 
home, the less likely he is to return.70 Contrary to expectations, information on the parents 
(parental income, dwelling size, social class) appears to be mostly not significant, with the 
exception of having parents born in non-European or in Eastern European countries, which 
increases the rate of return.
Aassve (2000) estimated a multiple destination transition model of NLS children’s departure 
from home where marriage is an absorbing destination, and living without a partner a state from 
which the child can either return to the parental home or move into a partnership. Because the 
focus of his study was not on returns home, but rather on independent living, the author does 
not devote much space to the interpretation of patterns of returning home. He shows, however, 
that women return home less than men, educational attainment has no effect on return home, 
and whites are more likely to return home than other races. Own current earnings do not affect 
return rates and family income in 1978 also has no significant effect. He also uses predicted 
wage rates to control for the endogeneity of earnings. When he does this, wages are still not 
significant, but 1978 family income now has a negative effect on return to the parental home.
2.4.2 Contributions from the return migration literature
The scarcity of literature on the topic of children’s return to the parental home has led us to 
review research in related areas, starting from return migration. Although there is a fair amount 
of literature on return migration,71 the theoretical and empirical models in that area can offer only 
a limited insight into the determinants of return to the parental home.
This is partly due to the fact that departures from the parental home are usually driven by 
different factors compared to the varaites affecting return migration. The literature of qualitative 
works on household formation reviews earlier in this chapter showed that leaving home is 
associated with a desire of independence and privacy, both for those who leave to move in with 
a partner and for those who leave for other reasons. By contrast, migration appears to depend 
more heavily on economic reasons. While economic factors do indeed appear to affect the
69 The authors acknowledge that these records may underestimate mobility if changes are not recorded by the 
individual, although registration is required for access to public services and residence (welfare) assistance.
70 Since the authors do not control for children’s age and for current year (in which the child is still leaving outside the 
parental home), however, and given that the sample includes only people born in 1973, the coefficients of their year-of- 
departure-from-home dumm ies cannot be interpreted that easily.
71 See, for example, the literature reviewed in Dustmann (2001).
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transition outside the parental home (ie, child’s economic resources increase departure), the 
desire to improve job and pay prospects is not the most important reason.72 Moreover, young 
people do not generally change region of residence when they move out of the parental home. 
Therefore, some of the most important factors in affecting return migration, eg, wage 
differentials between regions, are not useful for the analysis of children’s return home.
The differences in the factors underlying home leaving versus migration can explain why 
return migration and return home are different processes. If children who have left the parental 
home lose their job, they may desire to go back to the parental home, but they will likely do so 
for financial convenience, rather than because the parental home is located in a more 
favourable region. It is also reasonable to expect that marriage breakdown could be an 
important reason for return, and so could be bad health, say, all factors that are not the main 
focus of the return migration literature.
2.4.3 Why is this topic understudied?
We believe that the first reason why return to the parental home has not been studied 
satisfactorily in the literature is that departure from the parental home has been studied 
relatively little, before the spur of research that started in the very late 1990s. Since the two 
topics are clearly conceptually connected, the study of returns has been left somewhat behind. 
Becker (1974)’s important work and the economics of the family literature, for example, does not 
focus on the specific issue of children’s departure from home. The first empirical model that tried 
to explain children’s home-leaving was McElroy (1985), and it is was around 15 years later that 
more empirical work and limited theoretical modelling (Ermisch (1999), Manacorda and Moretti
(2000)) were undertaken on young adults’ departure from home. The analysis of children’s 
return to the parental home, however, has been barely studied, even at a descriptive level.
The second reason is that the study of the return home requires somewhat more complex 
datasets or models than the ones used for descriptive analyses of living arrangements: returns 
to the parental home can only be investigated using appropriate retrospective data from a cross- 
section or using panel data. In practice, suitable retrospective data on young people’s living 
arrangements are not common.73 When we remind ourselves that the analysis of young 
people’s living arrangements had been prevalently made using cross-sectional data until only 
very few years ago, it becomes apparent that this resistance to switching to panel data and 
dynamic models delayed analysis of the process of return to the parental home.
The third reason is that this issue seems to have been considered of lesser importance in 
the literature, compared to the question of young people’s departure from home and, more 
generally, household formation.
Finally, a further, less obvious, reason is that return rates home have often been implicitly 
considered too low for any significant work to be carried out. But we will show that this is not 
true for several of our datasets.
72 See, for example, Young (1975), Baanders (1998).
73 Ideally, the data should retrospective information on income and labour market status of children and of parents, 
along with less obvious information on parental health.
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2.5 O verview  of model and econom etric issues
From the literature survey we see that a few authors have explored the transition of young 
people into independent living.74 Over time, the models have subsequently addressed the 
econometric weaknesses of previous analyses, and the use of panel models in recent years, 
motivated by the increasing awareness of the possible endogeneity problems, has greatly 
increased the quality of research (although cross-sections are still being used for the more 
descriptive studies).75 Some of the most significant issues, along with the solutions and 
developments that followed, are explained in this section.
2.5.1 Theoretical framework and implementation
On the basis of the literature review, and particularly the theoretical part of it, the model that 
we shall be using in the applied part of this dissertation is based on the theoretical and 
econometric work contained in Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) and Ermisch (1999), and the 
derivations can be found in those two papers. For ease of reference, the main steps are 
reported in the appendix to this chapter. Their model shares the approach of several of the 
empirical papers reviewed earlier.76
Young people’s decision of household formation is modelled in a comparative static analysis 
framework, where the child maximises his welfare after comparing the utility he can obtain when 
living with his parents with the utility he can achieve when living on his own, and he takes into 
account all elements that may vary in the different living arrangements, including financial 
transfers. 77 Moreover, the parents are assumed to be altruistic, and their utility function is thus a 
function of the child’s utility and of their own consumption, which means that the parents, as part 
of their own utility maximisation, will also try to maximise the child’s utility and thereby they can 
affect the child’s living arrangement decisions, primarily via by financial transfers, and, if living 
together, sharing accommodation with them.78
As in the first part of Ermisch (1999), we could take all children living with their parent(s) at 
time f-1 and consider the following index function measuring the propensity for child / to be in 
the parental home:
(2.1) liit = fa yclt + [32 ypit + yziM + ^ x it +errors
74 Along with a much larger number studying young people’s entry into their first job or their move from education into 
the labour market, etc.,
75 This has made the models significantly more complex and beyond the traditional analytical tools of, say, sociologists, 
while demographers have always seemed to prefer transition models.
76 The main work on which this part is based is Ermisch (1999). The contribution by Aassve (2000), who presents a 
simple search theoretic model, is more in line with the theoretical models o f marriage and will be ignored in this section. 
The sim pler model underlying the analysis of returns to the parental home is outlined in the applied chapter on that 
topic, but is broadly based on a utility comparison framework sim ilar to the one comm only used to study departure from 
home, as explored in this section. The other theoretical works summarised earlier in this chapter will guide us in the 
choice of relevant covariates and their expected significance.
77 The utility of the child varies according to the cohabitation arrangements because o f three elements: /) cohabitation 
(generally) decreases his utility, because the child values his privacy, and this effect may depend on age, child's 
income, and other variables such as, for example, ch ild ’s health - for example, other things being equal, an older child 
may require a higher level of parental income to induce him to reside with his parents than a younger child; //) 
cohabitation affects the levels of transfers from parents to child; /'//) during cohabitation the child consumes local public 
goods that he cannot benefit from when living on his own, eg, housing, housework, etc.
This was the approach chosen by McElroy (1985), who derived the indirect utility functions for child and parents in a 
Nash bargaining model, while Hill (1977) assumed that separation from the parents, which could go from 0% to 100%, 
entered the child ’ utility function, and the child could choose the optimal degree of separation (as well as the degree of 
marriage -  interpreted as, for example, the share of time spent with the partner-, work and study).
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The elements of this function are as follows:
yc, is the child total income (that will be in the child’s indirect utility function) 
ypi is parental income and it represents the possibility of financial transfers from parents and 
the sharing of common goods;
the vector x  includes all other possible variables of relevance, eg, age, country, 
unemployment rate, potential wage, own health status, parental health, etc;
z is a vector including past/lagged variables such as experience, education, job search 
activity that also contribute to current income;
the error components includes a random variable that affect the decision to live outside the 
parental (preferences for privacy) and an innovation error that reflects unexpected changes in 
tastes and incomes, by construction, not correlated with the explanatory variables, and a fixed 
effect (see appendix for details).
The child lives outside the parental home if //f >0, while he lives with his parents when //f <0.
The theoretical model leads us to expect fa>0 ( the marginal utility of own income is likely to 
be higher when outside the parental home than when inside it and assuming preference for 
privacy), /?2<0  (in most cases, because the child’s marginal utility of parental income is higher 
when living with his parents, eg because when he can benefit from parental resources and the 
consumption of local public goods, while on his own he may only relie on transfers), each 
component of yto have a sign that depends on effect of such component on current income.
A dynamic extension of the static model, like the one illustrated in Ermisch (1999), focuses 
on young people who are still residing with their parents at time t-1. Instead of a straightforward 
model in first differences, individual’s information at time t-1, or earlier, is used to explain 
departures between time M  and t, to reduce the risk of endogeneity, thus assuming that it is 
levels of variables, as well as changes, that affect the decision to move outside the parental 
home. Ermisch (1999), for example, assumes that parents’ (permanent) income can be thought 
of as yp t = yP t - i +%, ie, parental income does not change significantly over time but for an 
innovation term, spt, whose expected value at time t-1 is zero. Child’s income can be modelled 
slightly differently, he suggests, as yct -  ycM + y z M+£ct, where z is a vector including variables 
such as age, experience, education, job search activity, health. sct is an i.i.d. random variable 
whose expected value at time t-1 is zero, and it may or may not be correlated with spt, but it 
cannot be correlated with u 0 u r,t and UiNJ, the preferences for privacy. It is important to notice that 
the child’s actual decision may take place when, say, he has actually never worked yet. The 
interpretation of yct then becomes that of potential income y , ie, the income the child could earn 
if working full-time at time t, and similarly for previous periods, and it is possible to assume that 
the child can form an expectation of his potential income by having some knowledge of the state 
of the labour markets and the earnings of his peers.
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In a limited number of empirical works79 researchers have therefore taken all children living 
with their parent(s) at time M  and estimated the following index function measuring the 
propensity for child / to leave the parental home:80
( 2 .2 )  l,j=  ( f t  yclM +  ( f t  ypit- 1  +  yz ,,t-i +  V\X jf +  errors
We shall be using this analytical framework in the subsequent empirical part of the 
dissertation.
2.5.2 Econometric models
Choice of model
As reviewed earlier in section 2.3.2.1, there is a large variety of empirical models used in the 
literature on young people’s transition from the parental home: dichotomous models (probit, 
logit), duration models, multinomial models (multinomial logit). All models serve a different 
purposes, so clearly there is no ideal model amongst them, and they require the underlying 
dataset to be suitable. For example, a duration model would also be very suitable for a panel 
dataset where the dates of leaving home or getting a job are recorded (at least as month and 
year dates) but if information is recorded simply once a year, a logit model may perform 
similarly.
Cross-sectional vs. panel (dynamic) analyses
Although most empirical work has used cross-sectional data to study young people’s living 
arrangements, this is not the optimal method for two reasons.
Firstly, in a cross-sectional framework, the correlation of covariates with the error term is 
bound to be much higher than in equation ( 2.2), ie, the dynamic case. This will give rise to 
inconsistent estimates of the coefficients.
Secondly, when considering a static view, the snapshot of a cross-section mixes the flows of 
young people out of the parental home with the flow of those back into it. When we look at the 
percentages of youth living with and without their parents, for example, we are ignoring the fact 
that over a number of years some youth who have left home have come back and then left 
again, so that the percentages understate the number of those who have left home over time. A 
particularly convincing case is presented by Ermisch (1999), whose results show that 
unemployment has a peculiar effect on departures and returns in the UK: a spell of 
unemployment during the year before the survey makes departure from home more likely, and 
for those already outside the parental home such a spell increases returns by ten percentage 
points. He therefore concludes that the cross-sectional evidence of children living with their 
parents having a relatively high rate of unemployment comes about partly because unemployed 
people without a partner are quite likely to return home. A cross-sectional analysis, however, 
would associate unemployment with higher probability of living with one’s parents, but it would
79 Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997), Ermisch (1999) and Manacorda and Moretti (2002) build their predictions and empirical
analyses within this framework, substantially improving upon McElroy (1985)’s model.
80 The error i]it = vit + f t e ct + ftr -Pt is an innovation error that reflects unexpected changes in tastes and incomes, ie rjit is
assumed to be i.i.d. and is, by construction, not correlated with the explanatory variables.
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be wrong to deduce that being unemployed reduces the risk of departure from the parental 
home.
Although the structure of panel studies is such that there are repeated observations for each 
person, most analyses pool the observations together, (sometimes) add year dummies, and 
estimate a simple probit, logit or multinomial logit model, instead of a random effects probit, 
conditional (fixed effects) logit, etc. Pooling, however, does not appear to be a significant 
problem: Ermisch (1999) reports that a pooled probit yields coefficient estimates and standard 
errors that are very similar to a random effects probit and in the present study we found 
essentially the same. Without a significant loss in the quality of the results, a pooled probit has a 
much less exacting computational burden than a random effects probit, and the quicker 
computations make the bootstrapping of standard errors much faster.81
Pooling across genders, countries
Some authors choose to pool men and women together and include a gender dummy in the 
model. They often neglect to mention, however, whether they have tested to see whether 
pooling is acceptable, and whether they have tried to include interaction dummies (eg, for child’s 
income).
Pooling across countries is not common, primarily because papers studying more than one 
country are rare.82 Such a choice, however, may be questionable because, even in the 
presence of interaction dummies, pooling would impose restrictions on the structure of the 
errors between countries.
2.5.3 Earnings and estimation of potential income
Although many researchers use the respondent’s income as a covariate in the analysis of 
living arrangements, this variable has a potential endogeneity problem, particularly when cross- 
sections are used. The child’s actual earnings may be endogenous because, for example, a 
youth living on their own is more likely to be working to sustain themselves.83
We are likely to encounter this kind of endogeneity when using cross-sections of living 
arrangements, but it is less clear whether this endogeneity exists and is strong in a panel model: 
when conditioning on living in the parental home in a panel (see for example Aassve et al.
(2001)), the endogeneity problem is bound to be limited. To understand this, let us assume that 
we condition on living with the parents in 1994: the income variable refers to the calendar year 
preceding the interview: the interview takes place in 1994 and the income questions refer to 
1993; moving out will occur between the 1994 interview and the one in 1995. In practice, this 
translates in an average of 12 months between the end of the 1993 calendar year and the date
81 Bootstrapping is a solution to the necessity to correct standard errors because of the use of potential wages (see 
below).
82 Soro-Bonmati (2001) and lacovou (2001) pool countries but do not mention any tests or concerns about the errors 
structure and only include intercept dummies.
83 If young people’s desire to build their own life is not observed, this will affect both current living arrangements and 
work status. If work status is a covariate used in the model to determ ine living arrangements, this results in a correlation 
between an explanatory variable and the error term, which leads to inconsistent estimation.
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of departure.84 To further reduce any possible endogeneity, longer lags can be used: for 
example, Hill (1977) uses information on child’s income at age 18 to predict living arrangement 
when they are 23; this is likely to reduce any endogeneity significantly.
Since we are conditioning on living in the parental home, though, the endogeneity becomes 
a problem only if the intention of moving out affects the probability that the person is employed 
and therefore earning an income, or if some other variable excluded from the model affects both 
income and the probability of moving out).
We also note that a large number of children may not work, or not work full-time, while they 
are living with their parents at the age of 18, so what is relevant to affect their departure from 
home a few months or years later is the income that they could potentially earn as full-time 
workers once they leave the parental house.85
The typical approach to estimate potential earnings (eg, Haurin et al. (1993), Whittington and 
Peters (1996), Aassve et al. (2001 ))86 is to estimate an earnings equations of a standard 
Mincerian type controlling for non-participation87 and to use the predicted earnings (or predicted 
wage) as a covariate.88
This model does not determines labour market participation and living arrangements jointly, 
but it addresses the reservations made, for example, by McElroy (1985), on the use of 
endogenous explanatory variables (employment status and hours worked).89
2.5.4 Standard errors
Repeated observations per person
When repeated observations are included for each individual, standard errors need to be 
corrected for autocorrelation among multiple observations per person. In practice, and 
especially if the panel is short, the presence of repeated observations do not cause great 
differences in the standard errors, as indicated by Ermisch (1999)’s findings after estimating 
both a random effects probit and a pooled probit.
Predicted values as covariate
In a similar way to the problems existing in two-stage least squares,90 the use of predicted 
values for children’s wages in the home-leaving model may create a serious issue. Since fitted
84 If the interview is conducted on, say, 1 July 1994, a subsequent departure taking place before the interview on 1 July 
1995, will happen after six months, on average, ie around 1 January 1995, thus 12 months after the end of the 1993 
calendar year. In some datasets this interval is much longer (BHPS interviews start in early September).
85 Information on income may also be missing for one of various reasons.
86 In most cases, predicted w a g e s  have been used in the literature, because income is the product of wage and number 
of hours worked, and thus predicted wage seems a more straightforward measure.
87 Mincer (1974), Heckman (1979); given the subsequent use of these potential wages, marital status and children 
should be excluded from the wage equation to avoid endogeneity.
88 The estimation is typically conducted on a sample of all young people, and not only on those living outside the 
parental home, because living arrangements could affect both participation and earnings, so not including them would 
lead to inconsistent estimates even for the subsample of working individuals (by contrast, Haurin et al. (1994) estimate 
earnings only on independent youth). Typically, the predicted values for earnings are used for all individuals, including 
those who are working and whose earnings are observed.
89 Instead of using fitted values for work status (which would be estimated probabilities o f working), some have used 
unemployment rates, or sim ilar variables, to control for the probability of employm ent of the child.
90 See Heckman (1979).
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earnings depend on an error component, they introduce a further element of random variation in 
the departure equation, which results in the inconsistency of standard errors, although the 
estimated coefficients are unaffected. The same problem found in two-stage least squares 
clearly applies in the models used to study departure from the parental home.91 There are two 
solutions to correct the standard errors: the estimation of the variance-covariance matrix, and
92bootstrapping methods.
Few of the works surveyed earlier correct the standard errors for repeated observations (for 
example, Ermisch (1999) does, while not using fitted values); nearly no author corrects them for 
the inclusion of predicted values (for example, Haurin et al. (1993), Whittington and Peters
(1996), Aassve et al. (2001) include fitted values but do not report having corrected the standard 
errors).
2.6 Expected and established results, unanswered questions and our research  
hypotheses
From the survey in this chapter, it is clear that a fair amount of work has been conducted on 
young people’s departure from the parental home. Drawing from our review of the applied and 
theoretical literature, we firstly explain what we would expect to find in an empirical analysis of 
ours. We then spell out the results that seem fairly established -  even if there may be no 
“consensus” around them. However, the state of the literature is still not always very well 
defined, so the third part of this section illustrates the points that still need to be addressed and 
several unanswered questions.
2.6.1 Expected effects of covariates
On the basis of the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed (sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2), 
we can expect a certain number of variables to be relevant to the determination of young 
people’s departure from the parental home and we can form a set of expectations with respect 
to the directions and magnitudes of their effects in different countries, before we embark on the 
empirical analyses in the following chapters.
Welfare systems provide different types of support to the individual, and therefore young 
people will choose their living arrangements on the basis of the welfare transfers that they are 
currently receiving and that they may be receiving in the future under different living 
arrangements and under different possible family and labour market circumstances. It is partly 
for this reason that individual income, parental resources and labour market status seem to 
have different effects on youth’s departure from home, depending on the country of residence. 
Holdsworth (2000) and Ermisch (1999), for example, find that being unemployed does not delay
91 The frequent use of models with instrumental variables (two-stage least squares models) has led many econometric 
software packages to the inclusion of routines for the correction of the standard errors in that context. In a qualitative 
dependent variable model, however, the correction of the standard errors is not comm only done.
92 See Newey (1987). The solution adopted in this work is to bootstrap the standard errors.
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children’s departure from home in the UK (it may even speed it up), while Holdsworth (2000) 
and Aassve et al. (2001) find that it clearly slows departure in Spain and Italy.
Income and employment status
Because the welfare systems of the Southern European countries do not offer much welfare 
support to young adults, we expect that young people in these countries may need to wait until 
they have sound finances before leaving the parental home. We may therefore believe that a 
much stronger link between current income/employment and departure exists in Southern 
Europe, while the association between the two might be much weaker or insignificant in other 
countries. This should be reflected in the significance and magnitudes of the estimated 
coefficients of current income and current employment (or unemployment).
In a more complex model including potential income rather than current income, we expect 
the opposite to be true: the role of potential income for Southern Europeans is limited to the 
extent in which potential income is already reflected in current income for those who are already 
working, while in Northern Europe and the UK potential income should be a crucial determinant 
of departure. We therefore expect potential income to be less significant for Southern 
Europeans than current income is, but potential income should be more significant than actual 
income in the North.
Gender differences are possible, however, given the traditional role of men as household 
heads. In all countries, but particularly in Southern Europe, income and employment should be 
more relevant for men’s risk to leave to enter a partnership than for women’s risk to enter a 
partnership. For departures without a partner, there are no strong expectations on whether there 
is a difference in the effect of income between genders.
Whether young unemployed people would consider migrating to find a job is a relevant 
question, and may potentially hide the effects that we expect. High difference in unemployment 
rates between regions as well as satisfactory welfare systems would increase the probability 
that unemployed people could leave home more than employed ones, so this issue needs to be 
kept in mind for later.
Labour market history
Lagged employment status or some measure of labour market activity in the past is 
expected to act as a control for the currently employed/unemployed dummy, and for the 
potential income covariate. Particularly in Southern Europe, current labour market status may 
not be a sufficient condition for the youth to feel safe in his job. Lagged unemployment, or 
whether the youth has ever been a long-term unemployed, or similar covariates, should have a 
negative and significant effect in the South.
Being long-term unemployed, however, can stimulate the child to leave home to look for 
work and possibly migrate, so the effect of this covariate is not obvious in any country. Another 
possibly significant variable is for how long the person has been unemployed, to be used in 
addition to current employment status and in alternative to the “long-term unemployed” dummy. 
A longer spell of unemployment should stimulate departure from home.
93 In addition to low credit accessibility and low provision of public housing in the South.
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Parental income
We expect Southern Europeans’ departure rates to be significantly affected by parental 
income, given the alleged importance of family networks for support in the South. The direction 
of the effect, however, is not obvious. Parental resources could delay departure if young people 
choose to take advantage of local public goods such as housing and home services (eg, 
provided by the mother). Parental income and wealth, however, could have the opposite effect, 
once controls for housing are included in the model, because parents may be willing to transfer 
financial resources to the child after he has left, particularly after the child has got married. In 
particular, Southern European parents expect that a child will only leave home to form a family, 
so non-partnership departures may indicate the existence of conflict. If, however, children’s 
presence in the parental home increases parental utility, as suggested by Manacorda and 
Moretti (2002), parental income will reduce departures, but more so for non-partnership 
destinations.
On the basis of the points above, we expect that non-transferable resources such as housing 
and home services will delay all departures in the South, while parental income may discourage 
departure towards non-partnership destinations, but either encourage or discourage departure 
towards partnership destinations depending on how altruistic the parents are and how much 
they value coresidence.
In Northern Europe, where parents may be less keen on subsiding children for many years 
(and conflicts with the parents may be more common), parental income may increase departure 
rates94 - but it is unlikely that it could delay departures as we expect to find in the South -, and 
the effect could be stronger on non-partnership destinations. Housing and other non- 
transferable resources will also delay departure.
The distinction between transferable and non-transferable resources seem to be quite 
crucial, because our expectations on the signs are clear and an empirical test would be quite 
useful, and also because it is one of the most important derivations from the theory and the 
analysis of the welfare systems.
2.6.2 Established results and unanswered questions
Effect of own resources: own earnings are significant and increase the probability of living
outside the parental household; potential earnings appear to have a positive effect, too, but the 
evidence on this is limited.
“Importance’’ as opposed to “significance”-, researchers have focused on which variables are 
significantly associated with departures from the parental home (or residence outside it, in the 
cross-sections) and on the signs of the effects, but have not assessed the magnitude and 
precision of the coefficients: for example, own income has been shown to be a statistically 
significant covariate but it is not clear how important (ie, large) its effect is. Failing to evaluate 
the importance of the covariates reduces the relevance of any empirical work for policy
94 This is because parents may want to increase their own privacy by facilitating children’s departure from home with 
financial transfers.
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purposes. We will be consider the magnitude and importance of our results in the discussion 
part of each empirical chapter.
Current vs. potential income: we find it necessary to draw a distinction between current 
income and potential income, and we believe that this issue has not been considered properly in 
the literature so far. In particular, no work compares the results obtained with current income 
(which is likely to be endogenous) with the ones obtained using potential income, so it is not 
clear how important it is to use potential income rather than actual one: in practice, we do not 
yet know whether the difference is minor or substantial.
Different effects o f parental resources: there is very limited research on the effects that 
parental resources of different kinds have on children departure, and this has provided evidence 
that transferable wealth and non-transferable wealth may have opposite effects on departure 
risks. We expect, for example, durables and the quality of the accommodation to delay 
departures while parental income and wealth may in fact accelerate departure via income 
transfers.
Differences between destinations: although only a few works have analysed this issue, the 
effects of covariates (eg, parental income) upon partnership vs. non-partnership destinations 
appear to differ significantly, and student departures are also marked by distinctive features (eg, 
own income reduces risk of student departures).
Differences between genders: females leave the parental home earlier, and are more likely 
to leave to enter a partnership. Both genders have generally experienced an increase in age at 
departure.
Differences across countries: an analysis of departure rates across countries and of the 
determinants of departure shows that the differences across countries are very large, even 
within a relatively small geographical region such as Europe and between neighbouring 
countries. The increase in age at departure in the last few decades has been observed in most, 
but not all, countries. As pointed out earlier, there is, however, almost no published research 
that compares results across countries using similar econom(etr)ic models, which brings us 
back to the need to appreciate the difference in “importance”, or magnitude, of the factors in the 
different countries. Additionally, it is not clear how departure may be affected by some important 
covariates, eg, unemployment rates and cultural factors, that differ between countries.
Theoretical modelling: the theoretical analysis of young people’s departure from the parental 
home has been limited, although some insights are provided by the literature on marriage, and, 
to a more limited extent, on migration and household bargaining. Although we are not aiming at 
expanding the theoretical literature, we expect to shed more light on what cannot be neglected
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at the modelling stage, for example whether there is a need to cater for different destinations or 
whether destinations can be pooled.
As to the empirical analysis of returns to the parental home, only DaVanzo and Goldscheider 
(1990), Kerckhoff and Macrae (1992) and Ermisch (1999) have so far focused on the issue and 
presented some econometric results.95 There is clear potential for research in this area, where 
no established results are available, so all of our findings will add to the existing knowledge. 
Relevant questions include the analysis of
i) how high the risk of return to the parental home is for young people;
ii) how the risk varies since departure from home;
iii) what determines return to the parental home, and particularly, how strong the effect
of economic variables is;
iv) how the patterns and determinants of return differ across countries.96
2.6.3 Our research hypotheses
On the basis of the points highlighted in sections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2, and as introduced in the 
first chapter, we intend to test empirically a series of hypothesis to shed light on the questions 
that still remain unclear or unanswered.
Hypothesis 1
The determinants of leaving home are the same for all destinations: leaving home to live 
with a partner and leaving home to live without a partner are not distinct destinations and 
can be pooled together.
Since many works have not used competing risk models and those that have done so have 
not tested whether this is, in fact, needed, we firstly intend to test whether multiple destinations 
need to be considered. Hypothesis 1 will be considered for each dataset used in our analyses.
Hypothesis 2
Young people’s departure from home in Southern European countries is affected by own 
and family current financial circumstances in the same way as in Central/Northern Europe 
and the US, ie, the effects of the covariates are not different from one another.
The literature emphasises the significance of own income to determine departure from 
home. But is this important everywhere in the same way? We still are not clear about this. The 
testing of hypothesis 2 will also allow to clarify which factors are significant vs which ones are 
important.
95 The results on returns home presented in Aassve (2000) are not central to his dissertation and are therefore not 
explored in detail in his work; all other applied research has been merely descriptive.
96 Some of the issues considered in the context of departure from home are also relevant in the study of the return 
home, which will be considered in greater detail in the last applied chapter of this thesis.
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Hypothesis 3
Potential financial circumstances are as important to young people in Southern European
countries as to youth in Central/Northern Europe and the US.
But is current income really good enough for our analyses? If it is a good explanatory 
variable, then potential earnings -  used in a very limited number of papers - would offer no 
important improvement in explanatory power. We intend to test how potential income differs in 
its significance and importance across countries. As a further step, we will also see how the 
roles of current and potential earnings differ.
Hypothesis 4a
The probability of return to the parental home is the same across countries.
Hypothesis 4b
Economic and financial circumstances are not determinants of young people’s return to the
parental home.
Hypothesis 4c
The determinants of young people’s return to the parental home are the same across
countries (with special consideration for economic and financial variables).
The literature on returns to the parental home is extremely small, so research on this has to 
start from more basic issues. Firstly, there is no evidence on whether people return home more 
often in some countries than in others. Secondly, it is not known whether the effect of economic 
and financial circumstances is significant in determining return home. Thirdly, we do not know 
how the effect of different variables, and particularly of economic and financial covariates, on 
the probability of return may differ by country. The above hypotheses will guide us into 
establishing some first results.
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2.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we firstly presented the facts: statistics and surveys show how some European 
countries have witnessed a change in family structure in the last few decades and how strikingly 
different family structures currently are across countries.
We then conducted a survey of the literature on a theoretical and on an applied level. We 
observed that most countries have been covered by some research, but that the majority of papers 
belong to the sociological literature, whereas econometric works are few; similarly, cross-country 
comparisons are the exception, or, when they exist, they are a collection of statistics by age and 
gender. We observed that, although some results appear to have attracted some - but not full - 
consensus in the literature, actual comparisons between results (even more so between results for 
different countries) are difficult because the models used differ in many ways and because the 
magnitudes of the effects have not always been made clear. In the following section we looked at 
the literature on returns to the parental home. We found that the literature is limited and not much is 
in fact known on this topic. In particular, even descriptive statistics on the return rates across 
countries are not easy to find.
We then introduced the model on which our subsequent applied chapters will be based, and 
referred to the previous papers by John Ermisch (Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) and Ermisch (1999)) 
that developed them. The chapter then discussed important empirical and econometric issues that 
need to be considered, including the important of potential income as opposed to current income.
At the end of the review, we identified the deficiencies in our current knowledge and linked the 
shortcomings found in the literature to the research objectives set out in this introductory chapter. 
We explained, for example, how important it is to expand the literature using a common analytical 
framework to allow a comparison across countries, and how more consideration needs to be given 
to the type of economic and labour market variables used in the empirical analysis.
In the chapters that follow, we will be looking at these hypotheses by using a similar framework 
to analyse different countries, which will make it easier for us to compare the results. We shall be 
focusing in particular on the effects of actual and potential income, evaluating the effects of different 
kinds of parental resources, and gauging the relative importance of the determinants of departure 
from, and return to, the partental home.
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2.8 Appendix: Definitions
Child: any individual of any age who is living in the same household as at least one of his97
natural or adoptive parents (as intended in normal speech) in any survey.98
Parent: any individual of any age who is living in the same household as at least one of his 
natural or adopted children (as intended in normal speech) at the time of any survey.
Family: a group of individuals within a household who are related by blood, naturalisation, 
marriage (or partnership) or affinity.
Household: generally, any group of individuals who share an accommodation and have common 
arrangements in terms of budget or share at least a meal a day. The definition varies by dataset, 
and sharing an accommodation is always a necessary, albeit mostly not sufficient, condition. 
Whether a youth without a live-in partner is living alone or sharing the accommodation with others is 
irrelevant in this thesis, because both are considered to be included in the group of “living alone” so 
there can be no confusion.99
Home or parental home: the place where an individual’s parents live.
Living at home: any individual who, in any given survey, is living in the same household as at
least one of his natural or adoptive parents.
Departure from home (or “leaving home”): we observe a child “leaving home” if he was living 
with his parents at the time of survey in year M  but was no longer living with them at the time of the 
following survey (ie, at t).
Time t and time t-1: in the dynamic analysis of the probability of leaving home, for any individual 
who is in the dataset in two consecutive surveys, we refer to the first of the two observations (eg, 
when the child is at home) as time M  and the subsequent year (eg, when the child may have left 
home) as time f.100
Return home: an individual returns home if he was living without any of his parents at time M 
but he is living with at least one of them at time t.
Destination (or “exit”): living arrangement of a child in the subsequent survey to the one in which 
he is living at home.
Partnership destination: living arrangement where the person lives with a married or unmarried 
partner (sometimes loosely replaced by “marriage” or “marriage destination”).
97 He: we use the generic “he” when referring to children of unspecified gender
98 When there are three generations in a household, eg grandfather, father (the son of that grandfather) and son, the son is a 
“child” , and the father, too, is a “child”.
99 It is important to understand that, in spite of the difficulty of agreeing on a definition of family and household in the various 
datasets, any differences between countries will not affect the models and the results presented in this work. This is because 
a child who is sharing the accommodation with his parent will invariably be in the same family and household, and when he 
moves out (or his parents move out), he will be recorded as having left home in all cases. He may be sharing his new 
accommodation with /) a partner, /'/) a partner and others, Hi) others (but not a partner) or iv) nobody else. Case iv) poses no 
problems (the youth is now living “alone”). In case /'/), the youth will be coded as “living with a partner”, and whether other 
people are in the same household is irrelevant to our classification. In case iii) thit may be difficult to identify the household, 
but in the context of this thesis this is irrelevant, since “living alone” and “living with others” (but not a partner) are grouped 
together in “non-partnership destinations”. Only few empirical papers do in fact treat “living alone” and “living with others” as 
different destinations.
100 The length of time between the two interviews may be somewhat shorter or longer than 365 days, depending on the 
survey rules and the difficulty of reaching the respondent.
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Non-Partnership destination: living arrangement where the person does not live with a (married 
or unmarried) partner, but alone (or with minors, eg, an own child) or with friends.
Student destination (or “student departure”): living arrangement where the person is a student 
who lives outside the parental home and without a partner.
Living alone: living arrangement where the person does not live with anybody else (except for 
minors, eg, an own child), ie, the person does not share his accommodation. When referring to a 
destination that is neither a student destination nor a partnership destinations, we will often use 
living “alone” to mean both living alone and “living with others” (as defined below).
Living with others: living arrangement where the person lives with others (excluding minors), but 
none of these is his partner or a parent of his.
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2.9 Appendix: Ermisch’s Model
The theoretical framework to which we refer in this chapter in section 2.5.1 above is based on 
Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) and Ermisch (1999), and this appendix aims to provide easy access to 
their derivations.
Young people’s decision of household formation is typically modelled in a comparative static 
analysis framework, where the child maximises his welfare after comparing the utility he can obtain 
when living with his parents with the utility he can achieve when living on his own. This was the 
approach chosen by McElroy (1985), who derived the indirect utility functions for child and parents 
in a Nash bargaining model. Most subsequent studies use a similar utility comparison framework.101
In this subsection we shall present the barebones of the model on which, more or less explicitly, 
several of the empirical papers are based. Such model is usually barely outlined in the applied 
works. We will not derive any results formally, and this section is therefore more a review than an 
advance of the theory, but we shall give literature references for each of the main points discussed. 
Let us consider a child and his family.102 The child has the following simplified utility function:
(2.3) Uc(Cc, hc, OUT) OUT = 0, 1
that he maximises subject to a budget constraint 
( 2.4) Yc + T(OUT)= Cc + OUTph hc
hc is child’s housing consumption, for which he has to pay when living without his parents; Cc is 
child’s consumption excluding housing; Yc is child’s total income; OUT is a dummy indicating 
whether the child lives outside the parental household (OL/7 = 1) or within it (0(77= O);103 T(OUT) is 
the amount of financial transfers from parents to child, which depend on whether the child is co- 
residing (T(0)) or away (T(1)): ph is housing costs and hc is the quantity of housing good when the 
child lives on his own. The subscript c, as in hc, refers to the child, while the subscript p refers to the 
parents. When the child lives with his parents, his budget constraint becomes a’) Yc + T(0) = Cc; 
otherwise it is a”) Yc + T(1)= Cc + ph hc.
The utility of the child depends on cohabitation because of three elements: i) cohabitation 
(generally) decreases his utility, because the child values his privacy, and this effect may depend 
on age, child’s income, and other variables such as, for example, child’s health;104 /'/) cohabitation 
affects the levels of transfers from parents to child; ///) during cohabitation the child consumes local 
public goods that he cannot benefit from when living on his own, eg, housing, housework, etc. 
(these could be included in hc, too).
The parents are assumed to be altruistic, and, therefore, their utility function is a function of the 
child’s utility and of their own consumption:
( 2.5) i f  = (7P(CP, hp, OUT, l f ( C c, hc, OUT)) OUT = 0, 1 s.t.
101 Hill (1977) assumes that separation from the parents, which could go from 0% to 100%, entered the child’ utility function, 
and the child could choose the optimal degree of separation (as well as the degree of marriage -  interpreted as, for example, 
the share of time spent with the partner-, work and study).
102 For simplicity it is commonly assumed that in each family there are two parents and one child.
103 For simplicity, we define 01/7=1-/A/ and we use the most straightforward dummy in each case.
104 For example, other things being equal, an old child who values privacy more than a young child may require a higher level 
of parental income to induce him to reside with his parents than a younger child.
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(2.6) Yp = Cp + ph hp + T(OUT)
( 2.7) T(OUT) >0
Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997), Ermisch (1999) and Manacorda and Moretti (2002) build their
predictions and empirical analyses within this framework, substantially improving upon McElroy
(1985)’s model. Parents can influence their child’s residential decision by deciding the amount of 
financial transfers, which depends on their degree of altruism. Manacorda and Moretti (2002) 
introduce the idea that parents’ utility may depend directly on whether they are cohabiting with their 
child: this is reflected by the OUT term in ( 2.5) directly affecting parents’ utility (in addition to the 
OUT term included in children’s utility).
The model therefore has two stages: in the first stage, parents choose financial transfers, their 
own consumption of housing and other goods to maximize ( 2.5) subject to ( 2.4), ( 2.6), ( 2.7) 
above. In the second stage, the child maximizes his own utility, taking the parental decisions as 
given, and thus chooses whether to cohabit. Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) note that it is effectively 
the parents who can decide the residential status of the child (assuming complete information on 
preferences). But Manacorda and Moretti (2002) add that if the parents are very altruistic, their child 
would receive so large a transfer when living on his own that he will inevitably decide to live outside 
the parental home, because T(0)~ T( 1j cannot be large enough to make them stay at home.
The effect of incomes, housing costs and other variables can be derived, but their signs depend 
on the choice of some functional form for the utility function; Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) and 
Ermisch (1999) use a constant elasticity of substitution function (that nests the Cobb-Douglas), 
Manacorda and Moretti (2002) use a Stone-Geary function, Hill and Hill (1976) only imposes some 
conditions on the utility functions. Their main observations and results are broadly similar:
i) the utility of both parents105 and child depends on cohabitation: generally, assuming that a 
child values his privacy, cohabitation is a bad for the child;106
ii) from a financial point of view, total housing costs are lower when the child lives with his 
parents, and there may be other economies of scale;
iii) altruistic parents may decide to support the child whatever his residential decisions,107 and 
they will find it “cheaper” to support him during cohabitation thanks to the presence of local public 
goods and economies of scale (ie, total family income minus total housing costs is higher when 
cohabiting);
iv) financial transfers from parents to child have an important effect on the child’s decisions: the 
larger the difference between transfers in cohabitation and in non-cohabitation, T(0)~ Tft), the more 
likely co-residence is;108
105 Only Manacorda and Moretti (2000) include a child’s presence in the household into the parental utility function; in all 
other models the effect of child’s cohabitation is indirect via the inclusion of child’s utility in the parents’ utility function.
106 The extent to which the child dislikes cohabitation is reflected in how covariates affect departure
107 Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) find conditions that show that when parental income is much higher than child’s income, 
financial transfers are made in both residential states T (1 )> 0  and T(0 )>0 , when parental income is too low there are no 
transfers at all, while in the intermediate range transfers are made only when the child lives apart.
108 Most surveys do not ask about financial transfers from parents to child if the child is cohabiting (the relevant ECHP 
question is “Did you personally receive in 199x any financial support or maintenance from relatives, friends or other persons 
outside your household?”, italics added), but they must clearly take place, if the child has no or little resource of his.
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v) parental income has an ambiguous effect on departure rates: since higher parental income 
increases the amount of public goods and of transfers during cohabitation, but it also increases 
transfers to non-cohabiting children; the net effect may also depend on the level of parental
109income;
v) financial transfers from parents to the child increase with the gap between parental income 
and child’s income and with the degree of altruism of the parents;
vi) the impact of the cost of housing depends on demand elasticity for housing.
In this fram ework we want to understand what determines young people’s residential choices. 
Let the child ’s indirect utility function when living away from his parents in period t be:
/  o  I / O U T  x / O U T ,  OUT\
( 2 . 8 )  Vt -  Vt (yet, Ypt, Pht, x t, ut )
Parental income is included because of the possibility o f financial transfers from parents. The 
vector x t includes other variables of relevance, such as age, country, unemployment rate, potential 
wage, own health status, parental health, etc. ut0UT is a random variable that affects the decision to 
live outside the parental home and it also represents preferences for privacy and living without 
parents.
Utility when living with parents at time t (indicated by the superscript IN) is represented by the 
indirect utility function:
( 2 . 9 )  Vt'N = V lN{ycU ypt, xu u lN)
utIN is a random variable similar to ut0UT.
Static framework
Following Ermisch (1999), a young person lives apart from his parents if
(2.10) V,0UT(ycl, ypt, phl, x,, u,0UT) > V,"(y«. ypl> pw, *,, u,IN)
If the indirect utility functions are linear, this becomes, in the simplest case:
( 2 . 1 1 )  ( /? o u t , i -  /? in ,i)Yct +  ( /? o u t ,2 -  /?in,2)Ypt +  (/? o u t,3  -/?in,3)Pht + ( ^ o u t  -  ¥\u)x t +  (Ut°UT -  u jN) > 0
x t includes x tIN and x t0UT. The f f s  and the y/s coefficients are the parameters of the indirect utility 
functions. /?0ut and /?,N represent the parameters of the indirect utility function in the two living 
arrangements.
From the derivations of the theoretical literature surveyed earlier, one can expect:
( 2.12) (/?out,i ■ y i^N,i)>0 in all cases,
109 If we assume that the child ’s marginal utility of own income is higher when living outside the parental home, that it is 
typically the same as the marginal utility of transfers from parents, and that higher level of resources available only  in the 
parental home reduces departure, we see that the effect of higher parental income on departure depends on the increase in 
transfers T(1) for each unit increase in parental income and the relative effects of higher own income and higher resources 
available only in the parental home (housing, durables, etc.). In one extreme case, if own income has no effect on departure, 
we would expect parental income to have a negative or zero effect on departure. If, on the other hand, parental housing and 
parental durables, say, are irrelevant to departure, parental income will affect departure if transfers to children (T(1)) 
positively depend on parental income, otherwise it will have no effect. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) find that parental 
transfers when outside the parental home depend on child’s total income but not much on parental resources, which would 
mean that parental income would affect cohabitation mainly via the provision of common goods and this must a negative 
effect on departure rates, for a given level of child’s income.
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because the marginal utility of own income is likely to be higher when outside the parental home 
than when inside it;
(2.13) ( / f o u r ,2 -  ^ in ,2 )< 0  in most cases,
because the child’s marginal utility of parental income is likely to be higher when living with his 
parents when living without them, eg because when he can benefit from parental resources more 
while he is living with them (via the consumption of local public goods), while when on his own the 
benefit arises only from transfers to the child (and if the transfers are nil, /? 0 i i t ,2 be zero);
(2.14) ( / f o u T ,3  - /?i n ,3 )<0  if parents’ demand for housing is price inelastic, as explained in
Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997).
Differences in taste (ie, personal propensity to live with one’s parents) will affect the term (ut0UT - 
utIN). If some of these preferences are due to fixed effects and the rest can be attributed to a 
random error, this term can be rewritten as:
(2.15) (ulN-u ,0UTh=6} + t *
for child /, /'= 1, ..., N. 0, (the fixed effect) and v it are considered mutually independent, and v it is
an iid random variable.
Following from equation (2.15), several authors estimate an index function measuring the 
propensity for child /'to live outside the parental home at time t:
( 2.16) l j t =  (/fo )U T,1  -  /? IN , l)  Yet +  ( /fo )U T ,2 -  f l \ N , 2 )  Ypt + (/fo>UT,3 "  P \ N , 3 )  Pht + ( ^ O U T  ~ V 'In )  * t  + # /+  Ujt
or, after substituting J3k = (J30UTM- J3m k), k - 1,2, 3, and ^ ( ^ o u t -  Wn):
(2.17) llt = /?) yC(M + p2 ypit-1 + fhPhit + Wit +#/+ rjn
If I >0, the child lives outside the parental home, while, if /<0, he lives with his parents. In a static 
framework, however, strong assumptions are needed on <9, + v it for consistency. The fixed effect 
may be correlated with income, for example because a stronger desire for independence may be 
associated with higher income (Hill (1977) and McElroy (1985) point out that leaving home and 
labour market choices are simultaneously determined).110
On the whole, a static model is problematic, because i) It requires more instruments, as 
contemporaneous variables on the right hand-side may be correlated with the error; /'/) it requires 
more explicit dealing with the simultaneity of housing and labour market activity decisions; Hi) it may 
suffer from problems of attrition (because split-offs are at higher risk of attrition than those who stay 
at their parental home); iv) it may not be very useful towards the understanding of the determinants 
of departure from the parental home, both because cross-sectional observations are the results of 
past decisions, which may have become irreversible, and because current living arrangements are 
due to the net effect of children’s departures and returns.111
110 Chamberlain (1980)’s conditional logit estimator can yield consistent estimates of the //coeffic ien ts under the assumption 
of logistic distribution for uit but without requiring iVs independence of the explanatory variables, but the drawback of his 
model is that all the coefficients of variables that do not vary over the sample period, such as gender, and possibly education 
and parental permanent income or parental wealth (which are better explanatory variables than current income, if parents 
are not liquidity constrained), will not be identified.
111 Further problems are the implicit assumption of instantaneous adjustments, so that the living arrangement with the 
highest utility is always the one chosen. In practice, there may be significant delays.
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Dynamic framework
A panel extension of the static model, such as the one illustrated in Ermisch (1999), may 
overcome many of the difficulties just pointed out.
We concentrate on young people who were still residing with their parents at time t-1, and for 
them it must be:
(2.18) V t-i (Yc,t-i, Yp.t-1, Ph.t-i, X t-i, Ut-i ) < V t - i  (Yct-i< Yp,t-i, Ph,t-i, X-t-1, U t-i'N)
Similarly, for such children to leave the parental home before period t it must be
( 2.19) V<0UT(ya, ypl, phll x M, u,0UT)> V,'N(ya, ypl, pM, x,.,. u,m)
Therefore, the probability that a child leaves home in period t conditional on living with his 
parents at M  is
( 2.20) /„ = Pr (OUr»=1 | OU7),.,=0) = Pr (V„0UT > V , f \  VU_,0UT< VlP,m)
From here, one could build a model in first differences. There are, however, two problems: firstly, 
young people who leave home have relatively high attrition, and there is sometimes limited 
information on their situation at time f;112 secondly, there are endogeneity problems for variables at 
time t, because a child who has left home is much more likely to be working, and the causality may 
run from departure to income, or viceversa.113
By using individual’s information at time t-1, or earlier, to explain departures between time f-1 
and t, the risk of endogeneity is reduced.114 Exogenous covariates relative to the interval t-1 to t (eg, 
housing costs, regional unemployment) could, however, be included. Lagged variables, including 
lagged income, can be used in place of contemporaneous covariates. This requires that past 
information be not correlated with errors at time t. The rationale for using lagged variables is that it 
can often be assumed that it is their levels, as well as their changes, that affect the decision to 
move outside the parental home. Ermisch (1999), for example, assumes that parents’ (permanent) 
income can be thought of as yp t = yPt-i +£pt, ie, parental income does not change significantly over 
time but for an innovation term, spt, whose expected value at time t-1 is zero. Child’s income can be 
modelled slightly differently, he suggests, as yc t = yc M + y zt.1+ect, where z is a vector including 
variables such as age, experience, education, job search activity, health. sct is an i.i.d. random 
variable whose expected value at time t-1 is zero, and it may or may not be correlated with spt, but it 
cannot be correlated with u 0 ur,t and u,N:t, the preferences for privacy. It is important to notice that the 
child’s actual decision may take place when, say, he has actually never worked yet. The 
interpretation of yct then becomes that of potential income y* ie, the income the child could earn if 
working full-time at time t, and similarly for previous periods, and it is possible to assume that the 
child can form an expectation of his potential income by having some knowledge of the state of the 
labour markets and the earnings of his peers.
112 We often have information on the other members of the original household who can report the destination of the departed 
child.
113 Note that the conditionality introduced in this step is crucial to the interpretation of the results.
114 See for example, Hill and Hill (1976).
84
In several empirical works, with the exception of the few duration models found in the literature, 
researchers have taken all children living with their parent(s) at time M  and estimated the following 
index function measuring the propensity for child / to leave the parental home:115
(2.21) l , j =  /Ji yen-1  + P i  ypit-1 + Pi P hit +  YZi.t-1 + W it  + ()I+  Hit
The error rjit = uit + p ^ ct +fi&pt is an innovation error that reflects unexpected changes in tastes 
and incomes, ie r j it is assumed to be i.i.d. and is, by construction, not correlated with the 
explanatory variables.116
The theoretical model leads us to expect /?i>0, p2<0, Pi <0 if housing demand is inelastic with 
respect to price, and each component of y and y/ to have the sign expected, given its role in the 
determination of current income introduced above.
115 Those authors using cross-sectional data estimate a similar model, but cannot guarantee that there are no endogeneity 
problems.
116 If we are concerned that child’s income may be correlated with preferences for independence, eg because a child is more 
likely to be active in the labour market if he also wants to become independent faster, which means that this assumption will 
not hold, we may choose to use a measure of potential income rather than actual income.
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3 Determinants of young people’s departure from the parental 
home: an econometric analysis of European countries using 
the European Community Household Panel
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to estimate a model of departure of young Europeans from the 
parental home. The focus is on Europe because there are large differences in household 
structure between countries (lacovou (1998)) and because of the availability of a unique 
dataset, the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which will facilitate the 
comparison of results across countries. Our main focus is on whether differences in the risks of 
departure from home towards different destinations can be explained by looking at children’s 
and parents’ income and labour market characteristics.
3.2 Descriptive analysis
In this paper we use one large cross-national dataset, the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP). The ECHP is a standardised annual longitudinal survey carried out in the 
European Union since 1994. A full description of the data, including data handling, is to be 
found in section 3.4.1 below, after the main description of the facts and of the problem under 
investigation.
3.2.1 Descriptive statistics
As shown earlier, in the 1990s, for any age group, children in Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal, or the “South”) were more likely to be living with their parents than children 
of the same age in the rest of the European Union (the “North”). In chapter 2, we broke down 
the statistics on the basis of who they were sharing their accommodation with (parents only, 
parents and a partner, etc.). A simpler version of that table is shown below, giving the shares of 
young Europeans who are living with their parents in each country, divided by age group and 
gender. We note that the differences between countries become quite marked from the mid-20s 
for both sexes.
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Table 3.1 -  Share of young Europeans who are living with at least one of their parents, by
gender and age group 1994-7
18-23
Males
24-29 30-34 18-23
Females
24-29 30-34
Size
GREECE 85.7 66.5 32.9 71.4 30.1 9.5 14710
s.e. (0.7) (0.9) (1.2) (0.9) (0.9) (0.7)
ITALY 96.0 74.2 31.9 91.7 50.6 18.0 24442
s.e. (0.3) (0.7) (0.9) (0.4) (0.8) (0.7)
SPAIN 97.1 71.3 36.9 92.9 54.6 24.4 23395
s.e. (0.3) (0.7) (1.0) (0.4) (0.8) (0.8)
PORTUGAL 94.6 67.2 26.6 89.5 48.2 19.5 14529
s.e. (0.4) (1.0) (1.1) (0.6) (1.1) (1.0)
AUSTRIA 82.2 44.8 25.9 66.7 24.1 12.3 7218
s.e. (1.1) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.3) (1.0)
France 83.3 33.2 14.0 71.9 19.5 5.5 17631
s.e. (0.7) (0.9) (0.8) (0.8) (0.7) (0.5)
GERMANY 87.9 37.5 13.9 70.2 16.7 3.8 27017
s.e. (0.5) (0.7) (0.5) (0.8) (0.5) (0.3)
Luxemboura 92.3 34.8 16.5 78.6 17.5 7.2 2110
s.e. (1.6) (2.6) (2.0) (2.4) (1.9) (1.4)
BELGIUM 93.3 42.5 9.4 82.2 17.2 5.1 7985
s.e. (0.7) (1.4) (0.9) (1.1) (1.0) (0.6)
UK 76.7 28.6 12.5 56.8 12.8 3.4 21583
s.e. (0.7) (0.7) (0.6) (0.9) (0.5) (0.3)
IRELAND 93.8 51.3 22.8 84.9 38.5 12.6 13107
s.e. (0.4) (1.1) (1.2) (0.7) (1.1) (1.0)
NETHERLANDS 66.0 15.9 2.4 47.8 4.0 0.6 12120
s.e. (1.1) (0.8) (0.4) (12 ) (0.4) (0.2)
DENMARK 62.9 8.9 2.7 47.4 2.6 2.1 7349
s.e. (1.4) (0.8) (0.5) (1.4) (0.4) (0.5)
FINLAND 60.9 14.3 6.5 40.0 5.4 0.8 5091
s.e. (1 .6 ) (1 -3 ) (0 .9 ) (1 .7 ) (0 .8 ) (0 .3 )
Source: Author’s calculations on ECHP data (weighted using the personal weights provided by the ECHP variable 
p g 0 0 2 ) .: Standard errors in brackets.
The differences between countries, however, are not only in terms of timing of departure, but 
also in terms of destinations. To see this, we could imagine to take a youth who belongs to our 
dataset and is living in the parental home at the time of the current survey. If we look at the next 
survey, we expect that his living arrangements may depend significantly on his country, gender 
and age group. In Table 3.2 we do exactly this exercise, by taking all youth living with their 
parents in any wave and looking at their living arrangements in the subsequent survey.
The statistics clearly indicate that the proportions of youth exiting into each destination vary 
greatly by gender and country.
In Southern Europe, departure rates are fairly low (3% for males in the age group 18-23, rising 
to 8% at ages 30-34; 5% and 8% respectively for females) and mostly represent departures into 
a relationship, whereas in Continental and Nordic Europe departures are more frequent and 
mostly not into relationships, as shown in Table 3.2 and, in more aggregate terms, in Table 3.5 
(on page 106). Even though in the North the risk of entering a relationship is lower than the risk 
of moving out alone, for any person living in the parental home the probability of leaving home 
to enter a partnership is significantly higher in the North than in the South, because the risk of 
leaving home (into any destination) is higher in the North.2 The risk of leaving as a student is
1 Various weights are calculated by Eurostat to take into account the sample design (unequal selection probabilities) and 
calibrated to reflect the structure of the country’s population so that descriptive statistics can be calculated appropriately 
and not be affected too strongly by attrition and non-response. W henever we present tables that are weighted, the 
weights used are from variable p g 0 0 2 . The weighting techniques are explained extensively in the official Eurostat 
documentation “ECHP UDB m anual” , DOC. PAN 165/01.
2 Because the risk of departure into a partnership a n d  student status (“partn. Student”) is very low, this destination is 
grouped together with the “with partner” one in the subsequent empirical analyses.
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very low in the South, presumably because of the relatively low level of state support available 
to students in those countries.3
Unfortunately, student status poses two sorts of problems in the ECHP, which affects the quality 
of our results. Firstly, the information on who is currently attending a course of study is asked at 
wave one but, although the variable appears every year in the dataset, the ECHP 
documentation reveals that such information is not updated consistently in the subsequent 
waves 2 to 4, except for new entrants to the panel. Although we have tried to correct the 
variable by using information on whether the person has completed a degree in the last 12 
months and other related variables, we believe that there is significant scope for errors in the 
information available.4 Secondly, students who live outside the parental home during the week 
and come home at the weekend may be recorded as living at home and it is not possible to 
distinguish those from the ones who spend every night in the parental home. This second 
difficulty, however, is not very serious in the context of our analysis.
When considering the departure probabilities it is also important to notice that some cell sizes in 
Table 3.2 are very small. This and the associated large standard errors that result make it 
difficult to compare these probabilities across countries and to estimate country-specific 
regressions.
3 Because the risk attached to student destinations is very low, with the exception of the Nordic countries, we sometimes 
encountered difficulties in the empirical estimations because some of the dumm ies become unstable for the 
determ ination o f student destination.
4 This is one of the reasons why departure rates into student destinations seem somewhat low, in spite o f our efforts to 
correct the information on student status. Because of this data quality shortcoming, we will not be able to consider 
student departures separately in the multinomial model estimated country by country.
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Table 3.2 -  Departure probabilities of young people in Europe (1994-1997) by age and gender
MEN
GR I S P A F G B LUX UK IRL NL DK FIN
Stays home 96.2 98.7 98.5 97.1 94.3
18-23 
92.2 95.6 94.1 96.0 88.0 95.9 90.0 79.5 76.9
Alone 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.4 1.8 2.6 1.9 1.6 1.6 6.9 2.1 2.6 8.8 8.1
Alone student 1.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.9 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.8 4.6 6.7 7.6
With partner 1.3 0.5 1.2 2.5 2.7 2.1 1.7 3.2 2.4 4.7 1.2 2.3 3.3 5.2
Partn. student 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.7 2.3
Obs. 1587 3082 2972 2082 653 1684 1836 766 153 1515 1810 904 408 307
Stays home 94.4 93.3 93.1 90.3 93.5
24-29 
84.1 88.6 83.8 95.5 85.4 92.4 83.0 74.9 81.3
Alone 1.2 1.4 1.4 0.8 1.1 7.3 3.1 5.7 1.0 5.1 3.1 7.5 8.8 4.8
Alone student 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.6 2.8 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 1.1 3.3 0.7
With partner 4.3 5.0 5.2 8.5 4.5 5.4 6.7 10.1 2.2 9.0 4.2 8.2 4.6 11.5
Partn. student 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.1 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 8.4 1.7
Obs. 1230 2392 1855 957 427 572 976 308 79 558 796 283 46 85
Stays home 92.6 89.1 93.3 92.8 97.1
30-34 
94.1 88.5 90.6 87.7 91.5 90.4 96.2 58.7 95.0
Alone 2.8 4.3 2.2 2.4 0.5 4.3 5.0 0.0 6.6 6.3 4.9 3.8 41.3 2.3
Alone student 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
With partner 4.6 6.3 4.0 4.7 1.3 0.6 4.7 9.4 1.6 2.2 4.3 0.0 0.0 2.0
Partn. student 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 4.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.7
Obs. 422 662 524 324 157 149 309 72 24 178 242 33 9 32
WOMEN
GR I S P A F G 
18-23
B LUX UK IRL NL DK FIN
Stays home 93.4 96.8 97.0 94.7 90.6 87.5 89.9 92.6 89.6 80.5 92.5 85.2 70.0 76.4
Alone 1.2 0.6 0.1 0.4 1.7 4.1 3.8 1.6 3.6 9.7 4.6 2.8 7.2 3.8
Alone student 1.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 2.3 3.2 1.6 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.3 4.2 9.4 7.5
With partner 3.7 2.0 2.2 4.1 4.5 4.4 4.0 5.1 4.1 9.2 2.6 6.5 5.4 7.0
Partn. student 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.9 0.3 0.1 1.3 8.0 5.4
Obs. 1340 2834 2597 1606 473 1392
24-
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-29
643 148 1014 1360 662 255 206
Stays home 88.2 92.3 89.4 92.0 85.3 81.1 83.0 76.5 92.9 72.3 89.0 83.2 54.7 75.2
Alone 2.7 1.2 1.2 1.6 5.9 6.4 4.5 9.4 4.2 10.3 4.5 8.1 11.9 20.3
Alone student 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.4 6.9 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 3.6 0.0
With partner 8.0 6.2 7.6 5.4 6.9 5.1 8.2 13.4 0.0 16.8 5.6 8.5 29.7 4.5
Partn. student 0.7 0.2 1.4 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.8 3.0 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Obs. 606 1599 1364 663 196 324 443 
30-34
166 44 283 501 87 21 23
Stays home 93.3 92.5 88.3 95.0 93.6 95.7 84.7 90.8 100.0 85.9 92.8 82.5 86.9 65.4
Alone 1.7 1.5 2.9 1.0 3.0 0.0 3.7 1.3 0.0 12.4 1.9 17.5 13.1 0.0
Alone student 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.7
With partner 4.9 5.5 8.1 3.5 2.7 4.3 10.5 7.9 0.0 1.7 3.4 0.0 0.0 7.9
Partn. student 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Obs. 148 405 399 254 85 55 66 59 14 60 127 11 4 5
Cell values represent percentage shares. Source: Author’s calculations on ECHP data for 1994-1997 (excluding 
additional samples), weighted by sampling probabilities.
The destinations risk can be interpreted as follows: for a given sample observation of a youth living in the parental 
home, for a given country, gender, and age group, the probability of “stays home” is the risk that the youth is observed 
living in the parental home in the following year’s survey, “alone” that he is instead living alone or with friends, “alone 
student" that he is living alone or with friends but is a student, “with partner” that he is living with a partner but is not a 
student, “partn. student” that he is living with a partner and is a student.
Abbreviations: Greece (GR), Italy (I), Spain (E), Portugal (P), Austria (A), France (F), Germany (D), Belgium (B), 
Luxembourg (LUX), United Kingdom (UK), Ireland (IRL), the Netherlands (NL), Denmark (DK), Finland (FIN).
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3.3 Empirical methods
As explained in the previous chapter, young people’s decision of household formation is 
typically modelled in a utility comparison framework (where the child compares his utility when 
living with his parents and when on his own), and we also follow this methodology here. Thus, 
we include all children living with their parent(s) at time M  in our sample and estimate the 
following index function measuring the propensity for child / to leave the parental home:
(3.1) i j j— P\ Ydt-1 + Pi ypit-i+ yzi.t- 1 + HfX\i fjn
lit cannot be observed, but we find that OUT/f=1 if lit >0 (the child leaves home) and OUT,f =0 if k 
<0 (the child stays at home). yc/M is a measure of the child’s total labour total income in the 
previous calendar year, and ypfM is is a measure of the parents’ income in the previous calendar 
year (the exact details of each covariate will be explained in section 3.4.2 that describes the 
explanatory variables,). The error % = uit + Ptec/f +p2 zpn is an innovation error that reflects 
unexpected changes in tastes and incomes, ie % is assumed to be iid, not correlated with the 
explanatory variables; we also assume that &, is uncorrelated with the covariates and with rjn.
In a model where the determinant of departure is potential income (y ) the index function 
becomes
(3.2) in ~ Pi y at+ Pi yPi,t-i +yzi,t-i y/xa tin
As explained in detail later in section 3.4.3, we will ensure that this predicted variable is 
identified from other variables in the model.
Given the dynamic structure of this empirical analysis, we will look at young people’s living 
arrangements in each wave (time f), excluding the first, conditional on their living with their 
parents in the previous wave, and their living arrangements will be explained with variables 
referring to either time t (eg, unemployment rate) or the months between t- 1  and t (eg, potential 
income), or variables at M , which is the time of the previous interview (eg, health status), or in 
the 12-18 (approx.) months-period before time t- 1  (eg, parental income, own actual income).
In the sections below we will explain the methodology involving a dichotomous model and a 
multinomial model.
In the initial stage of this analysis, we explored alternative specifications, mostly on the basis of 
the previous works that we had considered for chapter 2’s literature survey, and evaluated the 
possibility of using duration modelling and a more structural model. However, we considered 
that duration modelling would be needlessly complex given that “exposure time” to the risk of 
departure from home is simply age, and we intended to keep our methodology comparable to 
the literature (thus improving, for example, in the direction of standardisation across countries 
and datasets of use of potential income). The choice of using dichotomous models and then 
expanding them to multinomial models involved testing for some potentially problematic issues, 
such as youth who leave the family for unknown destinations. The move from dichotomous 
models to multinomial ones was clearly dictated by better fit of the models, and clearly different
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coefficients depending on destinations (with Wald test results immediately leading to 
multinomial models in the initial stages of this research.
Dichotomous model
By assuming that both &, and rjit are normally distributed, the equation could be estimated using 
a random effects probit model.5 The dependent variable is whether the person leaves home 
(OUT=1) or not (OUT=0) before the following interview. Such a model can be estimated on all 
“children”, ie, those who are still living with at least one of their parents in a wave, and study 
what affects their departure from the parental home in the following 12 months. The estimates of 
coefficients and standard errors using a standard probit are, however, extremely similar to the 
ones from a random effects probit,6 which is computationally much more expensive, so this 
implies that a pooled model is acceptable in certain cases. We therefore used a standard probit 
model for the preliminary analyses on the ECHP data. For the reasons outlined in the literature 
survey earlier, however, a multinomial model may be superior to a dichotomous one.
Multinomial model
Since the decision to move out may mean forming a household with a partner or living without a 
spouse (ie, living either alone or sharing with others), we expect that the determinants that drive 
the child towards the two destinations may differ. In this context, a dichotomous model would 
not be appropriate. Instead, it is possible to use a random utility model of unordered three-way 
choice, where the first choice is remaining in the parental home, the second is moving out to live 
without a partner, and the third is moving out to live with a partner. The utilities associated with 
the three possible choices are:
This model can be easily extended to include 4 destinations (staying at home, leaving alone but 
not as a student, leaving as a student, leaving with a partner).
To estimate the model we need to make some assumptions on the distribution of the errors. The 
model typically used in the literature to model unordered choices is the multinomial logit model, 
which assumes a Weibull distribution of the error. Such error distribution has the cumulative 
density function F(s)=exp(-exp(-s))). Given the assumption on the errors, we derive that, for K+1 
choices, the probability of choosing option j  is
5 In a panel context, the autocorrelation in the error introduced by 0-, may affect the standard errors, while retaining the 
consistency of the parameters. The standard errors can be corrected as shown by Guilkey and Murphy (1993), who also 
show that for a short panel a standard probit may be as good as a random effects probit model.
6 Ghidoni (2000) analysed the ECHP using a dichotomous model and found evidence of this; Ermisch (1999) found the 
same using the BHPS to analyse departure from the parental home.
Um ~ /VX / + £ i, U2 i -  /V X , + 8 2  i U3  j -  /?3'X j + £3 j
The choice will depend on a comparison of utilities for each state, such that:
1 if j> U2i and ,-> U3l
Yi = 2 if U2 1 > Ui i and U2, > U3,
3 if U3  j > U!, and U3, > U2,
A =  i
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It is important to realise that the assumption of a Weibull distribution is intrinsically linked to the 
property of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) that the odds between any two 
destinations do not depend on other outcomes available. This is important otherwise the error 
structure of the model will not be correct. Such assumption, however, can be too strong in 
certain circumstances, but it seems reasonable in the context of our analysis, and we will also 
see that this property holds statistically here: for example, when we exclude student departures 
from the model and estimate a multinomial logit with three rather than four destinations, the 
coefficients remain substantially unchanged (appropriate empirical tests confirm this).7 
Although this model is quite well-known in the microeconometric literature and is not difficult to 
estimate, it is not common in the literature on children’s departure from home. We therefore 
believe that some important research progress can be achieved by using it in this context.
Most of the literature has used, instead, some sort of dichotomous model. We can check 
whether a dichotomous model would be appropriate with our data: after estimating the 
multinomial model it is possible to test whether the different destinations are in fact 
indistinguishable:8 if they are, they can be merged and a simpler dichotomous model can be 
estimated. If the destinations cannot be combined, they must be kept separate, otherwise the 
estimated coefficients would combine the effects of the covariates on the different destinations 
and we would not be able to interpret the results correctly.
Marginal Effects
We present the estimations of the marginal logit models in the form of marginal effects (with 
standard errors) that we compute numerically.
The probability of choosing destination j  is:
( x exp(/?'Jf)
Prf>: = / )  = -----  ,}
1 + Z exp ( A T )
k = 1
The formula for the marginal effects of xs, the s-th covariate, is given by the following formula:
a P r £  = j  ) = Pr (y = j ^ P j ,  -  i  Pr { Y  = k ) p lk
Ie:
3Pr(r = y )_  exp(/?;^) K exp (fi x^)
-  K P.is Z u  K P jk
1 + £  exp(/?; X)  4=1 1 + £  exp(/?; X )
k=I L  *=1
7 This test is performed by estimating a model with all the destinations, then estimating a model where one of the 
destinations is dropped, and comparing the coefficients of the full model with those of the restricted one. If the 
coefficients are not statistically different, then the IIA property holds. Such exercise is repeated by dropping each 
destination in turn and comparing the results to those of the full model, checking that the IIA property holds in all cases. 
The alternative model, which has to be used when the IIA property does not apply, is a multinomial probit, which 
assumes that errors are jo in tly standard normally distributed and does not rely on the IIA property. The multinomial 
probit is a much more time-consuming model to estimate.
This test is done by comparing the log-likelihood of the (unrestricted) m ultinom ial model with that of a model where we 
impose that the coefficients on every variable are the same across all destinations (ie the coefficients on income are the 
same, the coefficients on health are the same, etc). If the null of equality is rejected, the m ultinom ial model is preferable.
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Although their calculation can be computationally intensive, the marginal effects make the 
interpretation of the results easier to interpret than the coefficients of the multinomial logit. This 
is because the effect of a variable on any one destination is a combination of effects, which may 
not be apparent when the results of the multinomial logits are given as the estimated 
coefficients (the estimated values of the /7s).
The difficulty in interpretation arises because the effect of variable xs, say (one of the variables 
included in X), on the probability of destination /  depends not only on the parameter J3js , but also 
on the probabilities of all possible choices (0 to K) and therefore on all the (3 parameters and the 
covariates (X) for which these probabilities are calculated. In other words, the sign of the 
marginal effect of xs on destination j  is not necessarily the same sign as that of jBJs. For example, 
if variable xs has a positive coefficient for destination 1 and for destination 2 (outcome 0 being 
the base category), the marginal effect of xs on outcome 1 will take both the coefficients into 
account. If the coefficient for destination 2 is much larger than the coefficient for destination 1, 
the marginal effect (a sort of “net effect”) of xs on destination 1 may be negative. The values of 
the covariates used to calculate marginal effects are also fairly important, because the marginal 
effect of any one covariate on any outcome depends on the values of all covariates. Marginal 
effects are typically evaluated for a representative individual using the means (or the medians) 
of continuous independent variables and zero values for the dummies.9 The standard errors of 
the marginal effect of variable xs on any one destination, calculated numerically, show that, 
generally, the statistical significance of the marginal effect is similar to the significance of the 
coefficient of that variable for the same destination.
The empirical interpretation of the results using marginal effects is straightforward in practice. 
For example, if, the No Job dummy has a marginal effect of -0.03 on, say, departure alone, this 
means that, compared to the baseline case, which uses dummy No Job equal to 0, having No 
Job equal to 1 (ie, not having a job) decreases the probability of departure alone by 3 
percentage points. So, if the average risk (based on a baseline of having a job, ie No Job = 0) of 
departure alone were 10%, the risk would only be 7% if the person has no job.
Earnings
As highlighted in the survey of the econometric issues in the previous chapter, the use of actual 
income in the departure equations can be questioned on econometric (endogeneity) and 
theoretical grounds (it may not be the actual variable that affects departure). We therefore 
estimate two models, one with actual earnings and one with potential earnings. We expect that 
the second model will not be affected by the endogeneity problems that may exist for the first 
one.
Standard errors in the models with actual income are robust standard errors clustered for 
repeated observations by person (Huber/White/Sandwich robust variance estimator, see
9 Taking the means of the dumm y variables means that the reference individual cannot exist, as nobody can have a 
value for the dumm y that is different from 0 and 1. Even then, however, the values of the marginal effects are still fairly 
close to the ones calculated using either 0 or 1 values for the dummies.
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Williams (2000)). In the model with potential income, we use instead bootstrapped standard 
errors.
3.4 Empirical analysis
3.4.1 Data description
The purpose of this section is to give a full description of the data used in this paper and to 
discuss data quality, data handling and the particular issues encountered with this dataset.
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a standardised annual longitudinal 
survey carried out in the European Union since 1994, of which only the first four waves were 
available when we conducted our research. All current EU member countries but Sweden are 
represented, although Austria and Finland only joined in wave 2 and 3 respectively.10 It is 
important to note that the original ECHP surveys were terminated in three countries (Germany, 
Luxembourg and in the United Kingdom) after the third wave, and existing national panels 
replaced the national ECHP subsamples from wave four onwards. For comparability and 
consistency purposes, the ECHP is distributed with supplementary data taken from the national 
surveys for those countries for waves 1 to 3.11 In our work, for those three countries we use data 
from the original three ECHP waves and the fourth wave from the national surveys as 
distributed in the ECHP dataset, but not the additional data for waves 1 to 3.
The ECHP focuses on individual sample members, who are followed if they leave their original 
households. New sample members are children borne to sample members, but not anyone else 
who joins the sample members’ household after the initial wave. Some 60,000 households and 
ca 130,000 people aged 16 years and over are interviewed every year. The questionnaires and 
procedures are fairly standard across countries, but there are differences, mainly in sample 
selection and anonymisation. The interviews took place mostly in the calendar year following the 
survey year (eg, the first survey’s interviews were carried out in the calendar year 1994 and a 
large amount of questions related to the full year 1993, the “survey year”, etc.). Living 
arrangements refer to the day of interview. Income and labour market variables are usually 
available both for the current week/month and for the whole survey year.
The survey includes around four hundred questions, focusing on household information (family 
composition, total income, financial situation, housing) and personal information (work, training 
and education, income, financial situation, health, and, to a very limited extent, social activities). 
There is very limited information on norms and values, such as religious attendance, 
emancipation and family roles, and no information on intentions and expectations, nor on family 
conflict.
10 In the next chapter we compare the results from this chapter to those found using national datasets for UK, Germany 
and the US (using different datasets reduces comparability but enhances the quality of the results because those three 
country panels offer a w ider range of more variables and have been available for longer periods).
11 See official Eurostat documentation “ECHP UDB manual” , DOC. PAN 168/01 annex 2.
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We analyse the probability of departure of all people who are still living in the parental 
household in any one wave and on whom we have some information on their living 
arrangements in the following year. To achieve this, we pooled the responses from adjacent 
waves of the dataset (1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97) and stacked them to create one large 
dataset of individuals and their responses at two successive points in time.
For the purpose of this analysis, it is useful to state the meaning of certain expressions:
Living in the parental household (ie being a “child”, thus being at risk of departure): we define 
“children” all people who are in the same household of at least one parent of theirs, natural or 
legal, at the time of interview, even if they are “temporarily away” (but consider the parental 
home as their main residence). Children temporarily away, however, are not included in the 
analysis if they have not had a completed personal interview (since they typically have missing 
variables). It follows that a “parent” is a person who is in the same household of at least one 
child of theirs, natural or legal, at the time of interview (including most children who are 
temporarily away, as explained above).
Departure is defined as living in the parental household at one interview and being, at the 
following interview, in a living arrangement where no parent is present. Living without a partner 
is a situation where no other member of the household is classified as partner (married or 
unmarried spouse) of the individual, while living with a partner is when one other member of the 
household is classified as partner.
Tracing rules and data quality
Following the above two definitions, we had various difficulties with the data in relation to the 
determination of whether a child was living in the parental household and thus of whether he 
had left home between two subsequent waves.
Tracing rules in the ECHP were based on the concept of following up all sample persons, 
despite the fact that they may have moved, where “sample persons” are all “sample adults” 
(persons included in the sample of the first wave aged 16 and over by the end of the survey 
reference year; ie persons born during 1978 or earlier) and all “sample children” (persons aged 
under 16 at the end of the survey reference year), with only the sample adults being interviewed 
with the full personal questionnaire. For all persons who have died or left the household since 
enumeration in the preceding wave, information will be obtained on the date of death or 
departure. 12 Sample adults who have moved to another dwelling within the country (but still 
living in a private household) are traced to their new location and interviewed on the basis of the 
detailed household and individual questionnaires, and this applies to households who have split. 
Sample adults temporarily institutionalised or absent for other reasons are to be interviewed by 
proxy or phone interview using a reduced questionnaire. Sample adults moving into institutions 
on a permanent basis or for a short stay but who cannot be considered a member of any private 
household have to be traced in order to restore the contact when they return to a private
12 This paragraph and the next draws on the technical documents “Tracing for the second wave of the ECHP”, Eurostat 
Doc.Pan.27/94 and “Tracing rules”, Eurostat Doc.Pan. 55/95. Some of the analysis on data quality is based on Peracchi 
(2002).
96
household. During their institutionalisation, only tracing information (new location, date and 
reason for the move) will be recorded and obtained from someone who was a member of the 
person’s household at the previous wave, typically the household head.13 
The above rules, therefore, mean that university students, and other youth temporarily away, 
may be considered as part of the household (and thus as not having left) depending on the 
information that the household head provides on them and whether the household head 
considers that has being temporarily away, rather than on the basis of whether the youth himself 
believes to have left permanently.
Non-Response. Attrition, Data Quality
There are some specific problems in relation to attrition in the ECHP in the context of the study 
of young people’s departure from the parental home.
First of all, we have the problem of attrition of the full household of the young person, which is 
when the whole household is not traceable in the subsequent survey or refused to be 
interviewed. Attrition levels in the ECHP of the whole household are very different by country, as 
illustrated in Table 3.3 below, and this is partly due to different levels of effort to try to maintain 
high response rates (for example, the UK interviewers only made one attempt to contact 
households, thus yielding the worst contact rates in the survey).
Table 3 .3 -  Attrition rates by country between first and second wave
Country Rate Number of 
households
GREECE 91% 16321
ITALY 95% 21934
SPAIN 88% 23025
PORTUGAL 96% 14706
AUSTRIA 90% 9579
FRANCE 90% 18916
GERMANY 93% 12435
LUXEMBOURG 94% 2807
BELGIUM 92% 9149
UK 76% 14342
IRELAND 84% 14585
NETHERLANDS 92% 13029
DENMARK 89% 7693
FINLAND 92% 11214
Source: Author’s calculations on ECHP data, Peracchi (2002) and W atson 
(2002). First wave for Austria is the second ECHP survey, first wave for 
Finland is the third ECHP survey.
In these cases, if is not possible to know whether the youth is still living with their parents, and 
for our practical purposes we have dropped his observation from the sample at risk in the 
previous wave (unless the household is interviewed in a subsequent wave and the child reports 
having been at home during the survey where the interview was not carried out).
13 As a technical note on variable construction, there is a specific group of variables that can be used to cross-check 
departures in the presence of individual attrition (when there is no attrition of their original household): PRESIDi 
Residential status in wave i; PTEMPi W here the person is currently / temporarily living in wave i; PLASTW i Membership 
status in wave i-1; PIO- YYi PIO_MMi Year / Month moving in / born or out / died (wave i); PTRACEi Able to trace the 
person in wave i.
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Secondly, we have the case where there is no interview with the young person. This could be 
because the youth is traced as living with the original household, but either refuses to be 
interviewed or is temporarily away or otherwise unreachable. In these cases, it is known that he 
has not left the household from the information provided by the household head, which allows 
us to leave him in the sample at risk for the previous wave (with departure not having occurred), 
but we have to remove him from the sample at risk in the current wave because of lack of 
information for the covariates of the next period at risk. If the interview with the young person 
does not happen because he has left the household, as reported to the interview by the 
household head, this allows us to leave him in the sample at risk for the previous wave (with 
departure having occurred), and of course he will no longer be at risk of departure in the current 
period. It may be important to quantify the extent to which attrition may affect young people in 
particular, given that we focus on young people as our main sample. As indicated in Table 3.4 
below, which can be compared to previous Table 3.3, young people do indeed exhibit a 
generally higher risk of attrition compared to the overall population.
Table 3 . 4 -  Average attrition rates of people aged 17-29 by country
Country Attrition rate
GREECE 83%
ITALY 94%
SPAIN 86%
PORTUGAL 93%
AUSTRIA 86%
FRANCE 87%
GERMANY 88%
LUXEMBOURG 92%
BELGIUM 87%
UK 69%
IRELAND 74%
NETHERLANDS 82%
DENMARK 84%
FINLAND 91%
Source: Author’s calculations on ECHP data. N: Greece 10,780, Italy 18,093, 
Spain 17,362, Portugal 10,829, Austria 4,908, France 12,817, Germany 17,881, 
Luxembourg 1,341, Belgium 5,353, UK 14,696, Ireland 10,016, Netherlands 
8,386, Denmark 5,249, Finland 3,337.
This attrition of the youth (but not of his family) may cause problems for the determination of the 
destination, but not generally cause serious difficulties for the observation of departure events. 
In fact, for the purposes of our analysis, to determine whether the youth has left home, we do 
not need to trace the child, since the only information we need is whether he has left home or 
not, and this can be provided by the remaining household members. For the estimation, this 
only creates difficulties as to which exact destination has been taken (Alone/Student/Married). 
However for this to be a serious problem for our analysis, it has to be that household’s attrition 
from the panel is positively correlated with high departure rates of children from home, given 
that child’s attrition would be observed as departure from home (or refusal to respond to the 
questionnaire, but this would result in a proxy interview or simply our knowledge that the child
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has not left).14 In general, attrition here may mean that departure rates are artificially low, eg if 
attrition of the whole household from the panel is positively correlated with high departure rates 
of young people from home (either immediately or in future years), and the estimates of the 
coefficients in the departure equation may become inconsistent for this reason.
To cope with the problem, we explored whether one could remove from the sample at risk those 
youth who would turn out to be attriting without attrition of the household without biasing the 
results. As discussed above, in a simpler model of bivariate departure (still at home vs. having 
left), young people’s attrition without attrition of the household is not a problem. To investigate 
whether ignoring attrited departed youth in a model with different destinations could bias our 
results, we tested to see whether the category of “leaving to unknown destination” could be left 
out from the estimation.15 We found that such category could be omitted. The results of the test 
for the exclusion of the attrited group were, for men, chi2= -0.265 (46 d.f.), for women, chi2= - 
0.0100 (45 d.f.), thus both of them showing that the group that left to unknown destination could 
be omitted from the sample at risk for the multinomial logit model.16
Additionally, with regard to children who entered military service between two given surveys M  
and t we decided to remove them from the sample at risk of the M  wave.17 A limitation of the 
data is that whenever a child is “temporarily away” at the time of interview, whether the child has 
left or not depends, in practice, on the view of the parents; according to Eurostat definitions, 
however, it should depend on whether the child intends to return to his household. Additionally, 
in some cases, errors were found in the data: for example approx two thousand French youth 
have missing information on cohabitation (variable PD005 is largely wrongly coded, and PD008 
partially wrongly). Due to the cumbersome data distribution process of ECHP data, we were 
unable to obtain a different version of the dataset. To a large extent, however, most of the 
French observations for 1997 have been corrected after close inspection of the demographic 
variables (PD group) and relationship file.
Only people aged 17 to less than 35 are included in the analysis for Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal, and only people aged 17 to less than 30 for all other countries.18 The lower bound 
represents the start of adulthood when children can take their own decisions, since the children
14 Additionally, there could also be cases where the household head reports that the child is temporarily away (although 
the child him self considers him self has having left permanently. This can lead to attrition problems because, in the proxy 
interview that is conducted by the household head on behalf of the child temporarily away, the youth will not have 
provided information that we need for the estimation of his departure risk in the subsequent wave, and thus we will not 
be able to include him in the subsequent sample at risk. This would bias the departure rates downwards (both if the 
child should have been classified as left in the year of the proxy interview, and if children who are genuinely temporarily 
away are more at risk of departure).
15 “Leaving to unknown destination” typically represents a case where the youth is not interviewed after leaving home, 
so that we don’t know if they are living with a partner or not, whereas his original fam ily is interviewed and reports him 
as having left.
16 The tests were run on a simplified model with linear variables rather than dummies, hence the low number of degrees 
of freedom). Note that in a dichotomous model (OUT vs IN) attrited children could simply be assigned to the OUT 
category (for children’s split-ups, both parents typically remain in the original household, they are interviewed and report 
that their child has moved out), while such an easy fix is not possible in a m ultinom ial logit model. Cf. Ghidoni (2000).
17 This is not the only solution, as military service is not a completely exogenous event if the youth can postpone it (but 
generally not indefinitely so). However the numbers involved are relatively small and tend to concentrate in Greece, 
Italy, France and Germany. Our treatm ent could have involved instead assuming that these children hadn’t left home 
(ie, as if they had been temporarily away) between the two surveys.
18 The age refers to the year following the interview in which they are still living with their parents. Some countries in the 
North, notably Finland, have so few "children” aged 30 or above that it was necessary to reduce the upper bound to 27 
years of age. This can be checked by looking at the coefficients that are not estimated and at the descriptive statistics 
for each country.
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will turn 18 between that survey and the subsequent one; at earlier ages, departures rates are 
negligible in the Mediterranean region and are around 1% elsewhere. The upper bounds have 
been chosen because the number of children still living with their parents is, by that age, 
extremely low in the North and somewhat stable in the South (as if the child had decided to live 
with their parents for the rest of their life). Further issues related to data handling of covariates 
other than living arrangements are discussed in the next section.
3.4.2 Departure equation: choice of explanatory variables
Implementation of the empirical specification explained above requires consideration of the 
variables that influence departure through the indirect utility function. On the basis of the 
empirical literature and the ECHP data, we include the following covariates.
Demographic and personal characteristics
We include demographic covariates such as age group dummies. This is preferable to using 
linear or square age terms because it avoids imposing any restrictions on the shape of the age 
profile.
Health status: satisfaction with own health status (0-1 dummy).
Propensity to mobility: information on whether the youth has lived in the current region at all 
times since birth is used to control for his history of mobility, and we expect this variable to affect 
departure to all destinations.
There is little variation in race groups and nationalities within each country, and therefore such 
variables are not used.
Own resources and job-related variables
Own income: we use net total labour income for the previous calendar year. In the model with 
potential income we use fitted net full-time yearly labour income, whose exact estimation is
19explained in section 3.4.3. To account for non-linearities in the effects of own (actual) and 
parental income and to allow easier comparisons across countries, we used percentiles (the 
position of the individual in the distribution of income), calculated by country and gender on all 
people aged 18-30 (18-35 for the South), excluding those with zero labour income. Individuals 
with zero income are given percentile zero and then a value of one in a zero-income dummy 
which is also included in the model. The reference group is an individual with the median level 
of income in the previous year.
Current labour market status (No Job dummy): this takes the form of a dummy to show whether 
the person has no job in the reference week (the week of the interview), and this includes both 
unemployment and inactivity (the dummy is equal to one if no job, equal to zero otherwise). It 
can be useful to point out that the “no Job dummy” differs significantly from the “zero income 
dummy” described in the previous paragraph in that the “no Job dummy” indicates the person is
19 W e investigated the use of non-labour non-transfer income (which includes, for example, investment income), but the 
results were mostly disappointing.
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not working during the reference week while “the zero income dummy” refers to the previous 
calendar year. Therefore the two dummies reflect, respectively, the most recent labour market 
status versus the labour market status over a longer and somewhat less recent (and thus non- 
contemporaneous) period.
Student status: this dummy is equal to one if, at the time of interview, the child is in education or
20training (not necessarily as his main occupation).
Satisfaction with job security: Those currently employed are asked how satisfied they are with 
the security of their job, and this is ranked on a scale from 1 (least satisfied) to 5 (most 
satisfied). The covariate in the model uses the same scale, while those not employed are 
assigned a value of 0 (and they are the ones for whom the current labour market status dummy 
No Job is equal to 1). Although there is information on the kind of contract (fixed term, 
permanent, etc.) for those employed, preliminary empirical investigations (correlation analyses) 
showed that a subjective variable may be a more useful explanatory variable.
Parental resources and household variables
Parental/family income: theoretical reasons indicate that, assuming that parents are not liquidity 
constrained, some measure of parental permanent income should be a relevant covariate. No 
measure of parents’ net assets is available in the ECHP.21 We therefore use total family income 
minus the child’s income. Both are amounts net of tax for the previous calendar year. We used 
an OECD-equivalised scale of household size to standardise it,22 and then, to account for non- 
linearities in its effect and to allow easier comparisons across countries, we used percentiles, 
calculated by country. We treat parental variables as exogenous: since income variables refer to 
many months before time t (the time of possible departure) this should reduce significantly the 
risk of endogeneity, while personal characteristics refer to the week that marks the beginning of 
the period of possible departure.
Household size: this variable is not entered directly but it is used to standardise family income 
and the size of the accommodation.
Durables: to capture the effect of non-transferable parental resources, we use an index of 
durables available in the parental home, based on eight questions.23 The range of this variable 
is therefore 0 to 8.
Household owns current accommodation: this dummy is included to capture the effect of wealth 
resources not reflected in parental income and durables.24
Rooms per person: this variable is a measure of accommodation size and is calculated as 
number of rooms (including kitchen) divided by household size.
Adequacy of the size of the current accommodation is a potentially important explanatory 
variable, and it can be derived from the household questionnaire in two ways: a subjective
20 As the ECHP acknowledges, the information on student status, which is correct in wave 1, is not updated correctly 
until wave 5. In the waves available to us, this results in somewhat unreliable information on student status, even if 
some information can be collected on whether the student has completed a course of study in the previous 12 months 
(variables pt001 and pt005=0).
21 There is very limited or indirect information on financial variables, eg, on mortgages and on non-labour income.
22 The “OECD equivalence scale” assigns a value of 1 to the first household member, of 0.7 to each additional adult and 
of 0.5 to each child.
23 The variables are hb001-hb008 and ask whether the household possesses the following (one for each question): a 
car, a colour TV, a VCR, a m icrowave, a dishwasher, a telephone, a second home and a computer.
24 The house owned dumm y is used in only some of the estimations.
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measure (“does the accommodation have shortage of space?” asked of the main respondent 
and leading to a “shortage of space” dummy) and a measure calculated as rooms per person 
(where household size is the OECD measure). In our preliminary analyses, the rooms per 
person measure appears to perform better empirically.
Macro variables
We have included levels and changes in the regional unemployment rate in all models. 
We also included year dummies and (macro-)regional dummies as controls.25
In addition to potential income, illustrated in the section below, other variables were used in
initial attempts but turned out not to be significant or to be highly correlated with other variables
in the models, and we therefore left them out. Amongst these are:
whether the person lives with a child of theirs (which was treated as exogenous).26
whether the person lives with a partner of theirs (makes departure without a partner very
unlikely);
whether the child is living with at least one stepparent;27 
whether the child is the only child in the household; 
whether the child only has one parent;
satisfaction with commuting time to the workplace (which may capture the propensity to leave 
home for job related reasons, but is not significant once a full set of control is used).
3.4.3 Estimation of potential income
The second model estimated includes all previous covariates except for actual earnings (and 
the related zero dummy), the job security variable and the no-job dummy, and these are 
replaced by a potential earnings covariate.
Predicted (or potential) earnings for young people in the panel are calculated using an earnings 
function estimated on the same dataset. The equations are estimated for each country and 
gender separately, but all waves are pooled together and year dummies are used. All four 
waves are used for the estimation, even if only three waves of potential earnings can be used
25 W e have NUTS3 regional definitions for most countries, but only larger aggregates are available for some, and a large 
number of observations have no information on the region of residence. No regional information at all is distributed for 
Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands (and Luxembourg).
26 In the North, less than 1% of males and 1-2% of females cohabit with their parents and a child of their own, so this 
parental dummy can only be included for the South and for Ireland. The general aim was to use the same covariates for 
every country, but it is apparent that the econom ic structures are quite different and using the same explanatory 
variables may make little sense. For example, one could try to control for household permanent wealth by including 
information on whether the household is owner-occupier or is renting their accommodation. It turns out that the sizes of 
the rental market differ w idely across Europe, and very few children (0.7%) live in social housing in Greece, whereas 
very few live in private rented accommodation in Ireland (0.4%). Similarly, the probability that a young person who is still 
living with their parents also has a child of theirs is negligible in most Northern countries, and the “has a child” dummy 
can generally not be used there because it creates instability (and when it can, it will have very large standard errors). It 
is therefore difficult to include much detail in a “standardised” regression.
27 This dummy is equal to one in very few cases (less than 1% of the sample in Southern European countries and 
Ireland), which leads to instability of the model. In Northern Europe, however, the percentage of children living with a 
parent who is not a natural mother or father can be 5% or more of all children still living at home. In ca. 80% of the 
cases when the dumm y is equal to one the child is living with a natural parent, so it is uncommon for a child to be living 
with stepparents and no natural parents. W e found that the dummy was sometim es strongly significant for some 
Catholic countries, but even then the sign was not consistently the same.
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for the estimation of the departure equation. The sample used for the estimation of the earnings 
equation includes all 17-35 year old people, irrespective of their current living arrangements.
We regressed log net yearly labour earnings on selected covariates using the procedure 
suggested by Heckman, ie, a maximum likelihood regression model with selection to control for 
sample selection bias in full-time employment. The variables used in the earnings equation 
differ slightly between countries, primarily because for some countries some variables are not 
available, eg, no regional indications are given for Germany because of confidentiality reasons. 
For the income equation, the dependent variable is net labour income for full-time workers in the 
previous year. Further covariates, chosen partly on the basis of the prevailing variables used in 
earnings equation in the labour economics literature and also with the intention of finding 
covariates that are not determinants of departure from home, are own education, tenure, tenure 
squared, whether the person has worked before (information available in variable pj0 0 1 , equal 
to 1 if person has worked before, equal to 2 if person is in his first job), potential experience 
(since the start of the person’s first job, using variable pe039 (age of first job)), potential 
experience squared and a dummy for long periods of unemployment in the recent past (variable 
pu004), and there are also year dummies and region dummies. The identification of the 
predicted variable in the departure from home equation is given by the previous job experience 
dummy and job tenure.
The participation equation is a probit where the dependent variable would ideally be whether the 
person worked full-time in the whole of the precedent year. The rationale for this is that we 
would like to estimate the potential full-time earnings of a youth working full-time and for most of 
the year. In practice, however, the calendar of activities for the previous year does not 
distinguish between full- and part-time employment. In most cases, therefore, a youth has been 
considered to have been in full-time employment in the previous year if that was his most
frequent activity in the previous calendar year and if he was working full-time at the time of the
28survey. The reason for not requiring continuous full-time employment over the whole year is 
that the earnings of a full-year may not necessarily reflect the expectations of a child when he is 
considering departure from home; on the contrary, he may well be factoring in the risk of being 
out of work for a period of time. Since our focus is on young people, we think it is important to 
control for non-participation for both sexes, because, contrary to what can be observed for older 
adults, large shares of young men are not working. 29 The selection equation (the probit that 
explains whether a person had been working for most of the previous year) is identified using 
marriage status, partner’s employment status and own health status.
In the earnings equation and in the selection probit we do not include any information on 
whether the child is living with his parents because including that information would create 
endogeneity, since residence with the parents is what we ultimately want to analyse. For similar 
reasons, we do not estimate an earnings function only on the sample of children already living 
outside the parental home (but we impose the restriction on full-time employment or the 
selection probit because we expect the youth to (expect to) be employed full-time, and for most 
of the year, if living without their parents).
28 In the Netherlands labour market participation is calculated on more recent information because information on 
monthly labour market status is not available.
29 Gross earnings for France.
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From the fitted model we then calculate a potential income variable for all individuals, ie both 
those in and out of work. Similarly to the standardisation carried out with actual income, this 
fitted variable is turned into a percentile measure, where we calculate the centile position of the 
fitted variable by country and gender. This covariate will then be used in the "departure equation 
with potential income”. As to the quality of the fitted measure, we observe a correlation of 
48.62% of potential income percentile with actual income percentile across the whole ECHP 
sample of young people, irrespective of their living arrangements but excluding those who had 
zero income in the previous year.
Results for the estimation of potential income and further details on how potential income is 
derived are reported in the appendix (section 3.10).
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3.5 Results
Descriptive analysis
Amongst all ECHP children living with their parents, we find an overall average departure rate of 
7%, but there are significant differences between genders and countries. The departure rates 
are much lower in the South, where the risk of departure stays extremely low at early ages and 
then increases slowly, and they are significantly higher in the North, as illustrated in Table 3.5. 
The differences are large and significant between North and South, and typically within each 
group as well. Since the ECHP sample sizes are relatively large in the South and Southerners’ 
departure rates are lower, most of the people living with their parents (ie, our population at risk
30of departure) reside in the South.
30 These figures are based on the actual samples used in the estimation and are therefore corrected for missing values 
of explanatory variables, while the statistics in Table 3.2 were more general and not corrected in this way.
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Table 3 .5 -  Average departure rates by country and sex (1994 -1997)
Stavs home
MEN
Alone Student Couole
GREECE 95.5 1.3 0.35 2.9
(0 .4 ) (0 2 ) (0 .1) (0 .3)
ITALY 95.8 1.2 0.21 2.8
(0 .3) (0 . 1) (0 .1) (0 .2 )
SPAIN 96.1 0.8 0.06 3.0
(0 -3) (0 .1) (0 .0) (0 .2 )
PORTUGAL 95.0 0.4 0.03 4.5
(0 .4 ) (0 . 1) (0 .0 ) (0 .4 )
AUSTRIA 95.1 1.3 0.63 3.0
(0 .5) (0 .3) (0 .2) (0 .4 )
FRANCE 90.9 3.8 2.25 3.1
(0 .6 ) (0 .4 ) (0 .3 ) (0 .4 )
GERMANY 94.0 2.3 0.83 2.8
(0 .5) (0 .3) (0 .2 ) (0 .3)
BELGIUM 93.8 2.0 0.3 4.0
(0 .8) (0 .4 ) (0 .2 ) (0 6 )
LUXEMBOURG 95.1 1.8 0.0 3.1
( 1.4 ) (0 .8) (0 .0) ( 1 1 )
UK 89.6 5.4 1.11 3.9
( 1 .1) (0 .8) (0 .4 ) (0 .7 )
IRELAND 94.8 2.4 0.75 2.0
(0 .5) (0 .3) (0 .2 ) (0 -3)
NETHERLANDS 90.8 2.9 3.18 3.2
(0 .9) (0 .5) (0 .6 ) (0 .6 )
DENMARK 82.0 7.1 5.71 5.1
( 1.6 ) ( 1 .1) ( 1.0 ) (0 .9)
FINLAND 85.1 4.4 5.28 5.3
( 1.8) ( 1-1) ( 1.2 ) ( 1 .2)
All countries 94.4 1.7 0.70 3.2
(0.1) (0.1) (0 0) (0.1)
WOMEN
Stavs home Alone Student Couole
GREECE 92 5 1.2 0 83 5 4
(0 .6 ) (0 .2 ) (0 .2) (0 .5)
ITALY 94.8 1.2 0.24 3.8
(0 .3) (0 .2) (0 .1) (0 .3)
SPAIN 94.5 0.6 0.27 4.6
(0 .3) (0 .1) (0 .1) (0 .3)
PORTUGAL 94.2 0.5 0.15 5.1
(0 .5) (0 .1) (0 -1) (0 .4 )
AUSTRIA 90.6 2.8 1.39 5.3
(0 .8) (0 .5) (0 .3 ) (0 .6 )
FRANCE 87.1 4.4 3.56 4.9
(0 .8) (0 .5) (0 .4 ) (0 .5)
GERMANY 91.9 3.1 1.09 3.9
(0 .7) (0 .4 ) (0 .3) (0 .5)
BELGIUM 93.0 2.3 0.12 4.6
(0 .9) (0 .5) (0 . 1) (0 .7 )
LUXEMBOURG 90.0 3.5 1.00 5.5
(2 . 1) (1.3) (0 .7 ) ( 1 .6 )
UK 89.2 3.4 0.26 7.2
( 1.3) (0 .7) (0 .2 ) ( 1 .1)
IRELAND 92.7 3.4 0.44 3.4
(0 .6) (0 .4 ) (0 .2 ) (0 .4 )
NETHERLANDS 87.8 3.1 3.13 6.0
( 1 .3) (0 .7) (0 .7 ) (0 .9)
DENMARK 72.7 8.2 9.09 10.0
(2 .2 ) ( 1 .4 ) ( 1 .4 ) ( 1 .5)
FINLAND 80.4 4.7 5.61 9.4
(2 .4 ) ( 1 .3) ( 1 .4 ) ( 1 8 )
All countries 92.4 1.9 0.97 4.7
(0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (01)
Cell values represent percentage shares. Source: Author’s calculations on ECHP data for 1994-1997 (excluding 
additional samples), calculated on the samples used for estimation of the m icroeconom ic models, and therefore correct 
for missing values in explanatory variables but no t for attrited youth. Age range is 17-29, except for Greece, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal where it is 17-34
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The destinations risk can be interpreted as follows: for a sample observation of a youth living in 
the parental home, for a given country, gender, and age group, the probability of “stays home” is 
the risk that the youth is observed living in the parental home in the following year’s survey, 
“alone” is the risk that he is instead living alone or with friends, “alone student” is the risk that he 
is living alone or with friends but is a student, “with partner” is the risk that he is living with a 
partner.
3.5.1 Pooled model for all countries
As a preliminary step, we estimate a model for all countries using only intercept dummies to 
control for country differences, because the large number of variables involved would make it 
impractical to include interactive dummies for every covariate, and even slope dummies for the 
most important covariates would easy lead to a rather complex model.
For illustration purposes, we keep the model simple, although we still introduce a certain 
number of control variables and estimate the model separately by gender.31 The results are 
reported in Table 3.6.
In this simple analysis there are several notable results.
Personal income and employment status have significant effects on departure rates to all 
destinations. For men, income is more important for departures into partnerships, while for 
women it is the opposite. The effects, however, are not very large: a move in the income 
distribution from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, for example, increases the probability 
of departure by less than 1pc, even considering the combined effect of this on all destinations. 
Having no job has a significant effect in delaying departures, but the magnitude is never larger 
than 1.4 percentage points, which is low in absolute values but of large magnitude for men 
leaving into Marriage, where the mean outflow rate is 3.2%, meaning that not having a job 
reduces men’s probability of departure into marriage by around 40%.
Parental income significantly increases men’s student departures and men’s alone departures, 
but the effects are very small in absolute levels.
Living in owned accommodation and the number of rooms per person appear to act as proxy for 
wealth/quality of accommodation: children from families with a large number of rooms or in 
owned dwellings leave later, but the effect is not particularly large in absolute terms. In relative 
terms, however, given that the sample mean outflow rate into Alone destinations is 1.7% for 
men and 1.9% for men, finding a significant estimated marginal effect of 0.4% is actually 
important. Under this light, the effect of parental income for men leaving Alone is also not 
negligible, as a move up two quartiles in the earnings distribution will have an effect of 0.34% on 
the risk.
31 Although we are not expecting pooling to offer the best analytical framework for the European countries, it may still be 
useful to use it as a starting point.
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The effect of job stability, unemployment, and other controls is either not significant or very 
small.
The values of the country dummies are reported in the appendix, and are in line with the 
differences in the average rates observed in Table 3.5.
In spite of the interesting results, this model suffers from several problems, particularly because 
it imposes a common structure across countries (eg, assuming that all coefficients are the 
same). While we could improve on it by using slope dummies for each country, the resulting 
model would still assume that the errors have the same structure in every country. Also, a large 
number of slope dummies can make the estimation unstable. The overall explanatory power of 
the model is low. The model also makes the assumption of common error variance across all 
countries. For this reason, in the next sections we will be estimated separate models by using 
subsamples of the dataset.
Additionally, in order to address our concerns on the quality of the student status information, 
we compute the Hausman test of the assumption of the independence of irrelevance
32alternatives (IIA). The test does not reject the null, and therefore allows us to analyse 
departure from home excluding student departures.
Table 3 . 6 -  Multinomial model of departure from the parental home - Pooled model for Europe -  
Marginal effects for selected covariates
Males
Alone
Males
Student
Males 
With partner
Females
Alone
Females
Student
Females 
With partner
Income 0.000088 -0.000008 0.000105 0.000072 -0.000028 0.000009
(percentile) [3.19]*** [0.74] [3.54]*** [2.06]** [1.04] [0.14]
Family standardised 0.000067 0.000018 -0.00003 0.000035 0.000018 0.000002
income (percentile) [3.06]*** [2.06]** [1.16] [1.37] [1.14] [0.03]
No Job -0.000507 0.002346 -0.013697 -0.004641 0.001593 -0.008073
[0.25] [2.67]*** [5.48]*** [2.08]** [1.13] [1.85]*
Zero income 0.000364 -0.000777 -0.004829 0.000861 -0.001832 -0.015505
dummy [0.22] [1.78]* [2.15]** [0.49] [2.14]** [4.57]***
Student -0.005398 0.000574 -0.00675 -0.007667 0.000941 -0.026182
[3.29]*** [1.33] [2.90]*** [4.52]*** [1.11] [7.32]***
House owned -0.004342 -0.000469 0.000313 -0.004065 -0.000781 0.000009
[3.63]*** [1.19] [0.20] [2.92]*** [1.04] [0.00]
Rooms pp 0.001489 0.000158 -0.002901 0.001275 0.000469 -0.005028
[1.78]* [0.57] [2.46]** [1.31] [0.75] [2.32]**
Accomm. short of 0.002518 -0.000123 0.001222 -0.001807 -0.000129 -0.002344
space [1.90]* [0.26] [0.78] [1.21] [0.15] [0.88]
Unemployment current 0.0003 0.000085 0.000294 -0.000042 -0.000041 0.000905
[2.01]** [1.22] [1.83]* [0.24] [0.32] [3.29]***
Unemployment change -0.001267 0.00032 -0.000946 -0.000865 0.001554 0.000621
[1.51] [1.01] _ [1-12] [0.94] [2.89]*** [0.44]
Source: Own calculations on ECHP data. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. Sample sizes: 30066 men, 23377 women. Age range is 17-29, except for Greece, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal where it is 17-34. Full sets of results is in appendix.
32 Further checks will be carried out again at later stages of the analysis. In most cases, including when performing the 
analysis country by country, the IIA property holds.
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3.5.2 Pooling by group of countries
Estimating a large pooled model entails making a number of simplifications, restrictions and 
assumptions, and it presents us with practical difficulties, such as the high number of slope 
dummies if one wants to observe the country effect of each covariate. We therefore want to 
focus our attention to group of countries that can be considered somewhat homogeneous. 
There is no obvious way to make such grouping. One possible avenue is to follow the taxonomy 
proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990) and Esping-Andersen (1999), also utilised by lacovou 
(1998) and lacovou (2001), with a Southern European regime (which includes Ireland), a Nordic 
model and a Continental mode, plus, separately, the UK. An alternative solution would be to 
look at the estimates on the country dummies presented in Table 3.21, which in fact do show a 
tendency to agree with the above taxonomy, with very negative dummies for Southern Europe, 
dummies for Continental Europe close to zero or significantly negative but not below a value of 
minus 1-1.5% (-0.0010, -0.0015), and positive dummies for Nordic Europe. The UK being the 
reference country, it would then fit in the Continental Europe group. The dummies for men and 
women do vary somewhat, and in fact there are different dummies for Alone, Student and 
Married, so one could argue that Austria - and perhaps Ireland, with a negative With-Partner 
dummy reflecting low risk of departure into Marriage, which is consistent with Esping- 
Andersen’s taxonomy- are close to both Southern Europe and Continental Europe; additionally, 
for women in general the distinction seems somewhat more blurred (Dutch Alone and With 
Partner women have dummies equal to zero).
Because of the large number of variables involved, here, too, it is not practical to include slope 
dummies for every covariate. Instead of dropping some of the covariates from the model, we 
choose to include a number of explanatory variables of potential significance and interaction 
dummies only for the most relevant of these.33
Southern Europe
Table 3.7 shows the parameters for each of the Southern countries. The effect of own income is 
mostly significant, particularly for Spanish males and for Portuguese men entering a 
partnership. The no-job dummy is always very strong and negative on departures into a 
partnership, and its effect is sometimes more important than that of own income. The standard 
errors seem to indicate that the effects vary by country, not only by being significant in some 
countries and not in others, but also because the size of the coefficient is significantly greater in 
some countries, although always positive and significant, as it is the case for own income for 
departures into relationship in Spain compared to Portugal and Italy.
Parental income has a clearly negative effect on partnership departures in Italy and Spain. For 
Italy, the coefficient on parental income is 50% larger than that for own income, while it is half of 
it for Spain.
33 The coefficients for income and employment are reported in the tables in the next pages, and a separate table (Table 
3.10) shows the results of the jo in t LR tests of country interaction effects (the results show that interaction effects are 
not significant, which is why we are not showing the full table of interaction coefficients), while Table 3.11 assesses 
whether destinations can be combined.
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The bottom part of the table refers to Southern women. The coefficients show that the effects of 
own and parental resources are much weaker than the ones found for males. There is no clear 
pattern across countries emerging from the results for women.
In general, although the results significant, they may appear of small magnitude. It is important, 
however, to relate them to the average departure rates considered in Table 3.5, where Southern 
Europeans’ risk was shown to be around 4-5%, with only 1% probability of moving into alone 
destinations. In the light of those average rates, the effects of some covariates, such as the No 
Job dummy, appear important from a relative point of view.
Table 3.7 - Effects of income and employment variables by country in pooled 
_____________ model for Southern Europe -  marginal effects_____________
MEN
SINGLE DESTINATIONS
Greece Italy Spain Portugal
Own income (pet) 0.000003 0.000059 0.000099 0.00004
[0.07] [1.96]* [2.36]** [0.53]
Parental income 0.000056 0.000019 0.000006 0.000001
[1.34] [0.61] [0.13] [0.01]
No Job 0.004575 -0.00367 -0.00523 -0.00141
[1.90]* [1.58] [1.73]* [0.24]
PARTNERSHIP DESTINA TIONS
Greece Italy Spain Portugal
Own income 0.000112 0.00008 0.000242 0.000143
[1.94]* [1.79]* [4.69]*** [3.05]***
Parental income 0.000033 -0.00014 -0.00012 -0.000031
[0.51] [2.86]*** [2.54]** [0.65]
No Job -0.01899 -0.01813 -0.01599 -0.01713
[3.14]*** [5.00]*** [3.90]*** _[_3.51]***
WOMEN
SINGLE DESTINATIONS
Greece Italy Spain Portugal
Own income -0.000002 0.000081 0.000047 0.000026
[0.05] [2.40]** [1.16] [0.38]
Parental income 0.000066 -0.000008 0.000066 -0.000047
[1.51] [0.27] [1.30] [0.84]
No Job -0.00042 0.000252 -0.00331 -0.00027
[0.18] [0.12] [1.49] [0.06]
PARTNERSHIP DESTINATIONS
Greece Italy Spain Portugal
Own income 0.000247 0.000189 0.000239 0.000092
[1.65]* [1.46] [2.20]** [0.78]
Parental income -0.00026 -0.00016 -0.00014 0.000022
[2.14]** [1.75]* [1.50] [0.20]
No Job -0.01698 -0.00398 -0.00617 -0.00625
[2.02]** [0.531 [0.96] [0.82]
Source: Own analysis on ECHP data. Marginal effects (t-stats in square brackets); * significant at 
10%; ** sign, at 5%; *** sign, at 1% . Age range is 17-34. Sample sizes: Men: Greece 2858; Italy 
6152; Spain 5289; Portugal 3429; W omen: Greece 2021; Italy 4947; Spain 4480; Portugal 2622. 
Full sets of results is in appendix.
Northern Europe
Table 3.8 refers to Northern Europe and reveals a pattern of the effect of own income and 
unemployment on single departures: earnings and employment mostly increase the risk of
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departure. Own income increases departure in Ireland, UK and Germany, and the no-job 
dummy has a negative effect on departures in Austria, France and Belgium/Luxembourg, but a 
positive one in the UK. In most cases and for both genders parental income has a positive effect 
on single departures (while in Southern Europe we found that parental income was delaying 
departure into partnerships).
Table 3.8 Effects of income and employment variables by country in pooled model for Northern 
Europe -  marginal effects_______________________________________________________________
MEN
SINGLE DESTINATIONS
Austria France Germany Bel/Lux UK Ireland
Own income 0.000065 0.000094 0.000094 -0.00009 -0.00021 0.000237
[0.34] [0.71] [0.85] [0.47] [1.54] [2.14]**
parental
income 0.000502 0.000234 0.000249 -0.000052 0.000455 0.000137
[1.83]* [1.98]** [2.09]** [0.27] [3.92]*** [1.08]
No Job -0.04203 -0.01538 -0.0104 -0.02639 0.015749 0.009798
[1.76]* [2.33]** [1.40] [2.28]** [2.66]*** [1 37]
PARTNERSHIP DESTINATIONS
Austria France Germany Bel/Lux UK Ireland
Own income -0.00029 -0.00013 0.000186 -0.00013 0.000132 0.000434
[2.41]** [1.24] [2.73]*** [1.11] [1.66]* [5.20]***
parental
income -0.00023 0.000027 -0.000012 -0.000001 -0.000071 0.000091
[1.63] [0.28] [0.16] [0.01] [0.71] [0.84]
No Job -0.02849 -0.01801 -0.00667 -0.02752 -0.00827 0.007599
[2.26]** [3.04]*** [1-37] [3.61]*** [1.33] [1.13]
WOMEN
SINGLE DESTINA TIONS
Austria France Germany Bel/Lux UK Ireland
Own income 0.000175 -0.00011 0.000209 0.000528 -0.00015 0.000034
[0.46] [0.44] [1.07] [1.66]* [0.71] [0.19]
parental
income 0.000143 0.000469 0.000311 0.000031 0.000379 -0.00034
[0.48] [2.96]*** [1.83]* [0.15] [2.37]** [2.04]**
No Job -0.02086 -0.03252 -0.0201 -0.00422 0.027991 -0.00454
[0.74] [3.19]*** [1.70]* [0.19] [3.38]*** [0.46]
PARTNERSHIP DESTINATIONS
Austria France Germany Bel/Lux UK Ireland
Own income -0.00059 -0.00013 0.000006 -0.00036 0.000191 0.000824
[2.06]** [0.55] [0.03] [1.43] [1.01] [4.06]***
parental
income -0.00017 0.000101 -0.00034 -0.00008 0.000204 -0.00024
[0.59] [0.63] [2.35]** [0.39] [1.17] [1.34]
No Job -0.01945 -0.01422 -0.01147 -0.03539 -0.00726 0.006334
[1.06] [1.28] [1.21] [2.47]** [0.74] [0.50]
Source: Own analysis on ECHP data. Marginal effects (t-stats in square brackets); * significant at 10%; ** sign, at 5%; *** sign, 
at 1%. Age range is 17-29.
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Nordic Europe
Finally, Table 3.9 shows the results for the last group of countries. There is some evidence of 
own income increasing single departures for all countries (for Danish and Dutch men moving 
out as single, and Danish women moving into partnerships, the effects are stronger than in all 
other European countries), and possibly parental income facilitating departure into partnerships 
(in Finland). These results, however, appear weak in comparison to those shown in the previous 
tables. High departure rates at early ages lead to rather small sample sizes and thus many 
coefficients are not very well determined. We cannot rule out, however, the possibility that the 
effects are indeed very close to zero.
Table 3.9 - Effects of income and employment variables by country in pooled model for Nordic 
Europe -  marginal effects____________________________________________________
MEN
SINGLE DESTINATIONS
Netherlands Denmark Finland
Own income 0.000509 0.000736 -0.00026
[2.25]** [2.54]** [0.70]
Parental income 0.000142 0.000135 -0.00034
[0.53] [0.56] [1.43]
No Job -0.00925 0.014442 -0.00659
[0.73] [1.10] [0.40]
PARTNERSHIP DESTINATIONS
Netherlands Denmark Finland
Own income 0.000254 0.000165 0.000098
[1.35] [0.68] [0.51]
Parental income 0.000178 0.000146 0.000568
[0.93] [0.60] [1.78]*
No Job -0.00084 -0.011973 0.008736
[0.08] [0.81] [0.74]
WOMEN
SINGLE DESTINATIONS
Netherlands Denmark Finland
Own income 0.000414 -0.000159 -0.000186
[0.88] [0.34] [0.31]
Parental income 0.000055 -0.000145 -0.000301
[0.17] [0.42] [0.85]
No Job 0.020134 -0.016202 -0.011111
[0.97] [0.88] [0.42]
PARTNERSHIP DESTINATIONS
Netherlands Denmark Finland
Own income 0.000049 0.001686 -0.000399
[0.09] [2.19]** [0.50]
Parental income 0.000456 0.001046 0.000155
[0.99] [1.41] [0.26]
No Job -0.039534 -0.017357 -0.016191
[1.66]* [0.58] [0.48]
Source: Own analysis on ECHP data. Marginal effects (t-stats in square brackets); 
* significant at 10%; ** sign, at 5%; *** sign, at 1%. Age range is 17-29.
Sample sizes: Men: 1880, W omen: 1325.
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Without exception, the sets of results presented so far show that the effects vary significantly by 
destinations, and also by country within each regional group. The preliminary evidence that the 
effects are significantly different within each group is important: the sociological literature has 
always emphasised the peculiarity of the Southern model, but we now see that the differences 
within this group may also be significant. Similarly, Northern countries are significantly different 
amongst each other. In the Nordic group, however, we are at the margin of the 5% significance 
level. Although it is possible that this is due to the small sample sizes involved, we cannot 
exclude that the effects of the variables are the same in this group.34
Significance of country interaction dummies
Table 3.10 shows the result of the statistical tests for joint significance of the country interaction 
dummies. We observe that the use of a different slopes for own income, parental income and 
own employment status is supported by the data in the South and in the North, while this is less 
clear in the Nordic countries. It is difficult to know, at this stage, whether the different result for 
the Nordic countries is due to small sample sizes or to the fact that the true coefficients are very 
similar to one another. The former explanation seems more likely: we expect the coefficients 
could be determined better with larger sample sizes.
Table 3.10 -  LR tests for significance of country interaction dummies
South M South F North M North F Nordic M Nordic F
2
7 208.754 72.194 171.29 133.053 28.632 15.879
d.f. 26 24 36 35 22 22
Prob. 0 0 0 0 0.053 0.135
Source: Own analysis on ECHP data.
Even if country interaction dummies being significant does not mean that countries are very 
different within each group, it is observable, for example from Table 3.7, that the country 
dummies are more different than one would have expected within a group of countries that are 
considered relatively homogenous. Looking at parental income, there is consistency inside the 
South and inside the North, which corroborates the taxonomy of South vs Continental vs Nordic 
regime. We do see, however, that while men’s marriage departures are regularly very sensitive 
to not having a job for all Southern countries, in the North some countries do exhibit a high 
negative effect of the “No Job” dummy on men’s married departure, while others show no effect. 
As to own income, although it tends to have a positive significant effect in the South, this is not 
always so, as the effect is not always significant (but always positive)
34 In this case, for example, if the coefficient of a certain variable has large standard error for every country (and in 
particular if it is not significantly d ifferent from zero), it is not surprising to find that we can impose equality o f the 
coefficient across countries.
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Combining destinations
As explained in the literature survey in the previous chapter, most empirical models have used 
dichotomous models to investigate the departure process from home. The results in the 
empirical papers that investigate competitive risks, however, along the theoretical discussion, 
lead us to expect that the most important variables may have effects that differ by destination. 
For example, own income may be relatively more important for women who choose to go to live 
on their own than for women who move in with a partner (who could support them), but the 
reverse may be true for men, for whom own income could be more important if they are to move 
into a relationship (and possibly support their spouse).
It is possible to test whether this is true by testing whether each coefficient in the equation for 
departure as a single person is equal to the corresponding coefficient in the equation for 
departure with a partner (for example, the coefficient on own income in the first equation (single 
departure) is compared to the coefficient of own income in the second equation (departure into 
a relationship), and so on for all other coefficients.
The results in the pooled model and in the models for the individual countries show in most 
cases that the null of equality between pairs of coefficients is rejected, as shown in Table 3.11. 
Destinations have different coefficients and they can not be pooled together.
The few exceptions to this result are when both coefficients, in each pair of equations that is 
compared, are not very well determined, and this happens mainly for countries with small 
sample sizes. In this case, for example, income is not significantly different from zero for either 
destination, so it is not surprising that we can impose equality of the two coefficients.
It appears that single and partnership destinations are to be treated differently for Southern and 
Northern countries. We cannot exclude that, for Nordic youth, the effect of the covariates may 
be similar for both destinations.
Table 3.11 -  LR tests for combining destinations
South M South F North M North F Nordic M Nordic F
2
X 234.901 296.633 133.036 116.551 23.313 29.338
d.f. 24 26 35 36 18 18
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.384 0.601
Source: Own analysis on ECHP data.
3.5.3 Expanded models
The differences in the country coefficients could still allow us to use a pooled model for groups 
of countries where we include interaction dummies. If we were to use slope dummies for every 
single covariate in the model, this would increase the number of variables by a factor equal to 
the number of countries minus one. In a multinomial logit context, such a high number of 
variables easily leads to problems of parameters stability or of extremely large estimates and 
makes it much more difficult to handle the model. Additionally, a pooled model would impose 
restrictions in the structure of the errors between countries.
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We find it preferable to estimate the same model for every country. The choice of covariates will 
be based on the most useful information included in the ECHP dataset and the review of 
empirical and theoretical review in the previous chapter.
Restrictions to the distribution of sensitive information for Germany, and slight differences in the 
survey, mean that some variables are sometimes not available for certain survey years or for 
some countries, which is the reason for small differences in the model used for each country in 
the rest of this chapter.35
Table 3.12 to Table 3.20 report the results of the multinomial logit models estimated for most 
countries included in the dataset (full results in the appendices).36 The problem of attrition is 
serious in some cases, especially for the UK. For some countries, the relatively small sample 
sizes of the national ECHP (in terms of households) combined with high rates of departures of 
children at young ages lead to quite small sample sizes of children still living with their parents. 
We have thus aggregated the Nordic countries (in Table 3.26), and the results show several 
significant covariates, eg potential income seems to play a significant role.37 
For each country we estimated a dichotomous model, then a multinomial logit, and conducted a 
test to see whether the two categories (moving out without partner and moving out with partner) 
are indistinguishable. The Wald test for combining outcome categories rejects the null of 
equality of coefficients at the 10% in most of the males equations and in half of the females 
equation.38 We then computed the Hausman test of the assumption of the independence of 
irrelevance alternatives (IIA) for the omitted category of “leaving to unknown destination” 
(typically representing a case where the youth is not interviewed after leaving home, so that we 
don’t know if they are living with a partner or not). The test always rejects the null.39 We have 
studied whether pooling males and females is acceptable. The answer is generally (but not 
always) negative, as the equality of coefficients is mostly rejected.
The fit of the models vary depending on the country and gender, and we shall discuss the 
quality of the results under the subsection for each single group of countries. The pseudo R2 are 
reported for each country at the bottom of the table with full estimation results (Table 3.22 and 
following ones, in the appendix).40 However we believe that what matters here are the estimates 
of the coefficients, ie ie their sign, significance, and particularly their importance, as reflected by
35 In a lim ited number o f cases, the very low frequency of some categories have made it necessary to drop or collapse 
certain categories to avoid convergence problems. In essence, this is also one of the reasons for not including older 
youth in the estim ation for Northern and Nordic countries.
In this model and in the subsequent m ultinom ial ones we use bootstrapping with 200 replications to correct the 
standard errors in the equations with potential income.
37 Some countries, however, have rather poor estimation results, and have been left out of the country by country 
regressions, although they had been included in the pooled models.
38 W e have performed the W ald test to show that the base category (stays at home) is not indistinguishable from each of 
the other two categories and the null is nearly always rejected (the exceptions are the countries where coefficients are 
not precisely estimated).
39 Results of the statistical test are reported in footnote 16. W hereas in a d ichotom ous model (OUT vs IN) attrited 
children can often be assigned to the OUT category (for children's split-ups, both parents typically remain in the original 
household, they are interviewed are report that the ir child has moved out). In a m ultinom ial logit model, however, if the 
child who has moved out is not interviewed, we cannot know whether they have moved in with a partner or not. Hence 
the creation of the "leaving to unknown destination” category.
40 Our pseudo R2 m easures are always higher (by around 50-100%) than the corresponding measures shown by 
lacovou (2001) in her appendix results.
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the absolute and relative magnitudes, and also how the coefficients compare country by
country, as discussed below.
Southern Europe
Table 3.12 and Table 3.13 shows the results for men, using actual and potential income 
respectively, and Table 3.14 and Table 3.15 refer to women. Men’s labour income has a 
positive and often significant effect on departures. This effect is, as expected, stronger for 
departures into a partnership.
For men’s departures with a partner, we observe that the effect of not having a job is large and 
negative, and very large relative to the average risk of leaving home, with estimates ranging 
from minus one percentage point to minus 2.5 pet (for Portugal): not having a job always 
significantly reduces departures into partnerships for men.41 Interestingly, for men’s single 
departures and for both destinations for women, coefficients are generally negative but mostly 
not significant.
Family income has a negative effect on Italian and Spanish males moving out with a partner, but 
the effect is relatively small. Again this is a very interesting result, that we shall comment in the 
next section. Living in owned accommodation reduces the risk of departure in several cases, for 
example for single departures in Greece, Italy and Portugal. For females, we observe that more 
durables reduce the risk of departure in Italy and Portugal. Overall, the various indicators of 
family wealth seem to point towards a reduction in the risk of departures.
Potential income has mostly a positive effect, and a significant one. The effects are small in 
absolute value, although relative to the average risk of departure these can be sometimes 
important if we compare individuals one or two quartiles away in the income distribution. It is 
interesting to note that the coefficients on potential income tend to be larger and/or more 
significant then the coefficients on actual income. For Spanish and Portuguese men moving out 
alone, the coefficients are indeed positive and significant, while both income and employment 
status covariates were not significant in the specification with current income. This is true for 
women, too, as in the case for Greece (alone and married), Spain (both destinations). From a 
qualitative point of view, what is the importance of these effects? Those children who would 
have the highest earnings potential if they were in a full-time job are leaving the parental home 
faster, and a move up two quartiles in the potential income distribution results in up to 1.5-2.0 
percentage points increase in departure risk. Clearly, it is not possible to move a given 
individual across the potential income distribution, however it is interesting to notice that high 
income potential is related to early departure from home (given the way we construct potential 
income, this would indicated that the relation runs from potential income to departure, rather 
than the other way round). Overall, we observe that the effects of current income and potential 
income are different -  disregarding at this stage any issues of identification and measurement,42 
the reasons for such difference may be linked to the fundamental difference in what the two
41 Expressed equiva lently, being employed at the time of the survey increases m en’s departures into partnerships 
destinations by a large and positive coefficient. Note that own income is rarely in higher quartiles, especially for 
countries in the “N orth ” .
42 See correlation coe ffic ients  reported in section 3.4.3.
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covariates are measuring: current income includes transitory, random factors, and in any case
does not represent the "permanent income" of the young person.
Table 3.12 - Multinomial model o f departure from the parental home -Southern Europe - Males, 
current income - Marginal effects o f selected covariates
GREECE GREECE ITALY ITALY SPAIN SPAIN PORT. PORT.
Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner
Own income -0.00005 0.000043 0.00011 0.000046 0.000036 0.000118 0.00001 0.000317
[057] [0.48] [2.28]** [1.23] [1.33] [2.29]** [0.02] [3.02]***
Zero income -0.007121 -0.00619 0.002705 0.001919 0.000251 -0.004379 -0.00384 -0.001852
Dummy [1.50] [1.02] [0.70] [0.64] [0.13] [1.18] [2.55]** [0.18]
No Job -0.002151 -0.014675 -0.006371 -0.011479 -0.000475-0.008891 0.000244 -0.024439
[0.37] [1.83]* [1.34] [3.27]*** [0.21] [2.15]** [0.15] [1.89]*
Parental income 0.000028 -0.000014 0.000038 -0.000071 -0.000004 -0.000069 0.00002 -0.000078
[0.46] [0.20] [1.01] [1.99]** [0.16] [1.74]* [1 04] [0.84]
Durables 0.001722 0.003608 0.000959 -0.000239 0.000012-0.000512 -0.000277 0.001103
[1.16] [2.23]** [1.24] [0.31] [0.03] [0.66] [0.60] [0.61]
House own -0.009613 -0.001997 -0.003736 0.001203 0.003167 0.003923 -0.002648 0.004136
[2.65]*** [0.40] [1.67]* [0.58] [1.32] [1.19] [2.05]** [0.73]
Rooms per -0.00167 -0.004337 0.001441 -0.003716 -0.000682-0.001821 0.000253 -0.006853
person [0.54] [1.05] [0.69] [2.14]** [0.79] [0.99] [0.24] [1.53]
Mobility 0.001185 0.010129 0.001969 -0.00138 0.002618-0.000768 -0.000116 0.002373
[0.31] [2.26]** [0.61] [0.48] [1.91]* [0.26] L0.08] [0.30]
Source: Own analysis on ECHP data. Absolute value o f z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant a 
*** significant at 1%. Age range is 17-34. Sam ple sizes: Men: Greece 2858; Italy 6152; Spain 5289; Portugal 3429.
Table 3.13 - Multinomial model of departure from the parental home -  Southern Eurof. 
Males, potential income - Marginal effects o f selected covariates
GREECE GREECE ITALY ITALY SPAIN SPAIN PORT. PORT.
Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner
Potential income -0.000023 0.0004 0.00037 0.000529 0.000097 0.000118 0.000138 0.00053
[0.23] [3.82]*** [0.91] [0.82] [1.94]* [1.16] [2.79]*** [2.76]***
Parental income 0.000068 -0.000095 0.00001 -0.000093 -0.000009-0.000095 0.000022 -0.00017
[1.02] [1.05] [0.24] [2.58]*** [0.34] [1.78]* [1.66]* [1.49]
Durables 0.000865 0.004675 0.001031 -0.000123 0.000062 -0.000343 -0.000985 -0.00113
[0.50] [2.44]** [1.25] [0.16] [0.13] [0.36] [2.03]** [0.50]
Rooms per -0.001526 -0.008077 0.000759 -0.003152 -0.000581 -0.001365 -0.000139 -0.01164
person [0.40] [1.54] [0.35] [1.88]* [0.58] [0.57] [0.10] [1.93]*
Parental health -0.001294 -0.005259 -0.00219 -0.000964 -0.00055 0.005613--0.000037 -0.00341
[0.26] [0.92] [0.76] [0.55] [0.41] [2.02]** [0.03] [0.56]
Mobility 0.002791 0.013119 0.002825 -0.002547 0.002415 0.000159 ■-0.000614 -0.00727
[0.62] [2.52]** [0.86] [0.85] [1.49] [0.04] [0.30] [0.68]
Source: Own analysis on ECH P data. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * s ignificant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. Age range is 17-34. Sample sizes: Men: Greece 2762; Italy 5668; Spain 5100; Portugal 3321.
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Table 3.14 - Multinomial model of departure from the parental home -  Southern Europe -
Females, current income - Marginal effects of selected covariates
GREECE GREECE ITALY ITALY SPAIN SPAIN PORT. PORT.
Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner
Own income 0.000017 0.00028 0.000126 -0.000011 0.00001 -0.000022! 0.00001 0.000227
[0.13] [1.15] [2.31]** [0.09] [0.91] [0.16] [0.69] [1.14]
Zero income 0.001757 -0.01357 0.00458 -0.018222 0.00001 -0.0187551-0.000011 -0.01133
Dummy [0.23] [1.00] [1.02] [2.51]** [1.04] [2.70]*** [0.62] [0.90]
No Job -0.00476 -0.01644 0.001446 0.008412 -0.000017’ -0.00817 -0.000014• -0.00095
[0.60] [0.89] [0.26] [0.86] [2.19]** [0.90] [0.65] [0.05]
Parental income 0.000084 -0.00019 -0.000014 -0.000029 0.00001 -0.000131 0.00001 0.000251
[1.14] [1.18] [0.34] [0.34] [0.61] [1.31] [0.21] [1.67]*
Durables -0.00084 -0.00229 -0.001923 -0.004095 0.000001 -0.00112 -0.000003i -0.00915
[0.68] [0.75] [1.91]* [2.26]** [0.52] [0.66] [0.61] [3.04]***
Parental health 0.004422 0.016285 -0.000177 -0.001887 -o.oooooeI 0.005022 -0.000004 0.02186
[0.87] [1.42] [0.07] [0.38] [0.77] [0.99] [0.48] [2.91]***
Unemployment -0.0002 -0.00248 0.000109 0.00105 -0.000001 0.000595 0.000004 0.001831
Rate [0.26] [1.40] [0.69] [2.91]*** [1.43] [1.31] [2.85]*** [1.19]
Change in Un. 0.000947 -0.00532 -0.003091 0.001877 -0.000001 0.001314 0.000005 -0.00394
[0.26] [0.73] [2.21]** [0-77].... [0.15] [0.60] [0.75] [0.79]
Source: Own analysis on ECHP data. Absolute value o f z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant c 
*** significant at 1%. Age range is 17-34. Sample sizes: W om en: Greece 2021; Italy 4947; Spain 4480; Portugal 2
Table 3.15 - Multinomial model o f departure from the parental home -Southern Eurof 
Females, potential income - Marginal effects o f selected covariates
GREECE GREECE ITALY ITALY SPAIN SPAIN PORT. PORT.
Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner
Potential income 0.000159 0.000827 -0.000015 0.000015 0.000001 0.000259 0.000024 0.000282
[1.62] [3.73]*** [0.14] [0.06] [2.53]** [1.24] [0.58] [1.23]
Parental income 0.000103 -0.0002 -0.000006 -0.000089 0.00001 -0.0002 0.000029 0.000269
[1.39] [1.10] [0.15] [0.96] [0.21] [1.89]* [1.01] [1.71]*
Durables -0.001095 -0.00292 -0.001961 -0.004188 0.000011 -0.00198 -0.00108 -0.00988
[0.83] [0.88] [2.32]** [2.14]** [0.00] [1.09] [1.65]* [3.15]***
Parental health 0.005175 0.023087 -0.000034 0.000563 -0.000008 0.006018 -0.00025 0.024613
[1.01] [1.87]* [0.01] [0.11] [0.75] [1.11] [0.19] [3.03]***
Mobility 0.001663 -0.00982 0.001837 0.008954 0.000006 0.011281 0.000729 -0.00536
JO. 36] [0.781 [0.54] [1.26] [0.67] [1.65]* [0.40] [0.45]
Source: Own analysis on ECHP data. A bso lu te  value of z statistics in brackets * s ignificant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** s ignificant at 1%. Age range is 17-34. Sam ple sizes: Women. Greece 1930; Italy 4625; Spain 4313; Portugal 2478.
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Northern Europe
Overall, our results appear more diverse and mixed for the countries outside Southern Europe 
and Scandinavia. To some extent, the coefficients are less well determined when the estimation 
is conducted country by country, and the standard error are not small, so that the coefficients 
could be potentially large.
There are several significant coefficients, but it is difficult to find a clear pattern across countries. 
The effect of own income is not as significant as for Southern Europe, exceptions being UK men 
moving out alone and Irish men moving into partnerships. Unexpectedly, we observe that 
having no job appears to increase departure rates in both Ireland and the UK, rather than 
decrease them as we found for Southern Europe.
Family income has a positive effect on UK and German males departures, while living in owned 
accommodation decrease risk in Ireland for both genders and destinations (and in several other 
groups).
High levels of unemployment appear to delay departures in the UK and Ireland (no regional data 
is available for Germany), and an increase in unemployment further reduces departures in both 
countries, particularly Ireland.
While the results for the UK and Ireland are consistent with each other and show a clear effect 
of income, employment and regional unemployment rates on departures, there appears to be no 
clear pattern across Northern countries, given that the results for the other countries are less 
well determined. The analysis for some of these countries appears to suffer from relatively small 
panel numbers, as young people tend to leave home faster and therefore drop out of the sample 
at risk, and one can also question the quality of the datasets in relation to confidentiality 
restrictions and high attrition rates.
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Table 3.16 - Multinomial model o f departure from the parental home -  Northern Europe -  Males,
current income  -  Marginal effects of selected covariates ________________________________
G ERM ANY GERM ANY BELGIUM BELGIUM UK UK IRELAND IRELAND
Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner
Own income 0.000004 0.000033 0.000001 -0.000025 0.000611 0.000207 0.000079 0.000005
[0.04] [0.47] [0.62] [0.22] [1.77]* [0.71] [0.75] [1.88]*
No Job -0.00138 -0.00714 -0.000002 -0.021573 0.04846 -0.02814 0.021805 0.000359
[0.20] [1.32] [0.28] [1.54] [2.15]** [1.52] [2.05]** [1.38]
Job security 0.00181 -0.00162 0.000001 0.001547 0.007355 -0.00574 0.004061 0.000061
[1.17] [1.42] [0.62] [0.75] [1.71]* [1.80]* [1.98]** [1.23]
Parental income 0.000193 0.000067 0.000001 0.000023 0.000645 -0.00011 0.000076 0.000003
[1.80]* [0.99] [0.62] [0.22] [2.29]** [0.41] [0.87] [1.13]
Durables -0.00145 0.001561 0.000001 -0.001477 0.00477 -0.00604 0.004401 0.000054
[0.64] [0.94] [0.43] [0.67] [0.73] [1.01] [2.21]** [1.00]
House own -0.01485 -0.00402 0.000004 -0.000008 0.008251 0.000237 -0.02776 -0.00048
[3.04]*** [1.21] [0.83] [0.00] [0.45] [0.02] [4.56]*** [1.89]*
Accommodation 0.007452 -0.00469 -0.000002 0.008494 0.034554 -0.00767 0.010099 0.000286
short of space [1.28] [1.01] [0.34] [1.43] [2.78]*** [0.64] [2.00]** [1.48]
Mobile 0.000001 0.002724 0.056047 0.028877 -0.01872 0.000002
[0.10] [0.38] [2.98]*** [1.02] [2.23]** [0.01]
Unemployment 0.000001 0.000118 -0.00707 0.005323 -0.02304 -0.00689
[0.65] [0.20] [1.75]* [1.49] [2.45]** [2.57]**
Change in Un. -0.000019 -0.012292 -0.01691 0.001586 -0.02001 -0.00491
[1.60] [0.78] [1.45] [0.15] [2.04]** [2.57]**
student -0.00574 -0.01151 -0.000013 0.009666 0.019877 0.010803 -0.00378 -0.00012
[0.86] [2.34]** [2.01]** [1 52] ..... [0.82] [0.39] 10.52] [0.47]
Source: Own analysis on ECHP data. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. Age range is 17-29. Sam ple sizes: Men: Germany 2554; Belgium 1229; UK 801; Ireland 2238.
Table 3.17 - Multinomial model o f departure from the parental home -  Northern 
Europe -  Males, potential income - Marginal effects o f selected covariates
GERMANY G ERM ANY UK UK IRELAND IRELAND
Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner
Potential income 0.000164 -0.000003 0.000353 0.00017 -0.000042 0.000016
[1.04] [0.02] [0.65] [0.37] [0.26] [1.98]**
Parental income 0.000094 0.000114 0.00069 -0.00042 0.000144 0.000007
[0.69] [1.08] [1.76]* [1 52] [1.24] [1.39]
Durables -0.00112 -0.000639 0.012018 -0.00526 0.003563 0.000108
[0.38] [0.24] [1.28] [0.81] [1.34] [0.98]
Parental health 0.005818 -0.006001 0.00588 0.004899 0.013672 0.000654
[0.91] [1.01] [0.24] [0.36] [1.49] [1.71]*
Mobility 0.06616 0.027765 -0.006589 0.000122
[2.85]*** [1.00] [0.72] [0.41]
Unemployment -0.01199 0.006982 -0.03293 -0.0149
[2.26]** [2.04]** [2.45]** [3.50]***
Change in Un. -0.03149 0.014305 -0.032424 -0.01049
[2.05]** [1.25] [2.01]** J3.50]***
Source: Own analysis on ECHP data. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** s ign ificant at 1%. Age range is 17-29. Sample sizes: Men: Germ any 2055; UK 606; Ireland 2005.
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Table 3.18 - Multinomial model of departure from the parental home -  Northern Europe -
Females, current income - Marginal effects of selected covariates______________________________________________________
GERM ANY
Alone
GERMANY
Partner
BELGIUM
Alone
BELGIUM
Partner
UK
Alone
UK
Partner
IRELAND
Alone
IRELAND
Partner
Own income 0.000264 -0.00016 0.000074 -0.00043 0.000185 0.000423 -0.000064 0.000249
[1.42] [0.70] [0.36] [1.53] [1.36] [0.91] [0.36] [2.03]**
No Job -0.01471 -0.02446 0.001022 -0.05311 0.004311 0.000657 0.001546 0.000976
[1.07] [2.09]** [0.09] [2.00]** [0.65] [0.02] [0.13] [0.14]
Parental income 0.000275 -0.00021 -0.000036 0.000006 0.000038 0.000464 -0.000159 0.000027
[2.06]** [1.27] [0.42] [0.03] [0.49] [1.03] [1.24] [0.36]
House own -0.01038 -0.00354 -0.01229 -0.00797 -0.0083 0.02498 -0.016534 -0.01532
[1.48] [0.46] [2.70]*** [0.66] [1.95]* [1.08] [2.01]** [2.34]**
Mobile -0.01751 0.001925 0.00482 0.069146 -0.008246 -0.01879
[1.47] [0.14] [0.76] [2.36]** [0.91] [2.06]**
Unemployment -0.00078 -0.00074 -0.000082 0.002612 -0.03231 -0.03211
[1.08] [0.56] [0.09] [0.45] [2.45]** [3.91]***
Change in Un. -0.0115 -0.01188 0.003415 0.010202 -0.045877 -0.03107
[1.32] [0.53] [1.27] [0.58] [3.33]*** [3.41]***
student -0.00503 -0.00148 -0.00945 -0.02113 -0.00229 -0.03528 -0.028264 -0.01512
J 0 .7 4 ] _ [0.16] [1.20] [1.59] [0.28] [0.59] [2.44]** [1.88]*
Source: Own analysis on ECHP data. Absolute value o f z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. Age range is 17-29. Sample sizes: W om en: Germany 1707; Belgium 1028; UK 600; Ireland 1827.
Table 3.19 - Multinomial model of departure from the parental home -  ECHP -  Northern Europe 
-  Females, potential income - Marginal effects o f selected covariates_____________
GERM ANY G ERM ANY 
Alone Partner
UK
Alone
UK
Partner
IRELAND
Alone
IRELAND
Partner
Potential income 0.000473 0.000187 -0.000004 0.000082 0.000235 0.000596
[1.16] [0.40] [0.13] [0.12] [1.12] [2.87]***
Parental income 0.000503 -0.00039 -0.000019 0.000849 -0.00031 -0.000064
[2.18]** [1.55] [0.95] [1.36] [1.95]* [0.60]
Parental health 0.001048 0.013613 -0.00281 -0.072 -0.00207 -0.0018
[0.08] [1.05] [1.40] [1.70]* [0.15] [0.18]
mobile 0.001231 0.080885 -0.01094 -0.01981
[0.77] [1.98]** [0.90] [1.62]
Unemployment 0.000015 -0.00164 -0.03723 -0.0509
[0.05] [0.19] [2.52]** [4.85]***
Change in Un. 0.000423 -0.00435 0.000435 -0.0022 -0.05098 -0.05461
[0.04] [0.37] [0.57] [0.08] [3.20]*** [4.19]***
student -0.0112 0.00048 -0.068067 -0.01912 -0.02938 -0.03018
[1.03] [0.04] [3.46]*** [0.23] [2.01]** [2.70]***
Source: Own analysis on ECHP data. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * s ignificant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. Age range is 17-29. Sam ple sizes: Women: Germ any 1211; UK 416; Ireland 1466.
121
Nordic Europe
Due to high departure rates at young ages, the Nordic countries feature very limited sample 
sizes. We found that separate regressions yield very few significant coefficients and rather large 
standard errors, so we found it is necessary to use a pooled model, which turns out to be better 
determined.43
Own income is significant for single males and can yield relatively large effects: a move from the 
first quartile to the third quartile brings about an increase of the departure risk of almost 4 
percentage points. Potential income is overall significant and the effects are larger: for men’s 
single departures the effect is nearly 50% larger, since a move in potential income of two 
quartiles now means slightly more than 5 percentage points; for departures into partnerships of 
both men and women potential income is now significant, while actual income was not -  for 
women we see that a move higher in the distribution of potential income by 50 centiles brings 
about an increase in the departure risk of approx. 6.7 percentage points.
No significant effect is found for employment status and job security, clearly indicating that 
current labour market conditions may not be as important as potential ones.
There is some indication that parental income increases departure rates for partnership 
destinations, which could indicated financial transfers from parents to children setting up a 
partnership.44
Overall, our results are consistent with the limited literature on household formation for Nordic 
Europe, which showed little effect of current income on departures, but it is important to note 
that the use of potential income points to a much more significant role of income variables than 
previously thought.
43 This model is an expanded version o f the one presented in Table 3.9.
44 Other covariates or control variables are not particularly insightful and are relegated to the appendix.
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Table 3.20 - Multinomial model of departure from the parental home -  Nordic countries pooled -
Marginal effects of selected coefficients
Actual income Potential income
Males Males Females Females Males Males Females Females
Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner
Own income 0.000737 0.000085 -0.00007 0.000447
[3.73]“ * [0.51] [0.18] [1.03]
Potential income 0.00105 0.00054 -0.00022 0.001331
[2.32]** [1.91]* [0.76] [3.06]***
Zero income 0.026305 -0.01428 -0.01174 0.010005
Dummy [2.52]“ [1.43] [0.82] [0.57]
No Job 0.000222 -0.01006 0.001633 -0.01442
[0.02] [0.92] [0.08] [0.60]
Job security -0.00013 -0.00206 0.000725 0.004343
[0.05] [0.94] [0.19] [0.86]
Student -0.02637 -0.00953 -0.01176 -0.05712 -0.04405 -0.00939 -0.00484 -0.08163
[2.91]“ * [1.15] [1.11] [3.59]“ * [3.45]*** [0.97] [0.40] [3.81]***
Parental income 0.000146 0.000306 -0.00003 0.000474 0.000226 0.000316 -0.00038 0.000903
[0.96] [2.05]** [0.11] [1.32] [0.95] [1.69]* [1.22] [1.88]*
House owned 0.004949 0.004207 -0.00418 -0.04347 0.007572 -0.0005 -0.0213 -0.06223
[0.57] [0.52] [0.32] [2.89]*“ [0.55] [0.05] [1.30] [2.86]***
Mobile -0.00285 0.002488 0.021042 0.016787 0.000492 -0.00179 0.027693 0.028546
[0.29] [0.28] [1.79]* [0.99] [0.04] [0.20] [1.89]* [1.36]
Source: Own analysis on ECHP data. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** 
s ignificant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Age range is 17-29. Sample sizes: Actual income model: Men: 1880, 
W om en: 1325; potential income model. Men: 1158, W om en: 791.
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3.6 Discussion
In this section we relate our results to the literature survey and discuss their significant in the 
context of our research objectives stated in the introduction and expanded in the final part of 
chapter 2.
The limited literature on Southern Europe, as surveyed in chapter 2, showed that being 
employed has a significant positive effect on departure. Many papers in the literature do not 
express their results as marginal effects, which makes it more difficult to compare results. In 
general, the literature finds that income is positively correlated with departure rates. Although 
our results for Southern Europe are generally consistent with that research, we do see that, by 
using marginal effects in the reporting of the results, the magnitude of the effects becomes 
much clearer compared to the results seen in the literature. Furthermore, we noted that in many 
cases the researchers did not distinguish clearly between income and employment. Our results 
for the South show that the effect of employment is significant and large relative to the small 
departure rates observed in the South, but it is still true that being employed increases the risk 
of departure by only around 1-2 percentage points, which can perhaps not be large enough in 
itself to be useful for, say, policy purposes. The effect of having a job is, as expected, stronger 
for departures into a partnership.45
The effect of income is small when we control for employment status, and we believe that the 
relatively strong effect of income reported in some literature (Aassve et al. (2001), amongst 
others) may be in fact reflecting the effect of employment.
For the rest of the ECHP sample, we find that the effects of employment and income are not 
always significant, but we do not seem to find very well determined results for some of the 
countries. For the UK and Ireland income does play a role, and for the Nordic countries we find 
a strong positive effect of income for men’s single departures, and the magnitude is clearly 
larger than for the coefficients estimated in Southern Europe.
We find some evidence that parental income has only a weak effect, but such effect is negative 
in the South and positive in the North. Previous research did also find no large effect of parental 
income, but the difference in sign has not been studied extensively. This is an important result 
that strengthens the findings of Manacorda and Moretti (2000) for Italy. Again, the effects are 
small in the South, and it is difficult to conclude that, overall, parental income plays an important 
role in affecting departures.
The difference in the size of the impact of income between the South and the North and the 
knowledge that current income may, in any case, not be the most important measure of income, 
prompted us to investigate the role of potential income. We find that potential income generally 
has a positive effect, although not always a large one. In the North potential income appears to 
be more important than in the South, where the significant coefficients for Spain and Portugal in 
fact represent very small effects. The fact that potential income has such a small or no effect in
45 Som etimes, the specification of the model is so different that the m agnitude o f the effects cannot be compared. For 
example, Aassve et al. (2001) use interaction qualitative dumm ies to analyse Italy’s departure rates and find that being 
employed and on a high salary has a very large effect on departure rates. Since the authors do not include age in the 
departure equation and because older Italians are much more likely to be employed and on high incomes, the large 
effect found m ay in fact be capturing mostly an age effect.
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3.6 Discussion
In this section we relate our results to the literature survey and discuss their significant in the 
context of our research objectives stated in the introduction and expanded in the final part of 
chapter 2.
The limited literature on Southern Europe, as surveyed in chapter 2, showed that being 
employed has a significant positive effect on departure. Many papers in the literature do not 
express their results as marginal effects, which makes it more difficult to compare results. In 
general, the literature finds that income is positively correlated with departure rates. Although 
our results for Southern Europe are generally consistent with that research, we do see that, by 
using marginal effects in the reporting of the results, the magnitude of the effects becomes 
much clearer compared to the results seen in the literature. Furthermore, we noted that in many 
cases the researchers did not distinguish clearly between income and employment. Our results 
for the South show that the effect of employment is significant and large relative to the small 
departure rates observed in the South, but it is still true that being employed increases the risk 
of departure by only around 1-2 percentage points, which can perhaps not be large enough in 
itself to be useful for, say, policy purposes. The effect of having a job is, as expected, stronger 
for departures into a partnership.45
The effect of income is small when we control for employment status, and we believe that the 
relatively strong effect of income reported in some literature (Aassve et al. (2001), amongst 
others) may be in fact reflecting the effect of employment.
For the rest of the ECHP sample, we find that the effects of employment and income are not 
always significant, but we do not seem to find very well determined results for some of the 
countries. For the UK and Ireland income does play a role, and for the Nordic countries we find 
a strong positive effect of income for men’s single departures, and the magnitude is clearly 
larger than for the coefficients estimated in Southern Europe.
We find some evidence that parental income has only a weak effect, but such effect is negative 
in the South and positive in the North. Previous research did also find no large effect of parental 
income, but the difference in sign has not been studied extensively. This is an important result 
that strengthens the findings of Manacorda and Moretti (2000) for Italy. Again, the effects are 
small in the South, and it is difficult to conclude that, overall, parental income plays an important 
role in affecting departures.
The difference in the size of the impact of income between the South and the North and the 
knowledge that current income may, in any case, not be the most important measure of income, 
prompted us to investigate the role of potential income. We find that potential income generally 
has a positive effect, although not always a large one. In the North potential income appears to 
be more important than in the South, where the significant coefficients for Spain and Portugal in 
fact represent very small effects. The fact that potential income has such a small or no effect in
45 Som etimes, the specification of the model is so different that the magnitude of the effects cannot be compared. For 
example, Aassve et al. (2001) use interaction qualitative dum m ies to analyse Ita ly’s departure rates and find that being 
employed and on a high salary has a very large effect on departure rates. Since the authors do not include age in the 
departure equation and because older Italians are much more likely to be employed and on high incomes, the large 
effect found m ay in fact be capturing mostly an age effect.
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the South is not surprising if we believe that having a job is important for a youth to be able to 
contemplate moving out. This is consistent with some of the literature we reviewed in the 
previous chapter.
It is important to point out, however, that although a number of results hold across each group of 
countries, we have also been observing several differences within each group, so that there is 
not always consistency between the effects of certain covariates within the groupings of 
countries. For example, the effect of actual income is not significantly positive in each Southern 
European country in Table 3.12, and the effect of potential income in Table 3.13 is somewhat 
inconsistent between countries (irrespective of the questions on the fit of potential income and 
of data quality in general). Similarly, for women in the South, it is only for Italian and Spanish 
women that current income (or job) has an impact on departures Alone, and again it is only for 
Italian and Spanish women that having zero income reduces departures into marriage (Table 
3.14). All in all, it could be perhaps be questionable whether the groupings are actually correct 
and useful or, instead, incorrect and somewhat even misleading, as Southern Europe is 
perhaps not as homogeneous as one would expect, as the estimates do vary amongst Greece, 
Italy, Spain and Portugal.
We can now compare our findings in this chapter to the research objectives we set out in the 
first and second chapter in the form of hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1
The determinants of leaving home are the same for all destinations: leaving home to 
live with a partner and leaving home to live without a partner are not distinct 
destinations and can be pooled together.
The estimates of the coefficients for different destinations appear quite different in the
multinomial logits, and the formal statistical Wald tests (of whether destinations can be
combined, shown in Table 3.11) indicate that the coefficients of the covariates differ significantly 
by destination. This indicates that the first hypothesis can not be accepted and that the
dichotomous model commonly found in the literature is therefore not appropriate. Excluding
student departures in the estimation is also found to be acceptable.
Hypothesis 2
Young people’s departure from home in Southern European countries is affected by 
own and family current financial circumstances in the same way as in
Central/Northern Europe and the US, ie, the effects of the covariates are not different
from one another.
The results generally point us towards rejecting hypothesis 2. In Table 3.12 we showed that, for
every Southern country, men without a job are significantly less likely to leave home to enter a
partnership; in Table 3.16, for Northern men, we did not observe any effect of own current
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income and employment of departures into partnerships. It appears that current working 
conditions are significant in the South (albeit perhaps of limited importance in absolute values) 
but not in the North.
The effect of parental income is very weak, and we find a negative effect on the risk of 
departure in the South (Italy and Spain), and a positive effect in the North (UK and Germany).
Hypothesis 3
Potential financial circumstances are as important to young people in Southern
European countries as to youth in Central/Northern Europe and the US.
For Southern Europe: in Table 3.13 (for men) and Table 3.14 (for women) we showed that the 
explanatory power of potential income is weak. When current income was significant, potential 
income is less strong or less significant, but for some “alone” departures, such as for Spanish 
and Portuguese men, potential income is now significant. The coefficients are, however, small 
and the standard errors are also small, which rules out the possibility that increases in income 
(or potential income) could increase departure rates from home in the South by a large amount.
In Table 3.17 for Northern men, the fit is overall disappointing, and potential income appears not 
to have any effect. Similarly, no effect is found for women in Table 3.18. Since our estimates are 
not very well determined, it is difficult to draw conclusions for Northern Europe. Table 3.20, for 
the Nordic countries, shows a somewhat different picture, where potential income is actually 
fairly important for most destinations.
Therefore, potential income has a significant but minimal effect on departures in the South, 
while the results seem to indicate no significant effect elsewhere. From the point of view of 
statistical significance, one could argue that potential income is more significant in the South 
than in Northern Europe, although in the former the size of the effect is rather small. For Nordic 
countries, however, potential income seems to be very significant and also large in its effect 
The results of this chapter do indicate large effects of the Nordic countries, tiny effects for 
Southern Europe, and unclear results for the Northern countries (Germany, UK, etc). Overall, 
we would lean towards rejecting hypothesis 3, although we feel that the specific results are not 
very clear enough and further investigation is needed.
3.7 Conclusions
Previous studies of young people’s departure from the parental home largely used cross- 
sectional studies in a single-country context. In this chapter we have used several waves of the 
European Community Household Panel to explore the determinants of departure across 
Europe.
The results of the multinomial logits and Wald tests show that the effects of economic variables 
differ by destination, providing some evidence that the dichotomous model commonly found in 
the literature is unsatisfactory. The determinants of departures into a living arrangement with a
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partner and of departures into a living arrangement without a partner are different enough to 
warrant a competing risk model.
Demographic and economic variables appear to influence young people’s living arrangements, 
and the effects differ by country and by destination. Current income and current employment 
status have a significant effect on males and females in the South. Although the effect of 
income is significant but not very large, in the South the effect of being out of work during the 
interview week is negative and significant, and also relatively important compared to the 
average departure risk of those countries. However, in absolute levels, the impact of income 
and employment status do not appear very large and a kind of welfare policy that simply 
targeted employment may not be effective. There is also some evidence that higher family 
income discourages departures in the South and facilitates it in the North. The combination of 
the results seen for Southern Europe would lead to suspect that deeper cultural factors are 
more important than economic variables.
The role of potential income seems still somewhat unclear. For Southern Europe, its role seems 
to be positive but very close to zero. In the Scandinavian countries, potential income is 
significant and has a large effect. In the other countries, the results are not very well 
determined, and we feel that longer and better datasets may be useful to investigate this issue 
further.
The results presented in this chapter give some useful indication on the determinants of 
departure from the parental home for Southern Europe and offer a better insight into the relative 
importance of income and employment.
We find, however, that the results are not very well determined for Northern countries. This is 
possibly due to samples designed in smaller sizes, higher departure rates that reduce the 
sample sizes even further and data and sample restrictions (for Germany).
We therefore intend to extend our analysis by using different, longer and richer datasets that 
may offer us a better insight in the Northern European countries.
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3.8 Appendix: Full sets of results
Table 3.21 - Multinomial model of departure from the parental home -  Pooled model for Europe
-  Marginal effects
Males Males Males Females Females Females
Alone Student With partner Alone Student With partner
Income 0.000088 -0.000008 0.000105 0.000072 -0.000028 0.000009
(percentile) [3.19]*** [0.74] [3.54]*** [2.06]** [1.04] [0.14]
family standardised 0.000067 0.000018 -0.00003 0.000035 0.000018 0.000002
income (percentile) [3.06]*** [2.06]** [1.16] [1.37] [1.14] [0.03]
No Job -0.000507 0.002346 -0.013697 -0.004641 0.001593 -0.008073
[0.25] [2.67]*** [5.48]*** [2.08]** [1.13] [1.85]*
Zero income 0.000364 -0.000777 -0.004829 0.000861 -0.001832 -0.015505
Dummy [0.22] [1.78]* [2.15]** [0.49] [2.14]** [4.57]***
Job security 0.000556 0.000212 0.000035 -0.000111 0.000018 0.000001
[1.50] [1.26] [0.08] [0.26] [0.05] [0.00]
Durables 0.000523 0.000173 0.000244 -0.000411 -0.000258 -0.0017
[1.17] [1.26] [0.44] [0.84] [0.90] [1.78]*
Student -0.005398 0.000574 -0.00675 -0.007667 0.000941 -0.026182
[3.29]*** [1.33] [2.90]*** [4.52]*** [1.11] [7.32]***
House owned -0.004342 -0.000469 0.000313 -0.004065 -0.000781 0.000009
[3.63]*** [1.19] [0.20] [2.92]*** [1.04] [0.00]
Rooms pp 0.001489 0.000158 -0.002901 0.001275 0.000469 -0.005028
[1.78]* [0.57] [2.46]** [1.31] [0.75] [2.32]**
Accomm. short of 0.002518 -0.000123 0.001222 -0.001807 -0.000129 -0.002344
space [1.90]* [0.26] [0.78] [1.21] [0.15] [0.88]
Parental health 0.002114 -0.000221 0.000671 0.000394 -0.000228 0.006572
[1.57] [0.41] [0.45] [0.24] [0.23] [2.38]**
mobile 0.001376 0.000841 0.002905 -0.0002 -0.000657 0.00333
[0.86] [1.75]* [1.42] [0.11] [0.66] [0.97]
unemployment current 0.0003 0.000085 0.000294 -0.000042 -0.000041 0.000905
[2.01]** [1.22] [1.83]* [0.24] [0.32] [3.29]***
un. change -0.001267 0.00032 -0.000946 -0.000865 0.001554 0.000621
[1.51] [1.01] [1.12] [0.94] [2.89]*** [0.44]
AGE2123 0.004666 0.001355 0.012344 0.002441 0.002102 0.01832
[1.73]* [1.42] [4.25]*** [0.82] [1.34] [4.37]***
AGE2021 0.005002 0.001272 0.017364 0.010878 0.002062 0.029263
[2.77]*** [2.67]*** [5.96]*** [6.21]*** [2.28]** [6.88]***
AGE2223 0.009728 0.000916 0.028647 0.008694 0.000763 0.040147
[5.34]*** [1.59] [10.78]*** [4.27]*** [0.66] [8.99]***
AGE2426 0.009051 0.000975 0.027579 0.009886 0.00157 0.038641
[5.43]*** [1.68]* [12.69]*** [5.23]*** [1.42] [11.43]***
AGE2729 0.008271 0.000714 0.031396 0.009323 -0.001267 0.030788
[4.18]*** [0.90] [13.55]*** [4.18]*** [0.65] [7.44]***
AGE3035 0.012436 -0.000095 0.027174 0.015077 -0.000192 0.023672
[4.96]*** [0.00] [9.57]*** [5.29]*** [0.00] [4.40]***
YEAR_95 0.001558 0.000546 0.003629 0.003911 -0.000413 0.002333
[1.10] [0.98] [2.34]** [2.36]** [0.41] [0.80]
YEAR_96 0.001711 0.001369 -0.001893 0.004043 0.001083 0.001212
[1.29] [2.50]** [1.15] [2.63]*** [1.09] [0.41]
CO_GREECE -0.015069 -0.001646 -0.014231 -0.01283 0.005989 -0.012756
[4.84]*** [1.23] [3.44]*** [3.49]*** [1.23] [1.78]*
CO ITALY -0.015753 -0.003771 -0.011872 -0.013348 -0.000178 -0.029844
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[5.72]*** [2.60]***
CO_SPAIN -0.024702 -0.007198
[7.00]*** [3.48]***
CO_PORTUGAL -0.02749 -0.007299
[7.76]*** [3.50]***
CO_AUSTRIA -0.015855 -0.001425
[4.12]*** [1.06]
CO_FRANCE -0.002028 0.001169
[0.86] [1.05]
CO_GERMANY -0.007406 -0.000259
[2.81]*** [0.23]
CO_BELGIUM + LUX -0.009816 -0.003683
[3.18]*** [2.11]**
COJRELAND -0.010106 -0.000351
[3.82]*** [0.27]
CO_NL -0.004381 0.002914
[1.55] [2.59]***
CO_DENMARK 0.00662 0.004233
[2.39]** [3.23]***
CO_FINLAND -0.000922 0.002217
[0.26] [1.67]*
Observations 30066 30066
chi2 1953.347
Pseudo R2 0.115
Source: ECHP. Own calculations. Absolute value of z sta 
significant at 1%. Ages in sample are 17-34 (South) and 1
[3.10]*** [4.07]*** [0.04] [4.37]***
-0.012358 -0.02004 0.00297 -0.026688
[2.88]*** [4.83]*** [0.57] [3.52]***
-0.000769 -0.023911 -0.001883 -0.013081
[0.20] [5.75]*** [0.36] [1.88]*
-0.016048 -0.007718 0.007215 -0.020694
[3.30]*** [1.94]* [1.45] [2.37]**
-0.004474 0.003442 0.012426 -0.012274
[1.14] [1.20] [2.63]*** [1.78]*
-0.006645 -0.003475 0.008125 -0.018579
[1.69]* [1.08] [1.70]* [2.55]**
-0.002874 -0.00485 0.000839 -0.013895
[0.69] [1.42] [0.15] [1.85]*
-0.020897 -0.00329 0.005423 -0.037592
[4.88]*** [1.17] [1.07] [5.15]***
-0.001258 -0.003359 0.01252 -0.001512
[0.27] [0.98] [2.64]*** [0.19]
0.010756 0.012621 0.018646 0.028247
[2.17]** [3.73]*** [3.86]*** [3.37]***
0.008872 0.008524 0.014862 0.024102
[1.60] [2.02]** [3.08]*** [2.50]**
30066 23377
1729.075
0.099
23377 23377
sties in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
'-29 (rest). UK is the reference country.
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Table 3.22 - Multinomial mode! o f departure from the parental home
income  -  Marginal effects______________________
ECHP -  Males, current
Own income
Zero income 
Dummy 
No Job
GREECE GREECE ITALY ITALY SPAIN SPAIN PORT. PORT.
Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner
-0.00005 0.000043 0.00011 0.000046 0.000036 0.000118 0.00001 0.000317
[0.57] [0.48] [2.28]** [1.23] [1.33] [2.29]** [0.02] [3.02]***
-0.007121 -0.00619 0.002705 0.001919 0.000251 -0.004379 -0.00384-0.001852 
[1.50] [1.02] [0.70] [0.64] [0.13] [1.18] [2.55]** [0.18]
-0 002151 -0.014675-0.006371 -0.011479-0.000475-0.008891 0.000244-0.024439 
[0.37] [1.83]* [1.34] [3.27]*** [0.21] [2.15]** [0.15] [1.89]*
-0.002063 0.001259-0.000037-0.000241 0.00049 0.000769-0.000153 0.002159
[1.61] [0.98] [0.04] [0.40] [1.16] [1.10] [0.52] [0.99]
0.000028 -0.000014 0.000038 -0.000071 -0.000004 -0.000069 0.00002 -0.000078 
[0.46] [0.20] [1.01] [1.99]** [0.16] [1.74]* [1.04] [0.84]
0.001722 0.003608 0.000959-0.000239 0.000012-0.000512-0.000277 0.001103 
[1.16] [2.23]** [1.24] [0.31] [0.03] [0.66] [0.60] [0.61]
-0.009613-0.001997-0.003736 0.001203 0.003167 0.003923-0.002648 0.004136 
[2.65]*** [0.40] [1.67]* [0.58] [1.32] [1.19] [2.05]** [0.73]
-0.00167-0.004337 0.001441 -0.003716-0.000682-0.001821 0.000253-0.006853 
[0.54] [1.05] [0.69] [2.14]** [0.79] [0.99] [0.24] [1.53]
-0.007434 0.005774 0.006433 0.000866-0.001352-0.002089 -0.00154 0.001444 
[2.09]** [1.44] [2.74]*** [0.45] [1.13] [0.94] [1.34] [0.27]
-0.002073 -0.003696 -0.002534 0.001004 -0.000825 0.003734 -0.000053 -0.001332 
[0.48] [0.76] [0.97] [0.58] [0.71] [1.76]* [0.07] [0.29]
0.001185 0.010129 0.001969 -0.00138 0.002618-0.000768-0.000116 0.002373 
[0.31] [2.26]** [0.61] [0.48] [1.91]* [0.26] [0.08] [0.30]
-0.000068-0.000276 0.000463-0.000007-0.000057 0.000011-0.000066-0.000048 
[0.10] [0.30] [2.72]*** [0.06] [0.51] [0.05] [0.32] [0.05]
-0.00549 -0.001031 -0.001505 0.00022 -0.000386 -0.000415 -0.000683 -0.005635
[1.88]* [0.36] [1.10] [0.22] [0.57] [0.40] [1.06] [1.78]*
0.000158 0.01258 0.003788 0.007953 0.002369 0.012546 0.001155 0.013087
[0.03] [1.60] [1.06] [1.48] [1.03] [2.95]*** [0.88] [1.88]*
0.001499 0.01281 0.005048 0.02499 0.005227 0.019358 0.000736 0.024623
[0.34] [1.79]* [1.57] [7.92]*** [2.98]*** [5.31]*** [0.59] [3.58]***
-0.000714 0.023716 0.005937 0.028869 0.006961 0.022359 0.00049 0.019308 
[0.13] [3.13]*** [1.68]* [8.47]*** [3.83]*** [5.81]*** [0.38] [2.44]**
0.011262 0.018704 0.008976 0.028811 0.00609 0.020401 -0.000739 0.00137
[2.54]** [2.41]** [2.43]** [7.72]*** [3.13]*** [5.14]*** [0.38] [0.14]
0.000088-0.007513 0.000584 0.000765-0.000267-0.001994 0.000033 0.013453 
[0.02] [1.71]* [0.23] [0.40] [0.25] [0.84] [0.03] [2.32]**
0.00126-0.007115 0.001709-0.001111-0.002561-0.007361 -0.00047 0.00206 
[0.35] [1.66]* [0.61] [0.52] [1.95]* [2.88]*** [0.39] [0.29]
2858 2858 6152 6152 5289 5289 3429 3429
0.103 0.134 0.177 0.122
Job security
Parental income
Durables
House own
Rooms pp
Accomm. 
short of space 
Parental health
Mobile
Unemployment
Change in Un.
AGE2123
AGE2426
AGE2729
AGE3035
YEAR_95
YEAR_96
Observations 
Pseudo R2 
P-value for 
Combining 
destinations 0.003 0.007 0.462 0
Source ECHP. Years. 1994-1996, with respect to year when still at home -  Ages in sample are 17-34 
(South) and 17-29 (rest); Own current and potential income percentiles are calculated only over positive 
values by country, gender and year. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** s ign ificant at 1%. Because some dumm ies have very small number of points with 
values of ones, we had to im pose a coeffic ient of zero on them for some destinations to ensure stability of 
the model (in such cases, the marginal effects are either omitted or the relative standard errors are indicated 
as [.]). The table continues on the next page.
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FRANCE FRANCE. GERMANY GERMANY BELGIUM BELGIUM UK UK IRELAND IRELAND
Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner
Own income -0.000115 -0.0000411 0.000004 0.000033 0.000001 -0.000025 0.000611 0.000207 0.000079 0.000005
[0.56] [0.54] [0.04] [0.47] [0.62] [0.22] [1.77]* [0.71] [0.75] [1.88]*
Zero income -0.001749 0.0015045 -0.0078 -0.00716 -0.000001 0.006459 0.027479 -0.01957 -0.00625 -0.00029
Dummy [0.20] [0.32] [1.01] [1.20] [0.24] [0.83] [1.72]* [0.94] [1.01] [1.08]
No Job -0.004215 -0.0050689 -0.00138 -0.00714 -0.000002 -0.021573 0.04846 -0.02814 0.021805 0.000359
[0.35] [1.38] [0.20] [1.32] [0.28] [1.54] [2.15]** [1.52] [2.05]** [1.38]
Job security 0 003165 0.0008425 0.00181 -0.00162 0.000001 0.001547 0.007355 -0.00574 0.004061 0.000061
[1.11] [0.76] [1.17] [1.42] [0.62] [0.75] [1.71]* [1.80]* [1.98]** [1.23]
Parental
income 0.00009 0.000003 0.000193 0.000067 0.000001 0.000023 0.000645 -0.00011 0.000076 0.000003
[0.59] [0.09] [1.80]* [0.99] [0.62] [0.22] [2.29]** [0.41] [0.87] [1.13]
Durables 0.001902 0.001122 -0.00145 0.001561 0.000001 -0.001477 0.00477 -0.00604 0.004401 0.000054
[0.64] [0.11] [0.64] [0.94] [0.43] [0.67] [0.73] [1.01] [2.21]** [1.00]
House own -0.0026 0.000211 -0.01485 -0.00402 0.000004 -0.000008 0.008251 0.000237 -0.02776 -0.00048
[0.42] [0.56] [3.04]*** [1.21] [0.83] [0.00] [0.45] [0.02] [4.56]*** [1.89]*
Rooms pp 0.006445 0.005243 0.001693 -0.00852 0.000003 0.00047 0.01075 -0.00071 0.003175 0.000024
[1.31] [2.16]** [0.49] [2.33]** [1.24] [0.13] [1.27] [0.07] [1-37] [0.26]
Accomm. 0.000644 -0.000233 0.007452 -0.00469 -0.000002 0.008494 0.034554 -0.00767 0.010099 0.000286
short of space [0.07] [1.57] [1.28] [1.01] [0.34] [1.43] [2.78]*** [0.64] [2.00]** [1.48]
Parental health 0.012191 0.001321 0.003265 -0.0037 0.000002 -0.004723 0.018175 0.010678 0.015177 0.000315
[1.68]* [0.52] [0.66] [1.01] [0.49] [0.47] [1.03] [0.86] [2.25]** [1.61]
Mobile 0.004184 -0.001876 0.000001 0.002724 0.056047 0.028877 -0.01872 -0.000002
[0.56] [0.56] [0.10] [0.38] [2.98]*** [1.02] [2.23]** [0.01]
Unemployment -0.001226 0.001283 0.00000 0.000118 -0.00707 0.005323 -0.02304 -0.00689
[0.86] [1.82]* [0.65] [0.20] [1.75]* [1.49] [2.45]** [2.57]**
Change in Un. 0.006738 -0.005581 -0.000019 -0.012292 -0.01691 0.001586 -0.02001 -0.00491
[0.63] [1.19] [1.60] [0.78] [1.45] [0.15] [2.04]** [2.57]**
AGE2123
AGE2426 0.053245 0.015581 0.018398 0.038703 0.000006 0.026303 0.000734 0.032688 0.012715 0.001026
[5.16]*** [3.24]*** [2.40]** [5.53]*** [0.96] [2.68]*** [0.04] [1.83]* [1.67]* [3.55]***
AGE2729 0.04968 0.00934 0.018127 0.044874 0.000011 0.028825 -0.00209 0.046198 0.009 0.00095
[4.09]*** [1.42] [1.81]* [6.11]*** [137] [2.54]** [0.09] [2.43]** [1.10] [3.26]***
AGE3035
YEAR_95 -0.013192 0.016774 0.003776 0.000487 0.000013 0.026809 -0.02165 0.020581 -0.01971 -0.00693
[0.69] [2.17]** [0.79] [0.16] [1.82]* [2.55]** [1.38] [1.33] [0.92] [2.54]**
YEAR_96 0.007867 -0.020651 -0.000001 0.020178 -0.0245 0.052016 -0.06091 -0.01606
[0.67] [5.95]*** [0.11] [2.35]** [1.66]* [3.51]*** [2.44]** [2.56]**
student -0.003754 -0.005392 -0.00574 -0.01151 -0.000013 0.009666 0.019877 0.010803 -0.00378 -0.00012
[0.46] [1.19] [0.86] [2.34]** [2.01]** [1.52] [0.82] [0.39] [0.52] [0.47]
AGE2021 0.034805 0.006205 0.005614 0.02879 -0.000216 0.001484 -0.02343 0.030023 0.005352 0.000711
[3.77]*** [1.37] [0.67] [4.37]*** [2.78]*** [0.13] [1.18] [1.94]* [0.80] [2.62]***
AGE2223 0.034418 0.01691 0.017691 0.03475 0.000009 0.02557 0.005192 0.032839 0.016297 0.000856
[3.27]*** [4.29]*** [2.26]** [5.51]*** [1.30] [3.18]*** [0.28] [2.06]** [2.35]** [3.11]***
Observations 2307 2307 2554 2554 1229 1229 801 801 2238 2238
Pseudo R2 0.159 0.114 0.194 0.124 0.159
P-value for
Combining
destinations 0.203 0.355 0.228 0.001 0.404
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Table 3.23 - Multinomial model o f departure from the parental home -  ECHP -  Females,
current income - Marginal effects  _____________________________________ __________________________________
GREECE GREECE ITALY ITALY SPAIN SPAIN PORT. PORT.
Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner
Own income 0.000017 0.00028 0.000126 -0.000011 0.00001 -0.000022! 0.00001 0.000227
[0.13] [1.15] [2.31]** [0.09] [0.91] [0.16] [0.69] [1.14]
Zero income 0.001757 -0.01357 0.00458 -0.018222 0.00001 -0.018756»-0.000011 -0.01133
Dummy [0.23] [1.00] [1.02] [2.51]** [1.04] [2.70]*** [0.62] [0.90]
No Job -0.00476 -0.01644 0.001446 0.008412 -0.000017 -0.00817 -0.000014 -0.00095
[0.60] [0.89] [0.26] [0.86] [2.19]** [0.90] [0.65] [0.05]
Job security 0 000163 0.000679 0.001234 0.002519 -0.000002 -0.001093 -0.000006 0.002819
[0.09] [0.15] [1.14] [1.23] [0.74] [0.51] [148] [0.63]
Parental income 0.000084 -0.00019 -0.000014 -0.000029 0.00001 -0.000131 0.00001 0.000251
[1.14] [1.18] [0.34] [0.34] [0.61] [1-31] [0.21] [1.67]*
Durables -0.00084 -0.00229 -0.001923 -0.004095 0.000001 -0.00112 -0.000003 -0.00915
[0.68] [0.75] [1.91]* [2.26]** [0.52] [0.66] [0.61] [3.04]***
House own -0.00068 0.016628 -0.002995 0.006275 -0.000016 -0.00535 0.00001 0.005031
[0.15] [1.43] [1.27] [1.12] [2.50]** [0.85] [0.01] [0.60]
Rooms pp -0.00108 -0.0132 0.001282 -0.003871 0.000004 -0.003544 0.000006 0.001755
[0.31] [1.27] [0.60] [0.97] [0.93] [0.76] [0.88] [0.25]
Accomm. -0.00038 -0.0091 -0.002932 -0.008013 0.000007 -0.001791 0.000009 0.005787
short of space [0.10] [0.98] [1.06] [1.63] [1.13] [0.36] [0.95] [0.71]
Parental health 0.004422 0.016285 -0.000177 -0.001887 -0.000006 0.005022 -0.000004 0.02186
[0.87] [1.42] [0.07] [0.38] [0.77] [0.99] [0.48] [2.91]***
Mobile 0.001192 -0.00388 0.001453 0.006457 0.000003 0.007915 -0.000001 -0.00319
[0.23] [0.34] [0.40] [0.94] [0.48] [1.21] [0.05] [0.29]
Unemployment -0.0002 -0.00248 0.000109 0.00105 -0.000001 0.000595 0.000004 0.001831
[0.26] [1.40] [0.69] [2.91]*** [1.43] [1.31] [2.85]*** [1.19]
Change in Un. 0.000947 -0.00532 -0.003091 0.001877 -0.000001 0.001314 0.000005 -0.00394
[0.26] [0.73] [2.21]** [0.77] [0.15] [0.60] [0-75] [0.79]
AGE2123 0.010357 0.016194 0.006194 0.02494 -0.000433 0.028209 -0.00051 0.008028
[1.98]** [1.33] [1.92]* [3.86]*** [3.29]*** [3.72]*** [3.13]*** [0.77]
AGE2426 0.009385 0.026392 0.006277 0.039965 0.000021 0.05128 0.00002 0.023809
[1.61] [2.39]** [1.98]** [7.14]*** [2.42]** [7.97]*** [1.30] [2.36]**
AGE2729 0.009874 0.039791 0.010499 0.03567 0.000023 0.051638 0.000021 -0.00087
[1.83]* [2.93]*** [3.30]*** [5.34]*** [2.76]*** [6.84]*** [1.35] [0-07]
AGE3035 0.013134 0.000801 0.010553 0.035817 0.000032 0.044617 0.000011 -0.00906
[2.13]** [0.04] [2.96]*** [4.86]*** [3.95]*** [5.30]*** [0.55] [0.58]
YEAR_95 0.002687 -0.01824 0.000664 ■-0.006845 0.000005 --0.008827 0.000007 0.009154
[0.65] [1.59] [0.26] [1.40] [0.71] [1.42] [0.53] [1.10]
YEAR_96 -0.00303 0.006182 -0.000813--0.002562 0.000005 0.000949 0.000007 -0.01379
[0.59] [0.66] [0.31] [0.45] [0.71] [0.17] [0.50] [1-33]
student
Observations 2021 2021 4947 4947 4480 4480 2622 2622
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.084 0.109 0.08
P-value for
Combining
destinations 0.149 0.005 0 0
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FRANCE FRANCE GERM ANY GERMANY BELGIUM BELGIUMI UK UK IRELAND IRELAND
Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner
Own income -0.000223 -0.000228 0.000264 -0.00016 0.000074 -0.00043 0.000185 0.000423 -0.000064 0.000249
[0.64] [1.32] [1.42] [0.70] [0.36] [1.53] [1.36] [0.91] [0.36] [2.03]**
Zero income -0.003717 -0.01417 0.00064 -0.0216 -0.00512 -0.01715 0.007671 -0.01962 -0.009692 -0.0043
Dummy [0.34] [2.45]** [0.05] [1.73]* [1.02] [1.36] [1.36] [0.72] [1.25] [0.66]
No Job -0.046198 -0.002459 -0.01471 -0.02446 0.001022 -0.05311 0.004311 0.000657 0.001546 0.000976
[2.73]*** [0.33] [1.07] [2.09]** [0.09] [2.00]** [0.65] [0.02] [0.13] [0.14]
Job security -0.002763 0.000491 0.001584 -0.00384 -0.00051 -0.00706 0.000054 0.002268 -0.000434 -0.0009
[0.69] [0.28] [0.80] [1.86]* [0.24] [1.91]* [0.04] [0.42] [0.19] [0.62]
Parental income 0.000342 0.000044 0.000275 -0.00021 -0.000036 0.000006 0.000038 0.000464 -0.000159 0.000027
[1.81]* [0.54] [2.06]** [1.27] [0.42] [0.03] [0.49] [1.03] [1.24] [0.36]
Durables 0.001205 0.000751 -0.00347 0.002369 0.00209 0.003321 0.001246 -0.00481 0.001416 0.000503
[0.35] [0.43] [0.98] [0.57] [1.27] [0.79] [0.86] [0.56] [0.72] [0.28]
House own 0.002489 0.003954 -0.01038 -0.00354 -0.01229 -0.00797 -0.0083 0.02498 -0.016534 -0.01532
[0.26] [0.93] [1.48] [0.46] [2.70]*** [0.66] [1.95]* [1.08] [2.01]** [2.34]**
Rooms pp 0.014212 -0.004373 -0.00115 -0.01542 0.004437 -0.0055 0.00042 -0.04002 -0.0048 -0.00109
[2.32]** [1.21] [0.21] [1.96]* [1.44] [0.72] [0.18] [2.27]** [1.11] [0.33]
Accomm. -0.013827 0.000356 -0.00172 -0.00951 0.003214 0.004932 -0.00279 -0.01055 -0.009758 0.001712
short of space [0.92] [0.07] [0.22] [0.95] [0.52] [0.38] [0.72] [0.53] [1.41] [0.38]
Parental health -0.007635 0.000922 0.001788 0.01134 0.018352 0.014998 -0.00307 -0.04982 0.001371 -0.00589
[0.60] [0.17] [0.23] [1.37] [2.82]*** [1.05] [0.51] [1.54] [0.14] [0.67]
Mobile -0 011061 0.000034 -0.01751 0.001925 0.00482 0.069146 -0.008246 -0.01879
[1.05] [0.01] [1.47] [0.14] [0.76] [2.36]** [0.91] [2.06]**
Unemployment 0.00471 0.001082 -0.00078 -0.00074 -0.000082 0.002612 -0.03231 -0.03211
[2.53]** [1.01] [1.08] [0.56] [0.09] [0.45] [2.45]** [3.91]***
Change in Un. -0.004591 0.004018 -0.0115 -0.01188 0.003415 0.010202 -0.045877 -0.03107
[0.34] [0.67] [1.32] [0.53] [1.27] [0.58] [3.33]*** [3.41]***
AGE2123
AGE2426 0.016386 0.017256 0.016827 0.04957 0.017648 0.041788 -0.00172 0.073014 0.022041 0.027665
[1.17] [1.98]** [1.43] [3.77]*** [2.27]** [2.48]** [0.26] [2.60]*** [2.16]** [3.02]***
AGE2729 0.019483 0.006313 0.009407 0.027317 0.015712 0.02372 -0.31369 0.065252 0.022075 0.019872
[1.06] [0.49] [0.56] [1.50] [1.68]* [1.03] [4.04]*** [1.24] [2.00]** [2.26]**
AGE3035
YEAR_95 0.018466 ■-0.000126 0.008279 -0.00254 0.017618 0.039396 0.002957 0.006533 0.003327 -0.01492
[0.74] [0.01] [1.30] [0.35] [2.13]** [2.27]** [0.66] [0.27] [0.15] [0.82]
YEAR_96 0.037841 -0.05646 0.007897 0.017627 0.006779 0.03317 -0.055409 -0.06495
[2.37]** [5.26]*** [1.15] [1.18] [1.46] [1.44] [1.70]* [3.11]***
student -0.015695-■0.016056 -0.00503 -0.00148 -0.00945 -0.02113 -0.00229 -0.03528 -0.028264 -0.01512
[1.47] [2.13]** [0.74] [0.16] [1.20] [1.59] [0.28] [0.59] [2.44]** [1.88]*
AGE2021 0.022199 0.01405 0.028101 0.031734 0.010659 0.024241 0.006834 0.063132 0.022998 0.012447
[2.20]** [2.03]** [3.57]*** [3.21]*** [1.69]* [1.67]* [1.82]* [2.74]*** [2.87]*** [1.60]
AGE2223 0.018017 0.021102 0.018578 0.037486 0.002868 0.04819 0.001245 0.054507 0.021525 0.020777
[1.58] [2.50]** [1.75]* [3.32]*** [0.38] [3.90]*** [0.19] [2.02]** [2.30]** [2.70]***
Observations 1868 1707 1707 1028 1028 600 600 1827 1827
Pseudo R2 0.145 0.095 0.171 0.123 0.141
P-value for
Combining
destinations 0.01 0.17 0.318 0 0.29
Source ECHP. Years: 1994-1996, w ith respect to year when still at home -  See notes in previous table.
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Table 3.24 - Multinomial model o f departure from the parental home -  ECHP  -  Males, potential
income - Marginal effects _________________________________
GREECE GREECE ITALY ITALY SPAIN SPAIN PORT. PORT.
Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner
Potential income -0.000023 0.0004 0.00037 0.000529 0.000097 0.000118 0.000138 0.00053
[0.23] [3.82]*** [0.91] [0.82] [1.94]* [1.16] [2.79]*** [2.76]***
Parental income 0 000068 -0.000095 0.00001 -0.000093 -0.000009 -0.000095 0.000022 -0.00017
[1.02] [1.05] [0.24] [2.58]*** [0.34] [1.78]* [1.66]* [1.49]
durables 0.000865 0.004675 0.001031 -0.000123 0.000062 -0.000343 -0.000985 -0.00113
[0.50] [2.44]** [1.25] [0.16] [0.13] [0.36] [2.03]** [0.50]
roomspp -0.001526 -0.008077 0.000759 -0.003152 -0.000581 -0.001365 -0.000139 -0.01164
[0.40] [1.54] [0.35] [1.88]* [0.58] [0.57] [0.10] [1.93]*
Accomm. -0.00682 0.006228 0.00744 0.001241 -0.002835 -0.002658 -0.000899 0.000033
short of space [1.61] [1.31] [2.98]*** [0.67] [1.98]** [0.89] [0.68] [0.00]
Parental health -0.001294 -0.005259 -0.00219 -0.000964 -0.00055 0.005613 -0.000037 -0.00341
[0.26] [0.92] [0.76] [0.55] [0.41] [2.02]** [0.03] [0.56]
mobile 0.002791 0.013119 0.002825 -0.002547 0.002415 0.000159 -0.000614 -0.00727
[0.62] [2.52]** [0.86] [0.85] [1.49] [0.04] [0.30] [0.68]
Unemployment 0.000035 -0.001564 0.000485 0.00027 -0.000081 -0.000285 -0.000147 -0.00116
[0.04] [1.56] [2.28]** [1.59] [0.61] [0.98] [061] [0.87]
Change in Un. -0.005629 -0 001494 -0.00098 0.000578 -0.000497 -0.000449 -0.000501 -0.00951
[1.75]* [0.40] [0.71] [0.63] [0.61] [0.34] [0.69] [2.38]**
AGE2123 -0.000016 0.018329 0.003557 0.004171 0.005301 0.022733 0.001223 0.028998
[0.00] [2.13]** [0.91] [0.76] [2.28]** [4.41]*** [0.86] [3.50]***
AGE2426 -0.000054 0.026556 0.003573 0.019731 0.008907 0.039412 0.00078 0.048978
[0.01] [3.78]*** [0.96] [6.16]*** [4.40]*** [9.89]*** [0.54] [7.09]***
AGE2729 -0.001368 0.042163 0.005766 0.022637 0.012273 0.045401 0.001025 0.046513
[0.22] [6.52]*** [1.44] [6.68]*** [4.98]*** [10.03]*** [0.74] [5.44]***
AGE3035 0.010986 0.032339 0.007738 0.021389 0.011269 0.042353 -0.0003 0.024952
[2.28]** [4.57]*** [1.85]* [5.62]*** [4.56]*** [8.98]*** [0.14] [2.16]**
YEAR_95 -0.001295 -0.010143 0.001613 0.000731 0.000154 -0.00382 0.000296 0.019657
[0.24] [1.84]* [0.58] [0.40] [0.12] [1.21] [0.24] [2.75]***
YEAR_96 0.000754 -0.005822 0.003045 -0.000722 -0.003594 -0.012026--0.000283 0.002651
student
[0.17] [1.17] [1.00] [0.35] [2.17]** [3.44]*** [0.18] [0.30]
Observations
Pseudo R2 
P-value for 
Combining 
destinations
2762
0.072
0.046
2762 5668
0.08
0
5668 5100
0.097
0.111
5100 3321
0.067
0.07
3321
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FRANCE FRANCE GERM ANY GERMANY U K U K
Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner
Potential income -0.00027 0.0000148 0.000164 -0.000003 0.000353 0.00017
[0.28] [0.13] [1.04] [0.02] [0.65] [0.37]
Parental income -0.001876 -0.0000214 0.000094 0.000114 0.00069 -0.00042
[1.74]* [0.11] [0.69] [1.08] [1.76]* [1.52]
durables 0.005076 -0.0019935 -0.00112 -0.000639 0.012018 -0.00526
[1.05] [0.60] [0.38] [0.24] [1.28] [0.81]
roomspp 0.009386 0.0151803 -0.00413 -0.016665 0.0133 -0.01304
[1.15] [2.37]** [0.81] [2.80]*** [1.23] [1.10]
Accomm. 0.002704 0.002711 0.007974 -0.011475 0.050392 -0.01717
short of space [0.17] [1.02] [1.02] [1.42] [3.06]*** [1.23]
Parental health 0.018596 -0.0004778 0.005818 -0.006001 0.00588 0.004899
[1.51] [0.08] [0.91] [1.01] [0.24] [0.36]
mobile 0.013582 -0.0069844 0.06616 0.027765
[1.18] [0.61] [2.85]*** [1.00]
Unemployment -0.001429 -0.0010803 -0.01199 0.006982
[0.59] [0.62] [2.26]** [2.04]**
Change in Un. -0.00049 0.0120156 -0.03149 0.014305
[0.03] [2.24]** [2.05]** [1.25]
AGE2123
AGE2426 0.066289 0.0298041 0.018452 0.056834 -0.01202 0.050313
[2.06]** [1.42] [1.40] [4.55]*** [0.37] [1.93]*
AGE2729 0.0533 0.0122314 0.018427 0.065924 -0.03906 0.028355
[1.51] [0.48] [1.09] [5.28]*** [0.88] [0.80]
AGE3035
YEAR_95 -0.018933 0.01103 0.00269 -0.002528 -0.01571 0.002831
[0.55] [0.95] [0.45] [0.51] [0.71] [0.13]
YEAR_96 0.009079 -0.003439 -0.03413 0.051375
[0.44] [0.88] [1.52] [3.08]***
student -0.012272--0.0303633
[0.83] [2.57]**
AGE2021 0.057303 0.001146 -0.00681 -0.020777 0.022304 0.035964
[2.52]** [0.08] [0.89] [2.89]*** [0.71] [1.25]
AGE2223 0.044828 0.0301055 0.015415 0.042437 -0.04135 0.023216
[1.48] [1.65]* [1.25] [3.59]*** [1.30] [1.06]
Observations 1451 1451 2055 2055 606 606
IRELAND
Alone
-0.000042
[0.26]
0.000144
[1.24]
0.003563
[1.34]
0.005078
[1.52]
0.015565
[2.56]**
0.013672
[1.49]
-0.006589
[0.72]
-0.03293
[2.45]**
-0.032424
[2 .01]**
IRELAND
Partner
0.000016
[1.98]**
0.000007
[1.39]
0.000108
[0.98]
0.000052
[0.26]
0.000695
[1.73]*
0.000654
[1.71]*
0.000122
[0.41]
-0.0149
[3.50]*** 
-0.01049
[3.50]***
[0.91]
-0.09161
[2.83]**
[3.44]*
[3.48]*
[0.48] [0.82]
[0.92]
2005
[1.91]*
2005
Pseudo R2 
P-value 
Combining 
destinations
for
0.142
0.01
0.052
0.338
0.094
0.001
0.125
Source ECHP. Years. 1994-1996, with respect to year when still at home -  See notes in previous table.
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Table 3.25 -  Multinomial model of departure from the parental home -  ECHP  -  Females ,
GREECE GREECE ITALY ITALY SPAIN SPAIN PORT. PORT.
Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner
Potential income 0.000159 0.000827 -0.000015 0.000015 0.000001 0.000259 0.000024 0.000282
[1.62] [3.73]*** [0.14] [0.06] [2.53]** [1.24] [0.58] [1.23]
Parental income 0.000103 -0.0002 -o.oooooei -0.000089 0.00001 -0.0002 0.000029 0.000269
[1.39] [1.10] [0.15] [0.96] [0.21] [1.89]* [1.01] [1.71]*
durables -0.001095-0.00292 -0.001961 -0.004188 0.000011 -0.00198 -0.00108 -0.00988
[0.83] [0.88] [2.32]** [2.14]** [0.00] [1.09] [1.65]* [3.15]***
roomspp -0.00046 -0.01583 0.001431 -0.001127 0.000004 -0.00261 -0.0002 -0.00485
[0.13] [1.39] [0.70] [0.29] [0.70] [0.54] [0.14] [0.62]
Accomm. 0.000774 -0.01212 -0.002429' -0.0068 0.000011 0.000018 0.000471 0.005006
short of space [0.22] [1.20] [0.89] [1.35] [1.35] [0.00] [0.26] [0.60]
Parental health 0.005175 0.023087 -0.000034 0.000563 -0.000008 0.006018 -0.00025 0.024613
[1.01] [1.87]* [0.01] [0.11] [0.75] [1.11] [0.19] [3.03]***
mobile 0.001663 -0.00982 0.001837 0.008954 0.000006 0.011281 0.000729 -0.00536
[0.36] [0.78] [0.54] [1.26] [0.67] [1.65]* [0.40] [0.45]
Unemployment -0.000013i -0.00243 -0.000106 0.000575 -0.000002 0.000295 0.000659 0.001871
[0.02] [1.21] [0.58] [1.30] [1.46] [0.60] [1.89]* [1.14]
Change in Un. 0.001772 -0.00455 -0.003385 0.000813 0.000002 0.001283 0.000437 -0.00299
[0.49] [0.60] [2.44]** [0.30] [0.51] [0.56] [0.46] [0.59]
AGE2123 0.013508 0.040255 0.008556 0.029422 -0.000559 0.030934 -0.00029 0.010127
[2.53]** [3.07]*** [3.02]*** [4.33]*** [2.91]*** [3.81]*** [0.11] [0.88]
AGE2426 0.013818 0.067704 0.009046 0.04796 0.00003 0.057151 0.003441 0.031795
[2.53]** [5.10]*** [2.52]** [6.69]*** [2.78]*** [8.34]*** [1.85]* [2.90]***
AGE2729 0.016775 0.094805 0.013578 0.045324 0.00003 0.056165 0.001377 0.00496
[2.70]*** [6.43]*** [3.57]*** [5.18]*** [2.45]** [6.62]*** [0.47] [0.33]
AGE3035 0.018842 0.042804 0.014201 0.047694 0.000043 0.046384 0.002513 0.003831
[2.90]*** [2.15]** [3.54]*** [5.19]*** [4.01]*** [5.06]*** [0.90] [0.23]
YEAR_95 0.002083 -0.01675 0.000098 -0.008425 0.000001 -0.00689 0.003844 0.014445
[0.52] [1.37] [0.04] [1.67]* [0.14] [1.06] [1.52] [1.61]
YEAR_96 -0.001944 0.013044 -0.000901 -0.004541 0.000004 0.000599 0.004087 -0.01108
[0.37] [1.30] [0.36] [0.77] [0.44] [0.10] [1.40] [1.02]
student
AGE2021
AGE2223
Observations 1930 1930 4625 4625 4313 4313 2487 2487
Pseudo R2 
P-value 
Combining 
destinations
0.072
for
0.36
0.08
0.123
0.097 0.067
0.003
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FRANCE FRANCE GERMANY GERMANY UK UK IRELAND IRELAND
Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner
Potential income 0.000539 0.000022 0.000473 0.000187 -0.000004 0.000082 0.000235 0.000596
[1.73]* [0.22] [1.16] [0.40] [013] [0.12] [1.12] [2.87]***
Parental income 0.000662 0.000008 0.000503 -0.00039 -0.000019 0.000849 -0.00031 -0.000064
[2.11]** [0.09] [2.18]** [1.55] [0.95] [1.36] [1.95]* [0.60]
durables 0.001001 0.002253 -0.00074 0.001479 0.000291 -0.00071 0.0025 -0.0009
[0.18] [1.02] [0.16] [0.25] [0.84] [0.06] [0.88] [0.39]
roomspp 0.012819 -0.002804 -0.00863 -0.02451 -0.000122 -0.05119 -0.012 -0.00364
[1.33] [0.73] [0.98] [1.96]* [0.13] [1.84]* [2.10]** [0.74]
Accomm. -0.025456 -0.003794 -0.00935 -0.01155 -0.001133 -0.01124 -0.0195 0.003283
short of space [1.06] [0.73] [0.65] [0.71] [1.00] [0.38] [2.12]** [0.55]
Parental health 0.002104 0.005778 0.001048 0.013613 -0.00281 -0.072 -0.00207 -0.0018
[0.11] [1.03] [0.08] [1.05] [1.40] [1.70]* [0.15] [0.18]
mobile -0.009096 -0.003731 0.001231 0.080885 -0.01094 -0.01981
[0.57] [0.59] [0.77] [1.98]** [0.90] [1.62]
Unemployment 0.009072 0.000647 0.000015 -0.00164 -0.03723 -0.0509
[3.12]*** [0.49] [0.05] [0.19] [2.52]** [4.85]***
Change in Un. -0.02306 -0.007452 0.000423 -0.00435 0.000435 -0.0022 -0.05098 -0.05461
[1.07] [0.97] [0.04] [0.37] [0.57] [0.08] [3.20]*** [4.19]***
AGE2123
AGE2426 -0.001708 0.007511 0.013662 0.06943 0.001174 0.084869 0.001957 0.006068
[0.06] [0.66] [0.60] [2.89]*** [0.77] [2.01]** [0.13] [0.49]
AGE2729 0.000352 -0.001217 -0.00222 0.023789 -0.067019 0.073833 0.004951 -0.01202
[0.01] [0.09] [0.06] [0.67] [3.41]*** [0.92] [0.31] [0.89]
AGE3035
YEAR_95 0.033194 0.020381 0.011113 -0.01325 0.001379 0.059079 -0.00699 -0.01533
[0.80] [1.30] [1.06] [1.18] [0.95] [1.50] [0.26] [0.68]
YEAR_96 0.049483 -0.027759 0.002444 0.061866 -0.07949 -0.10759
[1.91]* [2.57]** [1.88]* [1.71]* [2.15]** [4.25]***
student -0.048352 -0.021902 -0.0112 0.00048 -0.068067 -0.01912 -0.02938 -0.03018
[2.95]*** [2.03]** [1.03] [0.04] [3.46]*** [0.23] [2.01]** [2.70]***
AGE2021 0.029967 0.014515 0.034882 0.053513 0.001394 0.063011 -0.000038 -0.00174
[1.50] [135] [2.52]** [3.21]*** [1.05] [1.58] [0.00] [0.16]
AGE2223 0.012647 0.019248 0.017543 0.04926 0.000968 0.060133 0.00894 0.001203
[0.58] [1 -63] [0.89] [2.37]** [0.56] [1.30] [0.63] [0.11]
Observations 1081 1081 1211 1211 416 416 1466 1466
Pseudo R2 0.157 0.052 0.094 0.125
P-value for
Combining
destinations 0.01 0.295 0 0.211
ce ECHP: Years: 1994-1996, with respect to year when still at home ■-  See notes in previous table.
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Table 3.26 - Multinomial model o f departure from the parental home  -  ECHP  -  Nordic countries
pooled  -  Marginal effects  ______________________________________________________________________________________________
Actual income Potential income
Males Males Females Females Males Males Females Females
Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner Alone Partner
Own income 0.000737 0.000085 -0.000065 0.000447
[3.73]*** [0.51] [0.18] [1.03]
Potential income 0.00105 0.00054 -0.00022 0.001331
[2.32]** [1.91]* [0.76] [3.06]***
Zero income dummy 0.026305 -0.01428 -0.01174 0.010005
[2.52]** [1.43] [0.82] [0.57]
No Job 0.000222 -0.01006 0.001633 -0.01442
[0.02] [0.92] [0.08] [0.60]
Job security -0.00013 -0.00206 0.000725 0.004343
[0.05] [0.94] [0.19] [0.86]
Student -0.02637 -0.00953 -0.01176 -0.05712 -0.04405 -0.00939 -0.00484 -0.08163
[2.91]*** [1-15] [1.11] [3.59]*** [3.45]*** [0.97] [0.40] [3.81]***
Parental income 0.000146 0.000306 -0.000029 0.000474 0.000226 0.000316 -0.00038 0.000903
[0.96] [2.05]** [0.11] [1.32] [0.95] [1.69]* [1.22] [1.88]*
Durables -0.00313 -0.00113 0.000008 0.002575 -0.00481 0.000935 0.002911 -0.00073
[1.00] [0.36] [0.00] [0.43] [1.03] [0.25] [0.59] [0.09]
House owned 0.004949 0.004207 -0.00418 -0.04347 0.007572 -0.0005 -0.0213 -0.06223
[0.57] [0.52] [0.32] [2.89]*** [0.55] [0.05] [1.30] [2.86]***
Rooms pp 0.00082 0.00126 -0.00814 0.017763 0.002647 -0.00138 -0.00255 0.006257
[0.12] [0.24] [0.80] [1.59] [0.25] [0.23] [0.23] [0.38]
accomm_shortofspace -0.00152 0.005201 -0.02264 0.001409 -0.00164 0.005265 -0.05039 0.002519
[0.13] [0.55] [1.26] [0.07] [0.10] [0.48] [1.88]* [0.09]
Mobile -0.00285 0.002488 0.021042 0.016787 0.000492 -0.00179 0.027693 0.028546
[0.29] [0.28] [1.79]* [0.99] [0.04] [0.20] [1.89]* [1.36]
Unemployment -0.00216 -0.00191 0.004611 -0.01055 -0.00235 0.000036 0.003133 -0.00649
[0.65] [0.69] [1.18] [1.83]* [0.53] [0.01] [0.64] [0.95]
Change in Un. -0.00749 0.008501 -0.00481 0.029878 -0.00091 -0.00321 0.008665 0.009739
[1.01] [1.18] [0.49] [2.17]** [0.06] [0.29] [0.45] [0.37]
AGE2021 0.023134 0.037853 0.035154 0.023885 0.029378 0.039319 0.040197 0.002523
[2.67]*** [4.44]*** [2.90]*** [1.46] [2.38]** [3.74]*** [2.67]*** [0.12]
AGE2223 0.034236 0.050328 0.049362 0.046565 0.020451 0.044062 0.053692 0.011097
[3.58]*** [4.91]*** [3.45]*** [2.25]** [1.23] [3.47]*** [3.31]*** [0.38]
AGE2426 0.016133 0.042023 0.071871 0.012517 -0.00907 0.031443 0.093135 -0.03075
[1.23] [3.92]*** [4.35]*** [0.43] [0.41] [2.44]** [4.99]*** [0.64]
AGE2729 -0.02772 0.047597 0.016236 -0.00244 -0.05646 0.035252 0.023198 -0.03196
[1.29] [3.73]*** [0.61] [0.09] [1.67]* [2.23]** [0.76] [0.87]
YEAR_95 0.001838 -0.00927 -0.00332 -0.00694 0.010796 0.014289 -0.03773 0.037124
[0.19] [1.03] [0.26] [0.41] [0.44] [0.79] [1.28] [0.86]
YEAR_96 -0.00565 -0.001 -0.01438 0.012324 0.01176 0.011847 -0.04429 0.034961
[0.51] [0.10] [0.94] [0.60] [0.61] [0.86] [1.69]* [1.01]
CO_DENMARK 0.030176 0.022542 0.035687 0.074577 0.051019 0.038046 0.033052 0.070313
[3.10]*** [2.44]** [2.53]** [3.85]*** [3.39]*** [3.42]*** [1.58] [2.48]**
CO_FINLAND 0.042161 0.027712 -0.0081 0.136535 0.048438 0.035194 0.00777 0.042526
[1.43] [1.08] [0.20] [2.65]*** [1.35] [1-59] [0.16] [0.68]
Observations 1880 1880 1325 1325 1158 1158 791 791
Source ECHP: Years: 1994-1996, with respect to year when still at home -  See notes in previous table. The 
Netherlands is the reference country.
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3.9 Appendix: Definition of household
"In every Member State the definition of the household complies with Eurostat 
recommendations and corresponds to a combination of the criteria of dwelling and shared 
domestic arrangements. The shared arrangements may include meals taken together or a 
shared room (Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, United Kingdom) 
and/or a joint budget (Denmark, Greece, Spain, Germany, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Portugal), and/or the use of common equipments (Belgium and Ireland). Person currently 
residing in the household, persons temporarily institutionalised (health home, full-time 
education, military service) or absent for work or travel are included in all countries. However, in 
Denmark, persons in health homes are excluded. In addition ... to the head of household, 
partner or spouse and related persons, unrelated persons normally residing in the household 
such as borders [sic] and domestic staff are considered to be ... part of the household in most of 
the countries (with the exception of Denmark and France). Tenants/subtenants and lodgers are 
excluded (except in Germany, Greece and Ireland), as are persons temporarily with the 
household such as guests or visitors (with some exceptions in Greece and Spain).” Denmark 
excludes students and people in military service (who are “temporarily away”), if not expected 
back. (Eurostat (1996))
Table 3.27 -  National definitions of household
B | DK | D | G | E I F | IRL | I | L | NL | P | UK
H ouseho ld
- common accomodation yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
- common arrangements yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Are included
- p e rso n s  c urren tly  living in the  h o u s e h o ld
. relatives of head/spouse yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
. resident employee yes no yes yes
(3)
Yes no yes - if 
main 
place of 
residen 
ce
yes yes yes yes (3 yes
. tenant or subtenant not 
occupying separate 
accomm odation
no no yes yes No no yes no no no no
(4)
no
. person temporarily staying 
with the household (guest, 
visitor)
no no no yes -  
if > 1 
year
depend 
s (2)
no no no no no no no
- p e rso n s  tem p o rarily  a w a y  o r  a b s e n t fo r o th e r  re a s o n s
. institutionalised (1)
in hospital/nursing home yes no yes yes yes (5) yes yes (6) yes yes yes yes yes
in fu ll-time education yes yes if 
expected 
back
yes yes yes (5) yes yes (6) yes yes yes yes yes
m ilitary service
other yes depends yes yes yes (5) yes yes (6) yes yes yes yes yes
. temporary absence for other reasons
working out of town yes yes unless 
away for 
more than 
half a year
yes yes yes (5) yes yes (6) yes yes yes yes yes
on travel yes yes yes yes (5) yes yes (6) yes yes yes yes yes
other reasons yes yes yes yes (5) yes yes (6) yes yes yes yes yes
Source: Eurostat (1996), p. 18, table 3.
(1) Persons temporarily absent are considered as household members if they are absent for one year or 
less; or if they are absent for more than one year but consider this address as their main and unique
(2) yes (visitor), if more than 1 year with the household; no (guest)
(3) if they do not regard some other place as their main residence
(4) excluding persons in a hotel
(5) if less than one year and consider the dwelling as their main place of residence
(6) if absence is temporary and if expected back
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3.10 Appendix: Results of estimation of potential earnings
Table 3.28 -  Earnings equations for ECHP countries, by gender
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: author’s calculations on ECHP, 1994-1997 - 1995-7 for Austria, 1996-7 for Finland.
PORTUGAL PORTUGAL
GREECE_M GREECE_F ITALY_M ITALY_F SPAIN_M SPAIN_F M F AUSTRIA_M AUSTRIA_F FRANCE_M FRANCE_F
age 0.372112 -1.05467 0.018035 -1.01843 0.114082 -1.47522 -0.26473 -0.43116 0.944563 -0.03076 1.027916 0.798436
[1.49] [2.18]** [0.07] [3.32]*** [0.50] [4.04]*** [1.57] [1.97]** [4.32]*** [0.09] [3.51]*** [1.32]
age2 -0.01687 0.033176 -0.00848 0.028917 -0.01005 0.045605 0.007599 0.010476 -0.03255 0.000879 -0.03775 -0.02948
[1.82]* [1.90]* [0.89] [2.52]** [1.17] [3.37]*** [1.16] [1.25] [3.94]*** [0.07] [3.67]*** [1.41]
age3 0.000235 -0.00035 0.000173 -0.00027 0.000182 -0.00046 -0.000061 -0.00007 0.000379 -0.000004 0.000468 0.000361
non-labour
[2.08]**
non-transfer
[1.69]* [1.50] [1.90]* [1.73]* [2.79]*** [0.73] [0.68] [3.69]*** [0.03] [3.88]*** [1.50]
income 0.000001 0.000001 0.000015 0.000017 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000002 0.000004 0.000006
[5.23]*** [5.02]*** [2.55]** [2.70]*** [2.61]*** [1.88]* [7.80]*** [1.59] [3.07]*** [1.70]* [3.49]*** [2.46]**
Couple 0.005787 0.227896 -0.20681 0.112216 -0.1811 0.269278 -0.10032 -0.01885 0.080048 -0.08753 0.116012 -0.0182
[0.21] [5.97]*** [7.10]*** [3.37]*** [6.82]*** [7.30]*** [3.97]*** [0.65] [2.82]*** [2.33]** [4.30]*** [0.72]
EDU3 0.257129 0.235935 0.226082 0.26443 0.261938 0.372604 0.569593 0.845069 0.441514 0.322665 0.371985 0.432183
[8.37]*** [6.40]*** [4.90]*** [5.51]*** [10.83]*** [11.35]*** [11.62]*** [21.44]*** [5.79]*** [5.56]*** [12.90]*** [13.48]***
EDU2 0.146317 0.086878 0.093321 0.132865 0.063387 0.083575 0.212933 0.364254 0.119186 0.134867 0.066655 0.077718
[6.19]*** [2.33]** [4.81]*** [6.60]*** [3.06]*** [3.09]*** [7.80]*** [15.28]*** [3.16]*** [3.52]*** [3.46]*** [2.73]***
WORKB4 -0.01169 0.066096 -0.09652 -0.0855 -0.03095 0.089294 -0.08349 -0.11693 0.05854 0.309902 -0.0736 0.018048
[0.43] [1.80]* [3.65]*** [2.53]** [1.15] [2.27]** [3.33]*** [3.98]*** [1.76]* [6.55]*** [2.63]*** [0.51]
exp 0.031045 0.023852 0.008865 0.021868 0.009095 -0.02524 0.034208 0.037413 0.054374 0.013345 0.031685 0.003279
[3.62]*** [2.23]** [1.25] [3.00]*** [1.17] [1.54] [4.65]*** [4.04]*** [4.14]*** [1.12] [5.63]*** [0.46]
exp2 -0.00145 -0.00131 -0.00022 -0.00167 -0.00051 0.000664 -0.00227 -0.00177 -0.00286 -0.00138 -0.00235 -0.00053
[3.67]*** [2.42]** [0.60] [4.66]*** [1.53] [0.72] [7.26]*** [4.00]*** [4.89]*** [2.20]** [6.90]*** [1.25]
tenu 0.045059 0.070423 0.055239 0.057527 0.062875 0.093029 0.044966 0.067502 0.046937 0.029489 0.084807 0.111856
[5.87]*** [5.88]*** [7.86]*** [7.49]*** [10.39]*** [9.64]*** [7.14]*** [8.84]*** [4.96]*** [2.59]*** [12.02]*** [13.36]***
tenu2 -0.00188 -0.00242 -0.0031 -0.00279 -0.00332 -0.00425 -0.00193 -0.00342 -0.00229 -0.00099 -0.0044 -0.00522
[4.17]*** [3.37]*** [7.70]*** [6.78]*** [8.67]*** [6.81]*** [5.44]*** [8.96]*** [4.25]*** [1.63] [10.20]*** [10.67]***
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Long spells unemployed -0.10884 -0.03914 -0.01827 -0.04097 -0.13217
[3.80]*** [1.41] [0.91] [1.93]* [6.74]***
YEAR_95 0.198002 0.146621 0.10856 0.080091 0.029168
[7.24]*** [4.78]*** [4.19]*** [3.10]*** [1.33]
YEAR_96 0.245065 0.199888 0.170225 0.116626 0.025843
[8.97]*** [5.37]*** [6.27]*** [3.65]*** [1.05]
YEAR_97 0.356085 0.336062 0.179672 0.183195 0.071856
[11.72]*** [7.29]*** [5.54]*** [4.71]*** [2.54]**
Constant 11.8125 25.36462 12.45326 22.17161 15.1008
[5.27]*** [5.68]*** [5.46]*** [8.16]*** [7.46]***
age -0.12892 2.821412 0.37971 1.355091 0.869548
[0.39] [7.41]*** [1.51] [5.16]*** [3.59]***
age2 0.019311 -0.09207 -0.00249 -0.0396 -0.0212
[1.49] [6.46]*** [0.26] [3.99]*** [2.29]**
age3 -0.00035 0.001016 -0.000064 0.00039 0.000164
[2.16]** [5.81]*** [0.54] [3.18]*** [1.41]
WORKB4 0.034919 -0.01011 0.161733 0.089581 0.034078
[0.90] [0.28] [6.15]*** [3.13]*** [1.24]
HEALTH_A 0.732784 0.252092 0.1013 0.045099 0.099344
[7.71]*** [3.81]*** [3.14]*** [1.99]** [2.79]***
HEALTH_B 0.772557 0.146356 0.113745 0.062537 0.112226
[7.47]*** [2.09]** [3.80]*** [3.35]*** [3.30]***
non-labour non-transfer
income -0.000001 -0.000001 0.000011 -0.000001 -0.000001
[5.83]*** [6.58]*** [1.62] [0.24] [2.47]**
couple 0.506121 -0.31684 0.491142 -0.07071 0.475504
[7.58]*** [6.22]*** [12.12]*** [2.02]** [11.76]***
Partner has No Job 0.049501 0.144601 0.038071
[0.67] [4.13]*** [1.16]
parent 0.336709 -0.23542 0.073461 -0.12312 0.050549
[4.36]*** [4.64]*** [1.98]** [4.51]*** [1.40]
Household size -0.10154 -0.1623 -0.03417 -0.03051 -0.06142
-0.12534 -0.07554 -0.03139 -0.07102 -0.188 -0.13618 -0.21034
[5.75]*** [2.93]*** [1.42] [0.77] [3.36]*** [3.78]*** [5.64]***
-0.00709 0.011524 -0.0157 0.012325 -0.13029 -0.0057 -0.02498
[0.24] [0.54] [0.63] [0.45] [2.91]*** [0.27] [1.01]
0.036941 0.04567 0.032263 -0.12036 -0.01293 -0.01105
[1.07] [2.01]** [1.11] [3.49]*** [0.59] [0.43]
0.101674 0.105449 0.087362 -0.00983 0.019167 0.010085
[2.34]** [4.17]*** [2.54]** [0.35] [0.82] [0.33]
29.99872 16.83515 19.09548 2.384229 12.46186 1.665352 3.848816
[9.22]*** [11.89]*** [10.23]*** [1.27] [4.44]*** [0.60] [0.66]
1.897776 0.832036 0.950637 -0.67528 1.400672 0.755621 2.111208
[6.50]*** [3.35]*** [3.66]*** [1.75]* [4.27]*** [1.61] [4.22]***
-0.05762 -0.02459 -0.02619 0.031133 -0.04803 -0.01022 -0.0621
[5.24]*** [2.49]** [2.59]*** [2.02]** [3.73]*** [0.58] [3.40]***
0.000589 0.000248 0.000239 -0.0004 0.000555 -0.00003 0.000616
[4.33]*** [1.95]* [1.86]* [1.99]** [3.37]*** [0.14] [2.81]***
-0.0929 0.376269 0.195511 -0.20182 -0.34736 0.281008 0.126278
[3.04]*** [11.37]*** [5.91]*** [4.02]*** [8.01]*** [7.65]*** [3.58]***
0.093599 0.136211 0.115311 0.191826 0.238981 0.142161 0.08754
[3.02]*** [3.11]*** [2.69]*** [2.02]** [4.29]*** [2.73]*** [1.96]**
0.065644 0.256604 0.165343 0.367411 0.214335 0.181149 0.139034
[2.28]** [8.63]*** [6.49]*** [3.69]*** [3.59]*** [3.88]*** [3.74]***
- 0.000000 -0.000001 - 0.000000 -0.000004 -0.000003 -0.000009 -0.000011
[1.23] [7.06]*** [0.88] [2.66]*** [2.12]** [3.35]*** [2.14]**
-0.22604 0.631225 0.099711 0.208589 0.069129 0.535446 0.199907
[5.87]*** [10.71]*** [2.46]** [2.83]*** [1.45] [10.24]*** [4.40]***
-0.11966 -0.2968 -0.03189 -0.20123 -0.24279
[1.88]* [2.72]*** [0.33] [3.97]*** [4.30]***
-0.2613 0.185105 -0.10544 0.381006 -0.2913 0.294206 -0.16397
[7.47]*** [2.96]*** [3.32]*** [3.92]*** [5.88]*** [5.35]*** [3.38]***
-0.06169 -0.01545 -0.04564 0.070658 -0.04075 -0.1012 -0.4154
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[4.68]*** [7.63]*** [3.09]*** [3.17]*** [4.87]*** [5.45]*** [1.55] [4.50]*** [3.10]*** [2.97]*** [4.66]*** [11.18]***
year -0.07524 -0.03772 -0.03828 -0.02692 0.01033 0.000073 -0.03184 0.003937 -0.0846 -0.11223 -0.00132 -0.04359
[4.37]*** [2.30]** [3.43]*** [2.33]** [0.91] [0.01] [2.39]** [0.28] [2.89]*** [4.51]*** [0.07] [2.87]***
Constant 3.325776 -25.1541 -3.78173 -13.5655 -12.128 -20.7425 -6.59586 -11.6795 11.68804 -2.68081 -12.1109 -18.7311
[1.01] [6.84]*** [1.57] [5.42]*** [5.22]*** [7.55]*** [2.74]*** [4.71]*** [2.75]*** [0.75] [2.77]*** [4.03]***
athrho:Constant -0.916 -1.47578 -1.93097 -2.18545 -1.72202 -1.99315 -1.76746 -1.89266 0.212026 -2.00393 -0.45859 -0.70308
[9.76]*** [11.50]*** [27.25]*** [33.98]*** [33.25]*** [23.98]*** [29.85]*** [25.84]*** [4.42]*** [17.81]*** [3.45]*** [4.02]***
lnsigma:Constant -0.473 -0.24239 -0.05411 0.066911 -0.17162 0.06599 -0.35993 -0.20689 -0.55135 -0.09046 -0.70632 -0.59884
[14.45]*** [5.08]*** [2.16]** [2.26]** [6.19]*** [1.99]** [12.76]*** [6.08]*** [14.76]*** [2.23]** [16.73]*** [10.95]***
Observations 6276 7062 12139 12220 11417 11301 7492 6997 3608 3333 7226 7976
censored obs 3012 5303 6839 8832 6494 8654 2900 4098 1075 1689 3344 4936
Wald 461.072 440.014 471.777 550.09 593.026 810.825 1026.075 1371.763 943.152 203.377 955.5 826.415
LR test of indep. eqns 95.334 132.258 742.687 1154.661 1105.836 574.837 890.792 667.785 19.506 317.325 11.871 16.189
lambda -0.451 -0.707 -0.908 -1.043 -0.79 -1.029 -0.658 -0.777 0.12 -0.881 -0.212 -0.333
Se 0.039 0.048 0.025 0.033 0.026 0.038 0.022 0.029 0.028 0.039 0.06 0.077
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age
age2
age3
non-labour
non-transfer
income
Couple
EDU3
EDU2
WORKB4
Exp
exp2
Tenu
tenu2
Uneone
YEAR 95
GERMANY
_M
1.57707
[12.47]***
-0.05366
[11.37]***
0.000619
[ 10.66] * * *
0.000006
[4.14]*** 
0.102534 
[7.59]*** 
0.198052 
[8.96]*** 
0.034733 
[2.06]** 
0.049023 
[3.41]*** 
0.081921 
[9.31]*** 
-0.00406 
[10.63]*** 
0.022767 
[12.67]*** 
- 0.000011 
[12.72]*** 
-0.24782 
[8.07]*** 
-0.00162 
[0 .11]
GERMANY
_F
0.153201
[0.85]
-0.00437
[0.65]
0.000051
[0.61]
0.000008
[2.19]**
-0.03927
[2.15]**
0.192986
[8.27]***
0.035849
[1.87]* 
0.154061
[7.71]*** 
0.069836
[7.71]*** 
-0.00379 
[9.01]*** 
0.02017
[9.87]*** 
- 0.00001 
[9.93]*** 
-0.20364 
[7.40]*** 
0.007945
[0.44]
BELGIUM_
M
1.385704
[3.28]***
-0.04573
[3.00]***
0.000507
[2.81]***
0.000001
[0.13]
0.018334
[0.55]
0.178363
[4.46]*** 
0.01885
[0.60]
0.013501
[0.38]
0.029613
[2.40]**
-0.00128
[2.47]** 
0.039754 
[3.91]*** 
-0.0017 
[2.99]*** 
-0.27801 
[5.08]*** 
0.044171
[1.25]
BELGIUM,
F
-0.6859
[0.96]
0.019668
[0.78]
-0.00018
[0.63]
0.000001
[1.36]
-0.1415
[3.84]***
0.247175
[5.89]***
0.085803
[1.94]* 
0.069828
[2.33]**
0.032913
[3.06]***
-0.00169
[3.09]*** 
0.03242
[3.09]*** 
-0.0014 
[2.35]** 
-0.19226 
[5.28]*** 
0.059951
[1.94]*
UK_M
0.260502
[1.22]
-0.0068
[0 .86]
0.000063
[0.67]
0.000016
[2.76]***
-0.0131
[0.65]
0.15178
[8 .66] * * *
0.04674
[2.15]**
-0.00883
[0.41]
0.008024
[1.20]
-0.00081
[1.90]* 
0.028826 
[4.87]*** 
-0.00137 
[3.31]*** 
-0.29322
[8.90]*** 
0.025643
[1.26]
UK_F
0.370444
[1.56] 
-0.01071
[ 1 .22]
0.000106
[0.99]
0.000033
[2.56]** 
-0.15687 
[7.20]*** 
0.295492 
[12.17]*** 
0.115685 
[4.35]*** 
-0.03485
[1.25]
0.010741
[1.22]
-0.00144
[2.47]**
0.057989
[7.61]***
-0.00266
[4.53]***
-0.28787
[4.73]***
-0.01956
[0.79]
IRELAND
_M
iRELAND
F NL_M NL_F
1.232643 0.076361 2.329073 2.021902
[6.26]*** [0.18] [5.71]*** [4.56]***
-0.0457 -0.00645 -0.07818 -0.07053
[6.21]*** [0.43] [5.37]*** [4.48]***
0.000563 0.000129 0.000881 0.000819
[6.21]*** [0.71] [5.15]*** [4.43]***
0.000029 0.000035 0.000007 0.000001
[4.91]*** [1.34] [0.79] [0.08]
0.232311 0.007366 0.169719 -0.00898
[10.37]*** [0.28] [6.69]*** [0.31]
0.330141 0.414568 0.226103 0.229902
[9.60]*** [9.52]*** [7.44]*** [6.44]***
0.107284 0.10986 0.022102 0.005382
[5.11]*** [3.54]*** [0.96] [0.19]
0.088251 0.073365 0.14361 0.09432
[3.90]*** [2.56]** [5.34]*** [3.07]***
0.079633 0.070558 0.056668 0.064786
[7.51]*** [4.69]*** [5.04]*** [4.85]***
-0.00346 -0.00392 -0.00283 -0.00352
[7.02]*** [4.83]*** [5.98]*** [5.84]***
0.056508 0.074836 0.075645 0.106301
[7.76]*** [8.61]*** [10.51]*** [11.31]***
-0.00209 -0.00318 -0.00363 -0.00493
[4.66]*** [6.11]*** [7.78]*** [8.31]***
-0.16995 -0.0775 -0.31736 -0.11499
[5.33]*** [1.91]* [5.76]*** [1.59]
0.058025 0.063323 0.025932 0.060459
[2.60]*** [2.42]** [0.98] [1.84]*
DENMAR DENMAR FINLAND FINLAND
K_M K_F _M JF
0.2852322 0.240129 0.357265 -2.84831
[0.86] [0.74] [0.54] [3.16]***
-0.033522 -0.00632 -0.02211 0.099017
[1.38] [0.53] [0.94] [3.08]***
0.000421 0.000048 0.000355 -0.00114
[1.13] [0.33] [1.28] [3.01]***
0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001
[0.50] [0.66] [0.18] [0.58]
0.0439 -0.07526 0.114808 0.089064
[1.93]* [2.13]** [2.07]** [1.31]
0.157547 0.134842 0.314697 0.204446
[5.20]*** [4.23]*** [5.18]*** [2.68]***
0.059013 0.069949 0.156298 -0.01976
[2.59]*** [2.41]** [3.26]*** [0.28]
-0.038674 -0.06904 0.226044 0.346563
[1.20] [1.63] [3.72]*** [3.80]***
0.070547 -0.00132 0.033577 0.010983
[6.59]*** [0.09] [1.85]* [0.47]
-0.00277 -0.000011 -0.0024 -0.00112
[5.46]*** [0.02] [3.19]*** [1.06]
0.056708 0.072463 0.075962 0.078468
[8.08]*** [9.37]*** [5.49]*** [5.55]***
-0.004021 -0.00449 -0.00397 -0.00511
[8.02]*** [8.58]*** [4.06]*** [5.07]***
-0.239731 -0.12402 -0.13313 -0.19341
[7.18]*** [4.46]*** [2.60]*** [2.46]**
0.046495 0.047428
[1.91]* [1.77]*
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YEAR_96
YEAR_97
Constant
Age
age2
age3
WORKB4
HEALTH_A
HEALTH_B
non-labour
non-transfer
income
couple
Partner has 
No Job
Parent
Household
size
0.017705 0.05706
[1.19] [2.90]***
0.037767 0.090098
[2.17]** [3.59]***
-6.0243 7.866945
[5.42]*** [4.98]***
1.357031 2.736979
[6.74]*** [14.95]***
-0.04394 -0.09525
[5.56]*** [13.49]***
0.000497 0.00111
[4.90]*** [12.47]***
-0.51431 -0.38927
[17.91]*** [15.52]***
-0.00708 0.092271
[0.19] [3.49]***
0.092432 0.066896
[2.91]*** [3.40]***
-0.000015 -0.000012
[4.00]*** [2.57]**
0.420964 0.043249
[11.44]*** [1.58]
-0.20901 -0.02419
[4.64]*** [0.60]
0.200126 -0.6902
[4.63]*** [18.29]***
-0.0421 -0.10102
[3.50]*** [8.62]***
0.071091 0.079011
[1.95]* [2.47]**
0.06132 0.086663
[1.60] [2.20]**
-1.2422 20.67569
[0.32] [3.05]***
-0.41674 2.838362
[0.78] [4.39]***
0.034949 -0.08563
[1.71]* [3.64]***
-0.00058 0.000866
[2.29]** [3.08]***
0.123644 -0.18796
[2.05]** [3.88]***
0.45393 0.200785
[4.33]*** [3.64]***
0.534588 0.160785
[5.19]*** [3.25]***
0.000001 0.000001
[1.15] [1.96]**
0.707164 0.454109
[8.32]*** [6.95]***
-0.698 -0.19885
[7.76]*** [1.93]*
0.29405 -0.31972
[2.91]*** [5.38]***
-0.03595 -0.24224
[0.91] [6.46]***
0.020969 0.043042
[1.00] [1.67]*
0.076742 0.069154
[3.03]*** [2.44]**
5.896009 4.715888
[3.06]*** [2.24]**
2.151134 2.067848
[9.15]*** [9.16]***
-0.07332 -0.06841
[8.05]*** [7.86]***
0.000837 0.000764
[7.24]*** [6.97]***
0.120565 0.056987
[3.78]*** [1.56]
0.381714 0.17504
[9.62]*** [5.16]***
0.279634 0.110461
[7.60]*** [3.58]***
0.000001 -0.000063
[0.01] [3.79]***
0.570538 0.500944
[12.43]*** [14.22]***
-0.45703 -0.52026
[8.46]*** [7.98]***
-0.08467 -1.2873
[1.94]* [23.38]***
-0.06614 -0.12068
[4.69]*** [6.87]***
0.11591
[4.87]***
0.174369
[7.11]*** 
-2.8555
[1.64]
2.723656
[9.12]*** 
-0.08836
[7.56]*** 
0.000959 
[6.43]*** 
-0.21719 
[5.82]*** 
0.727601
[9.57]*** 
0.522842 
[6.70]***
0.000013
[0.74]
0.891751
[9.86]***
-0.70685
[9.04]***
-0.31983
[3.20]***
-0.04395
[2.98]***
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0.128065
[4.97]*** 
0.161125
[5.49]*** 
8.36762 
[2 .20]**
3.540559
[9.50]*** 
-0.11344 
[7.95]*** 
0.001197 
[6.71]*** 
-0.19856
[4.97]*** 
0.586762 
[7.38]*** 
0.415134 
[4.90]***
-0.000026
[0.65]
0.460465
[6.83]***
-0.74957
[7.26]***
-1.19143
[ 12 .11] * * *
-0.08302
[5.03]***
0.056713
[2.09]** 
0.078656 
[3.05]*** 
-13.7708 
[3.67]***
0.136954
[0.38]
0.010977
[0.77]
-0.00027
[1.46]
0.302048
[5.92]*** 
0.638441
[7.10]*** 
0.660442 
[7.66]***
-0.000064
[4.93]*** 
0.738863 
[ 11.20] * * *
-0.13748
[1.76]*
-0.16505
[1.87]*
0.069457
[2 .01]**
0.060997
[1.75]*
0.054305
[1.45]
-9.8313
[2.37]**
1.387449
[4.05]*** 
-0.03602 
[2.78]*** 
0.000296
[1.84]*
-0.17358
[3.93]***
0.402384
[7.06]*** 
0.309911 
[6 .10] * * *
- 0.0001
[4.33]*** 
0.50511 
[9.57]***
0.023808
[0 .21]
-1.46392
[18.27]***
-0.17148
[5.34]***
0.078737
[3.07]***
0.13481
[4.95]***
10.764498
[3.65]***
1.52055
[3.71]***
-0.049029
[3.09]*** 
0.00054
[2.69]*** 
0.203439 
[3.15]*** 
0.533379 
[6.46]*** 
0.41782
[4.70]***
0.000001
[0.85]
0.321555
[5.05]***
-0.34225
[4.83]***
0.181498
[2.43]**
0.073972
[2.09]**
0.150945
[4.47]***
0.154284
[4.36]***
8.861462
[3.00]***
2.209381
[5.90]***
-0.0786
[5.49]***
0.000955
[5.32]***
0.017448
[0.30]
0.262868
[4.77]***
0.211898
[3.80]***
- 0.000002
[0.71]
0.243437
[4.34]***
-0.35472
[4.80]*** 
-0.19613 
[4.10]***
-0.04582
[1.74]*
0.042371
[1.00]
10.67382
[1.74]*
1.606536 
[2.23]** 
-0.0407 
[1.53] 
0.000338 
[1.04] 
-0.64634 
[6.99]*** 
0.137631 
[2.16]** 
0.165494 
[2 .66]* * *
0.000001
[1.46]
0.124425
[1.48]
-0.25562
[4.30]***
0.129939
[1.88]*
-0.03797
[1.28]
-0.07001
[1.28]
38.49704
[4.61]***
3.723085
[6.41]***
-0.12593
[5.79]***
0.001441
[5.40]***
-0.64089
[7.14]***
0.111011
[2 .02]**
0.069884
[1.34]
0.000003
[1.28]
0.083901
[1.07]
-0.28009
[5.53]***
-0.27089
[3.97]***
-0.17425
[4.69]***
Year
Constant
athrho:Cons
tant
Insigma.Co
nstant
Observation
s
censored
obs
Wald
LR test of 
indep. eqns
Lambda
Se
-0.00608 -0.03649 -0.01707 -0.04411 0.066672 0.042505 0.015918 -0.0165 0.01349 0.034001 0.013708 -0.03002 0.002814 -0.0476
[0.52] [3.56]*** [0.69] [2.23]** [5.05]*** [3.39]*** [1.01] [1.01] [0.56] [1.95]* [0.64] [1.66]* [0.05] [0.83]
-13.0042 -21.9138 -1.1 -26.2855 -27.2564 -24.4433 -29.3337 -34.2014 -7.90986 -19.5131 -17.37323 -18.4503 -19.862 -31.637
[6.41]*** [11.93]*** [0.21] [4.28]*** [11.54]*** [10.82]*** [9.98]*** [9.70]*** [2.03]** [5.54]*** [4.38]*** [5.08]*** [2.32]** [4.03]***
0.019913 -1.51522 0.108602 -1.44817 -1.07583 -0.98916 0.064017 -0.82147 -0.0191 -0.80077 -0.87254 -1.73023 -2.00279 -2.22563
[0.62] [22.48]*** [4.44]*** [11.92]*** [11.99]*** [14.42]*** [1.13] [4.51]*** [1.30] [7.02]*** [11.99]*** [13.14]*** [9.07]*** [14.17]***
-0.67833 -0.25945 -0.56151 -0.42672 -0.45162 -0.35716 -0.72519 -0.63429 -0.74921 -0.49316 -0.751571 -0.40312 -0.21942 -0.03072
[33.86]*** [11.36]*** [9.42]*** [6.60]*** [13.64]*** [11.73]*** [34.51]*** [12.97]*** [20.49]*** [12.45]*** [34.49]*** [6.65]*** [2.77]*** [0.41]
12549 12931 3512 4064 8445 9808 6491 6119 4233 5198 3471 3666 2120 2352
4109 6388 1510 2197 3428 5675 3127 3709 1175 2611 1237 1858 1012 1528
3813.216 972.126 381.144 270.181 478.658 576.763 1333.682 606.66 1247.501 529.851 600.143 217.002 173.086 141.741
0.381 505.26 19.736 142.006 143.751 208.049 1.268 20.36 1.688 49.319 27.524 172.54 82.285 200.857
0.01 -0.7 0.062 -0.584 -0.504 -0.53 0.031 -0.358 -0.009 -0.406 -0.331 -0.628 -0.774 -0.947
0.016 0.023 0.015 0.05 0.036 0.035 0.028 0.067 0.007 0.05 0.023 0.045 0.07 0.077
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: author’s calculations on ECHP, 1994-1997 - 1995-7 for Austria, 1996-7 for Finland. . Gross earnings for France.
Abbreviations 
Age age linear 
age2 age squared 
age3 age cubed 
couple lives with partner 
EDU3 Education HIGH 
EDU2 Education MID 
W O RKB4 Has worked before 
Exp work experience linear 
exp2 work experience squared 
tenu tenure 
tenu2 tenure squared
uneone dumm y for long periods of unemploym ent in the recent past
HEALTH_A own health status is very good
HEALTHJ3 own health status is average
Parent whether the person has cohabiting children
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3.11 Appendix: Descriptive statistics on explanatory variables
The following descriptive statistics relate to the variables used in the departure equations in this 
chapter Each section of descriptives includes information on the country concerned and 
gender.
Abbreviations (also see text for full description and indication of values taken by dummies)
Income pctile: own standardised income (percentage corresponding to the percentile of income for 
each observation)
Roomspp: number of rooms per person 
accomm_short: accommodation short of space 
un.: unemployment
GREECE males
V ariab le Mean Std. Dev M in Max
income pctile 22.89296 30.08048 0 100
no income .5052301 .5000598 0
_ _ _
No Job .4229428 .4941127 0... “ .1
Job security 1.985356 2.044277 0 ....6.. .
family income 53.66736 26.42889 0 100
durables 3.625174 1.275191 1 8
student .1007671 .3010726 T "
House owned .8797071 .3253604 0
roomspp 1.481738 .4518794 .2631579 4.117647
accomm_short .3891213 .487636 0
. _ _  . . . . . . . . . . . .
parenthealth .1576011 .3644301 0
_ _  -
mobile .1304045 .3368066 0
un. current 8.979498 2.022522 4.2 “  11.9..
un. change 2375872 .6582171 -.9999995 1.3
age 23.86541 4.460814
— — ... ~  -
year 94.9735 8123536 94
................. _ _
GREECE females
V ariab le Mean Std. Dev M in Max
income pctile 11.31796 21.25999 0 100
no income .6756624 .4682417 ...0......
_ _ _
No Job .6668302 .4714623 0 1 ............
job security T 120707“ 1.793227 ... 0.... ...6
family income 57.19872 25.45888 0 100
durables 3.67419 1.31784 1 8
student 1324828 .3390981 0 .. 1 ..
House owned .8174681 .3863771 0
_ _ _
roomspp 1.444712 .4414588 .2631579 4.117647
accomm_short .3935231 .488651 0 1
_ _
parents’ health .1143278 .318287 0
mobile 1629048 .3693694 0 ™ i“
un. current 9.058783 2.171995 4.2 11.9
un. change .2333661 .6404505 -.9999995 1.3
age 22.18008 4.07953 17 34
year 9494603 .8110863 94 96
ITALY males
V ariab le Mean Std. Dev M in Max
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income pctile 19.35637 29.1309 0 100
no income .57794 .4939281 0 ....1...
No Job .574047 .4945267 ..........0 "' ... 1....
job security 1.59708 2101078 0 6
family income 53.02303 26.98056 0 100
durables 4.178751 1.193959 1 ...  8 ” _
student : 1798865 .384124 ....0 ~
House owned .8097324 .3925441 0 ... 1
roomspp 1.568198 .5273819 .4 5.294117~
accomm_short .2306569 .4212874 0 —
parents’ health .2171938 .4123691 0 _r
mobile .0666667 .2494641 0
_ _ _ _
un. current 13.82769 6.939012 5.3 25.4
un.change .4721654 .8939629 -1.200001 2.699999
age 23 43796 4.211583
_ _
34
year 94.98394 .8087181 94 96
ITALY females
V ariab le Mean Std. Dev M in Max
income pctile 12.48498 23.25238 0 100
no income .6823956 .4655916 0 - — j — —
No Job .7045775 .4562784 0 1
job security 1.083888 1.887257
family income 54.0482 27.53707 .......... 0 100—
durables 4.157895 1.209196 ...T ..
student .2163743 .4118138 ........1 ...... '.....
House owned .8100423 .392307 ... 0
roomspp 1.549168 .5106199 ...4 166667
accomm_short '2480339 .4319151 0 1
parents’ health .2022585 .4017245 0 1
mobile .6711837 .2571574 ....0 ... 1
un. current 14.14358 7.137276 5.3 25.4
un. change .4625125 .9048255 -1.200001 699999
age 22.634 4.067867 17 34
year 94.99093 .8107029 94 96
SPAIN males
V ariab le Mean Std 7),. v M in
income pctile 20.37169 28.82766 0 100
no income .5440287 .4981048 . ...o ".. ...1
~ ...No Job .6018519 .4895625 o ..
job security 1.436508 2.019264 0 '_ _ 6
family income 54.03175 26.6044 _ _ 100
durables 4 45257 1.471399
~
8
student .2505669 4333865 1
House owned 8662132 .3404553 “ ™ 1 " ~~
roomspp 1.699586 .5460638 4081633 5.882353
accomm_short 3133031 .4638803 0 1
parents’ health .2326153 .4225389 o.. T~
mobile .1088435 .3114722 0 1
un. current 23 38513. 4.767055 18.1 33^3
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un. change -1.135752 .9919842 -4.299999 1.800001
age 22.80933 4 281103 17 34
year 94.9726 .8143751 94 96
SPAIN females
Variable Mean Min Max
income pctile 12.2077 22.94075 0 100
no income .675423 .4682687 0 T
No Job .7455476 .4356014 ...0... 1
job security .9365539 1.807412 ...0......... ........... 6 ...“
family income 54.44279 26.45823 0 100
durables 4.424533 1.463838 1 .....  8.....—
student .3201247 .4665762 0
House owned .8633126 .3435553 0 1
roomspp 1.684275 .5166328 .4081633 5.882353
accomm_short .326358 .4689322 0 1
parents’ health .2252894 .4178193 ...o .. -  —
mobile .1001781 .3002707 0 1
un. current 23.56612 4.883891 ........18.1.. 33.3
un.change -1.14715 1.048124 -4.299999 1.800001
age 22.45347 4.192253 17 34
year 94.98308 .816594 94 96
female — 0 ..1... ...1..~
PORTUGAL males
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
income pctile 25.98746 30.32519 0 100
no income .4413994 .4966265 0
No Job .4 .4899694 0 1
job security 2.253644 2.030629
family income 53.40554 28.32307 0 100
durables 3.523907 1.532532 8
student .1924198 .3942585 0
_ _ _ _ _ _
House owned .7297376 .44416 ..1...
roomspp 1.655788 6036399 .1966784 4.166667
~accomm_short .3472303 .4761591 ...o'”... ..
parents’ health .341691 .4743457 .. 0 1 ”
mobile .0889213 .2846716 0
_ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
un. current 6:914111 2.26235 ........... 4 ...
un. change -6382216 9535676 -1.900001 ......... 2.5.....
age 22.43499 4.177562 17 34
year 95.02915 .8116756 94 96
PORTUGAL females
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
income pctile 15.46611 25.08919 0 100_ _ _
no income .5982483 .4903456 0.
No Job .5727342 .4947757 ...1..... ~...
job security 1.562072 1.946169 o'_ _ _ 6
family income 55.66489 27.27189 100
durables 3.67441 .......... 1.524482 ...1 8 .
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student .2543793 .4355947 ..o.." _ _
House owned .737243 .4402154 0 1
roomspp 1.63864 .6002607 2439024 5.882353
accomm_short .3377761 .4730419 0 1
parents’ health .3050267 .4605064 0 1
mobile .1191927 .3240768 0 1
un. current 6.81428 2.30978 4 12.3
un.change -.0343488 .9202074 -1.900001 2.5
age 22.04037 4.255986 17 34
year 95.04684 .8130457 94 96
AUSTRIA males
V ariab le Mean Std. Dev
income pctile 35.24082 30.41962 0
~ _
100
no income .2354521 .4244711
_  _
No Job .3213966 .4672218 0 ..... 1......
job security 3.274843 2.448872 ............ 0.... ......... . .6 ...
family income 63.06088 23.81767 ..11 100
durables 5.19427 1 233073 .......~..8........ ....
student 354521 4785822 . 0 1
House owned 8370636 .3694731 1
roomspp 1.90528 .5712747 .5555556 4117647
accomm_short .1414503 .3486416 o.. 1
parents’ health .1101164 .313175 ...0 I T
mobile .0537153 225556 0 ”
—
un. current 4.211101 .6950428 ... 3.2'" ~~T4
un.change .3193375 40159 -.3000002 .8000002
age 22.03402 3.620519 17 29
year 95.48075 .4998532 ....95. 96
AUSTRIA females
V ariab le Mean Std. Dev M in Max
income pctile 24.82247 26.0934 0 95
no income .334258 .4720579 0 "..1
No Job .3800277 .4857303 0 1
job security 3.040222 2.58302 * ...  0... “ T
family income 62.99445 24.52198 ..12 '......... ' 100
durables 5.180305 1.257511 .1..... ._ _ _ 8
~student 409154 .4920191 — — — —
House owned .. 7^933426 .4051886
roomspp 1.828031 .5234815 .4166667 ..4.117647
accomm_short .1456311 .3529808 ..0
parents’ health .0984743 .2981618 ....0 .." 1...
mobile .0651872 .2470273 ..0.... " r
un. current 4.239112 .7104938 ..... 3.2 5.4
un. change .3135922 .4107696 -.3000002 8000002
age 21.13176 3.300354 17 29
year 95.48405 .5000925 95 96
FRANCE males
V ariab le Mean Std. Dev M in Max
149
income pctile 14.23475 22.01889 0 100
no income 5597458 .4965228 0 ’.... 1....... .
No Job .6898305 .4626609 0 ~..1....
job security 1.144915 1.896254 6
family income 65.34492 24.72198 0 100
durables 4.916525 1.254167 ....... 7.............
student .3567797 .4791505 0 1
House owned .6838983 .4650517 0 ...1....
roomspp 1.929495 .5709983 .2325581 4.705883
accomm_short .1419492 .3490719 0 ~.1
parents’ health .1317797 .3383227 0 ~T..
mobile .1754237 .3804097 0 ' "T"
un. current 11.94763 2.105495 8.7 ......16.8
un. change -.040466 .7237934 -1.3 1.3
age 21.01356 3.095455 ..17... 29
year 94.97542 .803388 94 96
FRANCE females
V ariab le Mean S td. Dev Max
income pctile 8.172948 16.53667 0 95
no income .653588 4759492 0 “
_ _ _ _ _
No Job .8120805 .3907487 0 .. 1
job security .6809499 1.573743 0 6
family income 64.9205 24.59853 8 100
durables 4.909654 1.204586 ' "  1 ..
_ _ _ _
student .4419205 .4967436 0
_ _
House owned .7103769 .4537046 0.... " ..T '
roomspp 1.923591 .5810569 5050565 5294117
accomm_short .1275168 .3336371 .0.... ... ... 1 '
parents’ health .1202891 .3253833 ....0... ~
mobile .179143 .383571 0 V
un. current 11.99881 2.083582 8.7
un. change - 0605058 .7233519 .-1.3 1.3
age 20.44966 2.851647 17 29
year 94.97987 .8106391 94
-  —  —
GERMANY males
V ariab le Mean Std. Dev M in Max
income pctile 24.1316 26.90543 0 100_ _ _
no income .3171584 .46546 0
No Job .445264 .4970914 0 ... 1
job security .9770963 1.899785 0 6 “
family income 65.55435 23.35479 ...0 . 100
durables 3.790373 ! 246167 7
student .3998447 .4899613 0
House owned .5559006 .4969618 0 ..
roomspp 1.924798 "6291122 .5263158 5.882353
accomm_short .1723602 .3777666 0 1
parents’ health .2336957 423263 .0.... 1
un. current 8.475039 2806962 8.2 8.8
un. change .4789986 "5361328 -.5 ... 1....
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age 21.61918 3.462499 17 29
year 95.0691 .6994312 94 96
GERMANY females
V ariab le Mean Std. Dev M in Max
income pctile 17.41034 22.22097 0 100
no income .4034483 .4907302 0 1
No Job .4925287 .5000879 0 1
job security .866092 1.853117 0 6
family income 65.87414 22.19599 0 100
durables 3.665517 1.180961 1 7
student 5034483 .5001318 0 1
House owned .5252874 .4995037 0 1
roomspp 1.872483 .5673786 .5263158 5.882353
accomm_short .2114943 .4084854 0 1
parents’ health .1948276 .3961818 0 1
un. current 8.476149 .2830869 8.2 8.8
un. change .5163795 .5175934 -.5 1
age 20.43276 3.06693 17 29
year 95.11782 .6912114 94 96
BELGIUM males
V ariab le Mean Std. Dev M in Max
income pctile 17.73052 25.21811 0 100
no income .4577922 .4984176 ....0 .. “ f — —
No Job .6314935 .4825956 ..... .....0 ......’ ~’ ...T.'
job security 1.565747 2 238188 ~....0 ....._ _ 6
family income 64.11932 23.98381 ....100.. ........
durables 5.144481 1.19445 8..“ “
student .3287338 .4699438 _ T “
House owned .8311688 .3747549 0 1
roomspp 2.116527 .5993724 .6896552 4.705883
accomm_short .1428571 .3500692
parents’ health .0803571 .2719557 0 ~
mobile .1128247 .3165068 ...0 .............
_ _ _ _ _
un. current 9.105844 3.869651 2.8 14
un. change -.1926137 .3796218 -.6999998 .8000002
age 21.37744 3.172728 17 29
year 94.87744 .7808079 94 96
BELGIUM females
V ariab le Mean M in Max
income pctile 12.92338 22.55576 0 99
no income .5363725 4989173 0 1
No Job .7400582 .4388153 0 ... 1 .
job security 1.165858 2.104696 6 ...........
family income 63.98254 24.04913 ....0.... 100
durables 5.072745 1.239145
_ _ _ _ _
8
student .3976722 .4896545 1
— — —House owned .8292919 .3764363 0
roomspp 2.078561 .5840668 .. .2941177 4.705883 ’
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accomm_short .1483996 .3556682 0 1
parents’ health .085354 .2795434 0 1
mobile .1115422 .3149551 0 1
un. current 8.838215 3.856651 2.8 14
un. change -.2073715 3799131 -.6999998 .8000002
age 20.6227 3.005211 17 29
year 94.90301 .7822675 94 96
UK males
V ariab le Mean Std. Dev Min Max
income pctile 25.46468 26.43238 0 99
no income .3023544 .4595628 0 1
No Job .3593556 .4801091 0 1
job security 2.304833 2.35366 0 6
family income 64 88228 22.1668 0 100
durables 5.275093 1.128763 1 8
student .0594796 .2366667 0 1
House owned .7868649 .4097763 0 1
roomspp 2.161227 .6313607 .6896552 4.705883
accomm_short .2614622 .4397036 0 1
parents' health .1301115 .3366347 0 1
mobile .0433705 .2038161 0 1
un. current 8.719083 2.132289 4.2 14.5
un. change -.9097894 .7070126 -3.1 .2999992
age 21.04833 3.371372 17 29
year 94.97026 .8300245 94 96
UK females
V ariab le Mean S td . Dev M in Max
income pctile 19.48752 21.61327 0 94
no income .3227953 .4679347 .. ...... ....0 ... . .. ...1....
No Job .3876872 .4876284 0 ~..1
job security 2.382696 2.404156 0 ....6...
family income 64 66389 21.71866 16.... 100
durables ....5.296173 1.164246 ... l"...' 8
student .0615641 2405623 "...0 ... 1
House owned .7986689 .4013289 0
roomspp 2.14323 .6503382 .8333333 5.882353
accomm_short “ 2612313 .4396716 0
parents’ health .1198003 .3249984 0 ....1...
mobile .0499168 .2179545 ...0 .. T ~
un. current 8.634609 2.152355 4.2 14.5
un.change -.9043262 .7178542 -3.1 .2999992
age 20.04992 3.009015 17 29
— . —  —
year 95.02163 8293761 94
IRELAND males
V ariab le Mean Std. Dev Max
income pctile 26.43104 29.06396 0 99
no income .356541 4790838 0_ _ 1
No Job .5090909 .5006282
152
job security 1.9898 2.313569 0 — — Q
family income 54.11441 26 03167_ _ _ _ o .. 100
durables 4.636364 ... 1.... 8
student .2425721 .4287334 o ...
House owned .913082 .2817773 0 1...
roomspp 1.812495 .6913503 .2439024 5.882353
accomm_short 1773836 .3820777 0 1
parents’ health .0629712 .242965 0 1
mobile .1121951 ™3156764 o ... 1
un. current 13.19792 1.313955 11.8 15
un. change -1.550998 .8102317 -2.5 -.3999996
age 21.31574 3.357783 17 29
year 94.88647 .812212 94 96
IRELAND females
Variab le M ean Std. Dev M in Max
income pctile 20.0218 25.27816 0 99
no income .4283379 .4949728 0 ~ T ~ "
No Job .6065395 4886507 .— .0 ~ T “
job security 1.66158 2.290376 ............6 .... ' ......
family income 53.46104 26.38382 0 100
durables 4.601635 1.331973 ..1.... 8
student .2523161 .4344601 0 ...1....
House owned .8964578 .3047488 0 .. 1.~
roomspp 1.748547 .6464915 4651163 5.294117
accomm_short .2239782 .4170213 0
_ _
parents' health .0572207 .2323272 0 7
mobile .0997275 .299718 0
_ _ _
un. current 13.20698 1.312612 11.8 15
un. change -1.559073 .8032231 -2.5... -.3999996
age 20.96948 3.203417 17 29
year 94.88992 .816195 94 ..... 96.......
NETHERLANDS males
V ariab le M ean Std. Dev M in Max
income pctile 17.48555 22.15948 0 100
no income .3757225 .4845424 0 1
No Job .6021195 .4896965 0 ...1...
job security 1.731214 2.325493 T “ “.6 '
family income 65.50193 21.99631 .”1oo“
durables 4.982659 1.096891 2 8
student .2928709 .4552991
House owned .6647399 .4723089 ...0 1
roomspp 2 161705
5419157
4.117647
accomm_short .0857418 .2801174 ..0 ........ 1
parents’ health .0693642 .2541949 ..0.""
un. current 6.743353 .3736102 6.2 ........7
un. change -.5897881 .4339629 0
age 20.46628 3.035997 17 29
year 94 97784 .814816 94 96
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NETHERLANDS females
Mean Std. Dev Min Max
income pctile 13.76735 18.27519 0 90
no income .4068027 .491572 o .. ..1..
No Job .6517007 .4767559 0 1
job security 1.522449 2.260724 0 6
family income 65.38095 22.72593 T .. 100
durables 4.922449 1.14636 2... 8
student .2653061 .4417967 0 ~~T
House owned .6952381 .46062 0
roomspp 2.129975 .5429648 .8333333 4.117647
accomm_short .0843537 .2781068 .........o .... . ‘ ~
parents’ health .062585 .24238 0 ... 1....
un. current 6.754014 .3694124 6.2 7.. .
un. change -.6068028 .4230517 -1 ....... 0 ’
age 19.71156 2.616457 17 29
year 94.98912 .7915708 94 96
DENMARK males
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
income pctile 25.22449 21.5468 0 94_  -  .
no income .155102 .3623719 0...
No Job .4795918 .5000939 ... 0.... ... 1
job security 2.504082 2.646328 0.... “........ ..6
family income 78.70816 18.96576 0.. . 100 “
durables 5.22449 1.257539 “ T ~ 8
student .3959184 .4895468 .........o' ."l...-
House owned .8285714 .3772682 ... 0....
roomspp 2.24444 .6138883 .8333333 5.294117
accomm_short .1244898 .3304769
parents’ health 0673469 .250878 o.... 1
mobile .2 .4004088 0... ...1.. "_  _
un. current 7.917347 .6369702 7.4
un. change -.9822449 .7064638 -1.7_ _ ...o"~
age 19.57755 2.518461
year 94.87551 .8107233 94 ...... 96
DENMARK females
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
OUTDED .5630499 1.014446 0 3
income pctile 17.14076 17.0383 0.... 81
no income .170088 .3762622 1
No Job .6363636 .4817526 0 ... ‘ i " '
job security 1.527859 2.310453 0 .... ........6"...
family income 79.33431 16.52217 ” .....20..“_ _ 100
durables 5.16129 1.278935 8
student .3812317 .486403 0 """T”
House owned .8651026 .3421159 "...0.... 1
roomspp 2.240972 .5488773 _ _ 4.705883
accomm_short .1173021 .3222527 1
parents’ health .0733138 .2610339 0.. . 1
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mobile .2375367 .4261991 0 1
un. current 7.9261 .6390196 7.4 ........... 8.7...........
un.change -.989736 .702839 -1.7 0
age 19.08798 2.40915 17 29
year 94.86804 .8136005 94 ~  96
FINLAND males
Variable Mean Std. Dev M in Max
OUTDED .3073394 .7977216 0 3
income pctile 24.41284 24.3655 0 Too"
no income .25 .4335101 0 " ' 1 '
No Job .7041284 .4569579 0
,  __ -
job security .9288991 1.841286 ...  ........ 0
_ _ _ _
family income 69.37385 21.24796 4 100
durables 6.240826 1.251861 “ ~ T “ 8
student .3830275 .4866834
House owned .8669725 .3399946 ...0 1...
roomspp 1.886814 .5760715 5434783 5.294117
accomm_short .1697248 .3758221 ...o.... 1
parents’ health .0848624 .2789969 0 ...1...
mobile .2706422 .444802 0
un. current 15.27569 2.256618 11 8 18.3
un. change -.375 .4435948 .4000015
age 20.31651 3.234982 17 29
FINLAND females
V ariab le Mean Std. Dev Max
OUTDED 4392523 .9602497 0 3
income pctile 14.4704 16.37128 ..o ....
no income .2834891 .4513954 0
No Job.. .8629283 .3444599 ” .0 — J —
job security .4143302 1.244857 0 ~ ~ ~  6 
—
family income 74.21184 18.15244 11
durables 6.28972 1.262508 ....2..." ” T ™
student .6105919 .4883774 ..o..... . . T . . . . .
House owned .8878505 .316043 0 1
roomspp 1.883287 .5174702 .5434783 4.166667
accomm_short .1775701 .3827471 0 ...1...
parents’ health .0809969 .2732563 0 T ”
mobile .3146417 .4650981 0 ... i...
un. current 15.13925 2.247655 11.8 18.3
un. change -.3953271 .4378325 .4000015
age 19.00312 2.505617 ...17...... 28
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4 Determinants of young people’s departure from the parental 
home in long-established national panels for the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Germany
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we analysed young people’s departure from the parental home using 
the ECHP dataset. We concluded that there appears to be a significant, but not large, effect of 
employment and current income variables on departure for Southern Europeans. Although there 
seems to be no clear common pattern amongst Northern European countries, it appears that 
Northern Europeans may be less reliant on actual income before deciding to leave the parental 
home. Potential income was significant but of minimal effect in the South, it had large 
importance for the Nordic countries, but its effect was not very well determined for the other 
countries, including Germany and, to some extent, the UK.
Since the European panel is relatively short and Northern countries have relatively high 
departure rates at young ages, the sample sizes for many countries outside Southern Europe 
are fairly small in the ECHP. The UK sub-sample, in particular, suffers from relatively high 
attrition (Peracchi (2002), but attrition is a general problem of the ECHP) and, because of data- 
confidentiality reasons, the German sub-sample has no regional information and is of limited 
size. Moreover, the standardisation aim behind the ECHP translates into a limited depth of 
information on areas such as, for example, values, mobility, religion.
In this chapter, we use long-established panels such as the British Household Panel Study 
(BHPS) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) which we expect to bring advantages 
compared to the ECHP. Amongst the problems of the ECHP, firstly, it turned out from our 
analysis in the previous chapter and comparison with the literature (eg, Peracchi (2002)) that 
some countries, such as the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands, had unsustainable attrition 
levels, as pointed out in the data description section of chapter 3; secondly, the ECHP offers the 
advantage of a common survey aimed at creating datasets that were comparable across 
countries, but it turns out that this led to oversimplification and not enough depth in some areas 
(eg lack of retrospective information, limited amount of question on attitudes, limited recording of 
changes in living arrangements).1 The advantages of the BHPS and SOEP are on various 
levels. Firstly, they are generally higher quality datasets, with better design strategies, more 
resources for fieldwork, and better availability of support to researchers. They have larger 
sample sizes and they suffered from significantly lower attrition in the initial waves compared to 
the corresponding parts of the ECHP. Secondly, the longer time intervals reduce the 
consequences of attrition, as the number of waves past the initial one-two waves (where attrition 
is highest) is larger, and they allow us to use covariates more efficiently if there is more variation
1 Eurostat was also very keen to provide weights and imputed values, which slowed considerably the release of the data 
and th is was compounded by strong restrictions for use by research. W e also had real d ifficulties in getting access to 
new data over time.
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on the T dimension (eg, for unemployment rates.2 Thirdly, the BHPS and SOEP have a wider 
range of variables available: for example, these include information on religion attitudes (to offer 
better control for cultural factors), more precise information on mobility in previous years, and 
improved information on regions of residence (for Germany). Also, while the information on 
student status in the ECHP is of poor quality, in the BHPS and the SOEP we are able to analyse 
departures to student destinations.
In addition to an improved analysis on UK and German data, we introduce a panel dataset 
for the United States which will enable us to compare our results for Europe to the home leaving 
process in the United States.
4.2 Data description
The purpose of this section is to give a full description of the datasets used in this paper and 
to discuss data quality, data handling and the particular issues encountered with these datasets.
We use three datasets in this paper: the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) for the UK, 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for the US, and the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (SOEP) for Germany.
BHPS
The BHPS is a nationally representative sample of British households interviewed for the first 
time in autumn 1991, and we use data until 1999. The original sample respondents have been 
interviewed, along with their co-residents, approximately every year thereafter. There are six 
thousand private households (about ten thousand persons) interviewed every year from the 
beginning of September and until the beginning of the following year. Children are interviewed 
only from the age of sixteen (see Taylor (1999)). Compared to the UK part of the ECHP, the 
BHPS suffers from much lower attrition.
In the BHPS and in the other two datasets, we define “living at home” in year t as declaring 
in the interview that one is living in the parental home. The definition of “children” is the same as 
in the previous chapter.
“Departure as a student” between two waves (f-1 and t) is defined as living outside the 
parental home without a partner and being a student at time f, while at time f-1 the child was 
“living at home”. The classification of students who live away from home is slightly different for 
each dataset:3 after some adjustments for consistency, we classify students living in institutions 
or private accommodations as having left the parental home.
2 There are other advantages to a longer time interval, for example the ability to construct retrospective information from 
respondent’s previous interviews.
3 An individual is a student if, at the time of the survey, the child is in education or training (not necessarily as his main 
occupation). The same definition is used for the student dummies.
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“Single departure” (or "alone”) means living outside the parental home at time t while at time 
f-1 the person was “living at home”, as long as at time t the person is not a student (as defined 
above) and does not have a cohabiting (married or unmarried) partner.
“Departure into a partnership/couple” is defined as living outside the parental home at time t 
while at time f-1 the person was “living at home”, and having a cohabiting (married or 
unmarried) partner. The young person can be either a student or not.
In all cases, cohabiting with a partner while still living with one’s parents does not affect the 
classification of destinations.
In order to study the probability of departure of all people who are still living in the parental 
household in any one wave and on whom we have some information on their living 
arrangements in the following year, we pooled the responses from adjacent waves of the 
dataset, and stacked them to create one large dataset of individuals and their responses at two 
successive points in time. We used the same technique for the NLSY and the SOEP data, too.
Following the above definitions of departures, it was relatively straightforward to apply a few 
simple rules to the BHPS, because the vast majority of children were sample persons that were 
to be followed if they had moved. For all persons who have died or left the household since 
enumeration in the preceding wave, information will be obtained on the date of death or 
departure and is in record BINDSAMP.
People who are temporarily absent, eg on business travel, on holiday, in an institution or 
studying away from home are typically interviewed by proxy. There are two main cases where 
departure may not be a clearly defined event: one reason is that the household head needs to 
report whether a child that cannot be interviewed is temporarily away, and thus still considered 
part of the original household, or whether he has left the household; the second reason is that 
students in university accommodation are treated differently from students in private households 
(the former are treated as not having left).
Compared to the UK component of the ECHP, the BHPS scores considerably better in terms 
of initial non-response and attrition, partly thanks to better design and to larger resources 
available to fieldwork. To handle problems of attrition, the main strategy that we adopted was to 
explore whether attrition was related to observables, and adopted the technique used in the 
previous chapter and described at length in there, ie we categorized attrited youth as belonging 
to a separate destination (in addition to staying at home, leaving Alone, leaving as a student, 
and leaving with a Partner). Similar to the finding of the previous chapter, here, too, we 
computed the Hausman test of the assumption of the independence of irrelevance alternatives 
(IIA) for the omitted category of “leaving to unknown destination” (typically representing a case 
where the youth is not interviewed after leaving home, so that we don’t know if they are living 
with a partner or not). Since the test always rejects the null, we proceeded with the estimation of 
the departure risk for the remaining destinations after removing the attrited youth from the 
sample. Results of Hausman test were, for a slightly simplified model, for men, chi2= -0.217 (72
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d.f.), for women, chi2= 0.946 (74 d.f.), both of which lead to acceptance of the null, so that the 
attrited group can be omitted.4
NLSY
The US NLSY is a panel dataset of 12,686 persons aged between 14 and 22 when first 
surveyed in 1979 (sometimes therefore called NLSY79). The survey was collected annually until 
1994 and every other year beginning in 1996. The panel aims to be a statistically representative 
sample of the US population in the main sub-sample (comprising 6,111 youths). It also includes 
a boosted panel of Hispanic, black and economically disadvantaged whites (5,295 youths) and 
a panel of young people in the army. The boosted and the military sample are excluded from 
our work.
The NLSY presents very low attrition and a wide range of variables. Its main drawback is 
that it is a cohort born in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which means that such cohort will 
become “old” , for our purposes, in the early 1990s, thus making our analysis less up-to-date 
compared to other panels that included young people in the late 1990s as well.5 Also, by 
focusing on the youth cohort, it only provides a limited amount of information on the youth’s 
household members. A great advantage of this dataset, however, is that the home-leaving 
process of the cohort had only just begun in 1979 and it was largely completely by the mid- 
1990s, which greatly eliminates any censoring problems.
Attrition in the NLSY is low compared with other longitudinal surveys (much lower than the 
US PSID),6 as over 89% of the eligible respondents participated in 1994 (which is the last year 
when we still find sample members aged less than 29).7 This high response rate is extremely 
high, as it represents a mere 1% attrition rate on average per year, is partly achieved by the use 
of small size (6,111 initial size), by trying to contact respondents even after one or more missing 
interviews, and is definitely made easier by a focus on a cohort, rather than a sample meant to 
be representative of the whole population and allowed to grow over time.
4 This approach can be used for both youth who attrite while their original household is still in the panel, and for youth 
who attrite with the ir whole household. W e find that it is possible to define such case, too, as a destination, in the 
m ultinom ial model, and these results, too, indicate that the category can be omitted, so that even household attrition 
may turn out not to be a s ign ificant problem in the context of our topic of research.
5 In other words, our results fo r the US refer to the home-leaving behaviour of youth in the 1980s.
6 For comparison, the PSID lost around 12% sample members between wave 1 (1968) and wave 2 (1969)
7 The figure is adjusted for sam ple members who were dropped or who had died. In the initial survey, for the main cross- 
sectional sample, 6,111 people, equal to 89.7% of those selected, were interviewed successfully.
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Table 4.1 -  Participation rates of NLSY respondents
Interview year Response rate
79 100.0
80 96.1
81 96.4
82 96.1
83 96.6
84 95.1
85 94.1
86 92.2
87 90.7
88 90.2
89 91.1
90 89.9
91 90.9
92 90.8
93 90.6
94 89.2
96 86.5
The table shows, by year of interview, the average 
participation rate of the eligible respondents. Source: 
A u tho r’s calculations on main NLSY sample. N= 6060.
We looked specifically at attrition amongst the subset of young people aged 17-29 still living 
in the parental home and found that 97% of them had a full interview the following year. The 
attrition rates are very low, and significantly lower than for those who have already moved out of 
the parental home.
Table 4 .2 -  Attrition rates of NLSY respondents
Attrition rate if living 
without a parent (%)
Attrition rate if living 
with a parent (%)
N living without 
a parent
N living with a 
parent
79 5.9 3.4 1177 4883
80 8.3 1.6 1823 4237
81 7.9 1.3 2344 3716
82 6.3 0.9 2836 3224
83 6.9 2.4 3313 2747
84 7.8 2.5 3850 2210
85 9.8 3.2 4269 1791
86 10.8 4.8 4599 1461
87 11.2 4.1 4904 1156
88 9.9 2.9 5130 930
89 11.1 3.1 5272 785
90 9.8 3.5 5382 678
91 10.0 1.5 5455 605
92 10.1 3.3 5483 577
93 11.5 3.0 5522 538
94 14.2 5.9 5556 504
96 16.4 5.5 5642 418
The table shows, by year o f interview, the average rate of non-response at the subsequent wave 
conditional on w hether the youth is living with his parent(s) in the given (previous) year o f survey. 
Source: Author's calculations on main NLSY sample. Sample sizes are indicated in the table.
While the above figures do show that attrition rates are very low for the US sample, to handle 
problems of attrition, the main strategy that we adopted was the process that we used in the 
previous chapter, ie we categorized attrited youth as belonging to a separate destination (in
addition to staying at home, leaving Alone, leaving as a student, and leaving with a Partner). 
Here, too, we computed the Hausman test of the assumption of the independence of irrelevance 
alternatives (IIA) for the omitted category of “leaving to unknown destination” (typically 
representing a case where the youth is not interviewed after leaving home, so that we don’t 
know if they are living with a partner or not). Since the test always rejects the null, we 
proceeded with the estimation of the departure risk for the remaining destinations after removing 
the attrited youth from the sample. (Results of Hausman test were, estimated on a simplified 
model, for men, chi2= -8.686 (d.f. 51), for women chi2= 2.050 (47 d.f.), both of which lead to 
acceptance of the null, so that the attrited group can be omitted from the subsequent 
estimations.) This result is important, because the available evidence (MaCurdy et al. (1998)) 
shows that attrition in the NLSY is related to non-employment, which we also find to be related 
to departure rates.8
SOEP
The SOEP is an annual panel of six thousand households (fifteen thousand individuals) that 
began in 1984 in West Germany and is one of the longest panels in Europe. It was then 
expanded in 1990 to cover the new Eastern regions and also featured, from wave one, a 
boosted sample of foreigners (Turks, Greeks, Yugoslavians, Spaniards or Italians).9
The SOEP data provide a detailed account of income and employment status and are 
therefore particularly suitable for labour market studies. Compared to the German component of 
the ECHP, the SOEP includes regional information and features a bigger sample size.10 Attrition 
rates are not as low as for the NLSY and the BHPS, and we can see from the table below that in 
by the third wave one participant out of eight had already dropped out of the panel.
8 W e also considered using some measure o f imputed income for those who missed such information, however given 
that our second objective was to use “potential income” as a covariate to study departure from home, a measure of 
imputed income would have potentially created confusion as to whether imputed income was actually a half-way house 
between potential income and true income.
9 The fore igners’ sample as well as further sub-samples added in 1994, 1998 and 2000 are not included in our analysis.
10 See Haisken-De New and Frick (2001) for a more exhaustive description.
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Table 4 .3 -  Participation rates of SOEP respondents
Interview year Response rate
84 100.0%
85 92.2%
86 88.2%
87 86.7%
88 82.4%
89 79.3%
90 77.5%
91 76.8%
92 75.2%
93 74.3%
94 73.1%
95 72.4%
96 71.1%
97 70.3%
98 68.1%
99 66.6%
The table shows, by year o f interview, the average 
participation rate of the initial respondents. Source: Author’s 
ca lculations on SOEP sample A. Initial N= 9,076.
We considered various ways to handle the issue of attrition and items non-response in this 
panel, and we also considered the previous literature on the matter.11 The main strategy that we 
chose was to explore whether attrition was related to observables, and adopted the technique 
used in the previous chapter, ie we categorized attrited youth as belonging to a separate 
destination (as opposed to staying at home, leaving Alone, leaving as a student, and leaving 
with a Partner). Here, too, we computed the Hausman test of the assumption of the 
independence of irrelevance alternatives (IIA) for the omitted category of “leaving to unknown 
destination” (typically representing a case where the youth is not interviewed after leaving 
home, so that we don’t know if they are living with a partner or not). Since the test always 
rejects the null, we proceeded with the estimation of the departure risk for the remaining 
destinations after removing the attrited youth from the sample. Results of Hausman test were, 
for men, chi2= -2.824 (d.f. 114), for women (estimated on a simplified model), chi2= -2.252 (71 
d.f.), both of which lead to acceptance of the null, so that the attrited group can be omitted.
Differences in structure between datasets
Further to the analysis conducted in the previous chapter, now that we have given an 
overview of the three additional datasets, it is apparent that the datasets cover different time 
periods. Additionally, one dataset, the NLSY, has a different structure, being based on a youth 
cohort study that started in 1979 when most of the youth in the dataset were in their late teens. 
By the early 1990s, these youth were aged above 30. By contrast, the German panel started in 
1983, and those for the UK and EU in the early 1990s, and they all always had individuals in 
every age group. Therefore, our results are valid only for one particularly cohort for the US over
11 Since one o f the im portant variables in our analysis is current income, we find that around 15% of respondents does 
not have inform ation on earnings. Frick and Grabka (2006) have analysed this in depth and report that the SOEP shows 
a higher propensity o f income non-response for those in the lowest and highest income deciles. However our initial 
attempts to use som e m easure o f imputed income for those who m issed such information did not lead to improved 
results, and, as for the BHPS, we eventually decided that using imputed income could lead to a confusing set of results 
given that our second objective was to use “potential income” as a covariate.
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a period of years (and nothing can be said for more recent cohorts), while the German results 
relate to several cohorts over more than 15 surveys. At the other end of the spectrum, the 
analysis on the very short EU panel applies to several cohorts over very few years.
It may be important to take these differences into account in our work, the main reason being 
that the determinants of departure from the parental home may be varying over time 
(exogenously or endogenously). This implies that comparing the results for the 1980’s (for the 
NLSY and SOEP) to estimates for the 1990’s (for the BHPS, SOEP and the ECHP) may mean 
that the effect of country, cohort and time are not easily distinguishable, and thus comparisons 
may sometimes be inappropriate (eg, different return rates and different estimates for the 
coefficients may not be due to country effects but to cohort or time effects). Additionally, if the 
effect of certain variables change over time, a long panel would show a blended, average effect 
on the coefficients. These worries are not without substance, given that we have observed 
changes in departure rates and living arrangements for young people in Europe in the post-war 
period, as explained in the literature survey when we analysed the time trends in section 2.2.2 
In that section, for example, we observed that the average age of marriage had increase by 
around 3 years in Europe between 1980 and 1994. Although we do not attempt to quantify 
whether using different time periods affects our result, it is important to be aware of this issue 
since it is possible that the determinants of home leaving may differ over time. To some extent, 
having different time periods also implies that the results are, to some extent, not immediately 
comparable. Future extensions of our analysis should consider how the determinants of 
departure and returns have changed over time in each country, as long as the datasets are long
enough to provide information on trends (or structural changes) beyond single economic cycles.
12
4.2.1 Descriptive analysis
In this section, we present some summary statistics on young people’s average risk of 
departure in each of the three datasets, along with an overview of some variables that may 
affect attitudes towards home leaving.
12 In the estim ations in th is chapter and in the previous one, we only included tim e as a linear effect or as dummies, 
which would only control for changes in the average risk over time (once controlling for changes in the covariates, of 
course), but not for changes in the coefficients over time, which could be done by using interaction dummies, ie, using, 
in addition to an income covariate, a covariate constructed as tim e x income. W e have analysed the effect o f time and of 
tim e dum m ies by estim ating the various models model using linear and quadratic year effects. W e found no patterns 
apparent in the ECHP results. For the UK, we found that time effect is negative and significant for both men and women 
but only for the Student destination (effect is -0.0000295 (se .0000108) for men (-.0024475, s.e. 0.0010209). For the 
USA it is difficult to separate age from time effect, and we only appear to find some tim e effect on student departures for 
women (marginal e ffect o f -0.0009722, s.e. 0.000252). S.e. are robust Huber/W hite/Sandw ich.
164
Table 4 .4 -  Average departure rates by country and sex (age 17-29)
Home Out Alone Student Out Couple
UK Males 86.2 4.7 3.2 5.9
UK Females 80.3 5.7 4.1 10.0
US Males 71.2 11.1 8.8 8.9
US Females 66.0 11.9 8.6 13.5
German Males 92.2 2.0 1.0 4.8
German Females 86.9 3.1 2.4 7.7
The table shows, by country and gender, the probability (in percentage) that a young person aged 17-29 
living in the parental home in any year is found living still at home (“home”), having left and living without a 
partner but not being a student ( out alone”), having left, being a student and living without a partner 
("Student”), or having left and living with a partner (“out couple”). Age range is 17-29. Sample size: UK 3469 
men, 2617 women; US 8842 men, 7411 women; Germany 7212 men, 4771 women. Source: Author’s 
calculations from BHPS, NLSY, SOEP.
Because departure rates vary with age, it is useful to show the relationship between the rate 
of departure and age (using a cubic interpolation) for each country, by gender. Although this 
visual analysis is very crude and does not include any controls, it conveys immediately the 
extent to which the risk of departure differs by country and by gender at various ages.
United Kingdom
Visual inspection of the relationship between departure rates and age shows that the risk of 
departure for both genders is fairly high in the late teens, increases until the age of 24-25, after 
which it decreases slightly. The probability of departure is always higher for females than for 
males.
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Figure 4.1 - Departure rates by age - United Kingdom 
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Source: Author’s calculations on BHPS sample, age group 17-29. Polynomial is 
quadratic on age.
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United States
Visual inspection of the relationship between departure rates and age shows that the risk of 
departure is fairly high for both genders in the late teens, increases for both genders until the 
age of 24-25, after which it becomes stable for women and decreases slightly for men.
Figure 4.2- Departure rates by age -  United States 
Males Females
0 L
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age
Source: Author’s calculations on NLSY main sample (excluding supplement A and B 
samples), age group 17-29. Polynomial is quadratic on age.
Germany
German youth have the lowest average rate of departure, and this is particularly so in the 
late teens. People in their early twenties still have a risk of departure around 10% for males, and 
significantly higher for women. In contrast to the US and the UK, the risk does not decrease 
when the youth approach the age of 30. This is consistent to the descriptive statistics seen in 
chapter 3 (Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3), where the share of Germans still living in the parental home 
was seen to be higher relative to the UK, but the gap was being closed, and in fact reversed, for 
the age group above 30.
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Figure 4 .3- Departure rates by age - Germany 
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Source: Author’s calculations on SOEP main sample (excluding migrant and foreigners 
samples), age group 17-29. Polynomial is quadratic on age.
4.2.2 Questions on values and attitudes affecting home leaving
United Kingdom
The BHPS dataset contains no retrospective information on departure from the parental 
home, but there are some variables that may be useful to explain young people’s attitudes 
towards departure from home. Because they are only available for few of the waves or for 
selected subsamples, or because are likely to be endogenous, we will not be using them for our 
microeconometric analysis.
Respondents are asked about their preference to move house (wLKMOVE) (“If you could 
choose, would you stay here in your present home or would you prefer to move somewhere 
else?”) and, if so, why (wLKMOVY). We see that preference to move is significantly correlated 
with departure from home in the next twelve months.
Table 4.5 shows the average risk of leaving home by preference to move. We see that there 
is a significant correlation between preference to move and actual move.
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Table 4.5 -  Risk o f departure before next survey by preference to move and Correlation 
between preference to move and actual move (UK)
Males Females
% left home if preference to move 18.60% 28.37%
% left home if no preference to move 10.87% 13.91%
Correlation 0.1093 0.1786
Significance level (p) [0.0000] [0.0000]
Number preferring to move 1403 1128
Number not preferring to move 2069 1503
Total Observations 3472 2631
Source: Author’s calculations on BHPS, age range 17-29.
However, the above table is also showing that the average departure rates for those 
preferring to move is 24%, and 12% for those not preferring to move. In other words, intention to 
leave only increases departure risk by around 12 percentage points (and this is doubling of the 
risk, although the effect is much larger for women than for men, approximately 8 percentage 
points against 14).
Although the correlation is significance, it is perhaps not very high. In fact, the question is 
about preference “If you could choose, ... would you prefer to move somewhere else?”, plus it 
does not necessarily imply that moving somewhere else will require separating from the rest of 
the household. So this is a question that may encompass both desire for independence and 
dissatisfaction with the accommodation.
Given the availability of the wLKMOVY variable (why preferring to move), one may wonder 
whether a particular reason for departure may be a better predictor. We estimated departure 
risk using reasons as well as preference to move and we found that reasons related to size or 
type of the accommodation (larger, another type or other aspects) have the largest impact to 
move: for men, the effect of those reasons is to increase the risk, on average by 7.7 percentage 
points (s.e. 2.11), while for women the increase is of 12 percentage points (with s.e. of 2.53 
percentage points). The other reasons, which fail to show significance, are wanting to go into 
own accommodation, or related to the area (unsafe, noisy, etc), to “wanting a change”, to 
travelling, to occupation, to family and cohabitants (family, privacy, children), except for women 
where family reasons are significantly positive (but s.e. are large: marginal effect is 8.6, but s.e. 
are 4.2).
Information on whether respondents like their present neighbourhood (wLKNBRD) is also 
available, with a list of reasons available in wave 8 (wNEIGH, wNEIGH'\, ..., WNEIGH8). Again, 
this fails to show significance in simple regressions.
In waves 2, 4, 6, respondents are asked whether they think that cohabitation is always wrong 
(wOPFAMJ) and whether adult children should care for parents (wOPFAMK waves 2, 4, 6, 8). 
Children’s propensity to leave home may be partly explained both by their own answers to these 
questions and by the answers given by their parents.
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Young respondents13 are also asked at what age they want to get married (wYPAMAR, in 
waves 4 to 8) and at what age would like to start a family (ie, have children) (wYPAPAR, in 
waves 4 to 8). Quite interestingly, young respondents are asked at what age they think they will 
be when they leave home (wYPLVHM, in waves 4 to 9).
The summary results for these questions in wave 4 are as follows:
- average age when they want to get married is 24.28 (s.d. 3.41, minimum 17, maximum 40, 
valid answers 645; additionally, 102 say they will never marry);
- average age when they want to start a family is 26.91 (s.d. 3.90, minimum 16, maximum 
40, valid answers 623; additionally, 119 say they don’t want children);
- the average age at which they think they will leave home is 20.00 (s.d. 3.48, 738 valid 
answers).
This clearly shows that in the mind of those young respondents departure from home is 
something that happens significantly earlier than getting married.14
United States
The NLSY dataset contains a question on parents’ attitude towards the respondent’s 
possible decision to “move far away from where [their] parents live” at the age of 21 (variable 
R0149700). This question is asked in the 1979 survey (wave 1) only if the respondent is aged 
14-17 (5582 individuals out of 12686 fulfil this condition).
Of the 5266 valid answers, the results are indicated in the next table:
Table 4 .6 -  Parents’ attitude towards child’s potential departure at age 21 in NLSY
Level of approval % N
Strongly disapprove 17.95% 945
Somewhat disapprove 38.32% 2018
Somewhat approve 33.23% 1750
Strongly approve 10.50% 553
100.00% Total: 5266
Source: A uthor’s ca lcu lations from NLSY.
In Table 4.7 we report the percentages of young people who live outside the parental home 
at the age of 21, divided by the response they had given when asked if their parents would 
approve of their children’s departure from home at the age of 21. For example, for the 223 
young men who said that their parents would strongly disapprove, 26.9% was living away from 
their parents at the age of 21. As shown in the table, for women, having parents that would 
strongly approve of departure at the age of 21 increases departure rates by approximately 5 
percentage points compared to having parents who strongly disapprove of such departure. For 
men, no relationship seems to exist. Pearson’s chi-square test, however, cannot reject the null 
of independence between parental attitude and departure rates for either gender. By increasing
13 Young respondents are aged 11 years or over but less than 16 years on 1 December in the year of the survey, ie, for 
example, 1 Decem ber 1994 for wave 4. Because these youth are still very young, only a small part o f them is actually 
observed later on at the ages where they are at risk of departure.
14 Although getting married could possibly be a step beyond form ing a relationship and a step beyond moving to live 
with a partner.
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the age interval slightly to look at the living arrangements at the ages of 18 to 24,15 however, for 
females the null is rejected (for example, it is rejected at the 5% level for the wider 18-24 age 
range)
Table 4.7 -  Risk o f departure by parents' attitude towards child’s departure (United States)
Risk of departure
Parental attitude Men N obs. Women N obs.
At aqe 21
strongly disapprove 26.9% 223 28.9% 232
somewhat disapprove 27.6% 540 31.9% 442
somewhat approve 28.4% 469 34.3% 327
strongly approve 20.5% 146 34.3% 99
overall departure rate 27.0% Total: 1378 32.2% Total: 1100
Pearson Chi square (3) 3.6202 2.0287
Probability [0.306] [0.5606]
At aqe 18-24
strongly disapprove 24.5% 1627 28.1% 1719
somewhat disapprove 24.5% 3918 27.2% 3259
somewhat approve 26.5% 3380 29.6% 2395
strongly approve 24.2% 1052 32.1% 728
overall departure rate 25.1% Total: 9977 28.6% Total: 8101
Pearson Chi square (3) 4.9191 9.1520
Probability [0.178] [0.027]
Source: Author’s calculations from NLSY.
An alternative way to look at this issue is to estimate a simple probit on the probability of 
living outside the parental home using only age and parental attitude towards child’s departure 
as explanatory variables on a sample of all young people aged 18-24. This methods allows us 
to see the magnitude of the effect more precisely.
Whereas for men the coefficient on parental attitude is barely significant at the 10% level 
(even using a one-tailed significance test), for women the marginal effect of the approval 
variable (that ranges from 1 to 4, where 1 represents “strongly disapprove” and 4 is “strongly 
approve'1) is equal to 1.5 percentage points, as shown in the table below.16 This indicates that 
the risk of departure differs by around 6 percentage point between children depending on their 
parents’ attitude towards children departure at age 21, which is a rather important effect in both 
absolute and relative terms.
15 In this way, we calculate the probability o f living outside the parental home at several points of the young person’s life. 
A lthough this sim ple analysis does not correct for multiple observations per person, it does allow for the process of 
departure taking tim e over the late teens and early twenties.
16 Further analysis o f th is issue reveals that parental attitude towards departure appears to affect mostly Single and 
Student departures, rather than departures into a relationship. In the estimation part I will use a dumm y =1 if answer is 
““somewhat approve” or “strongly approve”, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 4 .8 -  Marginal effect o f parents’ attitude on child’s departure (US) 
Probit on departure from home - Female subsample, aged 18-24
Covariate Marginal effect
Age 0.0327
s.e. (0.0027)
Parental attitude 0.0149
s.e. (0.0056)
Obs: 1801
LR Chi2 (2) =156.88, prob= 0.0000
Mean of Dependent variable: 0.2855
Source: Author’s calculations from NLSY, controlling for repeated observations..
The NLSY also asks respondents whether they expect to be married five years from the date 
of interview (variable R0171600, asked in 1979) and about the age at which they would like to 
marry (variable R0171700, asked in 1979).17 The responses to these questions are correlated to 
departure rates but do not appear to be significant in the regression analyses undertaken later 
on.
17 The questions are asked in this precise order, and R 0 1 7 1 6 0 0  is no t autom atically computed from R 0 1 7 1 7 0 0 .
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4.3 Em pirical analysis
We analyse the probability of departure from home of all people who are still living in the 
parental household in a given wave and on whom we have some information on their living 
arrangements in the following year. The adjustments needed for each individual dataset are 
explained below.18
As explained earlier in this dissertation, young people’s decision of household formation is 
typically modelled in a utility comparison framework (where the child compares his utility when 
living with his parents and when on his own). We also follow this methodology here as we did in 
the ECHP chapter.
We include in our sample all children living with their parent(s) at time f-1 and estimate a 
multinomial model of their destination at the next interview.19 The better quality of the datasets 
used in this chapter allows us to also investigate student destinations along with departures as 
single non-student and departures with a partner, which we could not do in the ECHP model. 
The analytical model is essentially the same as the one presented in the previous chapter.20
As considered in the literature review (chapter 2) and in the chapter on the ECHP data 
(chapter 3), the use of actual income in the departure equations can be questioned on several 
grounds: /) earnings may be endogenous to the decision of leaving the parental home, and /'/) 
children’s decision to leave home may not depend on current, actual income (which may be nil if 
children are not working), but it may instead be a positive function of the income that can 
potentially be earned when working full-time (once living outside the parental home). For this 
reason, we also estimate a model with potential income instead of actual income.
In our estimations we exclude observations when the youth are younger than 17 or older 
than 29; a further reduction in sample size is due to the missing values in the covariates used in 
the models or to attrition.21 The way in which observations are excluded on the basis of age may 
need a few words of clarification. Youth younger than 17 or older than 29 are dropped from the 
sample. This means, for example, that a person in the panel who lives at home at ages 15, 16 
and 17 and then leaves home will be included in the analysis only for the year when she is 17. 
Similarly, a person in the panel at ages 28, 29, 30 and 31 and living in the parental home in all 
surveys but at age 31, will be included in the sample only at ages 28 and 29, but not at ages 30 
or 31 when he is above the threshold age for inclusion in the sample.
18 In this analysis we forgo some of the advantages of comparability by including the best variables available from each 
datasets. A lthough the m odels are not exactly the same, the results are still fairly comparable by looking at marginal 
effects and, for h igher precision, using the same reference person for each dataset.
19 As in the previous chapter, standard errors in the models with actual income are robust standard errors clustered for 
repeated observations by person (HuberAA/hite/Sandwich robust variance estimator, see W illiam s (2000)). In the model 
with potential income, we use instead bootstrapped standard errors (200 repetitions).
20 The longer tim e dim ension o f the panel could have allowed us to use a competing risk duration model instead of a 
multinom ial model, but this type of analysis is not undertaken in this work, mainly because the effects of duration and 
age cannot be distinguished (time at risk starts at the same age for everyone, and this is true if we consider time at risk 
starting at age zero or at any older age, eg, 16 or 18).
21 For all samples, we assume that m issing values are distributed independently of the object of our analysis.
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4.3.1 United Kingdom
Only people aged 17 to less than 30 are included in the analysis for the UK. The lower 
bound represents the start of adulthood when children can take their own decisions, and the 
upper bound of 30 is chosen because the number of children still living with their parents is, by 
that age, extremely low in the UK. Student departures are studied as a separate destinations, 
although children who leave with a partner are always included in the partnership destination 
irrespective of their student status.
Implementation of the empirical specification explained above requires consideration of the 
variables that influence departure through the indirect utility function. On the basis of the 
empirical literature and the data available, we include the following covariates.
Own resources and job-related variables
Own income: we use net total labour income for the previous calendar year. To account for 
non-linearities in the effects of own (actual) and parental income and to allow easier 
comparisons across countries, we use percentiles, calculated by gender and year on all people 
aged 17-29, excluding individuals with zero labour income. Individuals with zero income are 
given percentile zero and then a value of one in a zero-income dummy which is also included in 
the model. The reference group is somebody with the median level of income in the previous 
year (the corresponding percentile to enter the income variable). To make it easier to 
understand the relationship between income levels and percentiles, we have tabulated the 
values in appendix 4.10. In the model with potential income we use fitted net full-time yearly 
labour income, whose exact estimation is explained in appendix 4.9.
Potential income: in the model with potential earnings we use a fitted value of net full-time 
yearly labour income for all individuals, converted into percentiles.
Current labour market status (No Job): the dummy has a value of one if the person has no 
job at the time of the interview (this includes unemployment and inactivity), and a value of zero if 
the person is working.
Student status: this dummy is equal to one if, at the time of interview, the child is in 
education or training (not necessarily as his main occupation).
Satisfaction with job security (Job security): Those currently employed are asked how 
satisfied they are with the security of their job, and this is ranked on a scale from 1 (least 
satisfied) to 5 (most satisfied). The covariate in the model uses the same scale, while those not 
employed are assigned a value of 0 (and they are the ones for whom the current labour market 
status dummy No Job is equal to 1).22
Parental resources and other household variables
Parental/family income: theoretical reasons indicate that, assuming that parents are not 
liquidity constrained, parental permanent income may affect children’s propensity to leave 
home. As a proxy for permanent income, we use family standardised income, defined as total 
family income minus the child’s income standardised over household size. Both income figures
22 Although there is information on the kind of contract (fixed term, permanent, etc.) o f those employed, we prefer a 
more subjective variable o f job security as this is more likely to be an underlying determ inant of departure from home.
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are net amounts for the previous calendar year, and we use an OECD-equivalised scale of 
household size to standardise the income figures. To account for non-linearities in its effect and 
to allow easier comparisons across countries, we used percentile. We treat parental variables 
as exogenous: since income variables refer to many months before time t, ie, the time of 
possible departure, the risk of endogeneity with the i.i.d. component of the error should be 
small, and definitely smaller than if we used income figures for, say, the month of interview.
Adequacy of the size o f the current accommodation is a potentially important explanatory 
variable, and it can be derived from the household questionnaire in two ways: a subjective 
measure (“does the accommodation have shortage of space?” asked of the main respondent 
and leading to a “shortage of space” dummy) and the number of rooms per person (calculated 
as number of rooms divided by the standardised OECD measure for household size).
Household size: this variable is not entered directly but it is used to standardise family 
income and the size of the accommodation.
Parental health limitations: this measure the health status of the parents (dummy is equal to 
one if at least one parent has health limitations). We expect that parental ill health may delay 
children’s departure.
Demographic and personal characteristics
Age: we include age group dummies. This is preferable to using linear or square age terms 
because it avoids imposing any restrictions on the shape of the age profile.
Propensity to mobility ("mobile"): we use a dummy that takes a value of one if the person has
po
moved address in the last two years. Recent moves are used to control for the family’s history 
of mobility, which we expect to be positively correlated with the child’s own propensity to move. 
We expect this variable to affect departure to all destinations.
Health limitations to amount or type of work: the dummy is equal to one if the person has 
health limitations.
Religious attendance: this dummy is equal to one if the individual attends religious services 
or meetings at least once a month.
Macro variables:
We have included levels and changes in the regional unemployment rate in all models.24
We also include year dummies (reference is 1991) and regional dummies (reference is Rest 
of South East) as controls.
23 Having started with a group of dummies, each indicating a move in on of the last few year, we cannot reject the null 
that the dum m ies fo r the least recent moves do not affect departure from home. Only moves in the last two years are 
found to affect departure risks.
24 W e used regional overall unemploym ent rates by gender -  using unemploym ent rates o f people aged 18-24 (the age 
group to which m ost children belong to) did not appear to improve the significance of the covariate.
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Other variables were used in initial attempts but turned out not to be significant, or to be 
highly correlated with other variables in the models or to be very close to perfectly predicting the 
outcomes25 (leading typically to highly unstable, very large and very significant coefficients), and 
therefore had to be left out. Amongst these are:
whether the person lives with a child of theirs (which was treated as exogenous); 
whether the person lives with a partner of theirs (makes departure without a partner very 
unlikely);
whether the person lives with a stepparent (typically increases departure risk, but also 
made the model unstable);26
satisfaction with commuting time to the workplace (which may have captured the 
propensity to leave home for job related reasons): not significant once a full set of control 
is used.
whether the child is the only child in the household; 
whether the child only has one parent;27
whether the current accommodation is owned by the household and an aggregated 
measure of durables owned were both used in our initial estimations, but the results did 
not warrant inclusion in our preferred model.
Potential income equation
The equation with potential income (in percentile) includes the whole list of variables above 
except for actual income, the job security variable and the no-job dummy. Results and further 
details on how potential income is derived, including details on identification, are reported in the 
appendix from page 211.
4.3.2 United States
Only people aged 17 to less than 30 are included in the analysis for the US. The lower 
bound represents the start of adulthood when children can take their own decisions, and the 
upper bound of 30 is chosen because the number of children still living with their parents is, by 
that age, very low in the US. Student departures are studied as a separate destination, although 
children who leave with a partner are always included in the partnership destination irrespective 
of their student status.
Implementation of the empirical specification explained above requires consideration of the 
variables that influence departure through the indirect utility function. On the basis of the 
empirical literature and the data available, we include the following covariates.
25 This is fo r covariates where very few children have dummies equal to one, so alm ost all those with dumm y equal to 
one may be moving to the sam e destination.
26 Cf. lacovou (2001), who reports extremely high t-statistics, associated with positive coefficients, for this covariate. W e 
believe this was due to the small number of stepchildren in the sample. The inclusion of this dumm y tends to make the 
model and its coeffic ients unstable.
27 lacovou (2001) reports very positive coefficients and very high t-statistics for th is dummy, which is only rarely different 
from zero. W e encountered the same problem.
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Own resources and job-related variables
Own income, we use net total labour income for the previous calendar year. Similarly to the 
model for the UK, we use percentiles, calculated by gender and year on all people aged 17-29, 
excluding individuals with zero labour income, who are given percentile zero and a zero-income 
dummy equal to one.
Potential income: in the model with potential earnings we use a fitted value of net full-time 
yearly labour income for all individuals, then converted into percentiles.
Current labour market status (No Job): the dummy has the value of one if the person has no 
job at the time of the interview (this includes unemployment and inactivity), and a value of zero if 
the person is working.
Student status: this dummy is equal to one if, at the time of interview, the child is in 
education or training (not necessarily as his main occupation).
Satisfaction with job security (Job security): Those currently employed are asked whether 
they agree with the statement that the security of their current job is good. The answer is on a 1 
to 4 scale (the statement is “not true at all”, “not too true”, “somewhat true” or "very true”). In out 
model, we reclassify this variable as a dummy (equal to one when the original value is either 3 
or 4, equivalent to a fairly secure job).28
Parental resources and household variables
Family standardised income (percentile): similarly to the UK model, and as explained above, 
we use net total family income minus the child’s income, both for the previous calendar year, 
standardised by family size, and then converted into percentiles.
Household size: this variable represents the number of people in the current household. For 
the US model, this variable enters the equation directly as well as indirectly (via the 
standardisation of family income), because we do not have a measure of accommodation size 
or satisfaction with accommodation. Household size may therefore act as a rough proxy for lack 
of space (as we already control for family income).
Parents would approve of child’s moving out at 21: in the 1979 survey, the youth is asked 
about his parents’ attitude if he chose to move out at the age of 21.29 The answer has four 
possibilities: “strongly disapprove”, “somewhat disapprove”, “somewhat approve” and “strongly 
approve”, which we recode as 0 (the first two answers) and 1 (the last two). We expect this 
variable to capture cultural factors that would favour young people’s independence.30
Demographic and personal characteristics
Age: we include age group dummies. This is preferable to using linear or square age terms 
because it avoids imposing any restrictions on the shape of the age profile.
Race: white, black, reference is Hispanic.
28 This variable is not available in some of the waves.
29 Only respondents younger than 18 were asked this question.
30 Since the question is only asked in the first wave of people aged 17 or less, we believe it is a suitable control. In the 
initial specification I used 3 dumm ies but grouped into one after testing for d ifference in the individual effects of the 
dummies.
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Propensity to mobility: to indicate whether the child is “mobile”, we use a dummy that takes a 
value of one if the person has moved address in the last year, and zero otherwise.
Health limits work: the youth is asked whether their health status limits the amount or type of 
work they could carry out (dummy equal to one represents health limitations).
Religious attendance in 1979: in the first survey, the youth are asked how often they 
attended religious services in the previous year. The variable ranges from 1 to 6 (not at all, 
infrequently, once per month, 2-3 times per month, once per week, more than once per week). 
We use this information, for simplicity, in the same linear form in which it is found in the dataset.
Urban: information on whether the household’s residence is rural or urban is available from 
the interviewer’s section and we include it as a dummy equal to one if the residence is in an 
urban area.
Preferred age at marriage: information on the age at which the youth would like to get 
married is available for the first wave. The answer is coded in five bands (1 = less than 20 years 
old, 2 = 20-24, 3 =25-29, 4 = 30 or older, 5= never) and is entered as such in our model. This 
variable is only asked once of respondents aged 18 or less and we expect it to act as a proxy 
for young people’s attitude towards setting up their own household, although it mainly reflects 
preference for marriage rather than for independent living in general.
Macro variables
Unemployment: we have included levels and changes in the regional unemployment rate. 
Because of confidentiality reasons, the GEOCODE data that contain the exact rates is not 
available outside the United States,31 and the main datasets only provides this information using 
six bands (from 1 to 6, respectively: <3%, 3-5.9%, 6-8.9%, 9-11.9%,12-14.9, >15%). For 
simplicity, we use this information, in the same linear form in which it is found in the dataset.
Changes in unemployment rate, given the way we define the level of unemployment in the 
region, represent the number of bands up or down that the rate has moved in the last 12 month, 
and as such this variable ranges from -5  to +5.
We also include year dummies (1979 is the reference year) and macro-regional dummies 
(dummies included are South, West, North-Central; reference is Northeast) as controls.
There is no information in the NLSY on the size of the current accommodation or the 
respondent’s satisfaction with the current accommodation. Similarly, no information on parents’ 
health is available (except for a retrospective questionnaire asked of respondents when they 
reach the age of 40, but only a minority of respondents were older than 40, and had answered 
this questionnaire, in either the 1998 or the 2000 survey).
31 Geographic data for NLSY79 respondents fall into two categories: information on the main public CD and more 
detailed information released on a restricted-access geocode CD. The restricted data, to which we could not get access, 
includes information on which state and county the respondent lives.
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Potential income equation
The equation with potential income (in percentile) includes the whole list of variables above 
except for actual income, the job security variable and the no-job dummy. Results and further 
details on how potential income is derived are reported in the appendix from page 211.
4.3.3 Germany
Only people aged 17 to less than 30 are included in the analysis for Germany. The lower 
bound represents the start of adulthood when children can take their own decisions, and the 
upper bound of 30 is chosen because, in Germany, the number of children still living with their 
parents is, by that age, very low, albeit not completely negligible, and because departure rates 
by then have become very low, too. Student departures are studied as a separate destinations, 
although children who leave with a partner are always included in the partnership destination 
irrespective of their student status.
Implementation of the empirical specification explained above requires consideration of the 
variables that influence departure through the indirect utility function. On the basis of the 
empirical literature and the data available, we include the following covariates.
Own resources and job-related variables
Own income: we use net total labour income for the previous calendar year. Similarly to the 
model for the UK and the US, we use percentiles, calculated by gender and year on all people 
aged 17-29, excluding individuals with zero labour income, who are given percentile zero and a 
zero-income dummy equal to one.
Potential income: in the model with potential earnings we use a fitted value of net full-time 
yearly labour income for all individuals, converted into percentiles.
Current labour market status (No Job): the dummy has the value of one if the person has no 
job at the time of the interview (this includes unemployment and inactivity), and a value of zero if 
the person is working.
Student status: this dummy is equal to one if, at the time of interview, the child is in 
education or training (not necessarily as his main occupation).
Satisfaction with job security (Job security): every year the respondent (if employed) is asked 
whether he is worried about job security. Possible answers are ranked from 1 to 3, where 3 
indicates highest job security (1= very concerned, 2 = somewhat concerned, 3 = not at all). We 
enter this variable in this linear format.
Parental resources and household variables
Family standardised income (percentile): similarly to the UK and US model, and as explained 
above, we use net total family income minus the child’s income, both for the previous calendar 
year, standardised by family size, and then converted into percentiles
178
Household size, this variable represents the number of people in the current household. For 
the German model, this variable enters the equation directly as well as indirectly (via the 
standardisation of family income).
Adequacy of the size of the current accommodation, the respondents are asked about their 
current housing size. We include dummies for when their answer was that the accommodation 
was too small, small, or large (reference is size is adequate).32
Parent’s religion (No religion dummy): Because most German parents in our sample are 
religious and usually Christians,33 we included a variable to capture the case where neither 
parent is religious. We expect this variable to capture cultural factors that would favour young 
people’s independence, and possibly a child’s different propensity to enter (married or 
unmarried) partnerships.34
Parental health satisfaction: this is a measure of the health status of the parents35 and is 
based on the same question used for children (dummy is equal to zero if at least one parent 
reports low satisfaction with health (4 or less on a scale from 0 to 10), otherwise it is equal to 
one). We expect that parental ill health may reduce children’s departure.
Demographic and personal characteristics
Age: we include age group dummies. This is preferable to using linear or square age terms 
because it avoids imposing any restrictions on the shape of the age profile.
Propensity to mobility: to indicate whether the child is "mobile”, we use a dummy that takes a 
value of one if the person has moved address in the last five years, and zero otherwise. We 
expect this variable to affect departure risk into all destinations.
Satisfaction with health: this is a measure of the self-reported health status of the child where 
the answer ranges from 0 to 10: we created a dummy equal to one if the child reports to be 
satisfied with health (5 or more on the 0 to 10 scale), and equal to zero otherwise. We expect 
that own ill health may reduce children’s departure.
Macro variables
Unemployment: we have included levels and changes in the regional unemployment rate in 
the current region of residence. This is one of the several significant advantages of the SOEP 
dataset compared to the ECHP, where no information is available on the region of residence 
and where it is therefore impossible to use regional covariates.
We also include year dummies (reference: 1984) and macro-regional dummies (reference: 
Southern Germany) as controls.
32 A  measure o f the num ber of rooms is not available. The size in square m eters is available only for some of 
respondents.
33 The number of parents belonging to other Christian denom inations or having non-Christian religious affiliations is very 
low.
34 W e tried to use a dum m y for Catholic vs. Protestant parents to see whether this made a difference but the results 
indicated only occasional significance w ithout any large effect.
35 The question is asked to the parents and included in the file record of the parents, but we matched it to the children by 
matching the datasets appropriately.
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Potential income equation
The equation with potential income (in percentile) includes the whole list of variables above 
except for actual income, the job security variable and the no-job dummy. Results and further 
details on how potential income is derived are reported in the appendix from page 211.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 United Kingdom
The model estimated provides a set of interesting results with defined results for many of the 
variables on which we want to focus. A selection of the most important results of our preferred 
specification are presented in Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 as marginal effects, and full results are 
in the appendix (Table 4.15).36 The average departure rates by destination are reported at the 
bottom of each table of results to make it easier to assess the magnitude of the effects in 
relative terms. The results for student destinations will be considered separately at the end of 
this sub-section.
The fit of the model can be assessed either by looking at measures such as the pseudo R2, 
of around 16% for men and 14% for women,37 or, which we believe to be more appropriate for 
the purposes of our analysis here, by considering the estimates, ie their sign, significance, and 
particularly their importance, as reflected by the absolute and relative magnitudes. By looking at 
the coefficients and their significance, we see that, overall, income variables are significant and 
so are no job dummies for men, and we find important results when comparing potential income 
with actual one. Family income is also important for student departures. Some of the other 
variables in the model do not show a general pattern, so for example regional unemployment is 
not significant, while parental heath and own health, for example, used as controls, have 
significance only for one destination but only for one gender.
Effect of own income and employment
The results show that the effect of income varies significantly by gender and by destination.
Actual income has a strongly positive effect on men’s destinations (for a move of 2 quartiles 
up in the earnings distribution, the risk of departure alone increases by 2 pet points and the risk 
of departure with a partner by 2.7 pet points) and on women’s probability to move in with a 
partner (+4 pet points in risk for the same increase in earnings). Actual income has no effect on 
women moving out without a partner.
Potential income has a clearly positive effect on men’s departure without a partner, and the 
magnitude is larger, being two and a half times the size of the effect of actual income, that is, a 
move of two quartiles in the (potential) earnings distribution results in a +5 pet points in the risk 
of departure. This suggests that potential income is a more significant explanatory variable for 
men’s single departure than actual income. For partnership destinations, the coefficient is 
significant at the 5% level in a 1-tailed test, but the estimate is not very precise, so that we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on actual and potential income are the same.
Current employment status (no job dummy) has an effect on men’s alone and married 
destinations, and in the first case the effect is very strong (+3.5 pet points). The zero income 
dummy shows that women who in the previous year (to which the income dummy refers to) had 
no income are somewhat more likely to leave into Alone destinations. In this sense, the effect of
36 The W ald test to com bine categories rejects the null of equality of coefficients at the 1% level (see Table 4.16). 
Pooling by sex is also clearly rejected by the data. This is also apparent from the differences in the reported coefficients.
37 Pseudo R2 are reported at the bottom of the table with full estimation results, Table 4.15, in the appendix.
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the zero income dummy for women is consistent to what we observe for men moving into Alone 
destinations.
Being a student has a strongly negative effect on all departures.
The comparison of results using actual and potential income suggests that
1) for both genders current income is important for departures into a partnership.
2) for single departures, however, the effect of potential income on men’s risk is much 
higher than the effect of actual income, which means that men appear to be less reliant 
on having an income before they set out to live on their own.38
Other most notable effects
Family income, except for student departures, family income has no effect, or a small 
negative one.
Mobility: young men who have recently moved with their family have a much higher 
propensity to leave as single (plus 3.3 pet points); for women the effect is larger (+5pct points). 
In both cases the coefficients are very significant.
The unemployment rate does not seem to have any significant effect on departures (see 
appendix).
The frequency of religious attendance has a very strong negative effect on men’s departure 
into partnership, which indicates that strongly religious men have a significantly lower risk to 
leave home with a partner, but this covariate has no effect on any destination for women and no
39effect on single departures for men.
Student destinations
The results show that the effects of the main covariates on student destinations are different 
from the effects found for single and partnership destinations. The exclusion of student 
destinations, however, is not rejected by the data (the coefficients on other destinations do not 
change significantly if we estimate the model excluding student departures, and this is 
confirmed by a formal IIA test).
Actual income has a zero or small negative impact on the risk of leaving as a student.
Family income: higher family income increases the risk of student departures; a move of two 
quartiles in the distribution of income raises the risk by 0.6 pet points for men and more than 1 
percentage point for women.
Mobility: young men who have recently moved house with their family have a higher 
propensity to leave as students (plus 0.6 to 0.7 pet points), but no effect is found for women. 
With average departure rates into student destinations of approx., 3-4%, this represents a 20- 
25% increase in risk.
38 For women this is not necessarily so, but note that potential income for women has a larger positive coefficient that is 
significant at the 10% level (one-sided test).
39 It is possible that the risk o f religious men of leaving home to enter partnership is lower because such men prefer to 
leave home on their own (“alone”) and move in with a partner later, or that religious men generally marry less or later. It 
is not straightforward to d iscrim inate between these different cases from our set of results.
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Table 4 .9 -  Multinomial model of departure from the parental home (with actual income) -  United
Kingdom -  Marginal effects of selected coefficients
alone
Males
student couple alone
Females
student couple
Income 0.000404 -0.00012 0.000542 -0.000029 -0.00011 0.000834
(percentile) [2.11]** [1.76]* [4.05]*** [0.15] [0.93] [2.70]***
Zero income dummy 0.000605 -0.00103 -0.01159 0.021389 -0.00724 -0.01064
[0.06] [0.62] [1.01] [1.88]* [1.80]* [0.49]
Family standardised 0.000036 0.00012 -0.00021 -0.00023 0.000202 -0.00016
income (percentile) [0.25] [2.71]*** [1.65]* [1.66]* [2.74]*** [0.77]
Student -0.03955 0.01282 -0.06031 -0.06442 0.026252 -0.06898
[3.23]*** [3.70]*** [4.05]*** [5.25]*** [3.97]*** [3.20]***
No Job 0.034503 0.003579 0.016823 0.01741 0.004757 0.020781
[3.16]*** [1.24] [1.82]* [1.46] [0.84] [1.05]
Job security 0.001701 -0.00004 0.00127 -0.00023 -0.00099 -0.00067
[1.33] [0.18] [1.26] [0.15] [1.72]* [0.27]
Rooms pp 0.016617 0.000876 -0.00968 0.006068 0.004427 -0.01209
[3.44]*** [0.94] [1.89]* [0.89] [1.85]* [1.09]
Religious attendance -0.00035 0.002204 -0.02943 -0.00211 -0.00234 -0.00662
(frequency) [0.03] [1.26] [2.11]** [0.19] [0.55] [0.33]
Recent Mobility 0.03339 0.00594 0.006008 0.048335 0.006894 0.034687
[3.93]*** [2.58]*** .... [0-72] [5.50]*** [1.42] [2.05]**
Mean outflow rate 4.6% 3.2% 6.2% 5.5% 4.1% 10.3%
Source: BHPS. Own calculations. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Age range is 17-29. Sample size: 3469 men, 2617 women.
Table 4 .1 0 - Multinomial model o f departure from the parental home (with potential income) -  
United Kingdom -  Marginal effects of selected coefficients
Males Females
alone student couple alone student couple
Income 0.000986 0.000036 0.000293 0.000354 0.000175 0.000316
(percentile) [4.32]*** [0.91] [1.69]* [1.43] [2.38]** [0.88]
Family standardised -0.000052 0.00014 -0.00016 -0.00032 0.000194 -0.00011
income (percentile) [0.36] [2.76]*** [1.25] [2.29]** [2.70]*** [0.50]
Student -0.0195 0.019589 -0.05984 -0.04317 0.033866 -0.07043
[2.00]** [4.85]*** [4.82]*** [3.96]*** [5.70]*** [4.36]***
Rooms pp 0.01285 0.001071 -0.01065 0.00386 0.004266 -0.01329
[2.64]*** [0.99] [2.11]** [0.54] [1.69]* [1.18]
Religious attendance -0.00078 0.003215 -0.02972 0.005001 -0.00196 -0.00721
(frequency) [0.06] [1.59] [2.14]** [0.44] [0.45] [0.36]
Recent Mobility 0.028911 0.007285 0.001615 0.051772 0.00546 0.030853
[3.46]*** [2.55]** {0.19] [6.14]*** [1.14] [1.82]*
Source: BHPS. Own calculations. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** s ign ificant at 1%. Age range is 17-29. Sample size: 3424 men, 2600 women.
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4.4.2 United States
The model provides a set of very interesting results, with clearly defined results for the most 
important variables on which we have been focusing. Selected results of our preferred 
specification are presented as marginal effects in Table 4.11 and Table 4.12, and full results are 
in the appendix (Table 4.17).40 The results for student destinations will be considered separately 
at the end of this sub-section.
The fit of the model can be evaluated either by looking at measures such as the pseudo R2, 
of around 15% for men and 12% for women,41 or, which we believe to be more appropriate for 
the purposes of our analysis here, by considering the estimates, ie their sign, significance, and 
particularly their importance, as reflected by the absolute and relative magnitudes. Although the 
pseudo R2 may appear low, in fact when we find many coefficients that are significant and large 
in size, with income, no job and job security and past mobility being important covariates, and 
also cultural controls from 1979, such as religious attendance, marriage expectations and 
parents’ approval of early departures, all showing high significance for various destinations. 
Family income is also important for student departures and women’s married destination, and 
household size is significant too. Control variables, in the US model, seem to have a much 
stronger role and could perhaps even warrant further detailed investigation.
Effect of own income and employment
The results show that the effect of income varies significantly by gender and by destination.
Actual income has a strongly positive effect on men’s and women’s partnership destinations 
(for a move of 2 quartiles up in the earnings distribution, the risk of departure increases by 
2.8pct points for men and 3.5pct points for women), but has no effect on single departures.
Potential income has a positive effect on men’s departure risk without a partner (+7.5 pet 
points increase in risk for a move up two quartiles in the earnings distribution, which is much 
larger than the 2.8pct points found above). This suggest that potential income is a more 
significant explanatory variable for men’s single departure than actual income.
For women, the coefficient is very significant and large for departures into a partnership 
(+5.2pct points, and this is one and a half the size of the coefficient on actual income).
Current employment status has a signification on both destinations for men: not having a job 
means +2pct points increase in the risk of moving out alone and -1 .7  pet points on the risk of 
moving out with a partner. We also find an effect for women moving into marriage (+2.2 pet 
points, but the standard error is large). This is very similar to what we found for the UK. We note 
that the “zero income” dummy sometimes has a different sign compared to the “no job” dummy. 
For example, in the case of Alone destinations, the “no job” dummy has a negative sign for men: 
this would point out that the men with income in recent months but no current job are much 
more likely to move out into Alone destinations compared to men with an income in recent 
month but no current job. This seem to suggest that the “current” lack of a job (eg, due to recent
40 The W ald test to com bine categories rejects the null o f equality of coefficients at the 1% level. Pooling by sex is also 
clearly rejected by the data. This is also apparent from the differences in the reported coefficients. Pooling by sex and 
combining destinations is clearly rejected by the data. This is also apparent from the differences in the reported 
coefficients.
41 Pseudo R2 are reported at the bottom of the table with full estimation results in the appendix.
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loss of employment, while the man had a job and an income in the past) may be the reason for 
a man to leave the parental nest for job opportunities.42
Being a student has a strongly negative effect on all departures into a partnership, but a 
positive effect on men’s risk of single departure.
The comparison of results using actual and potential income clearly indicates that:
1) for both genders current income and employment are very important for departures into 
a partnership.
2) for single departures the effect of potential income on men’s risk is much higher than the 
effect of actual income, which indicates that men are less reliant on already having an 
income before they leave on their own.
Effect of family covariates
Family income does not appear to affect departure risk into Alone or Married destinations, 
however it also affects the outflow rate into being a student for both men and women, as 
explained further below in this section.
Household size has a significant positive effect on departures into partnerships. Since the 
dataset does not offer information on accommodation size/quality, household size seems to act 
as a proxy for overcrowding of the accommodation.43
Other most notable effects
Changes in unemployment affect the risk of single departure significantly. One move up the 
unemployment rate bands (approx. +3 pet in the local unemployment rate) translates in a 
change of minus 3.4pct in the departure rate for single men and minus 3.1 pet for single women. 
These effects are fairly large, both in levels and relative to the average departure rates. The 
effect on partnership destinations is only for women and is much smaller.
The mobility dummy is very positive and significant in for men and women moving out 
alone.44
A higher age o f expected marriage reduces partnerships risk for both genders.
Living in a urban location (town or city) significantly reduces departures into most 
destinations partnerships by up to 4 percentage points.45
Student destinations
The results show that the effects of the main covariates on student destinations are different 
from the effects found for single and partnership destinations. The exclusion of student
42 The same is true for Student destinations, for both men and women.
43 Household size could also reflect cultural factors, so that living in a bigger household is associated with a stronger 
propensity to form  a fam ily early. This would be consistent with household size affecting departures into a partnership 
but not single departures.
44 This could indicate that previous moves increase the probability of subsequent moves, or that there are cultural or 
individual’s factors that make certain people more likely to move.
45 The coeffic ients for this covariate are reported in the appendix.
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destinations, however, is not rejected by the data (the coefficients on other destinations do not 
change significantly if we estimate the model excluding student departures).
Actual income reduces the risk of leaving as a student, although, for both genders, the effect 
is only minus 1.7pct points for a move up two quartiles in the earnings distribution.
No Job increases the risk by approx 1pct point for both genders.
Family income: higher family income increases the risk of student departures; a move of two 
quartiles in the distribution of income raises the risk by 1.5 pet points for both men and women.
Mobility: young people who have recently moved house with their family have a higher 
propensity to leave as students (plus 1.6 pet points for both men and women).
The level of unemployment rate reduces the risk of student departures for men, but the effect 
is small (0.3pct decrease in departure rates for each move up one band in the rates, equivalent 
to 0.1 pet for an increase of 1 pet in unemployment rates).
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Table 4.11 -  Multinomial model of departure from the parental home (with actual income) -  United
States -  Marginal effects of selected coefficients
Males Females
alone student couple______ alone student couple
Income 0.000111 -0.000349 0.000563 -0.000203 -0.000337 0.000699
(percentile) [0.64] [5.06]*** [4.57]*** [1.01] [4.75]*** [3.52]***
Zero income dummy -0.047456 -0.025434 -0.013963 -0.043711 -0.02623 -0.010937
[3.59]*** [6.42]*** [1.23] [3.26]*** [6.16]*** [0.80]
No Job 0.020339 0.012613 -0.016626 0.013996 0.009114 0.022006
[2.19]** [4.57]*** [2.17]** [1.27] [3.36]*** [1.99]**
Family standardised 0.000223 0.000316 0.000051 -0.000072 0.000337 0.00023
Income (percentile) [1.26] [4.86]*** [0.39] [0.36] [4.70]*** [1.06]
Student 0.012813 0.053003 -0.044461 -0.004666 0.050634 -0.074535
[1.39] [9.55]*** [5.66]*** [0.49] [8.73]*** [7.41]***
Local unemployment -0.009742 -0.005326 -0.005624 -0.018328 -0.001843 0.000132
rate (band) [2.33]** [3.97]*** [1.74]* [3.68]*** [1.42] [0.03]
Change in -0.034474 -0.002494 -0.005826 -0.030915 -0.002484 -0.013614
unemployment [5.43]*** [1.61] [1.29] [4.41]*** [1.46] [1.89]*
Household size -0.004159 0.001173 0.004773 -0.00201 0.001293 0.006619
[1.66]* [1.73]* [2.83]*** [0.77] [1.75]* [2.62]***
Age of expected marriage -0.007369 0.00082 -0.017723 0.004869 0.004984 -0.030429
[1.68]* [0.58] [5.60]*** [0.91] [3.09]*** [5.43]***
Recent Mobility 0.071535 0.015632 0.013577 0.046787 0.015546 0.014074
[6.40]*** [5.18]*** [1.32] [3.74]*** [4.85]*** [1.01]
Mean outflow rate 11.1% 8.8% 8.9% 11.9% 8.6% 13.5%
Source. NLSY. Own calculations. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Age range is 17-29. Sample size: 8842 men, 7411 women.
Table 4.12 -  Multinomial model o f departure from the parental home (with potential income) -  United
States -  Marginal effects of selected coefficients
Males Females
alone student couple alone student couple
Income 0.001499 0.000425 0.000156 0.000283 -0.000079 0.001035
(percentile) [5.18]*** [5.33]*** [0.74] [1.17] [1.28] [4.33]***
Family standardised 0.000059 0.000125 0.000371 -0.0001 0.000239 0.000748
Income (percentile) [0.31] [2.19]** [2.46]** [0.47] [3.70]*** [3.40]***
Student 0.015549 0.059576 -0.070286 0.010586 0.052102 -0.08365
[1.63] [9.70]*** [8.02]*** [1.05] [8.57]*** [7.82]***
Local unemployment -0.014311 -0.004402 -0.007278 -0.021834 -0.001316 -0.003022
rate (band) [3.05]*** [3.27]*** [1.89]* [3.87]*** [1.07] [0.57]
Change in -0.038798 -0.002372 -0.004886 -0.030951 -0.002014 -0.013771
unemployment [5.68]*** [1.64] [0.94] [4.12]*** [1.26] [1.72]*
Household size -0.003606 0.000251 0.007686 -0.003865 0.001007 0.008416
[1.29] [0.34] [3.87]*** [1.33] [1.39] [3.13]***
Age of expected marriage -0.008851 0.000057 ■-0.021578 0.003464 0.005402 -0.029353
[1.80]* [0.04] [5.82]*** [0.59] [3.32]*** [4.88]***
Recent Mobility 0.074021 0.019535 0.01573 0.054682 0.017047 0.00243
[5.79]*** [5.69]*** [1.27] [3.91]*** [5.10]*** [0.15]
Source: NLSY. Own calculations. Absolute value o f z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** s ign ificant at 1%. Age range is 17-29. Sample size: 7837 men, 6464 women.
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4.4.3 Germany
This model, too, provides a set of interesting results, although the magnitudes of the effects 
are generally rather small in levels, but in some cases, in fact, relatively large compared to the 
average departure rates.
Selected results of our preferred specification are presented in Table 4.13 and Table 4.14 as 
marginal effects, and full results are in the appendix (Table 4.19).46 The results for student 
destinations will be considered separately at the end of this sub-section.
The fit of the model can be evaluated either by looking at measures such as the pseudo R2, 
of around 11% for men and 12% for women,47 or, which we believe to be more appropriate for 
the purposes of our analysis here, by considering the estimates, ie their sign, significance, and 
particularly their importance, as reflected by the absolute and relative magnitudes. We find 
income, no job dummies and job security covariates being generally significant, potential 
income performs well relative to current income, with previous residential mobility having a 
strong effect on the child’s risk of departure from home. Family income and other parental 
controls (health, religion) do not appear to have a significant effect, bar for women going to 
Married destination, where parental income has a small negative effect on departure risk.
Effect of own income and employment
The results show that the effect of income varies by gender and by destination.
Actual income has a positive and significant effect on men’s departures (for a move of 2 
quartiles up in the earnings distribution, the risk of departure increases by 0.6 pet for both single 
and partnership destinations -  this is small in absolute levels but not negligible relatively to the 
average outflow rates). For women moving out alone, the effect is approx. 1 pet, but no effect for
48women’s partnership destinations is found.
Potential income has a stronger, and much more significant, effect on men’s both departure 
risks, ie, a 1 pet increase in risk for a move up two quartiles in the earnings distribution, and a 
larger and significant effect than current income for women as well.
Current employment status has no effect on men while having no job increases women’s risk 
by 1 pet or 2pct. This is relatively large given the average departure rates observed for Germany. 
We also observe that for, Couple destinations, the “no job” dummy has the opposite effect of the 
“zero income” dummy, indicating that a woman with no income in the past and no current job is 
much less likely to leave to a Married destination compared to a woman with income in the past 
and no current job.
46 The W ald test to com bine categories in the German model rejects the null of equality o f coefficients for men at the 1 % 
level (model w ith potential income) and at the 5% level (border line with 1%) in the model with actual income in relation 
to the pooling of A lone and Married destinations. For Alone and Married destinations for women, the W ald test rejects 
the null o f equality o f coeffic ients only at the 10% level for women, with the sample with actual income being very close 
to 5% level, and we found that somewhat different set of covariates could change the results o f this test to rejection 
below the 5% level. Pooling by sex is clearly rejected by the data. This is also apparent from the differences in the 
reported coefficients.
47 Pseudo R2 are reported at the bottom of the table with full estimation results in the appendix.
48 Such effects are sm aller in levels compared to the results found for the US for partnership destinations -  however the 
average German outflow  rate is sm aller than for the US, so in relative term s it does matters. Additionally, when 
comparing like with like, the effect of actual income on Alone departures is positive and significant for Germany, and not 
significant for the US.
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Job security has a significant, but not large, positive effect for men’s departure into 
partnerships (+0.25pct)
Being a student has a significant negative effect on all departures (-1 pet up to -4pct).
The comparison of results of the two models suggests that for Germans, potential income is 
a more important explanatory variable than actual income, although the absolute effect of 
income is never as large as observed in the US or the UK.
Effect of family covariates
Family income appears to decrease the risk of women’s moving into a relationship (minus 
1.5pct for two quartiles up in earnings distribution, and somewhat stronger in the estimation with 
potential income) but has no impact for the other groups.
Other most notable effects
The mobility dummy is positive and significant for men and women for single departures, but 
the marginal effect is smaller than one percentage point.
Level o f unemployment affect student departures negatively and significantly, but changes in 
unemployment do not affect any of the departure risks significantly.49
Housing size that is deemed “too small” increases departure risk for men into all 
destinations by ca. one percentage point.
Student destinations
The results show that the effects of the main covariates on student destinations are different 
from the effects found for single and partnership destinations. Again, we note that the exclusion 
of student destinations is not rejected by the data (the coefficients on other destinations do not 
change significantly if we estimate the model excluding student departures).
Actual income has no effect on the risk of leaving as a student (while it had a positive effect 
on other departures).
Family income increases men’s risk (at the 10% significance level, one-sided test) but the 
effect is weak in levels (+0.3pc for the usual move up two quartiles in the distribution of income).
The mobility dummy is positive and significant for men and women for student departures, 
but the marginal effect is smaller than 1pc.
49 The coeffic ients for th is covariate and subsequent ones in this paragraph are reported in the appendix.
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Table 4 .1 3 - Multinomial model of departure from the parental home (with actual income) -  Germany
-  Marginal effects of selected coefficients
alone
Males
student couple alone
Females
student couple
income 0.000115 -0.000033 0.000122 0.000202 -0.000017 0.000008
(percentile) [1.99]** [0.53] [1.89]* [2.22]** [1.33] [0.05]
Zero income dummy 0.001133 -0.00025 0.001291 -0.00564 -0.00036 -0.04978
[0.32] [0.11] [0.30] [1.04] [0.78] [5.41]***
No Job 0.005663 -0.00045 0.004784 0.010033 -0.00039 0.019396
[1.61] [0.20] [1.14] [2.02]** [0.81] [2.17]**
family standardised -0.000039 0.000063 0.000048 -0.00006 -0.000001 -0.0003
income (percentile) [0.77] [1.56] [0.92] [0.98] [0.18] [2.52]**
Student -0.00993 0.00776 -0.01041 -0.00751 0.001422 -0.03732
[3.45]*** [2.53]** [3.06]*** [1.39] [2.31]** [4.61]***
Job security 0.001394 0.000608 0.002524 0.002741 -0.00019 0.001831
[1.45] [0.85] [2.16]** [1.74]* [1.08] [0.65]
Unemployment rate 0.000283 -0.00133 -0.00087 0.001145 -0.00031 -0.00461
(regional) [0.32] [1.72]* [0.74] [0.88] [1.98]** [1.62]
Housing size: too small 0.011089 0.006447 0.013049 0.008121 0.000875 0.036927
[2.13]** [1.68]* [1.66]* [0.86] [0.97] [2.57]**
Housing size: small 0.006224 -0.00141 -0.01041 0.003201 0.001319 0.006392
[2.07]** [0.54] [2.18]** [0.80] [3.62]*** [0.83]
Mobile in last 5 years 0.006756 0.003784 -0.00299 0.009087 0.001481 0.009465
[2.37]** [1.87]* [0.67] [2.18]** [4.23]*** [1.12]
Mean outflow rate 1.9% 1.0% 3.8% 2.7% 2.2% 6.7%
Source: SOEP. Own calculations. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** s ign ificant at 1%. Age range is 17-29. Sample size: 7212 men, 4771 women.
Table 4 .1 4 - Multinomial model of departure from the parental home (with potential income) -
Germany -  Marginal effects of selected coefficients
alone
Males
student couple alone
Females
student couple
income 0.000205 0.000099 0.000185 0.000287 -0.000001 0.000504
(percentile) [3.90]*** [2.21]** [2.41]** [2.15]** [0.09] [1.81]*
family standardised -0.000076 0.000065 0.000007 -0.00012 0.000007 -0.00042
income (percentile) [1.64] [1.64] [0.14] [1.81]* [1.19] [3.21]***
Student -0.01089 0.007672 -0.01353 -0.01034 0.001352 -0.03827
[3.99]*** [3.66]*** [4.19]*** [2.47]** [3.52]*** [5.11]***
Unemployment rate 0.000272 -0.00116 -0.00104 0.001485 -0.00015 -0.00517
(regional) [0.30] [1.53] [0.84] [0.99] [1.02] [1.61]
Housing size: too small 0.011438 0.007188 0.013877 0.006656 0.000767 0.038905
[2.16]** [2.05]** [1.75]* [0.60] [0.92] [2.40]**
Housing size: small 0.005841 -0.00082 -0.01157 0.004 0.001287 0.008322
[1.94]* [0.34] [2.31]** [0.88] [4.31]*** [0.94]
Mobile in last 5 years 0.006564 0.004171 -0.00373 0.008765 0.001259 0.006927
[2.24]** [2.14]** [0.80] [1.86]* [4.16]*** [0.73]
Source: SOEP. Own calculations. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** s ign ificant at 1%. Age range is 17-29. Sample size: 7081 men, 4539 women.
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4.5 Discussion
Amongst the results we presented for the three datasets, the most striking feature is the strong 
impact of economic factors for all countries. It is clear that employment and income are crucially 
related to departure from the parental home in all three countries.
In relation to the current literature, our results are consistent with the available research for the 
United Kingdom and they usefully expand the limited number of existing studies. Similarly to 
Ermisch (1999), for men we find that not being employed increases the risk of departure and so 
does own current income. Like Ermisch, we do not find clear effects of parental income on alone 
and married destinations, but we do find a significant, positive effect on student destinations. Some 
of our results, however, appear somewhat more precise than those reported by Ermisch: in his 
model with multiple destinations, the significance of own income is only borderline. Aassve et al. 
(2005) find evidence of some positive effect of income but not of employment: this could be 
because they used a complex set of interaction dummies, they made no distinction between alone 
and married destinations, and they analysed the ECHP data instead of the BHPS.
Our results confirm some of the results in the literature indicating that non-employment and 
employment on high incomes are linked to higher departure rates, whereas those employed but on 
low incomes are the ones who delay departures from home.
Additionally, our results indicate that potential income plays a very important role in departure for 
UK children: for men, we found that potential income is more important than actual income for 
single departures, while for women potential income affects student departures.
Both non-employment increasing departure and potential income being so important show that 
the process of departures from home in the UK appears to differ from what observed for Southern 
Europe, since the effects we found for the UK are significant and large.
The results appear much better determined compared to those found using the ECHP dataset in 
chapter 3 of this dissertation and in Aassve et al. (2005). We believe that this is due not only to the 
bigger size of the BHPS, but also to the better quality of the British Household panel and the much 
lower level of attrition compared to the ECHP.
As to the United States, our findings confirm only some of the empirical evidence found in the 
literature and add a useful insight into the role of potential income and the effect of macro variables.
In most previous analyses, own current income was found to be positively associated with the 
risk of departure. Potential income, however, had only been used rarely: Whittington and Peters 
(1996) found a positive impact of potential income, but they did not discriminate between different 
destinations, while Aassve (2000) found a positive impact on both married and single destinations, 
but the quantification of the effect was not clear. Our findings show that potential income is only 
significant and important for men moving into alone destinations, but not for men’s destinations with 
a partner. This is different from what we found for women: in particular, potential income is not
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significant for women moving into alone destinations. This result could reflect different attitudes 
towards independence and a difference in risk aversion when deciding whether to leave the 
parental nest on the basis of expectations of future income: since for women leaving home alone 
actual income is significant but potential income is not, with the opposite being true for men, this 
difference represents an interesting point for further research. We also found opposite signs in the 
effect of the “zero income” and the "no job” dummy for men: we interpret this as confirmation that 
the two dummies reflect different personal conditions ; in particular, the combination of no current 
job with a positive income in the previous months may indicate that moving out into Alone 
destinations is significantly related to the need to find work to replace a job that one no longer has. 
As to unemployment, since we also find only a small effect of the local unemployment rate on the 
risk of departure into a relationship, there is some inconsistency between our results and those of 
Aassve (2000), even if the same data are being used.
As to parental income, we find that higher parental income increases women’s departure into 
partnerships; this is not consistent with Avery et al. (1992) and Whittington and Peters (1996), who 
find that parental income reduces the risk of going to live with a partner.50 Since no other studies 
have studied departures as a student as a separate destination, it is important to point out that we 
observe a very significant and non-negligible positive effect of parental income on student 
departures.
Local unemployment rates and their changes appear to be very important. Higher levels of 
unemployment reduce departure significantly to single and student destinations; for married 
destinations, they are mostly significant, with only borderline significance for married men but very 
significant for married destinations in the model with potential income. Our results are stronger and 
better determined than the ones reported in one work, Whittington and Peters (1996), which used 
data from the PSID for the period 1968-1988 and found no significant effect of any of various 
unemployment measures in any of their models.
Cultural variables also prove to be an important factor that may warrant further research: we 
discovered that covariates such as family background, religion, and expectations of marriage are 
significantly related to departures and appear to have an important effect. For example, religious 
attendance in 1979 is associated with higher departure risk as a student. Parental (dis)approval of 
departure at young ages, once a full set of controls is used, turns out to be not as important as 
cross-tabulations and simple regressions had suggested initially. Young people’s own expectations 
of age at marriage (asked in 1979), however, are associated with departure into partnership in an 
important way and suggest the presence of important cultural factors.
The effect of race in our models is not significant once a full set of controls is included, which 
goes against the results of simple descriptive analyses. We therefore agree with Whittington and 
Peters (1996) who also find no effect of race after including potential wages. By contrast, Aquilino
50 Although the latter find that the effect on men’s departure is borderline and in fact, in their preferred model, it is not 
significantly different from zero.
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(1991) and Buck and Scott (1993) do find race effects but oversee the importance of potential 
earnings, so that their race dummies may in fact capture the effect of wage opportunities.
Our findings are very important for Germany, where there is very little research on young 
people’s departure from home. Our results show that own current income is significant for departure 
into alone and married destinations for both German men and women. The effect of income is 
somewhat stronger and more significant when using potential income rather than current income. 
Not being employed appears to have no effect on departure risk for men, while, for women, it 
increases the risk only slightly. These results are important because they show that the behaviour of 
young Germans is linked to income but such effect is not very large.51
When we compare the effects of the coefficients across the three countries, we observe that 
current income is generally positively associated with departures, with the effect being mostly larger 
for departures into Married.
It is interesting to notice that for all countries the effect of potential income is more positive (and 
more significant) than the effect of current income for men’s Alone destinations, which indicates a 
similar role played by potential income vis-a-vis current income.
The effect of the no job dummy varies between countries, genders and destinations, but we 
observe a large number of cases across all three countries where the effect on departure is positive 
and significantly so. Again, it appears to be a common theme that not being a job does not 
necessarily reduce outflows from the parental home.
With respect to student departures in particular, parental income has a positive effect on 
departures in the US and the UK, but no effect for Germany, which may possible be due to 
differences in the educational systems and wider availability of student support in Germany 
compared to the US and the UK. When looking at the other destinations, we fail to find any common 
effect of parental income across countries and genders.
If we now consider the hypotheses outlined in the introductory chapter and the gaps in the 
literature identified at the end of the literature survey, we see that we have made considerable 
progress towards answering some of the questions.
Hypothesis 1
The determinants of leaving home are the same for all destinations: leaving home to live
with a partner and leaving home to live without a partner are not distinct destinations and
can be pooled together.
51 For women, however, parental income appears to reduce departure into partnerships (but the effect is not very large), 
which is an unexpected result and is not consistent with the results for the UK and the US (it is not dissim ilar from the results 
found for Southern Europe).
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In all three datasets considered in this chapter, we tested whether destinations could be 
combined using Wald tests (formal tests of whether the coefficients of the variables are significantly 
different across different destinations, ie, of whether destinations can be combined), and the results 
have categorically shown that equality of coefficients between destinations is rejected. This was 
also apparent from the size of the coefficients estimated for different destinations. It is thus 
important to distinguish between destinations, and we can reject hypothesis 1.
In general, our estimates showed that the effects of economic variables differ significantly by 
destination, both in magnitude and sometimes also in sign, proving that the dichotomous model 
commonly found in the literature is unsatisfactory and misleading.
In particular, own current income has a stronger effect on married destinations than on alone 
destinations (plus, in some cases, own income is not significant on alone destinations). Student 
destinations are much less affected by current income than other destinations, and when an effect 
is found this is generally negative (own higher income reduces the risk of departures as a student, 
even after controlling for age); the effect of parental income is (typically) positive only on student 
destinations, but not on other destinations.
As far as Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 are concerned, it is no longer possible to compare 
Northern Europe with Southern Europe as we did in chapter 3, as the data is not strictly 
comparable. However, it may be useful to point out that some differences stand out from comparing 
the results between the two chapters: for example, whereas Southern Europeans without a job 
were likely to delay departure; in Northern Europe and the US not having a job provides an 
incentive to departure.52 Additionally, while current income and current employment status were 
significant for Southern Europe but the effects were rather small, the effects of such variables for 
the countries discussed in this chapter appear significant and of larger magnitude in absolute and 
relative levels. From this comparison exercise we notice that, while potential income is of little 
importance in Southern Europe (relative to current income), in Northern Europe and the US 
potential income is mostly more important than actual income.
52 In the UK and the US, not having a job increases men’s probability of departure into alone destinations, and the effect is 
very close to the 5% significance level for German males. For women, the No Job dummy has a positive and significant 
coefficient for German women (alone and married destinations), and we find positive (insignificant) coefficients for UK 
women.
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4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we expanded the analysis started in the ECHP chapter by using different 
datasets -  which we expected to be of better quality - for the UK and Germany, and widened our 
analysis to cover the United States. Although this has taken us away from a standardised model 
which could make comparisons amongst countries easier, we could benefit from the wealth of each 
individual dataset to the fullest extent.
The analysis in this chapter has produced some extremely interesting and important results, and 
we confirmed that the effects of economic variables mostly differ by destination, both in magnitude 
and sometimes also in sign, proving that the dichotomous model commonly found in the literature is 
unsatisfactory and misleading.
Amongst the results we presented for the three datasets, the most striking feature is the strong 
impact of economic factors for all countries. It is clear that employment and income are important 
determinants of departure from the parental home in all three countries, and particularly for the UK 
and US.
For married departures, current income and current employment are very important, and we 
estimate that the effect of potential income is smaller, to indicate that partnership formation may 
indeed require an actual job and earnings rather than a prospective income. This is very clear for all 
men in the samples.
For single destinations, men’s potential income is always more important than actual income, 
suggesting that young men in the countries considered in this chapter do not view a safe job and 
income as necessary conditions for departure from the parental home.
The analysis of student destinations reveals that the effects of income and family covariates is 
different from the effects that these variables have on non-student destinations: own income 
typically reduces the risk of student departures; family income has a positive effect on student 
departures in the UK and the US, but negative or zero effect on non-student departures. We also 
find that excluding student destinations (and dropping those observations) does not affect the 
coefficients on the other two exit routes.
Since we lacked such strong link between income, employment and departure in Southern 
Europe, we can conclude that there appear to be rather significant differences in the way in which 
economic and financial factors affect young people’s departure from the parental home in Northern 
Europe and the US, compared to Southern European countries.
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4.7 Appendix: Definitions of household
From an analysis of the official documentation on the datasets and the questionnaires, we see 
that the only relevant difference amongst the survey relates to the classification of students.53 When 
considering a student who is attending university, this could be categorised either as having left 
home or as being temporarily away from home and thus still belonging to the original household, 
depending on somewhat subtle details.
In the BHPS and the SOEP, university students do not belong to the parental household if they 
are living away from home during term time, irrespective of where they are at the time of interview. 
In the US NLSY the definition is different: a distinction is made depending on whether the student 
lives in university accommodation, in which case he is considered to be temporarily away from 
home but still belonging to the original household, or in private accommodation, and thus belonging 
to a new household rather than to the parental home. We reclassify those living in an institution (eg, 
a university dorm or fraternity) as having left home, for what we believe is needed for consistency 
within the NLSY and with the UK and German datasets.
The details of the definitions for each dataset are reported below, along with information on the 
amendments and changes that we needed to make for consistency purposes.
4.7.1 United Kingdom  (BHPS)
In the BHPS a household is defined as a group of persons
1) who are living together, and
2a) “either share living accommodation” or
2b)“share one meal a day” and “have the address as their only or main residence”
The main requirement for marginal cases of household membership was six months continuous 
residence during the year. This therefore means that students who might have been at the parental
home during vacations do not qualify as living in the parental home, ie, such students would be
treated as members of their term-time household.
On the basis of the selection of the samples for wave 1, the dataset’s following rules and the 
rules for inclusion of new individuals, the original sample members (of the first wave) are clearly 
crucial in determining which households are interviewed in later waves. This is because, in any 
given survey, all those living in the household of an original sample member will be interviewed for 
that survey, but they will not be interviewed in any of the following waves unless they are still living 
with an original sample member. Children born to original sample members also become “original 
sample members” and are followed.54
This definition of household is suitable to the analyses conducted in this chapter.
53 The inclusion or exclusion of lodgers and boarders is not a relevant issue for our purposes.
54 See h t t p : / / w w w . i s e r . e s s e x . a c . U k / b h p s / d o c / v o l a / i n t r a . h t m l # b h p s s a m p .
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4.7.2 United States (NLSY)
Somewhat similarly to the UK BHPS, the US NLSY follows the sample of all original sample 
members from wave one onwards. In the NLSY, however, no new “original sample members” are 
created. The survey process focuses on the original youth as they are followed over time. Some of 
the interview questions, however, relate to the household in which the youth belongs.
"[In the NLSY] the term “household” refers to all individuals sharing the respondent’s 
primary residence at the time of the interview. For respondents living in temporary quarters 
(except temporary military quarters), the usual residence is defined as that person’s 
permanent residence. For those living in their own dwelling unit or in military family housing, 
the usual residence is the person’s dwelling unit. For example, if a male college student is 
living in a temporary residence, such as a fraternity, those who share his permanent 
residence, such as his parents’ address, would be considered his household members. 
However, if that same college student were living in his own apartment, all those living in 
his apartment would be considered his household members. Household specification for 
those respondents enlisted in the military is as follows: (1) for those in the military who are 
married but living in military quarters other than military family housing, the household is the 
household of the respondent’s spouse, and (2) for those in the military who are unmarried, 
no household information is recorded.”55
For the purpose of our analysis, for consistency with those who are studying at university while 
living in private accommodation, we classify all those living in a dorm or similar institution as having 
left the parental home.
4.7.3 Germany (SOEP)
The German SOEP uses a relatively standard definition of household. Students are classified as 
belonging in a separate household if they do not live in the parental household (and therefore we 
classify them as having left the parental home). Those who are temporarily away from the parental 
home for education purposes do not belong to the parental home (education is not considered a 
possible reason to justify being away from home, as detailed below).
55 The household of the respondent therefore includes not only people related to the respondent, the respondent’s partner 
and the respondent’s in-laws, but also lodgers, boarders and anyone who usually lives there but is away at time of interview 
travelling, at school or in hospital. Persons employed by the respondent (or any of the people listed in their household) who 
lives in the same accommodation are also interviewed. Persons who have a usual residence somewhere else but are 
currently staying in the same dwelling are not included in the respondent’s household. Sources: Zagorsky and White (1999), 
p. 185. See also http://www.bls.qov/nls/79auex/v79auex.htm and http://www.bls.aov/nls/79auide/nls79usQ.htm.
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56The official SOEP documentation includes the following definitions:
Private Household (“Privathaushalt”)
“Every group of persons, who live together and economically spend and earn together, where 
meals are shared.”
Therefore, those living alone, and earning (or responsible for) their own money, constitute 
single-person-households.
Other private households include:
so-called "private households in institutions": persons who live in institutions, but are 
responsible for earning their own living, e.g. a gatekeeper husband and wife at a hospital, or 
a superintendent family in a home for children, while not being communal care personnel 
from the institution;
most persons in a residence (eg, a convent), as long as they run their own household, and 
are not cared for and fed by the institution.
Non-private households include those persons who live in "institutions" and are mainly fed and 
cared for by the institute’s communal facilities.
Note: All persons who normally live in the household, but who are at the time of interview at the 
hospital, on vacation, doing military or civilian service, are indeed considered to be part of the 
household.
56 Source: “A Primer on the German Institutional Background for SOEP Users” ,
http://panel.gsoep.de/soepinfo/background_e.html.
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4.8 Appendix: Full sets of results
Table 4 .1 5 - Multinomial model of departure from the parental home -  United Kingdom  -  Marginal effects
With potential income With potential income
Males Females Males Females
Alone student couple Alone student couple alone student couple alone student couple
Income 0.000404 -0.00012 0.000542 -0.000029 -0.00011 0.000834 0.000986 0.000036 0.000293 0.000354 0.000175 0.000316
(percentile) [2.11]** [1.76]* [4.05]*** [0.15] [0.93] [2.70]*** [4.32]*** [0.91] [1.69]* [1.43] [2.38]** [0.88]
Zero income dummy 0.000605 -0.00103 -0.01159 0.021389 -0.00724 -0.01064
[0.06] [0.62] [1.01] [1.88]* [1.80]* [0.49]
Family standardised 0.000036 0.00012 -0.00021 -0.00023 0.000202 -0.00016 -0.000052 0.00014 -0.00016 -0.00032 0.000194 -0.00011
income (percentile) [0.25] [2.71]*** [1.65]* [1.66]* [2.74]*** [0.77] [0.36] [2.76]*** [1.25] [2.29]** [2.70]*** [0.50]
Durables -0.00151 0.000017 0.002836 0.001276 -0.00038 0.00104 -0.00346 0.000162 0.002932 -0.00016 -0.00021 0.002401
[0.51] [0.03] [1.21] [0.46] [0.31] [0.22] [1.18] [0.25] [1.22] [0.06] [0.17] [0.52]
Student -0.03955 0.01282 -0.06031 -0.06442 0.026252 -0.06898 -0.0195 0.019589 -0.05984 -0.04317 0.033866 -0.07043
[3.23]*** [3.70]*** [4.05]*** [5.25]*** [3.97]*** [3.20]*** [2.00]** [4.85]*** [4.82]*** [3.96]*** [5.70]*** [4.36]***
No Job 0.034503 0.003579 0.016823 0.01741 0.004757 0.020781
[3.16]*** [1.24] [1.82]* [1.46] [0.84] [105]
Job security 0.001701 -0.00004 0.00127 -0.00023 -0.00099 -0.00067
[1.33] [0.18] [1.26] [0.15] [1.72]* [0.27]
Rooms pp 0.016617 0.000876 -0.00968 0.006068 0.004427 -0.01209 0.01285 0.001071 -0.01065 0.00386 0.004266 -0.01329
[3.44]*** [0.94] [1.89]* [0.89] [1.85]* [1.09] [2.64]*** [0.99] [2.11]** [0.54] [1.69]* [1.18]
Accomm_shortofspace 0.008778 0.002505 0.005155 0.015292 -0.00101 -0.000066 0.007594 0.003014 0.004901 0.018661 -0.00021 0.000084
[0.93] [1.20] [0.71] [1.46] [0.25] [0.00] [0.81] [1.24] [0.67] [1.76]* [0.05] [0.00]
Health limits -0.04235 -0.0075 -0.00192 0.001672 0.00587 -0.01616 -0.03077 -0.00764 -0.00356 0.005612 0.007515 -0.01663
[1.93]* [1.40] [0.17] [0.12] [1.06] [0.65] [1.49] [1.22] [0.33] [0.41] [1.37] [0.66]
Parental_healthlimits 0.002544 -0.00151 -0.00095 -0.00444 -0.00765 -0.00853 0.005172 -0.00175 0.00086 -0.00256 -0.00773 -0.00742
[0.34] [1.00] [0.17] [0.54] [1.96]* [0.63] [0.71] [0.97] [0.15] [0.30] [1.94]* [0.55]
Religious attendance -0.00035 0.002204 -0.02943 -0.00211 -0.00234 -0.00662 -0.00078 0.003215 -0.02972 0.005001 -0.00196 -0.00721
(frequency) [0.03] [1.26] [2.11]** [0.19] [0.55] [0.33] [0.06] [1.59] [2.14]** [0.44] [0.45] [0.36]
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Mobility 0.03339 0.00594 0.006008 0.048335 0.006894
[3.93]*** [2.58]*** [0.72] [5.50]*** [1.42]
Current unemployment -0.00015 -0.00052 -0.00045 -0.00283 -0.000036
[0.09] [1.11] [0.30] [1.43] [0.06]
Change in unempl. 0.005737 -0.00191 0.002762 0.009193 0.003472
[0.82] [1.42] [0.52] [1.09] [1.19]
REG_London -0.01693 -0.00686 -0.00625 -0.00626 0.000028
[1.49] [1.83]* [0.61] [0.41] [0.01]
REG_SW 0.000577 -0.00043 0.014062 0.006253 -0.00075
[0.05] [0.19] [1.36] [0.48] [0.17]
REG_EAnglia 0.004304 -0.00189 0.038145 0.027796 0.00424
[0.23] [0.62] [3.00]*** [1.62] [0.68]
REG_EMidlands 0.003671 -0.0002 0.015941 -0.00139 -0.00239
[0.32] [0.12] [1.56] [0.10] [0.46]
REG_WMidlands -0.01648 -0.00307 0.011124 -0.00245 0.001543
[1.15] [1.07] [0.89] [0.16] [0.30]
REG_NW -0.00881 0.001004 0.002726 -0.01635 0.003898
[0.78] [0.49] [0.25] [1.00] [0.93]
REG_YorksHum -0.03642 -0.00024 0.019869 0.008691 0.000904
[2.33]** [0.11] [1.80]* [0.56] [0.19]
REG_North -0.03538 -0.00203 0.000722 -0.00431 -0.00338
[1.97]** [0.53] [0.05] [0.19] [0.51]
REG_Wales 0.003255 0.000013 -0.00563 0.026088 -0.000041
[0.24] [0.00] [0.42] [1.63] [0.00]
REG_Scotland 0.001591 -0.00701 0.018749 0.037144 -0.02781
[0.11] [1.62] [1.74]* [2.89]*** [2.45]**
YEAR_92 0.007153 -0.01073 0.016393 0.023818 -0.01847
[0.50] [3.27]*** [1.50] [1.57] [2.88]***
YEAR_93 0.010558 -0.01127 0.007609 0.035443 -0.01066
[0.58] [3.16]*** [0.53] [1.75]* [1-43]
YEAR_94 0.023964 -0.01002 0.024059 0.045919 -0.01058
[1.28] [2.79]*** [1.61] [2.16]** [1.33]
0.034687 0.028911 0.007285 0.001615 0.051772 0.00546 0.030853
[2.05]** [3.46]*** [2.55]** [0.19] [6.14]*** [1.14] [1.82]*
-0.00149 -0.00052 -0.00059 -0.00085 -0.00301 0.000006 -0.00162
[0.42] [0.30] [1.09] [0.55] [1.51] [0.01] [0.45]
0.015191 0.005216 -0.00203 0.001359 0.010689 0.003494 0.015478
[1.23] [0.75] [1.30] [0.26] [1.24] [1.18] [1.24]
-0.05445 -0.03283 -0.00801 -0.01398 -0.00441 -0.00223 -0.05613
[2.12]** [2.76]*** [1.84]* [1.30] [0.30] [0.46] [2.17]**
0.016712 0.014382 -0.00021 0.018503 0.012925 -0.00032 0.016836
[0.80] [1.26] [0.08] [1.74]* [0.96] [0.07] [0.77]
0.043271 0.017532 -0.00219 0.044951 0.036679 0.006475 0.049687
[1.43] [0.94] [0.62] [3.33]*** [1.93]* [0.97] [1.59]
0.011192 0.010937 0.000042 0.014337 0.014616 -0.00156 0.012428
[0.47] [0.91] [0.02] [1.34] [0.93] [0.30] [0.50]
-0.00191 -0.00828 -0.00308 0.011707 0.000335 0.000504 0.002261
[0.08] [0.57] [0.94] [0.92] [0.02] [0.10] [0.10]
0.039973 0.004033 0.001553 0.004242 -0.01087 0.0056 0.044282
[1.96]* [0.34] [0.65] [0.38] [0.61] [1.27] [2.01]**
0.021801 -0.02036 0.000125 0.02367 0.017647 0.002765 0.027135
[0.93] [1.29] [0.05] [2.04]** [1.01] [0.56] [1.07]
0.00944 -0.02876 -0.00183 0.004719 0.001447 -0.00303 0.014043
[0.27] [1.54] [0.42] [0.33] [0.06] [0.46] [0.40]
-0.02294 0.015986 -0.00009 -0.00212 0.026611 -0.000086 -0.02016
[0.67] [1.13] [0.00] [0.16] [1.61] [0.00] [0.60]
0.019188 0.011694 -0.00778 0.02186 0.041027 -0.02849 0.020855
[0.93] [0.80] [1.57] [1.94]* [3.13]*** [2.48]** [0.99]
0.055575 0.000828 -0.01376 0.011514 0.023116 -0.02021 0.055856
[2.25]** [0.06] [3.89]*** [1.07] [1.48] [3.10]*** [2.26]**
0.060312 0.005773 -0.01449 0.000438 0.035571 -0.01223 0.052879
[1.86]* [0.32] [3.67]*** [0.03] [1.69]* [1.61] [1.63]
0.091756 0.016792 -0.01282 0.016125 0.046114 -0.01182 0.085515
[2.74]*** [0.91] [3.22]*** [1.12] [2.10]** [1.47] [2.56]**
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YEAR_95 0.010101 -0.01105 -0.00304 0.010213 -0.02903 0.091558 0.003797 -0.01426 -0.01075 0.012787 -0.03099 0.085028
[0.60] [3.18]*** [0.23] [0.48] [3.13]*** [3.01]*** [0.23] [3.66]*** [0.86] [0.58] [3.32]*** [2.79]***
YEAR_96 0.01057 -0.01711 0.019189 0.025652 -0.02263 0.085888 0.004109 -0.02089 0.011927 0.029758 -0.02442 0.080931
[0.55] [3.95]*** [1.26] [1.12] [2.35]** [2.52]** [0.22] [4.22]*** [0.80] [1.29] [2.48]** [2.38]**
YEAR_97 0.022943 -0.02465 0.023204 0.022842 -0.01758 0.103622 0.016102 -0.02987 0.016137 0.025492 -0.01958 0.100219
[1.19] [4.05]*** [1.61] [1.00] [1.91]* [3.03]*** [0.85] [4.35]*** [1.15] [1.09] [2.07]** [2.92]***
YEAR_98 0.024226 -0.0134 0.003165 0.015833 -0.01974 0.044477 0.017149 -0.01688 -0.00149 0.017977 -0.02177 0.037065
[1.62] [3.75]*** [0.25] [0.86] [2.57]** [1.44] [1.18] [4.28]*** [0.12] [0.97] [2.78]*** [1.19]
AGE2021 0.014756 -0.00126 0.024921 0.008214 0.002111 0.045955 0.00322 -0.00263 0.032804 -0.000002 -0.00097 0.054547
[1.63] [0.82] [3.12]*** [0.82] [0.61] [2.98]*** [0.35] [1.42] [4.02]*** [0.00] [0.27] [3.49]***
AGE2223 0.025128 -0.00249 0.041097 0.030285 -0.00581 0.037908 -0.00273 -0.00475 0.047231 0.015857 -0.01291 0.042487
[2.88]*** [1.03] [5.12]*** [2.97]*** [1.00] [2.07]** [0.24] [1.72]* [5.39]*** [1.25] [2.14]** [2.00]**
AGE2426 0.022909 -0.00566 0.049872 0.011708 -0.00763 0.065055 -0.01331 -0.00938 0.054898 -0.00631 -0.01618 0.077871
[2.35]** [1.53] [5.62]*** [105] [1.07] [3.61]*** [1.00] [2.04]** [5.33]*** [0.40] [2.21]** [3.41]***
AGE2729 -0.01206 -0.00014 0.036701 0.022535 -0.00088 0.045771 -0.05564 0.000082 0.043086 0.001452 -0.00075 0.055071
[0.80] [■] [3.98]*** [1.65]* [■] [1.98]** [3.00]*** [■] [3.69]*** [0.08] [.] [2.07]**
Pseudo R2 0.1613 0.1357 0.1558 0.1278
Observations 3469 2617 3424 2600
Source: BHPS, 1991-1999. Own calculations. Age range is 17-29. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Because some dummies have very small number of points with values of ones, we had to impose a coefficient of zero on them for some destinations to ensure stability of the 
model (in such cases, the marginal effects are either omitted or the relative z-statistics are indicated as [.]).
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Table 4 .1 6 - Further tests and descriptives for United Kingdom model
Destinations in sample with actual income MALES: Destinations in sample with actual income: FEMALES:
D e s tin a tio n Freq. P ercen t D e s tin a tio n Freq. P ercen t
H o m e s ta y e r 2 9 8 4 8 6 .0 2 H o m e s ta y e r 2 0 9 7 8 0 .1 3
A lone 159 4 .5 8 A lone 143 5 .4 6
S tu d e n t 112 3 .2 3 S tu d e n t 108 4 .1 3
C oup le 2 1 4 6 .1 7 C oup le 2 69 1 0 .28
T o ta l 3 4 6 9 1 0 0 .0 0 T o ta l 2 6 1 7  1 0 0 .0 0
Wald tests for combining outcome categories Wald tests for combining outcome categories
Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated with given pair of outcomes are 0 Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated with given pair of outcomes are 0 (i.e.,
(i.e., categories can be collapsed). categories can be collapsed).
In  sa m p le  w ith  a c tu a l in co m e  MALES: In  sa m p le  w ith  a c tu a l in co m e  FEMALES:
C a te g o rie s  te s te d ch i2 d f P > ch i2 C a te g o rie s  te s te d ch i2 d f P > ch i2
A lo n e  -S tu d e n t 1 5 8 .6 0 1 36 0 .0 0 0 A lone  -S tu d e n t 2 1 0 .6 1 1 36 0 .0 0 0
A lo n e  -C o up le 0 0 .6 1 7 36 0 .0 0 0 A lone  -C o up le 8 4 .6 5 2 36 0 .0 0 0
A lo n e  -h o m e s ta y 1 8 .4 5 0 36 0 .0 0 0 A lone  -h o m e s ta y 1 5 5 .5 2 2 36 0 .0 0 0
S tu d e n t -C o up le 5 0 .4 5 7 36 0 .0 0 0 S tu d e n t -C o up le 2 2 2 .1 3 9 36 0 .0 0 0
S tu d e n t -h o m e s ta y 2 2 3 .9 6 8 34 0 .0 0 0 S tu d e n t -h o m e s ta y 1 8 2 .6 3 6 34 0 .0 0 0
C oup le  -h o m e s ta y 1 8 2 .3 8 3 36 0 .0 0 0 C oup le  -h o m e s ta y 1 3 1 .7 5 3 36 0 .0 0 0
in sa m p le  w ith  p o te n tia l in co m e  MALES: In  s a m p le  w ith  p o te n tia l in co m e  FEMALES:
A lone  -S tu d e n t 1 6 1 .9 0 3 33 0 .0 0 0 A lone  -S tu d e n t 1 9 1 .0 8 6 33 0 .0 0 0
A lone  -C o up le 9 6 .2 3 7 33 0 .0 0 0 A lone  -C o up le 6 2 .8 2 0 33 0 .0 01
A lone  -h o m e s ta y 1 2 6 .2 4 3 33 0 .0 0 0 A lone  -h o m e s ta y 1 4 2 .3 3 4 33 0 .0 0 0
S tu d e n t -C o up le 2 3 1 .1 4 6 33 0 .0 0 0 S tu d e n t -C o up le 2 0 5 .2 0 3 33 0 .0 0 0
S tu d e n t -h o m e s ta y 2 1 6 .4 2 5 31 0 .0 0 0 S tu d e n t -h o m e s ta y 1 7 5 .6 5 7 31 0 .0 0 0
C oup le  -h o m e s ta y 1 5 5 .5 9 1 33 0 .0 0 0 C oup le  -h o m e s ta y 1 2 2 .8 3 4 33 0 .0 0 0
Hausman tests of IIA assumption Hausman tests of IIA assumption
Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives. Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives.
In  sa m p le  w ith  a c tu a l in co m e  MALES: In  s a m p le  w ith  a c tu a l in co m e  FEMALES:
O m itte d ch i2 d f P > ch i2  e v id e n ce O m itte d ch i2  d f P > ch i2  e v id e n ce
A lone 7 .4 0 5 72 1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho A lone 0 .8 2 9  72 1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
S tu d e n t -0 .0 0 0 74 fo r  Ho S tu d e n t 0 .2 9 7  74 1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
C oup le -1 .8 8 8 71 fo r  Ho C oup le 1 4 .8 2 7  72 1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
In  s a m p le  w ith  p o te n tia l in co m e  MALES: In  s a m p le  w ith  p o te n tia l in co m e  FEMALESV
A lo n e  1 8 .0 0 6  65  1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho A lone  0 .9 5 4  65  1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
S tu d e n t 0 .1 3 5  68  1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho S tu d e n t 1 .5 1 5  68  1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
C oup le  2 .4 3 1  66  1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho C oup le  -8 .8 3 9  66  —  fo r  Ho
Note: If chi2<0, the estimated model does not meet asymptotic assumptions of the 
test -  this is considered a result in favour o f Ho.
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Table 4.17 -  Multinomial model of departure from the parental home -  United States -  Marginal effects
With potential income With potential income
Males Females Males Females
Alone student couple Alone student couple alone student couple alone student couple
Income 0.000111 -0.000349 0.000563 -0.000203 -0.000337 0.000699 0.001499 0.000425 0.000156 0.000283 -0.000079 0.001035
(percentile) [0.64] [5.06]*** [4.57]*** [1.01] [4.75]*** [3.52]*** [5.18]*** [5.33]*** [0.74] [1.17] [1.28] [4.33]***
Zero income dummy -0.047456 -0.025434 -0.013963 -0.043711 -0.02623 -0.010937
[3.59]*** [6.42]*** [1.23] [3.26]*** [6.16]*** [0.80]
Family standardised 0.000223 0.000316 0.000051 -0.000072 0.000337 0.00023 0.000059 0.000125 0.000371 -0.0001 0.000239 0.000748
income (percentile) [1.26] [4.86]*** [0.39] [0.36] [4.70]*** [1.06] [0.31] [2.19]** [2.46]** [0.47] [3.70]*** [3.40]***
student 0.012813 0.053003 -0.044461 -0.004666 0.050634 -0.074535 0.015549 0.059576 -0.070286 0.010586 0.052102 -0.08365
[1.39] [9.55]*** [5.66]*** [0.49] [8.73]*** [7.41]*** [1.63] [9.70]*** [8.02]*** [1.05] [8.57]*** [7.82]***
No Job 0.020339 0.012613 -0.016626 0.013996 0.009114 0.022006
[2.19]** [4.57]*** [2.17]** [1.27] [3.36]*** [1.99]**
Job security 0.024952 -0.008321 -0.00381 -0.001716 0.000261 0.006124
[2.22]** [2.61]*** [0.43] [0.13] [0.09] [0.47]
Health limits work -0.016457 -0.009206 0.019673 -0.001708 -0.01068 0.024949 -0.020808 -0.00899 0.008106 -0.000099 -0.011856 0.031447
[0.78] [1.34] [1.55] [0.10] [1.33] [1.53] [0.92] [1.19] [0.52] [0.01] [1.50] [1.77]*
Local unemployment -0.009742 -0.005326 -0.005624 -0.018328 -0.001843 0.000132 -0.014311 -0.004402 -0.007278 -0.021834 -0.001316 -0.003022
rate (band) [2.33]** [3.97]*** [1.74]* [3.68]*** [1.42] [0.03] [3.05]*** [3.27]*** [1.89]* [3.87]*** [1.07] [0.57]
Change in -0.034474 -0.002494 -0.005826 -0.030915 -0.002484 -0.013614 -0.038798 -0.002372 -0.004886 -0.030951 -0.002014 -0.013771
unemployment [5.43]*** [1.61] [1.29] [4.41]*** [1.46] [1.89]* [5.68]*** [1.64] [0.94] [4.12]*** [1.26] [1.72]*
Household size -0.004159 0.001173 0.004773 -0.00201 0.001293 0.006619 -0.003606 0.000251 0.007686 -0.003865 0.001007 0.008416
[1.66]* [1.73]* [2.83]*** [0.77] [1.75]* [2.62]*** [1.29] [0.34] [3.87]*** [1.33] [1.39] [3.13]***
Religious attendance ‘79 -0.002068 0.002377 -0.000252 -0.00162 0.002202 0.004195 -0.002446 0.001716 0.001186 0.000077 0.001776 0.005421
[0.92] [3.33]*** [0.15] [0.63] [3.05]*** [1.67]* [0.97] [2.43]** [0.60] [0.03] [2.59]*** [1.95]*
Marry at what age? -0.007369 0.00082 -0.017723 0.004869 0.004984 -0.030429 -0.008851 0.000057 -0.021578 0.003464 0.005402 -0.029353
[1.68]* [0.58] [5.60]*** [0.91] [3.09]*** [5.43]*** [1.80]* [0.04] [5.82]*** [0.59] [3.32]*** [4.88]***
Parents would approve 0.001563 -0.007776 0.005237 0.021329 0.000386 0.01476 0.003964 -0.004572 0.003933 0.022484 -0.000714 0.017187
of departure at 21 [0.17] [2.67]*** [0.75] [2.04]** [0.14] [1.39] [0.37] [1.50] [0.47] [1.86]* [0.24] [1.43]
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Urban -0.001892 -0.005752 -0.035142 -0.02127 -0.003046 -0.020814 -0.045175 -0.019379 -0.038925 -0.032801 -0.001232 -0.035385
[0.19] [2.13]** [5.32]*** [1.82]* [1.16] [1.93]* [3.24]*** [5.11]*** [4.05]*** [2.41]** [0.47] [2.70]***
Mobile 0.071535 0.015632 0.013577 0.046787 0.015546 0.014074 0.074021 0.019535 0.01573 0.054682 0.017047 0.00243
[6.40]*** [5.18]*** [1.32] [3.74]*** [4.85]*** [1.01] [5.79]*** [5.69]*** [1.27] [3.91]*** [5.10]*** [0.15]
RACE_WHITE 0.005107 0.006096 0.02454 0.03034 0.018844 0.021044 -0.004762 0.002194 0.033239 0.051327 0.014298 0.030163
[0.23] [0.49] [1.22] [1.17] [2.04]** [0.76] [0.18] [0.18] [1.36] [1.82]* [1.41] [1.01]
RAC E_B LACK -0.011419 -0.002126 -0.009337 0.032118 0.018653 -0.041301 -0.012683 -0.002986 -0.012729 0.051508 0.015009 -0.047856
[0.45] [0.16] [0.43] [1.14] [1.89]* [1.36] [0.42] [0.23] [0.48] [1.68]* [1.41] [1.45]
REG_NORTHCENTRAL 0.05759 0.004295 0.025657 0.061803 -0.004581 0.036349 0.066699 0.004244 0.026876 0.067509 -0.000791 0.045876
[5.28]*** [1.40] [3.07]*** [4.80]*** [1.38] [3.00]*** [5.55]*** [1.36] [2.71]*** [4.77]*** [0.25] [3.45]***
REG_SOUTH 0.027333 -0.00956 0.035196 0.02615 -0.009989 0.029537 0.074552 0.006038 0.043683 0.038681 -0.007358 0.062147
[2.32]** [2.87]*** [4.49]*** [2.01]** [2.94]*** [2.43]** [4.72]*** [1.59] [3.81]*** [2.36]** [1.90]* [4.02]***
REG_WEST 0.075452 -0.00821 0.036521 0.076548 -0.011051 0.024936 0.081268 -0.008786 0.039976 0.074922 -0.006064 0.023873
[6.12]*** [1.97]** [3.80]*** [5.24]*** [2.48]** [1.68]* [5.89]*** [2.13]** [3.53]*** [4.56]*** [1.42] [1.50]
YEAR_80 0.029543 0.005284 -0.008757 -0.01664 0.004666 0.007576 0.030327 0.0066 -0.018969 -0.009266 0.004021 0.003111
[1.94]* [1.88]* [0.71] [1.04] [1.73]* [0.45] [1.69]* [2.29]** [1.24] [0.48] [1.48] [0.16]
YEAR_81 0.035658 0.005289 0.002393 -0.01183 0.002717 0.010308 0.048883 0.008888 -0.008027 -0.010356 0.004566 0.001548
[2.28]** [1.66]* [0.19] [0.71] [0.84] [0.58] [2.72]*** [2.75]*** [0.52] [0.53] [1.42] [0.07]
YEAR_82 0.018741 0.010563 0.002607 -0.016857 0.002896 0.013323 0.03103 0.015657 -0.007037 -0.008535 0.002734 0.012739
[1.13] [2.83]*** [0.20] [0.92] [0.77] [0.72] [1.63] [4.01]*** [0.44] [0.41] [0.77] [0.60]
YEAR_83 0.00806 0.00348 0.004236 -0.022718 0.001142 0.034721 0.009902 0.011195 -0.002489 -0.015031 0.002609 0.033868
[0.42] [0.82] [0.27] [1.09] [0.25] [1.59] [0.49] [2.73]*** [0.15] [0.67] [0.65] [1.48]
YEAR_84 0.031724 -0.007172 -0.007029 -0.031319 -0.00323 0.045044 0.038826 0.005804 -0.018917 -0.025921 0.001192 0.035677
[1.64] [1.50] [0.44] [1.45] [0.62] [2.09]** [1.92]* [1.35] [1.08] [1.14] [0.26] [1.59]
YEAR_85 0.015628 -0.006756 0.015229 -0.03171 -0.008188 0.023903 0.025383 0.007177 0.00665 -0.024053 -0.004364 0.010141
[0.75] [1.26] [0.97] [1.35] [1.20] [1.00] [1.15] [1.43] [0.38] [0.96] [0.74] [0.41]
YEAR_86 0.036948 -0.017752 0.021174 -0.006062 -0.035048 0.044706 0.053781 -0.003735 0.012613 0.003142 -0.028342 0.029736
[1.72]* [2.30]** [1.26] [0.24] [2.33]** [1.72]* [2.32]** [0.54] [0.67] [0.12] [2.22]** [1.11]
YEAR_87 0.053695 -0.001875 0.018987 -0.037848 -0.001047 0.076682 0.075549 -0.00207 0.009446 -0.027316 -0.000889 0.064146
[2.28]** [•] [1.02] [1.33] [■] [2.81]*** [2.91]*** [•] [0.45] [0.91] [■] [2.28]**
YEAR_88 0.00216 -0.000075 0.000752 -0.007273 0.000083 0.004202 0.042233 -0.000693 -0.013762 0.003657 0.000025 -0.004686
[0.08] [•] [0.04] [0.24] [■] [0.13] [1.39] [■] [0.58] [0.11] [■] [0.13]
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YEAR_89 0.020073 -0.000624 0.004101 -0.027684 -0.001469 0.082176 0.048854 -0.000967 -0.009161 -0.019152 -0.001274 0.071964
[0.62] [■] [0.18] [0.77] [.] [2.38]** [1.38] [■] [0.35] [0.50] [■] [1.98]**
YEAR_90 0.06846 -0.001536 -0.008922 -0.022053 0.000209 0.014298 0.102318 -0.001796 -0.028574 -0.013848 0.000316 0.000736
[2.09]** [■] [0.36] [0.59] [.] [0.34] [2.83]*** [•] [0.98] [0.34] [•] [0.02]
YEAR_91 -0.022892 0.000164 0.016537 -0.043538 -0.000896 0.076754 0.01074 -0.000379 0.004817 -0.035559 -0.000828 0.069885
[0.52] [■] [0.65] [0.92] [.] [1.80]* [0.22] [■] [0.16] [0.70] [■] [1.57]
YEAR_92 0.003016 0.000287 -0.01414 -0.097774 0.002876 -0.0089 0.044683 -0.00034 -0.030716 -0.092537 0.002676 -0.018355
[0.06] [•] [0.44] [1.52] [.] [0.14] [0.85] [■] [0.81] [1.35] [■] [0.27]
YEAR_93 0.022454 -0.000282 -0.011513 -0.166051 0.004032 0.016502 0.070371 -0.001038 -0.027763 -0.165636 0.00377 0.009428
[0.42] [■] [0.30] [1.43] [.] [0.23] [1.18] [■] [0.61] [1.34] [■] [0.12]
AGE2021 0.0402 0.004533 0.025074 0.044797 -0.000711 -0.009024 0.015897 -0.00559 0.034672 0.043094 -0.0025 0.007754
[3.81]*** [1.98]** [2.93]*** [3.72]*** [0.30] [0.78] [1.32] [2.58]*** [3.30]*** [3.45]*** [1.21] [0.62]
AGE2223 0.044425 -0.015094 0.0431 0.064521 -0.027029 0.002357 0.004073 -0.02706 0.055933 0.06114 -0.02627 0.018324
[3.46]*** [3.87]*** [4.34]*** [4.21]*** [4.36]*** [0.16] [0.26] [6.92]*** [4.33]*** [3.83]*** [4.95]*** [1.18]
AGE2426 0.05288 -0.025201 0.059262 0.064218 -0.036878 0.009532 0.003355 -0.03801 0.07713 0.06129 -0.03671 0.029538
[3.24]*** [3.67]*** [4.88]*** [3.27]*** [3.84]*** [0.51] [0.17] [5.92]*** [4.93]*** [3.00]*** [4.51]*** [1.50]
AGE2729 0.032637 -0.051225 0.050287 0.062269 -0.047398 -0.020148 -0.03839 -0.00061 0.063595 0.053541 -0.00105 -0.01006
[1.38] [2.65]*** [3.09]*** [2.38]** [2.49]** [0.74] [1.33] [•] [3.00]*** [1.93]* [•] [0.35]
Pseudo R2 0.1465 0.1166 0.1380 0.1121
Observations 8842 7411 7837 6464
Source: NLSY, 1979-1994. Own calculations. Age range is 17-29. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Because
some dummies have very small number of points with values of ones, we had to impose a coefficient of zero on them for some destinations to ensure stability of the model (in such 
cases, the marginal effects are either omitted or the relative z-statistics are indicated as [.]).
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Table 4 .1 8 - Further tests and descriptives for United States model
Destinations in sample with actual income MALES: Destinations in sample with actual income FEMALES:
D e s tin a tio n Freq. P ercen t D e s tin a tio n  Freq. P e rcen t
H o m e s ta y e r 6 2 9 2 7 1 1 6 H o m e s ta y e r 4 8 9 0  6 5 .9 8
A lone 9 8 0 1 1 .0 8 A lone  8 8 0  1 1 .87
S tu d e n t 781 8 .8 3 S tu d e n t 6 3 8  8 .6 1
C oup le 7 8 9 8 .9 2 C oup le  1 003  1 3 .53
T o ta l 8 8 4 2 1 0 0 .0 0 T o ta l 7 411  1 0 0 .0 0
Wald tests for combining outcome categories Wald tests for combining outcome categories
Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated with given pair of outcomes are 0 Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated with given pair of outcomes
., categories can be collapsed). categories can be collapsed).
In  s a m p le  w ith  a c tu a l in co m e  MALES: In  sa m p le  w ith  ac tu a l in co m e  FEMALES:
C a te g o rie s  te s te d ch i2 d f P > ch i2 C a te g o rie s  te s te d  ch i2  d f P > ch i2
A lo n e  -S tu d e n t 5 7 8 .7 1 5 38 0 .0 0 0 A lone  -S tu d e n t 4 6 4 .3 7 2  38 0 .0 0 0
A lo n e  -C o u p le 1 9 6 .9 7 7 38 0 .0 0 0 A lone  -C o up le  1 2 8 .0 3 3  38 0 .0 0 0
A lo n e  -H o m e s ta y 2 7 4 .7 6 0 38 0 .0 0 0 A lone  -H o m e s ta y  1 8 7 .4 9 8  38 0 .0 0 0
S tu d e n t -C o up le 7 7 7 .4 9 9 38 0 .0 0 0 S tu d e n t-C o u p le  6 2 1 .3 6 4  38 0 .0 0 0
S tu d e n t -H o m e s ta y 6 8 7 .7 9 4 30 0 .0 0 0 S tu d e n t -H o m e s ta y  5 9 0 .3 4 6  30 0 .0 0 0
C ou p le  -H o m e s ta y 4 1 1 .8 3 1 38 0 .0 0 0 C oup le  -H o m e s ta y  2 6 7 .4 5 9  38 0 .0 0 0
in s a m p le  w ith  p o te n tia l in co m e  MALES: in s a m p le  w ith  p o te n tia l in co m e  FEMALES:
A lo n e  -S tu d e n t 4 6 4 .7 9 9 35 0 .0 0 0 A lone  -S tu d e n t 3 6 1 .8 1 1  35 0 .0 0 0
A lo n e  -C o u p le 1 7 6 .4 1 1 35 0 .0 0 0 A lone  -C o up le  1 2 3 .5 4 4  35 0 .0 0 0
A lo n e  -H o m e s ta y 2 1 7 .2 0 4 35 0 .0 0 0 A lone  -H o m e s ta y  1 2 3 .6 7 6  35 0 .0 0 0
S tu d e n t -C o up le 6 0 8 .5 3 2 35 0 .0 0 0 S tu d e n t -C o up le  4 8 2 .7 7 0  35 0 .0 0 0
S tu d e n t -H o m e s ta y 5 6 7 .6 4 6 27 0 .0 0 0 S tu d e n t -H o m e s ta y  4 6 9 .7 5 0  27 0 .0 0 0
C oup le  -H o m e s ta y 3 0 0 .7 0 3 35 0 .0 0 0 C oup le  -H o m e s ta y  2 2 4 .6 0 6  35 0 .0 0 0
Hausman tests of IIA assumption Hausman tests of IIA assumption
Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives. Ho. Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives.
In  sa m p le  w ith  a c tu a l in co m e  MALES: In  sa m p le  w ith  ac tu a l in co m e  FEMALES:
O m itte d  ch i2 d f  P > ch i2 e v id e n ce O m itte d  ch i2  d f  P > ch i2  e v id e n ce
A lo n e  -1 8 .1 1 6  70  1 .0 0 0 fo r  Ho A lone  -2 7 .9 0 8  70  1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
S tu d e n t 3 2 .7 2 5 77 1 .0 0 0 fo r  Ho S tu d e n t -0 .7 3 9  77 1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
C oup le  6 .2 6 5 6 9  1 .0 0 0 fo r  Ho C oup le  -1 5 .9 8 9  69  1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
In  sa m p le  w ith  p o te n tia l in co m e  MALES In  sa m p le  w ith  p o te n tia l in co m e  FEMALES:
A lone  -9 .5 1 7 6 3  1 .0 0 0 fo r  Ho A lone  -1 7 .6 1 6  63  1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
S tu d e n t 1 .3 2 8 72  1 .0 0 0 fo r  Ho S tu d e n t 3 .7 2 5  72 1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
C oup le  0 .0 1 2 63  1 .0 0 0 fo r  Ho C oup le  1 1 .20 1  64  1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
0 (i.e.
Note: If chi2<0, the estimated model does not meet asymptotic assumptions of the 
test -  this is considered a result in favour of Ho.
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Table 4 .1 9 - Multinomial model of departure from the parental home -  Germany - Marginal effects
With potential income With potential income
Males Females Males Females
Alone student couple Alone student couple alone student couple alone student couple
Income 0.000115 -0.000033 0.000122 0.000202 -0.000017 0.000008 0.000205 0.000099 0.000185 0.000287 -0.000001 0.000504
(percentile) [1.99]** [0.53] [1.89]* [2.22]** [1.33] [0.05] [3.90]*** [2.21]** [2.41]** [2.15]** [0.09] [1.81]*
Zero income dummy 0.001133 -0.00025 0.001291 -0.00564 -0.00036 -0.04978
[0.32] [0.11] [0.30] [1.04] [0.78] [5.41]***
No Job 0.005663 -0.00045 0.004784 0.010033 -0.00039 0.019396
[1.61] [0.20] [1.14] [2.02]** [0.81] [2.17]**
Job security 0.001394 0.000608 0.002524 0.002741 -0.00019 0.001831
[1.45] [0.85] [2.16]** [1.74]* [1.08] [0.65]
Student -0.00993 0.00776 -0.01041 -0.00751 0.001422 -0.03732 -0.01089 0.007672 -0.01353 -0.01034 0.001352 -0.03827
[3.45]*** [2.53]** [3.06]*** [1.39] [2.31]** [4.61]*** [3.99]*** [3.66]*** [4.19]*** [2.47]** [3.52]*** [5.11]***
Unemployment rate 0.000283 -0.00133 -0.00087 0.001145 -0.00031 -0.00461 0.000272 -0.00116 -0.00104 0.001485 -0.00015 -0.00517
(regional) [0.32] [1.72]* [0.74] [0.88] [1.98]** [1.62] [0.30] [1.53] [0.84] [0.99] [1.02] [1.61]
Change in unempl. 0.001636 0.001357 -0.00228 0.000968 -0.000072 -0.000095 0.001882 0.000938 -0.00231 0.002513 -0.00032 0.000301
[0.91] [0.61] [0.93] [0.31] [0.24] [0.02] [1.00] [0.40] [0.88] [0.62] [0.63] [0.05]
Family standardised -0.000039 0.000063 0.000048 -0.00006 -0.000001 -0.0003 -0.000076 0.000065 0.000007 -0.00012 0.000007 -0.00042
income (percentile) [0.77] [1.56] [0.92] [0.98] [0.18] [2.52]** [1.64] [1.64] [0.14] [1.81]* [1.19] [3.21]***
Parents’ religion: 0.004408 -0.00015 0.002719 0.001764 0.000715 0.007533 0.004574 -0.00158 0.003452 0.001846 0.000514 0.009559
none [1.20] [0.05] [0.60] [0.32] [1.36] [0.77] [1.23] [0.53] [0.74] [0.29] [0.78] [0.84]
Household size -0.00115 0.000679 0.000649 -0.00273 0.000035 0.000153 -0.00123 0.000375 0.000787 -0.00389 0.000148 -0.00056
[1.20] [0.89] [0.57] [1.94]* [0.22] [0.06] [1.30] [0.53] [0.67] [2.42]** [1.16] [0.21]
Housing size: too small 0.011089 0.006447 0.013049 0.008121 0.000875 0.036927 0.011438 0.007188 0.013877 0.006656 0.000767 0.038905
[2.13]** [1.68]* [1.66]* [0.86] [0.97] [2.57]** [2.16]** [2.05]** [1.75]* [0.60] [0.92] [2.40]**
Housing size: small 0.006224 -0.00141 -0.01041 0.003201 0.001319 0.006392 0.005841 -0.00082 -0.01157 0.004 0.001287 0.008322
[2.07]** [0.54] [2.18]** [0.80] [3.62]*** [0.83] [1.94]* [0.34] [2.31]** [0.88] [4.31]*** [0.94]
Housing size: too large 0.005955 0.000964 -0.0068 -0.0008 0.000621 -0.00236 0.005454 0.001011 -0.00818 0.000249 0.000294 -0.00505
[1.77]* [0.36] [1.32] [0.12] [1.16] [0.20] [1.60] [0.40] [1.50] [0.04] [0.65] [0.36]
Health satisfaction -0.01381 -0.00233 -0.00876 0.002013 -0.00071 0.006676 -0.01417 -0.00226 -0.01028 0.001202 -0.00027 0.008396
[1.74]* [0.51] [1.32] [0.32] [0.79] [0.54] [1.77]* [0.51] [1.46] [0.17] [0.40] [0.60]
Parent’s health 0.001126 0.000118 -0.00418 0.000984 0.000385 -0.00428 0.00139 0.000395 -0.00433 0.001526 0.000249 -0.00439
satisfaction [0.48] [0.06] [1.58] [0.30] [1.00] [0.67] [0.60] [0.22] [1.56] [0.41] [0.81] [0.60]
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Mobile in last 5 years 0.006756 0.003784 -0.00299 0.009087 0.001481
[2.37]** [1.87]* [0-67] [2.18]** [4.23]***
MACROREG..BERLIN 0.010232 0.00969 0.013254 0.010113 0.004043
[1.23] [1.65]* [1.06] [0.76] [3.45]***
MACROREG..EAST -0.00384 0.01616 0.020269 -0.00639 0.002747
[0.34] [1.69]* [1.38] [0.38] [1.49]
MACROREG..WESTC 0.004499 0.003382 0.004785 0.005665 0.00085
[1.33] [1.31] [1.18] [1.12] [1.69]*
MACROREG .NORTH 0.005707 0.001344 0.007976 0.007265 0.001975
[1.25] [0.37] [1.50] [1.06] [2.97]***
YEAR_85 0.000793 0.003059 0.015016 0.014003 -0.05651
[0.14] [0.72] [1.87]* [1.71]* [6.94]***
YEAR_86 -0.00061 0.000035 0.000441 -0.00184 0.000163
[0.11] [0.01] [0.05] [0.20] [0.19]
YEAR_87 -0.00294 -0.00233 0.003611 0.000221 -0.00118
[0.51] [0.52] [0.43] [0.03] [1.21]
YEAR_88 0.000258 -0.01025 0.010933 0.006744 -0.00054
[0.04] [151] [1.38] [0.81] [0.56]
YEAR_89 -0.00702 -0.00141 0.008064 0.004255 -0.00031
[0.99] [0.30] [1.00] [0.47] [0.34]
YEAR_90 -0.00105 -0.003 0.001889 0.007241 -0.00114
[0.15] [0.61] [0.22] [0.78] [1.07]
YEAR_91 -0.00457 -0.00317 0.008386 0.004161 -0.001
[0.67] [0.73] [1.01] [0.45] [1.02]
YEAR_92 -0.00494 -0.00282 0.006765 0.004588 -0.00114
[0.80] [0.59] [0.81] [0.54] [1.28]
YEAR_93 -0.00106 -0.00307 0.00371 0.00243 -0.00024
[0.19] [0.67] [0.45] [0.31] [0.28]
YEAR_94 -0.00026 -0.00114 0.005944 -0.02216 0.000171
[0.04] [0.26] [0.74] [1.85]* [0.19]
YEAR_95 0.001377 -0.006 0.001164 0.002392 0.00057
[0.25] [1.23] [0.14] [0.29] [0.67]
YEAR_96 -0.00862 0.00008 0.006445 -0.00838 -0.000018
[1.39] [0.02] [0.74] [0.90] [0.02]
0.009465 0.006564
[1.12] [2.24]**
0.043728 0.009898
[1.77]* [1.23]
0.05395 0.002433
[1.59] [0.22]
-0.00154 0.001758
[0.16] [0.49]
0.035939 0.004109
[2.84]*** [0.89]
0.018186 0.001363
[1.10] [0.23]
0.013503 -0.00011
[0.85] [0.02]
-0.01228 -0.00171
[0.72] [0.30]
0.005476 0.001286
[0.33] [0.22]
-0.01029 -0.00517
[0.57] [0.73]
0.012222 -0.00078
[0.68] [0.11]
0.004463 -0.00408
[0.24] [0.60]
-0.00119 -0.00484
[0.07] [0.78]
0.005463 -0.00035
[0.34] [0.07]
0.013499 0.000351
[0.81] [0.06]
0.011924 0.001698
[0.75] [0.31]
0.001252 -0.00774
[0.08] [1.25]
0.004171 -0.00373
[2.14]** [0.80]
0.008827 0.013935
[1.60] [1.08]
0.017278 0.028605
[1.76]* [1.85]*
0.001868 0.001962
[0.76] [0.44]
0.00077 0.006901
[0.22] [1.23]
0.002577 0.016196
[0.63] [1.93]*
-0.00032 0.001096
[0.08] [0.12]
-0.00223 0.005347
[0.54] [0.61]
-0.00974 0.012634
[1.54] [1.52]
-0.00145 0.010537
[0.32] [1.23]
-0.00367 0.003944
[0.76] [0.44]
-0.0033 0.009804
[0.80] [1.13]
-0.00293 0.007904
[0.64] [0.89]
-0.00313 0.005491
[0.73] [0.64]
-0.00196 0.007292
[0.46] [0.86]
-0.0058 0.002068
[1.27] [0.24]
-0.00169 0.008578
[0.34] [0.94]
0.008765 0.001259
[1.86]* [4.16]***
0.011035 0.002513
[0.76] [2.62]***
-0.00202 0.002477
[0.10] [1.49]
0.005936 0.000516
[1.04] [1.26]
0.007539 0.001155
[0.94] [2.03]**
0.017311 -0.03453
[1.83]* [5.42]***
-0.00051 0.000033
[0.05] [0.05]
0.001991 -0.00083
[0.21] [1.17]
0.011216 -0.00055
[1.15] [0.69]
0.008314 -0.00043
[0.78] [0.50]
0.00876 -0.00086
[0.80] [0.90]
0.005043 -0.00055
[0.47] [0.73]
0.003079 -0.00076
[0.31] [0.74]
0.000793 0.000366
[0.09] [0.50]
-0.02504 -0.00021
[1.83]* [0.28]
0.001219 0.000707
[0.13] [1.09]
-0.00957 0.000255
[0.91] [0.36]
0.006927
[0.73]
0.050182
[1.71]*
0.078714
[1.99]**
-0.00343
[0.31]
0.042162
[2.91]***
0.023401
[1.23]
0.023687
[1.28]
-0.00539
[0.27]
0.01564
[0.81]
- 0.00201
[0.10]
0.018604
[0.89]
0.009451
[0.43]
-0.00023
[0 .01]
0.006901
[0.37]
0.017982
[0.93]
0.016135
[0.87]
0.010374
[0.53]
YEAR_97 -0.00123 0.004237 0.007641 0.009817 0.000283 0.023396 0.00017 0.004005 0.009867 0.012756 0.000059 0.036234
[0.21] [0.97] [0.88] [1.33] [0.32] [1.52] [0.03] [0.99] [1.08] [1.47] [0.08] [2.00]**
AGE2021 0.009564 0.007257 0.030987 0.011585 0.001456 0.029754 0.006289 0.004993 0.028854 0.011748 0.001122 0.033205
[2.32]** [2.87]*** [5.49]*** [2.49]** [3.84]*** [3.65]*** [1.48] [2.12]** [4.60]*** [2.22]** [2.74]*** [3.45]***
AGE2223 0.012136 0.010689 0.042495 0.016905 0.001214 0.048212 0.004022 0.006183 0.036867 0.014679 0.000786 0.045132
[3.13]*** [4.51]*** [8.32]*** [3.41]*** [2.33]** [5.28]*** [0.95] [2.13]** [6.10]*** [2.30]** [1.27] [3.71]***
AGE2426 0.015648 0.012414 0.051765 0.019731 0.002441 0.044444 0.005727 0.006343 0.045497 0.014195 0.001933 0.032123
[3.92]*** [5.18]*** [10.48]*** [3.69]*** [5.19]*** [4.21]*** [1.31] [1.97]** [7.21]*** [1.89]* [2.78]*** [2.05]**
AGE2729 0.019042 0.010236 0.050933 0.021143 0.002036 0.03294 0.010934 0.00456 0.046553 0.011557 0.001366 0.011964
Pseudo R2 
Observations
[4.18]***
0.1139
7212
[3.25]*** [9.52]*** [3.07]***
0.1176
4771
[2.70]*** [2.44]** [2.49]**
0.1116
7081
[1.28] [7.43]*** [1.19]
0.1012
4539
[1.34] [0.57]
Source: SOEP, 1984-1998. Own calculations. Age range is 17-29. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Because some dum m ies have very sm all number of points with values of ones, we had to impose a coefficient o f zero on them for some destinations to ensure stability of the model (in such cases, the marginal 
effects are either om itted or the relative z-statistics are indicated as [.]).
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Table 4.20 -  Further tests and descriptives for German model
Destinations in sample with actual income MALES: Destinations in sample with actual income FEMALES
D e s tin a tio n Freq. P e rcen t D e s tin a tio n Freq. P e rcen t
H o m e s ta y e r 6 7 3 0 9 3 .3 2 H o m e s ta y e r 4 2 2 0 8 8 .4 5
A lone 134 1 .8 6 A lone 128 2 .6 8
S tu d e n t a lone 73 1.01 S tu d e n t a lone 103 2 .1 6
C oup le 275 3 .81 C oup le 320 6 .7 1
T o ta l 7 2 1 2  1 0 0 .0 0 T o ta l 4771 1 0 0 .0 0
Wald tests for combining outcome categories
Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated with given pair of outcomes are 0 (i.e. 
categories can be collapsed).
In  sa m p le  w ith  a c tu a l in co m e  MALES:
C a te g o rie s  te s te d ch i2 d f P > ch i2
A lo n e  -S tu d e n t 9 3 .5 6 1 37 0 .0 0 0
A lo n e  -C o u p le 5 8 .5 4 0 37 0 .0 1 4
A lo n e  -H o m e s ta y 1 8 4 .8 8 9 37 0 .0 0 0
S tu d e n t -C o up le 1 3 4 .4 8 9 37 0 .0 0 0
S tu d e n t -H o m e s ta y 9 4 .0 9 3 37 0 .0 0 0
C ou p le  -H o m e s ta y 2 2 4 .2 4 8 37 0 .0 0 0
In  s a m p le  w ith  p o te n tia l in co m e  MALES:
A lo n e  -S tu d e n t 8 7 .7 9 8 34 0 .0 0 0
A lo n e  -C o up le 5 9 .2 2 0 34 0 .0 0 5
A lo n e  -H o m e s ta y 1 6 7 .3 1 1 34 0 .0 0 0
S tu d e n t -C o up le 1 1 4 .6 6 0 34 0 .0 0 0
S tu d e n t -H o m e s ta y 8 5 .8 8 8 34 0 .0 0 0
C oup le  -H o m e s ta y 1 9 4 .3 6 5 34 0 .0 0 0
Hausman tests of IIA assumption
Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives. 
In  sa m p le  w ith  a c tu a l in co m e  MALES:
O m itte d  c h i2  d f  P > ch i2  e v id e n ce
A lone
S tu d e n t
C oup le
0 .0 4 7  75 1 .0 0 0  
0 .0 4 4  75  1 .0 0 0  
0 .0 2 0  75 1 .0 0 0
fo r  Ho 
fo r  Ho 
fo r  Ho
In  sa m p le  w ith  p o te n tia l in co m e  MALES:
A lone -0 .2 8 7  68 fo r  Ho
S tu d e n t -0 .0 3 8  69 fo r  Ho
C oup le 0 .2 4 5  68  1 .0 0 0 fo r  Ho
Note: If chi2<0, the estimated model does not meet asymptotic assumptions o f the test -  this 
is considered a result in favour of Ho.
Wald tests for combining outcome categories
In  sample w ith actual income FEMALES: 
Categories tested chi2 df P>chi2
A lone  -S tu d e n t 
A lone  -C oup le  
A lone  -H o m e s ta y  
S tu d e n t -C oup le  
S tu d e n t -H o m e s ta y  
C oup le  -H o m e s ta y
1 4 5 6 6 .1 2 0
5 1 .6 0 4
1 6 5 .8 6 9
2 0 6 0 6 .6 2 0
8 3 1 4 3 .5 6 3
2 4 1 .1 9 7
37
37
37
37
37
37
In  sa m p le  w ith  p o te n tia l in co m e  FEMALES:
A lone  -S tu d e n t 
A lo n e  -C oup le  
A lone  -H o m e s ta y  
S tu d e n t -C oup le  
S tu d e n t -H o m e s ta y  
C oup le  -H o m e s ta y
1 1 4 5 8 .4 1 9
4 5 .6 3 4
1 4 2 .7 1 6
1 4 7 8 6 .2 2 4
5 0 2 8 9 .7 6 7
1 9 7 .3 3 7
34
34
34
34
34
34
0.000
0 .0 5 6
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0 .0 8 8
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Hausman tests of IIA assumption
Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives. 
In  sa m p le  w ith  a c tu a l in co m e  FEMALES:
O m itte d  ch i2  d f P > ch i2  e v id e n ce
A lone
S tu d e n t
C oup le
1 .2 0 4
0 .2 6 7
0 .8 9 6
74
76
74
1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
In  sa m p le  w ith  p o te n tia l in co m e  FEMALES:
A lone
S tu d e n t
C oup le
2 .1 3 4
0 .0 7 0
1 .821
65
67
64
1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
1 .0 0 0  fo r  Ho
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4.9 Appendix: Data on earnings and estimation results
As explained earlier, young people’s actual earnings are likely to be endogenous to the decision 
to leave the parental home, and certainly to their decision to be currently residing with their parents. 
It is arguable that what matters for the decision to leave home is, from a theoretical point of view, 
not actual earnings, but the earnings that can potentially be earned when working full-time.
We calculate predicted (or potential) earnings for young people in the datasets using an 
earnings function estimated on each dataset on all young people, irrespective of their current living 
arrangements. The equations are estimated for each country and gender separately (for Germany, 
we also estimated separate equations for Western and Eastern regions), but all waves are pooled 
together and year dummies are used.
We regressed log net yearly labour earnings on selected covariates using the procedure 
suggested by Heckman (1979), ie, a maximum likelihood regression model with selection to control 
for sample selection bias in full-time employment. The variables used in the earnings equation differ 
slightly between countries, primarily because the variables available or suitable are different for 
each dataset. For the income equation, the dependent variable is net labour income for full-time 
workers in the previous year. Further covariates - chosen partly on the basis of the prevailing 
variables used in earnings equation in the labour economics literature and also with the intention of 
finding covariates that are not determinants of departure from home, within the restrictions of each 
dataset’s survey questions- are own education, parental education (if available), potential 
experience (if available), and other controls (as indicated in the next pages for each country’s 
results), including year dummies and region dummies.
The participation equation is a probit where the dependent variable would ideally be whether the 
person worked full-time in the whole of the year. The rationale for this is that we would like to 
estimate the potential full-time earnings of a youth working full-time and for most of the year. In 
practice, however, the quality of information varies, and it is difficult to know exactly to what level of 
economic activity last year’s income refers to.
Full-time participation (WORK=1) for most of the previous year is defined as follows.
For the UK, WORK is equal to 1 if the person had been working for at least 48 weeks in the 
previous calendar year and if he is currently working full-time (either self-employed or employed).
For the US, WORK is equal to 1 if the person had been working for at least 48 weeks in the 
previous calendar year and if he is usually working more than 30 hours per week in the current or 
last job.
For Germany, WORK is equal to 1 if the person is currently working full-time and if he had never 
registered as unemployed in the previous calendar year.
The reason for not requiring continuous full-time employment over the whole year is that the 
earnings of a full-year may not necessarily reflect the expectations of a child when he is considering 
departure from home; on the contrary, he may well be factoring in the risk of being out of work for a 
period of time. Since our focus is on young people, we think it is important to control for non-
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participation for both sexes, because, contrary to what can be observed for older adults, large 
shares of young men are not working. The selection equation (the probit that explains whether a 
person had been working for most of the previous year) is identified using partner’s employment 
status, own non-labour income, and own health status.
In the earnings equation and the selection probit we do not include information on whether the 
child is living with his parents because including that information would create endogeneity, as 
residence with the parents is what we ultimately want to analyse. For similar reasons, we do not 
estimate income exclusively on the sample of children already living outside the parental home (but 
we impose the restriction on full-time employment in the selection probit because we expect the 
youth to (expect to) be employed full-time, and for most of the year, if living outside the parental 
home.57
From the fitted model we then calculate a potential income variable for all individuals, ie both 
those in and out of work. Similarly to the standardisation carried out with actual income, this fitted 
variable is turned into a percentile measure, where we calculate the centile position of the fitted 
variable by country and gender. This covariate will then be used in the “departure equation with 
potential income”.
As to the quality of the fit between current income and potential income, an indicative measure 
of this is the correlation coefficient between the percentiles under the two measures (removing the 
individuals with zero current income). The correlation coefficients are relatively high at 50.91% for 
the UK, 42.3% for the US and 46.81% for Germany. This is, of course, not a perfect fit, but we were 
not expecting one given that there are large numbers of individuals with no income, and because 
the two variables are supposed to be different (particularly if they yield different estimated effects): 
amongst the reasons for this is the fact that potential income does not include the random 
fluctuations in income that actual income would be affected by, and thus gives a better measure of 
the “expected” income for the young person.
The results are shown in the following tables.
57 We are aware that this assumption is questionable for departures as a student.
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Table 4.21 -  Earnings equations - United
YEAR_92
[3.03]***
0.003917
[1.26]
0.080245
Kingdom [0.08] [1.46]
T he fo llo w in g  v a ria b le s  a re in c lu d e d  (the  nam e s  in YEAR_93 0.082698 0.008479
[1.24] [0.12]
the  ta b le s  a re  a b b re v ia tio n s ) YEAR_94 0.041914 0.007822
Income [0.72] [0.12]
sq u a re d , a ge cub ic , tenu re , te n u re
YEAR_95 0.047249 0.05867
age, age
[0.78] [0.89]
squa red , coup le , re g io n a l d u m m ie s , ye a r dum m ies , YEAR_96 0.077354 0.161207
e d u ca tio n  d u m m ie s . R e fe re n c e  ye a r is 1991. [1.34] [2.37]**
YEAR_97 0.038463
[0.98]
0.068939
[1.55]
Participation YEAR_98 0.246024 0.046777
age, a ge  sq u a re d , s tu d e n t in th e  la s t 24 m onths, [4.23]*** [0.79]
EDU2 -0.108475 -0.203732
fa m ily  incom e , a m o u n t o f ow n n o n -la b o u r non- [1.06] [1.73]*
tra n s fe r  in co m e , co u p le , [Dartner no t e m p lo ye d - EDU3 -0.17411 -0.439309
dum m v. has ch ild re n , h e a lth  lim ita tio ns , h o u seho ld
EDU4
[1.64] [3.50]***
-0.311694 -0.506148
size, tim e  trend , e d u c a tio n  d u m m ie s . [3.14]*** [4.35]***
A g e s  usedI: 1 7 -34  (bo th  inc lu d e d ). EDU5 -0.378612 -0.597649
[3.83]*** [5.17]***
EDU6 -0.427301
[4.12]***
-0.699786
[5.68]***
INCOME EDU7 -0.444557 -0.71326
1 2 [4.35]*** [5.67]***
Men Women Constant 4.719796 5.711052
age 0.479745 0.384072 [2.42]** [2.60]***
[2.12]** [1.50] WORK
age2 -0.015015 -0.012077 age 0.104648 0.304824
[1.74]* [1.24] [1.69]* [4.82]***
age3 0.000161 0.000132 age2 -0.001222 -0.004667
[1.50] [1.08] [1.05] [3.98]***
tenure 0.004197 0.010328 STUDENT24 -1.509289 -1.184521
[0.45] [0.89] [17.52]*** [13.80]***
tenure2 -0.000479 -0.000376 Family income 0.000007 0.000001
[0.73] [0.42] [2.59]*** [0.06]
couple 0.063265 0.026901 Own non-labour -0.000364 -0.00026
[2.12]** [0.89] income [13.94]*** [9.76]***
REG_London 0.0952 0.092037 couple 0.225064 -0.004879
[1.94]* [1.87]* [3.02]*** [0.07]
REG_SW -0.136531 -0.127589 Partner No Job -0.261346 -0.43266
[2.72]*** [2.06]** [2.98]*** [3.53]***
REG_EAnglia -0.139679 -0.255797 parent 0.281303 -1.235532
[1.92]* [3.20]*** [2.94]*** [14.68]***
REG_EMidlands -0.105374 -0.136475 healthlimits -0.196425 -0.379557
[2.04]** [2.33]** [1.71]* [3.56]***
REG_WMidlands; -0.12308 -0.057347 Household size -0.119865 -0.196915
[2.46]** [1.00] [5.50]*** [8.54]***
REG_NW -0.115082 -0.155284 REG_London -0.155006 0.131396
[2.33]** [2.83]*** [1.50] [1.33]
REG_YorksHum -0.185999 -0.243082 REG_SW 0.139756 -0.239527
[3.72]*** [4.40]*** [1.25] [2.07]**
REG_North -0.101495 -0.158236 REG_EAnglia 0.017772 0.116815
[1.71]* [2.42]** [0.11] [0.73]
REG_Wales -0.157874 -0.078208 REG_EMidlands -0.043933 0.072947
[2.49]** [1.08] [0.40] [0.65]
REG Scotland -0.149133 -0.067881 REG_WMidlands -0.172091 0.000694
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[1.61] [0.01]
REG_NW -0.100445 0.086157
[0.95] [0.80]
REG_YorksHum -0.1325 0.044907
[1.24] [0.42]
REG_North -0.239202 0.002958
[1.93]* [0.02]
REG_Wales 0.178931 0.200888
[1.25] [1.39]
REG_Scotland -0.027234 -0.118698
[0.26] [1.15]
year -0.036893 0.009216
[3.34]*** [0.82]
EDU2 0.018666 0.363519
[0.08] [1.51]
EDU3 0.196136 0.683049
[0.81] [2.64]***
EDU4 -0.015477 0.51642
[0.07] [2.18]**
EDU5 0.024272 0.66387
[0.11] [2.81]***
EDU6 0.026707 0.365085
[0.11] [1.47]
EDU7 -0.374167 0.086281
[1.62] [0.35]
Constant 2.559545 -4.685917
[1.99]** [3.41]***
athrho:Constant -0.923882 -0.736702
[12.65]*** [9.68]***
lnsigma:Constant -0.596147 -0.668868
[28.55]*** [28.44]***
Observations 3069 3247
censored obs 1317 2005
Wald 358.611 374.438
LR test of indep. 62.139 94.133
lambda -0.401 -0.321
se 0.025 0.028
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
Table 4.22 -  Earnings equations -  United
States
Incom e
age (cub ic), h ig h e s t e d u ca tio n a l
q u a lifica tio n  (h igh  schoo l d ip lo m a , dum m y, 
d e g re e  dum m y), race  d u m m ie s  (w hite, 
b lack  -  la tino  is re fe re n ce ), w h e th e r has a 
partner, u rban  area , un e m p lo ym e n t, m um  
and  d a d ’s h ig h e s t e d u ca tio n a l
a ch ie ve m e n t, ye a r dum m ies , m a c ro ­
reg ion.
R e fe rence  ye a r is 1979.
P a rtic ipa tion
age (square ), cu rre n t s tu d en t s ta tus, 
h ig h e s t e d u ca tio n a l q u a lifica tio n  (h igh  
schoo l d ip lom a , dum m y, d e g re e  dum m y), 
race  d u m m ie s  (w hite , b lack -  la tin o  is 
re fe rence), hea lth  lim ita tio n s  to  w ork, 
w h e th e r has ch ild , w h e th e r has a partner, 
h o u seh o ld  size, fa m ily  incom e , d u m m y fo r 
p a rtn e r ( if any) no t e m p lo ye d  in cu rre n t 
year, m um  and d a d ’s h ig h e s t e d u ca tio n a l 
ach ie ve m e n t, sh a re  o f ye a r th a t dad 
w o rked  in 1979 (re fe re n ce  is dad  not 
w o rk in g  in 1979 - o r no in fo rm a tio n ), u rban  
dum m y, u n e m p lo ym e n t, ye a r dum m ies .
1 2
Men Women
age 0.695474 0.376545
[3.36]*** [1.64]
age2 -0.02909 -0.01784
[3.41]*** [1.89]*
age3 0.000413 0.000277
[3.55]*** [2.16]**
diploma 0.041334 -0.21481
[3.05]*** [10.38]***
degree 0.190391 0.221764
[9.84]*** [9.81]***
RACE_WHITE 0.001655 -0.0426
[0.07] [1.48]
RACE_BLACK -0.017 0.039717
[0.67] [1.28]
couple 0.012984 0.18955
[1.01] [13.26]***
urban 0.116406 0.081729
[8.80]*** [4.96]***
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Unemployment 0.004589 0.013421 [11.06]*** [7.80]***
[0.81] [1.94]* Has kid 0.220988 -0.2877
dadhighestgrade 0.004937 0.00495 [7.23]*** [17.37]***
[3.81]*** [3.32]*** couple 0.139583 -0.21995
mumhighestgrade 0.006438 0.00712 [4.31]*** [12.60]***
[4.07]*** [3.57]*** Household size (CR) 0.027347 -0.02824
YEAR_80 0.115759 0.111475 [7.28]*** [8.37]***
[3.93]*** [3.07]*** si_100 0.016092 0.006571
YEAR_81 0.1681 0.146783 [40.00]*** [37.25]***
[5.78]*** [4.27]*** Partner not working 0.137235 -0.00753
YEAR_82 0.25347 0.249963 [7.21]*** [0.20]
[8.86]*** [7.29]*** dadhighestgrade -0.00768 -0.00458
YEAR_83 0.253702 0.282817 [4.10]*** [2.70]***
[8.48]*** [7.99]*** mumhighestgrade 0.000681 0.001846
YEAR_84 0.218445 0.285087 [0.30] [0.83]
[7.34]*** [7.94]*** dadworkyr79ALL 0.134891 0.065088
YEAR_85 0.272701 0.290268 [9.23]*** [5.33]***
[8.93]*** [7.84]*** dadworkyr79SOME 0.052109 -0.00381
YEAR_86 0.293745 0.298673 [2.41]** [0.20]
[9.34]*** [7.82]*** urban -0.03225 0.015539
YEAR_87 0.319909 0.355637 [1.68]* [0.85]
[9.78]*** [9.06]*** Unemployment -0.07458 -0.05736
YEAR_88 0.38841 0.399185 [10.07]*** [7.97]***
[11.49]*** [9.79]*** year -0.00155 0.011206
YEAR_89 0.381153 0.419171 [0.44] [3.37]***
[10.82]*** [9.87]*** REG_NORTHCENTR -0.09852 -0.05641
YEAR_90 0.40052 0.458533 [4.15]*** [2.43]**
[10.95]*** [10.37]*** REG_SOUTH 0.016852 0.13961
YEAR_91 0.435026 0.51674 [0.76] [6.64]***
[11.28]*** [11.08]*** REG_WEST -0.05727 -0.04832
YEAR_92 0.48005 0.562675 [2.26]** [1.97]**
[11.79]*** [11.48]*** Constant -6.57637 -8.90059
YEAR_93 0.517471 0.582172 [13.77]*** [19.24]***
[11.87]*** [11.17]*** athrho:Constant -1.62001 -1.87748
YEAR_94 0.492925 0.649935 [71 80]*** [73.94]***
[9.83]*** [11.16]*** lnsigma:Constant -0.32469 -0.16205
REG_NORTHCENTR -0.00948 -0.04813 [40.90]*** [15.93]***
[0.57] [2.31]** Observations 30446 37075
REG_SOUTH -0.1172 -0.2121 censored obs 16394 26777
[7.69]*** [11.39]*** Wald 1745.857 1589.617
REG_WEST 0.00748 0.015124 LR test of indep. eqns 2150.702 1947.698
[0.42] [0.69] lambda -0.668 -0.812
Constant -3.06677 0.269461 se 0.007 0.01
[1.85]* [0.15] Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
age 0.474049 0.548553 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant a t '
[14.65]*** [17.19]***
age2 -0.00856 -0.00982
[12.81]*** [15.16]***
student -0.57196 -0.29498
[29.40]*** [17.44]***
diploma 0.203966 0.538556
[10.86]*** [25.83]***
degree -0.04413 -0.01635
[1.42] [0.61]
RACE_WHITE 0.011603 -0.0569
[0.35] [1.77]*
RACE_BLACK -0.19262 -0.16167
[5.35]*** [4.66]***
HEALTHLIMITS -0.34826 -0.18287
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Table 4.23 -  Earnings equations - Germany 
Note: Separately for West and East Germany. The income percentiles for own actual and potential income as 
well as for parental income, however, are calculated over the whole of Germany.
Income eouation:
Age (cubic), potential work experience (and squared), education dummies (degree higher than high 
school, high school degree), year dummies, regional controls
Reference year is 1984 for West, 1997 for East.
Participation equation:
age, age squared, family income, whether has partner, household size, whether children in household, 
satisfaction with health (from 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest satisfaction)), education dummies, whether partner (if 
any) is employed, time trend, regional controls.
Ages used: 17-34 (both included).
W EST WEST EAST EAST
MEN WOMEN MEN WOMEN
age 1.260356 0.816621 -0.48967 0.783491
[11.62]*** [5.57]*** [1.27] [1.64]
age2 -0.04792 -0.0317 0.016893 -0.02734
[11.62]*** [5.72]*** [1.20] [1.58]
age3 0.000604 0.000417 -0.00018 0.000333
[11.70]*** [6.02]*** [1.09] [1.60]
exp 0.013068 0.033754 0.00746 0.001423
[2.78]*** [5.64]*** [0.49] [0.07]
exp2 -0.00119 -0.00203 -0.00104 -0.00168
[5.04]*** [6.42]*** [1.34] [1.63]
EDUJHIGHERTHS 0.13441 0.129528 0.100421 0.084616
[7.36]*** [5.19]*** [1.87]* [1.89]*
EDU_HIGHSCHOOL 0.041506 0.004422 -0.08671 -0.12178
[3.92]*** [0.34] [2.58]*** [4.66]***
MACROREG_BERLIN 0.03995 -0.03119 0.144798 0.209929
[1.31] [0.83] [3.34]*** [4.82]***
MACROREG_NORTH 0.011589 -0.03907
[0.82] [2.23]**
MACROREG_WESTC 0.032468 0.004781
[3.12]*** [0.37]
YEAR_85 0.034496 0.010335
[1.73]* [0.44]
YEAR_86 0.085221 0.08632
[4.23]*** [3.56]***
YEAR_87 0.12144 0.133998
[6.07]*** [5.43]***
YEAR_88 0.16096 0.160614
[7.86]*** [6.34]***
YEAR_89 0.212693 0.215304
[10.31]*** [8.55]***
YEAR_90 0.24915 0.256728
[11.77]*** [10.19]***
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YEAR_91 0.317287 0.305406
[15.20]*** [11.79]***
YEAR_92 0.392936 0.349752 -0.38187 -0.4727
[18.60]*** [13.26]*** [11.59]*** [12.44]***
YEAR_93 0.414478 0.404445 -0.20711 -0.28872
[19.49]*** [15.22]*** [6.33]*** [7.60]***
YEAR_94 0.480196 0.475715 -0.0711 -0.16582
[22.17]*** [17.65]*** [2.17]** [4.33]***
YEAR_95 0.467804 0.452799 -0.02694 -0.1222
[21.33]*** [16.96]*** [0.82] [3.04]***
YEAR_96 0.485601 0.467107 -0.06024 -0.00287
[21.42]*** [17.20]*** [1.80]* [0.07]
Y E A R 9 7 0.483661 0.479897
[20.96]*** [17.02]***
Constant -7.49216 -3.7882 8.257667 -4.04936
[7.94]*** [2.95]*** [2.34]** [0.93]
age 0.574812 0.612377 0.932178 0.708603
[19.51]*** [21.06]*** [9.88]*** [7.60]***
age2 -0.00881 -0.01078 -0.01552 -0.01071
[15.73]*** [19.87]*** [9.02]*** [6.43]***
Family income -0.03071 -0.01484 -0.07217 -0.04686
[25.30]*** [15.84]*** [14.45]*** [14.05]***
couple -0.3206 -0.54906 -0.57135 -0.59217
[9.12]*** [10.73]*** [5.69]*** [4.53]***
Household size 0.043806 0.007303 0.03614 -0.14101
[5.36]*** [0.82] [1.09] [4.48]***
Kids in household -0.17129 -1.09671 -0.45623 -1.30339
[6.61]*** [29.88]*** [5.18]*** [14.32]***
Health satisfaction from 0 to 10 0.035847 0.003624 0.052777 0.002374
[7.68]*** [0.80] [3.56]*** [0.17]
EDU_HIGHERTHS 0.054025 0.109765 0.062812 0.112632
[1.27] [2.40]** [0.45] [1.00]
EDU_HIGHSCHOOL 0.108357 0.118266 0.313765 -0.14833
[4.49]*** [5.21]*** [3.64]*** [2.33]**
Partner employed? 0.537548 0.560678 0.658848 0.81161
[15.90]*** [11.65]*** [8.53]*** [6.90]***
year -0.00663 -0.0144 0.086 0.009956
[2.39]** [5.46]*** [4.77]*** [0.61]
MACROREG_BERLIN -0.40628 -0.13012 0.082442 0.133304
[6.12]*** [1.98]** [0.58] [1.17]
MACROREG_NORTH -0.23121 -0.20175
[7.19]*** [6.39]***
MACROREG_W ESTC -0.2372 -0.20279
[10.01]*** [8.81]***
Constant -8.13191 -6.81813 -21.06 -10.6818
[18.73]*** [16.07]*** [10.12]*** [5.48]***
athrho:Constant -1.1501 -0.98418 -0.69477 -0.20098
[32.90]*** [19.04]*** [7.35]*** [2.26]**
lnsigma:Constant -0.79502 -0.74399 -1.02281 -1.10102
[67.44]*** [43.89]*** [37.54]*** [44.24]***
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REG_MECKLENB 0.068068 0.07445
[2.07]** [1.97]**
REG_BRANDENB 0.000106 0.048022
[0.00] [1.35]
REG_SACHSENA 0.034861 0.001921
[1.26] [0.06]
REG_THUERING -0.01818 -0.04586
[0.68] [1.41]
W ORK:REG_MECKLENB -0.11937 0.122263
[1.19] [1.31]
W ORK:REG_BRANDENB -0.08579 -0.01525
[0.93] [0.18]
WORK:REG_SACHSENA -0.10752 0.203164
[1.26] [2.59]***
WORK:REG_THUERING -0.14112 -0.01708
[1.70]* [0.22]
Observations 16901 19377 2595 2938
censored obs 9349 14042 1201 1986
Wald 1947.69 1698.599 322.169 443.251
LR test of indep. eqns 413.074 175.797 29.566 5.539
lambda -0.369 -0.359 -0.216 -0.066
se 0.009 0.016 0.026 0.029
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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4.10 Appendix: Descriptive statistics
4.10.1 individual Earnings deciles
To give a better view of what the earnings covariates represent and then to facilitate the 
understanding of the difference in magnitudes of the effects of such covariates, we are showing 
here for each country the levels of income (in the national currencies) against the percentile 
levels. The variables used in the analyses are percentile positions: eg, for own income, a value 
of 50 means that the youth is at the median of the distribution for the earnings of the previous 
year (50th percentile), where the distribution is with reference to all youth of the same gender in 
the previous year; a value of 90 would represent the 90th centile (ie, a very high income).58
Table 4.24 -  Earnings deciles by sex -  United States
Men US Women US
Percentile % difference in Percentile % difference in
Percent (K USD) difference levels Percent (K USD) difference levels
10 1.50 10 0.88
20 3.15 110% 1.65 20 1.99 126% 1.11
30 5.11 62% 1.96 30 3.16 59% 1.17
40 7.36 44% 2.25 40 5.08 61% 1.92
50 9.72 32% 2.36 50 7.03 39% 1.96
60 11.99 23% 2.27 60 8.96 27% 1.93
70 14.92 24% 2.93 70 10.94 22% 1.98
80 17.98 21% 3.06 80 13.11 20% 2.17
90 22.89 27% 4.91 90 16.43 25% 3.33
Source: A u thor’s ca lcu lations on NLSY, 1985.
Table 4.25-- Earnings deciles by sex - United Kingdom
Men UK Women UK
Percentile % difference in Percentile % difference in
Percent (K GBP) difference levels Percent (K GBP) difference levels
10 1.43 10 0.89
20 3.74 162% 2.31 20 1.79 102% 0.90
30 6.04 62% 2.31 30 3.28 84% 1.49
40 7.88 30% 1.84 40 4.78 46% 1.49
50 9.64 22% 1.76 50 6.87 44% 2.10
60 11.22 16% 1.58 60 8.36 22% 1.49
70 12.78 14% 1.56 70 9.97 19% 1.60
80 14.90 17% 2.12 80 11.62 17% 1.66
90 18.22 22% 3.32 I 90 14.33 23% 2.71
Source: A u tho r’s calculations on BHPS, 1996.
58 For sim plicity, we only consider the data for a year around the middle of each survey, except for the SOEP. The 
calculation is done on all individuals in the age group, ie, including both those living with their parents and those living 
w ithout them. To compare data between countries, we have indicated exchange rates (see at the end o f this appendix) 
and converted som e of the results accordingly. US data is for 1985. US CPI data show that for 1996 prices were 45.8% 
higher than 1985 prices and that, using observation from all types o f households, from 1985 to 1996 median income had 
increased by 50.2%, mean income by 62%. (U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
<http://research.stlouisfed.orq/fred2/data/CPIAUCSL.txt>: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual 
Social and Econom ic Supplements, Table H-9, <http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/h0901.htm l>).
To give a better view of the monetary values of the income and earnings covariates, the exchange rates were as 
follows. In June 1996, USD/DEM was 2.17 (1 United States Dollar was worth 1 German Deutsche Mark); GBP/DEM 
was 2.37 (1 United Kingdom Pound was worth 2.37 German Deutsche Marks), and GBP/USD was at 1.55 (1 Pound 
was worth 1.55 Dollars). USD/DEM in 1985 was 2.94 DEM for 1 USD. 1996 was the peak of the USD strengthening 
cycle), and by 1996 USD/DEM had fallen to 1.80. Source, http://www.xe.com /ict/.
219
Table 4.26 -  Earnings deciles by sex -  Germany
Men Germany Women Germany
Percentile % difference in Percentile % difference in
Percent (K DEM) difference levels Percent (K DEM) difference levels
10 4.06 10 2.96
20 7.11 75% 3.05 20 5.98 102% 3.02
30 12.17 71% 5.06 30 10.04 68% 4.06
40 17.80 46% 5.63 40 15.01 50% 4.97
50 28.26 59% 10.46 50 20.80 39% 5.79
60 35.88 27% 7.62 60 28.36 36% 7.56
70 41.62 16% 5.74 70 34.35 21% 5.99
80 47.36 14% 5.74 80 39.43 15% 5.08
90 54.66 15% 7.30 90 47.15 20% 7.72
Source: Au thor’s calculations on SOEP, 1996.
4.10.2 Family Income deciles
To give a better view of what the family income covariate represents and then to facilitate the 
understanding of the difference in magnitudes of the effects of such covariate, we are showing 
here for each country the levels of family income (in the national currencies) against the 
percentile levels. The variables used in the analyses are percentile position: a value of 50 
means that the family is at the median of the distribution for income of the previous year (50th 
percentile), where the distribution is with reference to all families in the previous year; a value of 
90 would represent a 90th centile (ie, a very high income).
Table 4.27 -  Family income deciles -  United States
Percent Percentile (K USD) % difference difference in levels
10 2.15
20 4.01 87% 1.86
30 5.58 39% 1.57
40 7.53 35% 1.95
50 9.42 25% 1.89
60 11.15 18% 1.73
70 15.11 36% 3.96
80 19.38 28% 4.27
90 26.57 37% 7.19
Source: A u thor’s ca lcu lations on NLSY, 1985.
Table 4.28 -  Family income deciles -  United Kingdom
Percent Percentile (K GBP) % difference difference in levels
10 4.18
20 6.51 56% 2.33
30 9.73 49% 3.22
40 11.13 14% 1.40
50 13.36 20% 2.23
60 16.54 24% 3.18
70 19.01 15% 2.47
80 22.60 19% 3.59
90 29.81 32% 7.21
Source: A u tho r’s calculations on BHPS, 1996.
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Table 4.29 -  Family income deciles  -  Germany
Percent Percentile (K DEM) % difference difference in levels
10 6.09
20 9.59 57% 3.50
30 12.48 30% 2.89
40 15.02 20% 2.54
50 17.82 19% 2.80
60 20.61 16% 2.79
70 23.81 16% 3.20
80 28.86 21% 5.05
90 36.52 27% 7.66
Source: A uthor’s calculations on SOEP, 1996.
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4.10.3 Descriptive statistics on explanatory variables
The following descriptive statistics relate to the variables used in the departure equations in 
this chapter.
Abbreviations (also see text earlier)
income pctile: own standardised income (percentage corresponding to the percentile of income for each observation) 
no income: Zero own income dummy
family income: fam ily standardised income (percentage corresponding to the percentile of income for each observation) 
accomm_short: accommodation short of space
HOUSE 2 SMALL: Housing too small (dummy); HOUSE SMALL: Housing small (dummy); HOUSE LARGE: Housing
large or very large(dummy)
healthlimits Health limits work (1 = yes, 0 = no)
parenthealth : parents’ health satisfaction
religion_att Religious attendance
religioat~79: Religious attendance in 1979
religio_pare: religion of parents
approve: parents would strongly approve of departure at the age of 21
mobility : indicator of mobility (dummy) as explained in text
un. = unemployment
marry when : Age of expected marriage
MACROREG_B Berlin
MACROREG_N North Germany
MACROREG_W W estern Germany (this is only the W estern part, ie a subset, of the original Federal republic of W est 
Germany)
MACROREG_E Eastern parts of Germany (Original DDR minus Berlin)
REG_NORTHC~L. North and Central States in the US; REG_SOUTH: Southern States in the US; REG_WEST: 
Western States in the US (reference is East States)
United Kingdom
MALES EQUATION WITH ACTUAL INCOME UK
Mean Std. Dev .Min
income pctile 37.17576 24.53787 0 100
no income .2185068 .4132926 0 1
family income 66.54915 22.21175 0 100
durables 5.379937 1.16381 0
STUDENTt .2110118 .4080856 0 1
No Job .3632171 .480996 0 1
Job security 4.283079 3.185174 0
rooms pp 1.39727 .5238205 .3333333
accomm short .1302969 .3366783 0 1
healthlim its .0415105 .1994965 0 1
parenthealth .2211012 .4150483 0 1
religion_att .0784088 .2688525 0 1
mobility .070049 .2552664 0 1
un. current 7.829663 2.694492 0 12.3
un.change -.3376766 .8176692 -2.1 1.8
YEAR 92 .119631 .3245763 0 1
YEAR 93 .1219372 .3272604 0 1
YEAR 94 .1216489 .326927 0 1
YEAR 95 .1204958 .3255874 0 1
YEAR 96 .1225137 .3279254 0 1
YEAR 97 .1372153 .3441241 0 1
YEAR 98 .1349092 .3416758 0 1
REG London .1026232 .3035099 0 1
REG SW .0933987 .2910323 0 1
REG EAnglia .0250793 .1563885 0 1
REG EMidla~s .0982992 .2977617 0 1
REG WMidla~s .0867685 .2815361 0 1
REG NW .1207841 .3259232 0 1
REG YorksHum .0971462 .2961994 0 1
REG North .0749496 .2633479 0 1
REG Wales .057077 .2320231 0 1
REG Scotland .0683194 .2523296 0 1
year 94.59066 2.313439 91 98
AGE2021 .1987231 .3990922 0 1
AGE2223 .1660016 .3721316 0 1
AGE2426 .1463155 .3534693 0 1
AGE2729 .0774142 .2672831 0 1
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FEMALES EQUATION WITH ACTUAL INCOMEUK
income pctile 42.96253 26.04851 0 100
no income .228888 .4201973 0 1
family income 52.13603 26.87149 0 100
durables 5.251815 1.316366 0
STUDENTt .2888804 .4533288 0 1
No Job .4264425 4946542 0 1
Job security 4.682461 3.188828 0
rooms pp 1.389188 .5036143 .5
accomm short .1280092 .3341639 0 1
healthlim its .055407 .2288166 0 1
parenthealth .2162782 .4117848 0 1
religion_att .1004968 .3007187 0 1
mobility .0771876 .2669399 0 1
un. current 7.638326 2.629357 0 12.3
un.change -.348567 .8218995 -2.1 1.8
YEAR 92 .1207489 .3258976 0 1
YEAR 93 .1169278 .3213956 0 1
YEAR 94 .1188384 .3236601 0 1
YEAR 95 .1207489 .3258976 0 1
YEAR 96 .1268628 .3328828 0 1
YEAR 97 .1367979 .3436995 0 1
YEAR 98 .1421475 .3492681 0 1
REG London .1035537 .3047389 0 1
REG SW .0917081 .2886686 0 1
REG_EAnglia .0374475 .1898919 0 1
REG EMidla~s .0813909 .2734868 0 1
REG W Midla~s .0966756 .295572 0 1
REG NW .1089033 .3115774 0 1
REG YorksHum .0680168 .2518229 0 1
REG North .0427971 .2024381 0 1
REG W ales .0470004 .2116801 0 1
REG Scotland .0989683 .2986765 0 1
year 94.64425 2.317976 91 98
AGE2021 .1933286 .3949792 0 1
AGE2223 .1302009 .3365847 0 1
AGE2426 .1284075 .334603 0 1
AGE2729 .0692253 .2538823 0 1
United States
MALES EQUATION WITH ACTUAL INCOME
Variable Mean Std. Dev .Min Max
AGE2021 .2463244 .430894 0 1
AGE2223 .1691925 .3749431 0 1
AGE2426 .1351504 .3419035 0 1
AGE2729 .0707985 .2565024 0 1
income pctile 36.1891 30.3512 0 100
no income .1980321 .398539 0 1
fam ily income 57.47738 27.56687 0 100
student .394594 .4887909 0 1
No Job .3317123 .4708549 0 1
Job security .2164669 .4118594 0 1
Health limits .0435422 .2040857 0 1
un. Current 3.298123 1.154316 1 6
un. change .0629948 .8171828 -4 4
Househ.sizeCR 3.641145 1.906903 1 18
Relig. Attend. 79 3.130513 1.723881 1 6
Marry when 2.659014 .8777127 0 5
approve .2589912 .4381055 0 1
urban .7877177 .4089467 0 1
mobility .0942095 .2921364 0 1
RACE WHITE .856028 .3510811 0 1
RACE BLACK .1195431 .3244448 0 1
REG NO RTHC-L .3334087 .4714578 0 1
REG SOUTH .2865867 .4521923 0 1
REG W EST .138204 .3451335 0 1
YEAR 80 .1284777 .3346399 0 1
YEAR 81 .1419362 .3490044 0 1
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YEAR 82 .1370731 .3439439 0 1
YEAR 83 .1116263 .314924 0 1
YEAR 84 .0888939 .2846067 0 1
YEAR 85 .0758878 .2648335 0 1
YEAR 86 .0625424 .2421518 0 1
YEAR 87 .0439946 .2050946 0 1
YEAR 88 .0283872 .1660859 0 1
YEAR 89 .0200181 .1400699 0 1
YEAR 90 .0171907 .1299887 0 1
YEAR 91 .0132323 .1142746 0 1
YEAR 92 .0085953 .092317 0 1
YEAR 93 .0052024 .0719442 0 1
FEMALES EQUATION W ITH ACTUAL INCOME
Std. Dev Min
AGE2021 .2430171 .4289343 0 1
AGE2223 .160842 .3674099 0 1
AGE2426 .1177979 .3223904 0 1
AGE2729 .0626096 .2422759 0 1
income pctile 35.73607 31.50968 0 100
no income .2610984 .4392631 0 1
family income 57.3086 26.9519 0 100
student .4505465 .4975819 0 1
No Job .3535285 .4780972 0 1
Job security .2287141 .420033 0 1
Health limits .0600459 .2375879 0 1
un. Current 3.26717 1.1365 1 6
un. change .0877075 .8316439 -4 4
Househ.sizeCR 3.858049 1.964553 1 18
Relig. Attend. 79 3.572662 1.70328 1 6
Marry when 2.303333 .8482822 0 5
approve .239239 .4266477 0 1
urban .8025907 .3980706 0 1
mobility .1091621 .3118635 0 1
RACE W HITE .8092025 .3929563 0 1
RACE BLACK .1536905 .3606761 0 1
REG NO R TH C -L .2834975 .4507262 0 1
REG SOUTH .3512347 .4773883 0 1
REG W EST .1347996 .3415325 0 1
YEAR 80 .1455944 .3527229 0 1
YEAR 81 .1545001 .3614518 0 1
YEAR 82 .1393874 .3463737 0 1
YEAR 83 .1148293 .3188373 0 1
YEAR 84 .0855485 .2797151 0 1
YEAR 85 .0631494 .2432478 0 1
YEAR 86 .053704 .2254478 0 1
YEAR 87 .039266 .1942401 0 1
YEAR 88 .024828 .155611 0 1
YEAR 89 .0182162 .1337414 0 1
YEAR 90 .0149777 .1214718 0 1
YEAR 91 .01039 .1014071 0 1
YEAR 92 .0064769 .0802233 0 1
YEAR 93 .0031035 .0556263 0 1
Germany
MALES EQUATION WITH ACTUAL INCOME GERMANY
Mean Std. Dev .Min
income pctile 25.73988 27.84 0 100
no income .2947865 .4559783 0 1
No Job .5897116 .4919201 0 1
Job security 1.316001 1.295953 0 3
Student .59401 .4911167 0 1
Un. current 7.683125 4.266454 2.3 20.4
un. change .1038824 .8728474 -3.1 3.9
family income 63.83486 24.37363 1 100
religio_pare .1372712 .3441573 0 1
Househ.size 3.855103 1.085167 2 9
HOUSE 2 SMALL .020244 .1408438 0 1
HOUSE SMALL .1236828 .3292421 0 1
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HOUSE LARGE .0743206 .2623101 0 1
health satisf .0400721 .1961419 0 1
parenthealth .6637549 .4724567 0 1
mobility .1232668 .328766 0 1
MACROREG B .0169163 .1289667 0 1
MACROREG E .1645868 .3708329 0 1
MACROREG W .3702163 .482896 0 1
MACROREG N .1498891 .3569874 0 1
YEAR 85 .0697449 .2547342 0 1
YEAR 86 .072934 .2600462 0 1
YEAR 87 .0719634 .2584452 0 1
YEAR 88 .0722407 .258904 0 1
YEAR 89 .0700222 .2552021 0 1
YEAR 90 .0635053 .2438864 0 1
YEAR 91 .06198 .241136 0 1
YEAR 92 .0863838 .2809494 0 1
YEAR 93 .0806988 .2723909 0 1
YEAR 94 .0744592 .262535 0 1
YEAR 95 .0730727 .2602738 0 1
YEAR 96 .0701608 .2554356 0 1
YEAR 97 .0705768 .2561344 0 1
AGE2021 .2035496 .4026657 0 1
AGE2223 .1787299 .3831525 0 1
AGE2426 .1878813 .3906444 0 1
AGE2729 .1033001 .3043715 0 1
year 90.61065 3.990467 84 97
age 21.61564 3.346751 17 29
FEMALES EQUATION WITH ACTUAL INCOME GERMANY
Mean Std. Dev .Min
income pctile 24.3974 28.2615 0 100
no income .3709914 .4831208 0 1
No Job .6533222 .475962 0 1
Job security 1.2511 1.274585 0
Student .6828757 .4654051 0 1
ucurrent 8.065542 4.520834 2.3 20.4
un.change .1260323 .8990406 -3.1 3.9
fam ily income 62.35548 25.97791 1 100
religio_pare .1444142 .351546 0 1
Househ.size 3.965416 1.138915 2
HOUSE 2 SMALL .0236848 .152081 0 1
HOUSE SMALL .1467198 .3538634 0 1
HOUSE LARGE .0568015 .2314872 0 1
health satisf .0454831 .2083831 0 1
parenthealth .6805701 .4663046 0 1
mobility .119891 .3248681 0 1
MACROREG B .0176064 .1315295 0 1
MACROREG E .2043597 .4032752 0 1
MACROREG W .3380843 .473107 0 1
MACROREG N .1297422 .3360548 0 1
YEAR 85 .0630895 .2431493 0 1
YEAR 86 .0649759 .2465092 0 1
YEAR 87 .0687487 .2530528 0 1
YEAR 88 .0687487 .2530528 0 1
YEAR 89 .0668623 .2498095 0 1
YEAR 90 .0578495 .2334831 0 1
YEAR 91 .0534479 .2249485 0 1
YEAR 92 .0850975 .2790559 0 1
YEAR 93 .0806959 .272396 0 1
YEAR 94 .0821631 .2746418 0 1
YEAR 95 .0836303 .2768615 0 1
YEAR 96 .0809055 .2727185 0 1
YEAR 97 .0830015 .2759134 0 1
AGE2021 .227206 .4190707 0 1
AGE2223 .1532174 .3602346 0 1
AGE2426 .1127646 .316338 0 1
AGE2729 .0469503 .2115547 0 1
year 90.92832 4.051231 84 97
age 20.44875 2.936655 17 29
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5 Determinants of young people’s return to the parental home
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to estimate a model of young adults’ return to the parental home 
in several European countries and the US, and compare the results across countries. The 
differences in living arrangements and the process of departure from home were covered in 
earlier chapters. The return to the parental home, however, has been studied rarely, and we 
therefore do not know whether any pattern exists between countries. We intend to highlight the 
similarities and differences amongst countries and analyse how income and labour market 
variables affect the risk of return home.
This introductory section explains the reasons for studying returns. Section 2 discusses the 
data while section 3 describes the methods used. In section 4 we set out the empirical analysis 
and the choice of covariates, in section 5 we present the estimates, section 6 is devoted to the 
discussion of the results, while section 7 concludes with consideration of our initial hypothesis 
and policy implications.
In the previous three chapters, starting from the literature survey we showed that the process 
of departure from the parental home differs significantly between countries, both in terms of 
timing of departure and in terms of the factors that appear to affect departure risks. We may 
expect that the differences in home-leaving across countries may be reflected in differences in 
the process of returning home.1
The reasons why we want to study returns is threefold.
Firstly, the literature on this topic is minimal, as there are only three main studies of the 
process of young people’s return to the parental home: one in the sociological literature 
(Kerckhoff and Macrae (1992)), one in the economic literature (Ermisch (1999)) and one in the 
demographic literature (DaVanzo and Goldscheider (1990)), but only the third one of these 
works actually presents an empirical model, while the other two only estimate exploratory 
regressions. Descriptive works are less rare but rather generic.2 Thus, we believe that this area 
of analysis is important to explore because, as it stands, we don’t know much about how often 
and when returns happen and also where from (is it just single people returning or also married 
people). For example, there is no evidence on whether people return home more often in some 
countries than in others.
Secondly, the study of returns home follows as the natural next step after the study of 
departure from the parental home. In particular, the previous chapters highlighted how 
departure from home is linked to income (actual or potential) and employment in several 
countries. Thus, if departure from home is linked to income, should we expect that changes in 
financial circumstances will also prompt young people to seek to return back to the parental
1 Since Southern Europeans take longer to leave home, it may be that departure from home is seen as a more 
perm anent move than in Northern countries and in the US, where departures are more frequent and happen at earlier 
ages: th is m ay mean that Southern European youth return home less than youth elsewhere. But the opposite could also 
be true. W e sim ply do not know.
2 W e do not consider the literature on union dissolution (see, for example, Erm isch and Francesconi (2000)). Although 
the term ination o f a partnership may lead to a young person's return home, as explained later, the focus o f this chapter 
is on the return home of single people.
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home. At the moment, it is not known whether the effect of economic and financial 
circumstances is significant in determining returns home and whether such effects are different 
across countries. The economic intuition behind returns is, in a utility comparison framework, 
that the child maximises his welfare after comparing the utility he can obtain when living on his 
own with the utility he can achieve when living with his parents, and returns home may be 
favoured if housing goods are cheaper when in the parental home and financial transfers and 
transfers in kind may be larger, and cheaper for the parents to make, if the child lives in the 
parental home.
Thirdly, if youth in some countries leave very fast, should we be worried about their poverty 
rates, and are young people able to come home if they are in financial difficulties? This is a 
question to which this chapter can provide some answer and this of course could yield 
significant implications for policy.3
Since the analysis of returns to the parental home has been barely addressed by 
researchers, this chapter can provide some original results, shed further light on the meaning of 
departure from the parental home and therefore usefully complement the results on the 
determinants of young people’s departure from the parental home presented earlier in this 
dissertation. In the final section of this chapter we will compare our results to the ones found in 
the three papers listed above.
5.2 Data description and definitions
We use four datasets in this chapter: the ECHP (for several EU countries), the BHPS (for the 
UK), the SOEP (for Germany), and NLSY (for the US). We described these surveys in earlier 
chapters,4 and they all appear potentially suitable for the analysis of return to the parental 
home.5
We can observe young people who are living outside the parental home in any one wave 
and whether they are living with their parents at any subsequent wave. The length of the panels, 
except for the NLSY, means that in most cases we can not observe many young people first as 
they are living in the parental home, then when they are living outside of it, and finally when they 
return to the parental home. In the absence of retrospective information on when the youth has 
left the parental home (this information is available, by construction of the panel, for most NLSY 
sample members), a short panel suffers from left truncation (delayed entry). In other words, we 
often do not know when a youth has left the parental home and we can only observe that he is 
currently living without his parents.6
3 Aassve et al. (2005) show that home-leaving has a significant effect on poverty rates especially in Nordic Europe.
4 Further inform ation can also be found in Peracchi (2002) (ECHP), Taylor (1999) (BHPS) and Zagorsky and W hite 
(1999) (NLSY). The SOEP is considered only to a limited extent in this chapter because, as explained later, the return 
rates in the datasets are too low to allow an empirical analysis.
5 A lthough in the first wave o f the ECHP people living in institutions were not included in the sample, they were included 
from wave two.
6 Information on when the youth got married or when cohabitation began is in principle useful, but not so much in 
practice. This is because in many countries (except for Southern Europe) there is often a period when the youth lives 
outside the parental home before the cohabitation begins Therefore transitions into marriage are usually n o t directly 
from the parental home. W ith the ECHP data the problem of left-censoring may be serious. In the BHPS we attempted 
to reduce the problem o f by using several retrospective variables (including length of residence at current address and
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In order to study the probability of return home, we pooled the responses from adjacent 
waves of each dataset, and stacked them to create one large dataset of individuals and their 
responses at two successive points in time. This is the same technique that we used in the 
earlier chapters.7
The main focus of this chapter is on the risk of return home for single youth; for the US and 
the UK, we also include some results on the risk of return of people who live with a partner. 
Although we are aware that such analysis would require to model union dissolution as well (eg, 
a nested logit, where upon union dissolution the youth can choose to return to the parental 
home), we include these results to offer a comparison with the results for single people and as a 
starting point for future research.
Definitions
The two main living arrangements we are concerned with are “living without one’s parents” 
(living outside the parental household) versus “living with at least one of them” (living in the 
parental home).
Living outside the parental household (ie being potentially at risk of departure back into the 
parental household): all people who are not in the same household of any parent of theirs, 
natural or legal, at the time of interview. Children temporarily away are not included in the group 
at risk because their absence from home is only temporary and, typically, they consider 
themselves still living at home (or their parents do so). Therefore a “parent” is a person who is 
in the same household of at least one child of theirs, natural or legal, at the time of interview 
(including children who are temporarily away, as explained).
Return to the parental home (“BACK”) is defined as returning to a household where at least 
one of the youth’s natural or legal parents lives.
The living arrangements of young people who are no longer living with their parents were 
described in tabular form in chapters 2 and 3 (tables 2.1 and 3.2). We showed that, in most of 
Northern and Nordic Europe and in the US, a significant share of youth live on their own or with 
friends. In Southern Europe, by contrast, young people either live with their parents or with a 
married partner (and the most common transition out of the parental home is into marriage).
5.3 Methods
As explained in the literature survey in chapter two, both for the modelling of departure from 
the parental home and the modelling of return to it, there are several different modelling 
techniques to study these phenomena. For example Buck and Scott (1993), Ermisch and Di 
Salvo (1997), Aassve (2000) and Holdsworth (2000) used duration models to study departure
reasons for moving there), and we removed as many data points as possible where parents are reported as no longer 
living. See further details on the calculation of time since departure from home in each subsection of section 5.4.3.
7 As in the previous chapters, standard errors in the models with actual income are robust standard errors clustered for 
repeated observations by person (Huber/W hite/Sandwich robust variance estimator, see W illiam s (2000)).
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from home, but duration modelling has not been used for the study of returns home. In this
chapter we shall be using two complementary approaches.
5.3.1 Kaplan-Meier hazard function
Whereas for departure from home the duration modelling is time since birth (or time since 
legal age), although this is in effect just “age”, for the modelling of returns home there are an 
age effect and a duration effect, where duration refers to permanence in the “living outside 
home” state. The Kaplan-Meier approach is essentially similar to looking at departure rates from 
home, however here we use "time since departure from home”, instead of age, as the
explanatory variable. The main purpose of using the Kaplan-Meier approach here is to describe
the phenomenon, to show the difference between the return rates conditional on initial states, 
and to give a preliminary flavour of how the hazard varies over time. In this sense, this 
complementary approach adds greater insight into the return process and presents an 
alternative avenue into the analysis.8
Survival, or duration, analysis is concerned with the analysis of the length of time until the 
occurrence of a “failure” event. We want to model “time to return to the parental home”, that is 
the risk that an individual is recorded as living in the parental home at the time of a future 
interview, given that he is has left the parental home.
We define the occurrence of the “failure event” as the time when a person states that he has 
returned to the parental home. When the exact month is not available, we use the middle date 
between the interview when the youth was living outside the parental home and the interview 
when he was back in the parental home.
For our analyses, we will use the Kaplan-Meier hazard function (mainly for descriptive 
purposes) and, in the next section, a probit model.
Kaplan-Meier hazard function
The Kaplan-Meier or product-limit estimator of the hazard function h(t) is the probability that 
at duration t the person returns to the parental home, conditional on having reached time t (ie, 
on being outside the parental home at time t). By t we denote the time at risk.
If we take T as a nonnegative random variable denoting the time to a “failure event” (here, 
the return home), and then derive T s probability density function f(t) or its cumulative density 
F(t) = Pr(T<f), the survivor function S(t) is the reverse cumulative and it reports the probability of 
surviving longer than t, ie,
S(t) = 1 - F(t) = Pr(7"> t)
S(t) is equal to 1 at t = 0 and decreases monotonically towards 0 as t goes to infinity. The 
density function f(t) can be obtained as follows:
8 Further analysis in the modelling o f duration would involve Cox proportional hazards and then Parametric survival 
models, also exploring how the hazard varies over time and whether there is duration dependence (akin to interacting 
the explanatory variables -  income, health, etc -  with time since departure from home).
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In practice, it is more usual to talk about the hazard function, or hazard rate, which is defined 
as the (limiting) probability that the failure event occurs in an interval, conditional on the subject 
having survived to the beginning of the interval, divided by the width of the interval:
. . .  Pr(/ + At > T > 1 1 T > t )h( t)  = hrn — -^--------------------1---------L
A /-> 0  A t
The hazard rate can vary from 0 (meaning no risk at all) to infinity (meaning the certainty of 
failure at that instant). Over time, the hazard rate can increase, decrease or remain constant, 
and the overall shape of the hazard over the whole period 0 to T can even change slope.
From the hazard function we can derive the cumulative hazard:
H{ t )  = | h{x)dx
and therefore
S(t) = exp (-H(t))
F(t) = 1 - S(t) = 1 - exp(-H(t)) 
f(t) = h(t)exp(-H(t))
The Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimator of hit) is the easiest estimator of the survival 
literature. The probability of failure at time t (ie, here, the probability of return to the parental 
home) is calculated as the ratio of failures (returns) in period t, rt, to the number of potential 
failures (nt) (in our model, the number of children who are living outside the parental home at 
time t).
k t )= - 5 -
Equivalently, the probability of failure (return home) is equal to the complement to one of the 
probability of survival, ie, 1 minus the probability of survival.
n — r  
h{t )  = 1 — — L
S(t) will, accordingly, be defined as the probability of remaining outside the parental home 
until time t
s ( o = r i ^ = r i M ( o '
/ = i  n i  / = i
F(f), as defined earlier, will be the probability of returning to the parental home at any time 
before t and thus the complement to 1 of the survival function.9
9 There are several tests to compare the estimates of survival functions by groups, such as the log-rank test, the 
W ilcoxon test, or some variations on them (see Hosmer and Lemeshow (1999); for a variation on the log-rank test 
(“Cox” test) using Cox regression, see StataCorp. (2001)).
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5.3.2 Dichotomous analysis of return to the parental home
Since the literature mentioned earlier used simple dichotomous models to analyse returns 
home, and for consistency with the framework of the more complex models that we used in the 
previous chapters of this thesis, we use here dichotomous models (probits) for the analysis of 
return home. There is a difference here, however, compared to the analysis in the previous 
parts of this thesis, in that here the destination state (living with parents) is the same but the 
initial states are different (eg, living alone, being alone as a student, and Living with a partner). 
We strongly expect that this matters for modelling, and we therefore use separate models 
conditional on initial state, and then perform LR tests for equality of coefficients in the separate 
models.10
As we explained in the previous chapters, young people’s decision of household formation is 
typically modelled in a utility comparison framework, where the child compares his utility when 
living with his parents and when on his own). This was the approach we used in the analysis of 
departure from the parental home.
To analyse returns home, a similar framework can be used. To take into account the effect of 
how long the youth have been living outside the parental home, we include a variable that was 
not present in the previous chapters, namely “time since departure from home”.11
The framework for such analysis is very similar to the model presented in the survey of the 
literature in chapter 2. The only difference is that, instead of the probability that a child living with 
his parents may move out in the next period, we are now modelling the probability that a child 
goes back home in period t conditional on not living with his parents at f-1. We are therefore 
looking at a process where we estimate the probability of return home, ie the probability of not 
living outside the parental home at time t given that the person was living outside the parental 
home at time f-1:
(5.1) Pr (BACKit = 1) = Pr (OUTit=0 | OU7)M=1) = Pr ( V jN > V f UT\ ViiMIN < V ^ 7)
That is, the person compares his indirect utility in the two living arrangements to choose 
between them. The empirical model estimated is a probit, where the probability of return home 
is modelled as.
Prob(BACK=1) = t f ^ 'X )
Where <£(.) indicates the standard normal distribution.
The results will be presented as marginal effects <p(p ' X)/?, whose interpretation is very 
similar to that of marginal effects of multinomial logit models seen in the previous chapters. For 
example, let us assume that the baseline probability (which refers to some “average” individual) 
is calculated assuming No Job =0 and is equal to 0.05 (5% risk of return home). A marginal 
effect of, say, 0.04 attached to the dummy variable No Job, means that, when the dummy value 
changes from zero to one, the probability of returning home increases by the value of the 
marginal effect, ie, in this case, the risk of return home increases by 4 percentage points, from 
5% to 9%. In the case of a continuous variable with a marginal effect of 0.04, the effect on the 
probability of return home of a change by d units in the covariate from the baseline value
10 See footnotes 28 and 37.
11 For the analysis of home leaving, by contrast, the age covariate reflected by definition both the effect o f age and the 
effect o f “duration”, if all departures are first-time departures.
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(usually the mean, for which the average probability is computed) is found as the product of d 
times the marginal effect.
5.4 Empirical analysis
5.4.1 Descriptive analysis
We start by comparing the return rates by country to see whether any systematic patterns 
arise. We will then estimate a model of return to the parental home to study whether economic 
and financial circumstances are significant determinants of young people’s return home, and 
whether the effects differ amongst countries.
We estimate the probability of return of all people who are living outside the parental 
household in any one wave and on whom we have some information on their living 
arrangements in the following year. Only people aged 18-29 (incl.) are included in the analysis 
for all datasets. The lower bound represents the start of adulthood when children can take their 
own decisions. So if they have left before they are 18 and they are currently younger than 18, 
we assume that they cannot decide autonomously whether to come back, whereas they can 
decide to do so if they are 18 or older. The upper bound has been chosen because the number 
of children returning home in their thirties is very small and because the reasons for returning 
home at that age may have more and more to do with parental health as parents get older (in 
general, however, information on parents is not available while the children are living outside the 
parental home, so being unable to control for this factor may lower the quality of the results.) 
Children who are serving in the armed forces are excluded from this analysis. Sample members 
who are studying are included in the analysis.
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We see that return rates for most countries appear to be in the order of 1-2%. Table 5.1 
includes statistics for all our datasets and shows that, for the European countries, return rates 
range from a high of nearly 5% (for UK males) to a low below 1%, with most countries located 
towards the low values.12
Table 5.1 -  Return rates by country -  Youth aged 18-29 living outside the parental home (in %)
Males Females Sample size Sample size
(males) (females)
Greece 2.3 1.4 646 1587
Italy 2.1 1.5 847 1576
Spain 1.7 1.2 952 1406
Portugal 1.6 1.9 696 1016
Austria 0.2 0.3 401 616
France 2.5 1.8 1879 2440
Germany (ECHP) 1.0 0.4 2428 3619
Belgium/Lux 1.4 0.6 712 1254
UK (ECHP) 4.8 2.5 2146 3044
Ireland 1.9 1.2 517 818
Netherlands 0.6 0.8 1006 1641
Denmark 0.9 0.8 974 1252
Finland 0.6 0.2 328 442
US 7.2 5.3 17145 22266
UK (BHPS) 4.0 3.0 4080 5718
Germany (SOEP) 1.0 0.5 7869 11808
Source: A u thor’s calculations on ECHP, NLSY, BHPS and SOEP datasets
We would intuitively expect that the decision to return for married people may be related to 
marriage dissolution, and thus require a more complex model. In this paper we want to study on 
youth living without a partner separately from those living with one, and to focus primarily on the 
former sub-sample.13 Indeed, Table 5.2 shows that youth in a relationship generally exhibit a 
very low probability of return home, whereas, in most countries, the return rates of young adults 
who are not in a relationship are several times higher (see Table 5.3 for the return rates of these 
samples), and in the order of at least 3-4 times higher. For the South European countries, return 
rates for single people are more than 10 times higher than for people in a relationship. For 
example, out of 664 Italian males in a relationship, only 0.3% return home, while out of 183 not 
in a relationship, 8.7% return home. Thus, the average of the two groups is 2.1%, which of 
course reflects the bigger size of the youth in a relationship. It therefore appears that the overall 
lower return rates observed in the South for young people are the average of very low return 
rates of the many youth who are in a relationship (with return rates of less than 1%) and of the 
relatively high return rates of the few people who have left and live without a partner (average 
return rate of 7.7% for the whole of Southern Europe).
12 These rates appear tow to allow empirical analyses, given that sample sizes for many of the countries are of around 
thousand observations. In the empirical section we will pool Southern European countries and we will drop most other 
countries as the ECHP will not allow us to use them satisfactorily. Surprisingly, also the SOEP will not allow to estimate 
a model satisfactorily.
13 W e will estim ate models separately for single and married people (and separately by gender). W e will use formal LR 
tests to see whether the coefficients are the same for single and married people, and we will find that equality can be 
rejected. See footnotes 28 and 37.
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It is apparent that return rates for unmarried youth are indeed large in the South and, in our 
datasets, they are bigger in the South than in many European countries (eg, the Nordic 
countries and Germany).
Table 5 .2 -  Return rates by country -  Youth aged 18-29 in a relationship, living outside the 
_________________  parental home (in %)
Males Females Sample Sample size Males Females
size (M) (F) returning returning
Greece 0.6 0.3 470 1339 3 4
(0.4) (0.1)
Italy 0.3 0.5 664 1436 2 7
(0.2) (0 2 )
Spain 0.7 0.8 807 1251 6 10
(0.3) (0.3)
Portugal 0.5 1.6 597 948 3 15
(0.3) (0.4)
Austria 0.0 0.2 281 474 0 1
(0.0) (0.2)
France 0.5 0.6 1305 1861 7 11
(0.2) (0.2)
Germ any (ECHP) 0.6 0.1 1764 2791 11 3
(0.2) (0.1)
Belgium /Luxem bourg 0.7 0.2 576 1091 4 2
(0 3 ) (0.1)
UK (ECHP) 2.0 1.0 1511 2195 30 22
(0.4) (0.2)
Ireland 0.5 0.5 373 590 2 3
(0.4) (0.3)
Netherlands 0.1 0.0 742 1301 1 0
(0.1) (00 )
Denmark 0.3 0.5 601 873 2 4
(0.2) (02 )
Finland 0.4 0.0 234 350 1 0
(0.4) (0.0)
US 3.6 3.1 10191 15265 367 473
(0.2) (01 )
UK (BHPS) 1.7 1.6 2850 4077 48 65
(0.2) (0.2)
Germ any (SOEP) 0.5 0.2 6350 10043 32 20
(0.1) (00 )
Source: A u tho r’s calculations on ECHP, NLSY, BHPS and SOEP datasets. S.e. in brackets.
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Table 5 .3 -  Return rates by country -  Youth aged 18-29 not in a relationship, living outside the
parental home (in %) _______________________
Males Females Sample size Sample size Males Females
(M) (F) returning returning
Greece 6.8 7.7 176 248 12 19
(1 9 ) (1.7)
Italy 8.7 12.1 183 140 16 17
(2.1) (2.8)
Spain 6.9 4.5 145 155 10 7
(2.1) (1.7)
Portugal 8.1 5.9 99 68 8 4
(2.7) (2.9)
Austria 0.8 0.7 120 142 1 1
(0.8) (0.7)
France 7.3 5.4 574 579 42 31
(1.1) (0.9)
Germ any (ECHP) 2.1 1.3 664 828 14 11
(0.6) (0.4)
Belgium /Luxem bourg 4.4 3.1 136 163 6 5
(1.8) (1.4)
UK (ECHP) 11.3 6.2 635 849 72 53
(1.3) (0.8)
Ireland 5.6 3.1 144 228 8 7
(1.9) (1.1)
Netherlands 1.5 1.8 264 340 4 6
(0.7) (0.7)
Denmark 1.9 1.8 373 379 7 7
(0.7) (0.7)
Finland 1.1 1.1 94 92 1 1
(1.1) (1.1)
US 12.5 9.9 6954 7001 869 693
(0.4) (0.4)
UK (BHPS) 9.4 5.7 1230 1641 116 94
(0.8) (0.6)
G erm any (SOEP) 2.3 1.3 1519 1765 35 23
(0.4) (0.3)
Source: A u thor’s calculations on ECHP, NLSY, BHPS and SOEP datasets. S.e. in brackets.
It is difficult to say, by merely looking at the tables above, whether any of these return rates 
are low or high. What is useful to do at this stage, however, is to compare them to the outflows 
out of the parental home (table 3.5 in chapter 3). Firstly, it is important to draw attention to the 
relatively small sample sizes of youth out of the parental home and not living in a partnership.14 
Secondly, we can recall that the average departure rates of men into a married destination was 
around 3% (4.5% for Portugal), and around 4.5% for women. This means that return rates from 
a partnership initial state are around 15% of the corresponding outflow rate into a partnership 
destination, with a high s.e.. For other countries, such as the UK (BHPS) and the US, we find 
that return rates from Married are 1.6% and 3.3%, while departure rates into Married are around 
8% and 12.5%, representing a ratio of around 20% and 25%.15 It is worth noting that these 
ratios represent an overestimate of the relative sizes, because the return rates of youth from a 
partnership are likely to include youth who had moved out of the parental home to go into Alone 
or Student destinations.
If we turn our attention to return rates of unmarried people, whereas only around 1% of 
Southern Europeans left to go into Alone destinations, the return rates are at 7-8% on average, 
(with large s.e.). One could regard Alone destinations as a low probability destination; moreover 
once a youth is in that status, he has a relatively high probability of moving out of it. For other 
European countries, the probability of entering Alone destinations is significantly higher, around 
3% for Continental Europe, 5% for the UK, and slightly more for the Nordic countries, and a high
14 W e still see, however, that the return rates for people not in a partnership are significantly higher than the return rates 
for people in a partnership, as s.e. are around 0.2 for those in a relationship, and around 2 for those in a relationship.
15 The 8% figure for the UK is taken from the average departure rates calculated chapter 4.
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of 13% of the US. The return rates from Alone into Home for these countries are very different 
from each other, plus some countries (for example, Austria, Belgium, Ireland) have really small 
sample sizes of youth living on their own; the UK has a return rate of around 7%, and the US 
one of around 11% This is different from what we observed for Southern Europe, since here 
return rates from Alone are not wildly higher than outflow rates into Alone: for the US, in 
particular, return rates are lower than outflows into Alone.16
The following figures shows the hazard of returning home conditional on current relationship 
status, which we construct simply as the probability of return using an age polynomial (Figure 
5.1, for the NLSY, Figure 5.2 refers to the BHPS and Figure 5.3 to Southern Europe in the 
ECHP, ie, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal). A comparison of the graphs shows that the return 
rates differ by relationship status: those without a partner always have a higher return hazard. In 
general, return rates decline with age, but the steepness of the curves does vary between 
countries. These curves are based on a probit of return on a quadratic in age, except for UK 
people not in a relationship, where a cubic provides a better fit and does not appear to suffer 
from multicollinearity.
Figure 5.1 -  Return rates by age, by relationship status -  United States (genders pooled)
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Return rates with age polynomial, United States
Source: Author’s calculations on NLSY main sample (excluding supplement A and B 
samples), age group 18-29. Polynomial is quadratic on age.
16 To be precise, one should consider US men and women separately. Both US men and women have a departure rates 
into A lone of around 13%, however return rates from Alone into Home are 12.5% for men and 9.9% for women. Since 
moving into Alone destinations can be followed by moving into Marriage, ie the Living Alone sample may in fact have 
outflows into Married destination, if the outflows into Married destination is high enough then even a high return rate 
from Alone destinations into Home does not imply that a youth leaving into Alone destinations will have a high 
probability to return home.
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Figure 5 .2 -  Return rates by age, by relationship status -  United Kingdom (genders pooled)
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Return rates with age polynomial, United Kingdom
Source: Author’s calculations on BHPS sample, age group 18-29. Polynomial is quadratic on age.
Figure 5 .3 -  Return rates by age, by relationship status -  Southern Europe (genders pooled)
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Return rates with age polynomial, Southern Europe
Source: Author’s calculations Calculated on ECHP on pooled sample of Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, 
age group 18-29. Polynomial is quadratic on age.
It is therefore clear that, amongst young adults living without their parents and not in a 
relationship, there are substantial return rates back into the parental home in all countries 
considered here. Amongst people in a relationship, however, the rates back into the parental 
home are extremely low in Southern Europe, while they are significantly higher in the UK and in 
the US, partly because a large part of these relationships are cohabitations, rather than 
marriages.
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The main conclusion that can be drawn at this point it that, although the risk of return is, on 
average, much higher in the UK and US than in Southern Europe, this is partly due to a 
composition effect17 and due to higher return risks for young US and UK adults who are in a 
relationship. We observe that, in all countries, those who are not in a relationship always have 
relatively high return risks.
Given the low average return rates observed for some countries, meaningful econometric 
analyses cannot be conducted on all countries: in the rest of this chapter, therefore, we will be 
focusing on the UK (BHPS data), the US (NLSY data) and Southern Europe.18
5.4.2 Kaplan-Meier survival curves
As explained earlier, a first descriptive analysis of the risk of returns can be provided using 
the Kaplan-Meier curves. Although in this exercise we do not yet control for personal 
characteristics, the curves are useful to give an approximate idea of how the risk varies for the 
people in the sample.
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.6 shows survival probabilities outside the parental home for the US 
and UK, by gender, for those living without a partner. The pattern in the two graphs is similar: it 
is clear that males have a higher probability of return home and that there is a relatively high risk 
of return home up to approximately the first three years after departure from home, and then the 
risk seems to become significantly lower, as reflected by the curve becoming flatter and by 
formal statistical.19 Although the hazard is not pictured, we could think of it approximately as the 
slope of the survivor function: a steep survivor function curve implies a high return risk, while a 
flatter curve implies a lower risk.
The next step of our analysis is to discuss whether the differences can be explained by 
looking at differences in personal characteristics using a model with explanatory variables. 
Before that, we consider the set of covariates that we consider important as potentially affecting 
the risk of return home.
17 For the sake o f clarity: young people who leave home in Southern Europe are more likely to be entering relationships 
than those who leave in the UK and US; therefore, in the Southern Europe sample at risk of returning home, the vast 
majority, 87%, are in a relationship, while in the US only 62% of the men and 69% of the women are in a relationship.
18 The analysis on Southern Europe is more limited given the data available. Analysis on the German data was 
performed, but, given a return rate of 2.3% on fifteen hundred men and 1.3% on approximately the same amount of 
women, the results were poor.
19 For the UK chi2(1) = 11.10 (Pr = 0.0009), for the US chi2(1) = 6.53 (Pr>chi2 = 0.0106). This log-rank test is a rank 
test which can be viewed as an extension of the fam iliar Mantel-Haenszel test applied to survival data. The jum ps 
observed, particularly in the US curve, are due to lack o f information on the exact dates of return home as we can only 
observe children's cohabitation with parents at the interview dates, thus a spell outside the parental home, and then 
back to it, can only be observed, on average, as a one-year spell, unless the three interviews happen over a period of 
less than 24 months.
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Figure 5 .4 -  Kaplan-Meier survival curves -  US unmarried youth, by gender
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Source: Calculated on NLSY for all people living outside the parental home and without a partner, sample 
aged 18-29. The horizontal axis represents the time since departure from home (in years).
Figure 5 .5 -  Kaplan-Meier survival curves -  US partnered youth, by gender
1.00
female
0.75 male
0.50
0.25
0.00
Time since departure from home
Source. Calculated on NLSY for all people living outside the parental home and with a partner, sample 
aged 18-29. The horizontal axis represents the time since departure from home (in years).
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Figure 5 .6 -  Kaplan-Meier survival curves -  UK unmarried youth, by gender
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Calculated on BHPS for all people living outside the parental home and without a partner, sample aged 18- 
29. The horizontal axis represents the time since departure from home (in years).
Figure 5 .7 -  Kaplan-Meier survival curves -  UK partnered youth, by gender
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Calculated on BHPS for all people living outside the parental home and with a partner, sample aged 18-29. 
The horizontal axis represents the time since departure from home (in years).
241
5.4.3 Choice of explanatory variables
Our models include four main groups of covariates: own resources and job-related variables; 
household variables; demographic and personal characteristics; macroeconomic variables. Our 
main aim is to study the effect of income and employment on the probability of return, and the 
macroeconomic variables (unemployment rates) are a further attempt to see the importance of 
work and income, in this case by trying to pick up the effect of general economic conditions.20
5.4.3.1 United States
Only people aged 18 to less than 30 years of age are included in the analysis for the US,
where we model the probability that the young person returns to live in the parental home.
On the basis of the empirical literature on return home and on departure from home 
(including our analyses in the previous chapters), we include the following covariates in the 
models.
Own resources and job-related variables
Own income: We use net total labour income for the calendar year prior to the interview at 
which the youth is living outside the parental home. To account for non-linearities in the effects 
of own (actual) and parental income and to facilitate comparison across countries we used 
percentiles, calculated by gender and year on all people aged 18-30, excluding individuals with 
zero labour income. Individuals with zero income are given percentile zero and then a value of 
one in a zero-income dummy which is also included in the model. The reference group is 
somebody with the median level of income in the previous year (the corresponding percentile to 
enter the income variable).
Current labour market status (No Job): the dummy has the value of one if the person has no 
job at the time of the interview (this includes unemployment and inactivity), and a value of zero if 
the person is working.
Student status: this dummy is equal to one if, at the time of interview, the person is in 
education or training (not necessarily as his main occupation).
Household variables
Household size: this variable represents the number of people in the current household and 
enters the equation directly. It is used as a control for crowding in the accommodation.
Single household: to account for non-linearity in the effect of household size, we also include 
a dummy if the person is living on his own.
Demographic and personal characteristics
Age: we include four age group dummies (reference is the 18-19 year old group).
20 W e have tried to keep the specification as standardised as possible across countries, however it turned out that the 
small sample for Southern Europe required to limit the number of covariates to a m inimum to avoid m ulticollinearity and 
perfect prediction o f outcom es on the basis of certain explanatory variables.
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Race: white and black dummies; reference is Hispanic.
Religious attendance in 1979: in the first survey only, youth are asked how often they 
attended religious services in the previous year. The variable ranges from 1 to 6 (not at all, 
infrequently, once per month, 2-3 times per month, once per week, more than once per week). 
We include this covariate in order to capture cultural effects: more religious people may have a 
lower propensity to return home (if they are living with a partner and/or if they perceive 
departure as a more permanent and important decision).
Urban: information on whether the household’s residence is rural or urban is available from 
the interviewer’s section and we include it as a dummy equal to one if the residence is in an 
urban area.
Time since departure from home: To control for variation in return risk due to length of time 
since last cohabitation with parents (in a sense, a simple measure of duration dependence), we 
included the time since departure from home. The way we built this variable is as follows: at 
each interview, we have information on whether the child is living with his parents. Thus, for any 
interview when the child is not living with his parents, we can calculate since when he was last 
seen living with them. However, this calculation is imprecise because own and parental living 
arrangements are not recorded precisely and the month of moving residence between two 
interviews is not recorded, while months are only recorded for changes in residence before the 
1979 interview. Thus, the date when a child leaves the parental home is not clearly known. We 
therefore had to make a set of assumptions. Firstly, if the child’s cohabitation with parents 
changed between two interviews, then we assumed that it happened half-way through the 
period (this also if the child’s has not moved accommodation, although we use checks for 
parents being alive, eg, records R0006700 and R0008100 on mother and father being alive, 
records R6354300 and R6354700 reporting the age of death of the parents). For the periods 
before the child’s first interview, for which month of moving is recorded, we are not able to 
observe the residential arrangements of parents, but we cross-checked information using 1988 
survey information on living arrangements when children were less than 18 years old (variables 
R2837200-R2849100).21
Macro variables
Unemployment: we have included levels and changes in the regional unemployment rate. 
Because of confidentiality reasons, the GEOCODE data with precise rates are not available 
outside the United States; and the main dataset available to us only provide this information 
using six bands (from 1 to 6, indicating respectively the following unemployment rate: <3%, 3- 
5.9%, 6-8.9%, 9-11.9%, 12-14.9, >15%). Change in unemployment rate, in our model, therefore 
represents the number of bands up or down that the rate has moved in the last 12 month, and 
as such this variable ranges potentially from -5  to +5).
We also include year dummies (1979 is the reference year) and macro-regional dummies 
(dummies included are South, West, North-Central; reference is Northeast) as controls.
21 There are variables that indicated in which month the child changed marital status, or enrolled in college
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5.4.3 2 United Kingdom
Only people aged 18 to less than 30 are included in the analysis for the UK.
We include the following covariates:
Own resources and job-related variables
Own income: we use net total labour income for the calendar year prior to the interview at 
which the youth is living outside the parental home. To account for non-linearities in the effects 
of own (actual) and parental income and to facilitate comparison across countries we used 
percentiles, calculated by gender and year on all people aged 18-30, excluding individuals with 
zero labour income. Individuals with zero income are given percentile zero and a dummy for 
zero income people is therefore also included. We also include a measure of durables.
Current labour market status {No Job): the dummy has the value of one if the person has no 
job at the time of the interview (this includes unemployment and inactivity), and a value of zero if 
the person is working.
Student status: this dummy is equal to one if, at the time of interview, the person is in 
education or training (not necessarily as his main occupation).
Household variables
Household size: this is used as a control for crowding in the accommodation.
Single household: to account for non-linearity in the effect of household size, we also include 
a dummy if the person is living on his own.
Demographic and personal characteristics
Age: we include age group dummies. This is preferable to using linear or square age terms 
because it avoids imposing any restrictions on the shape of the age profile.
Time since departure from home: To control for variation in return risk due to length of time 
since last cohabitation with parents (in a sense, a simple measure of duration dependence), we 
included the time since departure from home. The way we built this variable is as follows: at 
each interview, we have information on whether the child is living with his parents. Thus, for any 
interview when the child is not living with his parents, we can calculate since when he was last 
seen living with them. As opposed to the US data, this calculation is more precise, both because 
we have information on the month of the move and because parental living arrangements are 
also recorded. The drawback of the BHPS compared to the NLSY is that the latter is a cohort 
dataset that essentially captures all youth from the time when they are still in the parental home 
(or present us with retrospective information collected at the first interview). Such advantage is 
not present for the BHPS, since this is a panel that started in 1991 with youth already living 
outside of the parental home. In order to calculate the time since departure from home for those 
already outside home in wave 1, we use the information from variables wPLNOWM and 
wPLNOWY (Month and Year moved to present address) to create a proxy further increased if 
the person has been married or cohabiting by longer than the time at the current
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accommodation, measures admittedly likely to be biased downwards if the child had moved 
since having left the parental home, and biased upwards to the extent that it does not allowing 
for the possibility that parents have moved away from the current address and that while 
married the child was still living with his parents. However we use several variables to limit the 
extent of any erroneous assumption, particularly FBPAR16 (Lived with both natural parents up 
to 16), (FLVHMAG Age stopped living with natural parents).22
Macro variables:
We have included levels and changes in the regional unemployment rate in all models.23
We also include year as a linear covariate and aggregate regional dummies (reference is 
London) as controls.24
5.4.3.3 Southern Europe
Only people aged 18 to less than 30 are included in the analysis for Southern Europe.
We include the following covariates:
Own resources and job-related variables
Own income, we use net total labour income for the calendar year prior to the interview at 
which the youth is living outside the parental home. To account for non-linearities in the effects 
of own (actual) and parental income and to facilitate comparison across countries we used 
percentiles, calculated by gender, year and country, excluding those with zero labour income on 
all people aged 18-30. Individuals with zero income are given percentile zero and a dummy for 
zero income people is therefore also included.
Current labour market status (No Job dummy): this takes the form of a dummy to show 
whether the person is employed or not in the current week, and the dummy has the value of one 
if the person has no job at the time of the interview (this includes unemployment and inactivity), 
and a value of zero if the person is working.
Household variables
Household size: this is used as a control for crowding in the accommodation.
Single household: to account for non-linearity in the effect of household size, we also include 
a dummy if the person is living on his own.25
Adequacy of the size of the current accommodation: we use a dummy derived from a 
subjective measure included the household questionnaire (“does the accommodation have
22 From records w M ARRlAG  and wCOHABIT of wave 2.
23 W e use regional unemploym ent rates by gender for all age groups. W e noticed that using unemployment rates for the 
age groups included in the sample did not appear to improve the results.
24 In previous specifications we investigated further explanatory variables sim ilar to the ones used for the US data 
(whether the accom m odation is short o f space, health problems, attitude towards religious, and also included more 
disaggregated regional dumm ies) but removed them from the final model due to no significance. The specification 
presented here aggregates individuals only into three regions.
These two variables are included only for women as they make the results for men less stable.
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shortage of space?” asked of the main respondent and leading to a "shortage of space” 
dummy).
Demographic and personal characteristics
We include age as a linear covariate.
We also include country dummies as controls (reference is Greece).26
Time since departure from home: To control for variation in return risk due to length of time 
since last living with parents we included the time since departure from home. For the ECHP the 
way we attempted building the variable in a way similar to what we did for the UK, ie, for any 
interview when the child is not living with his parents, we can calculate since when he was last 
seen living with them, potentially with information on the month of the move. However, at the 
first interview many youth were already living outside of the parental home. We therefore looked 
for parts of the questionnaire that would allow to impute the time since departure from home. 
The ECHP unfortunately only includes a very small set of variables that represent retrospective 
information: we considered using the information from variables ha001, ha002, ha003 (year and 
month of move to this address and reason for move), however empirically it turns out that a 
simple measure of number of previous years in the panel (since departure from home or merely 
previous years in the panel without cohabiting with one’s own parents -  which is a censured 
measure of course) performs better, so this is the construction of the variable that we ultimately 
used in this chapter for the ECHP.
5.5 Estim ation Results
The tables in this section present estimates for selected coefficients of the preferred 
specifications of the probits for the three datasets. Full sets of results are included in the 
appendix.27
5.5.1 United States
Table 5.4 reports the estimates on selected coefficients for the four groups of young people
28living outside the parental home.
26 Health status, student status, and m acroeconom ic variables (unemployment rates) were used initially but did not 
improve the quality o f the results. W e believe that this may be partly due to the small sample sizes.
27 Given our concerns about endogeneity of income in the previous chapters and our emphasis on the importance of 
potential income as the true explanatory variable, rather than actual income, one may wonder whether it would be useful 
to use potential income as an explanatory variable to explain return risk. For all samples we have estimated a sim ilar 
model where current income, the no income dummy and the no job dummy are replaced by the potential income 
variable as calculated in the previous chapters. The results show that potential income is generally not significant, and 
when it is, its estim ate is much sm aller than the total effect on income plus the no job dumm y and the significance is 
reduced. In detail: for US single men the marginal effect o f potential income is similar, at 0.000667, to that of actual 
income but significance is somewhat smaller - since we had to remove the nojob dummy, we see that the explanatory 
power o f potential income is significantly less than actual income and no job dummy combined; for US married men, the 
covariate has an effect which is 40% sm aller and is of borderline significance (t-stat 1.72); for US single women, the 
estim ate of potential income is two-thirds o f the effect o f actual income and the t-stat is 50% sm aller at 2.19; for US 
married women: the covariate has no significance. For the UK I found no significance of potential income in any of the 
samples. Southern Europe: no effect o f potential income at the 5% level (at the 10% we find a negative effect for Italian 
men and Greek women).
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The fit of the model can be assessed either by looking at measures such as the pseudo R2, 
of around 15% for men, and 14% for women,29 or, which we believe to be more appropriate for 
the purposes of our analysis here, by considering the estimates, ie their sign, significance, and 
particularly their importance, as reflected by the absolute and relative magnitudes. By looking at 
the coefficients and their significance, we see that, overall, income variables are significant and 
so is the no job dummy for single men. For both single men and women local unemployment 
variables are important too. Also time since departure from home is highly significant. We 
consider this to be an important set of results, both in terms of pseudo R2 and in terms of 
importance of the covariates that we are focusing on.
We immediately notice that there is a very significant income effect in all sub-samples, and 
that this is particularly large and important for single people: if, in the unmarried sample, we take 
individuals A and B with exactly the same covariates except for A being 10 percentiles above B 
in the income distribution, A ’s return risk would be approximately 0.6 percentage points less. We 
see that the “no job” dummy is very significant for men, and increases returns rates by 2.6 
percentage points. Those on high incomes have the lowest return probabilities, while individuals 
at the lowest percentiles of income and no current employment have the highest return rates.
The effect of income on return risk can be presented more directly by plotting fitted 
probabilities of return against income, as shown in Figure 5.8. The top two lines are the return 
rates for single people (the highest is for men, the one beneath is for women). Three of these 
lines are essentially straight lines (once the effect of no income is captured by a dummy), while 
for single women a second-order polynomial offers a better fit.30 The effect of income is 
significant and large for all four groups, and it is particularly strong for single people. It would be 
inappropriate, however, to dismiss the effect of income for married people as “small”. Although 
they are significantly lower in levels than the effects for single people, they have a large impact 
relative to the average return rates (3-3.5%) of married people.
The level of the unemployment rate at year t-1 (when the youth is outside the parental home) 
is associated with higher risk of returns for single men. The fact that there is no significant effect 
on married people is consistent with the reduced impact of income on returns for married 
people.
A change in the unemployment rate has a very significant and important effect for both men 
and women who are living without a partner (each movement up in unemployment by 3 
percentage points brings about an increase of 3percentage points in risk for single men and 
1.3percentage points for single women). Married people’s returns, however, do not appear to be 
affected by changes in the unemployment rate, in the same way as the levels of the 
unemployment rate had no effect on the risk.
Cultural and social factors are important in certain cases, as suggested by the fact that 
married black women have twice the return risk of other married women, and that married
28 W e calculated form al LR tests of equality of coefficients between the single and the married sub-samples. The test for 
men yields 153.40 (34 d.f.) and for women 166.65 (34 d.f.). We can reject the null that the sub-samples have equal 
coefficients.
29 Pseudo R2 are reported at the bottom of the table with full estimation results in Table 5.8 in the appendix.
30 In the regression, however, we can reject squared income, although this is borderline. The concave shape in the 
graph is presum ably due to the effect on returns of other variables that are somewhat correlated with income.
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women living in an urban location have much higher risk than other married women (see 
appendix, Table 5.8).31 Religious factors are also significant for both single and married men. 
We would have expected religion to reduce return risk for men in a partnership, possibly due to 
the moral stigma associated with breaking up a relationship, and such significance may in fact 
be consistent with the fact that religious men are less likely to leave home to enter partnerships 
compared to non religious men, as found in the previous chapter. In other words, if religious 
men take longer to move out, this may reveal that such decision has been thought out better 
and returns home afterwards are therefore less likely, so that, for more “religious” youth,
32departures from home are a more permanent decision. In the previous chapter, however, we 
did not find any effect of religion on departures of US men to single destinations.
The estimate on time spent outside the parental home show that this is an important 
covariate, indicating that the risk of return decreases with time spent outside the parental home. 
To facilitate understanding of how this relationship behaves, in Figure 5.9 we plot return risk 
against time since departure from home. It appears that the risk is not necessarily monotonically 
decreasing, that the risk of return for single people is very high in the initial years since 
departure from home, and then drops sharply at around year 3 to reach approximately the same 
rate of return of married people. For married people, the initial risk is also high, then drops 
earlier, and mostly remain somewhat lower than the return risk of single individuals.33
If we compare the effects of the covariates with respect to the effect of the same covariates 
on outflow rates found in earlier chapters we observe that income is as significant here as it was 
significant there, however, for the Marriage initial state, the size of the coefficients is around a 
half for men and a quarter for women if compared to the effect of actual income for departures 
into Married destinations. It is interesting to notice that while current income had no effect on 
departures alone, current income has a fairly strong effect on outflow from Alone (although the 
magnitude of potential income on men’s Alone departure was three times as much as the effect 
of current income on returns) -  it therefore appears that potential income is the driver of 
departure from home into Alone,34 but current income determines returns home from Alone.35
The effect of the unemployment rate and of its change on single men’s returns is very similar 
to the effects found for outflows, while for women the impact on returns is relatively small 
compared to its impact on outflows.
31 Both these results, however, could be attributed to differences in labour market opportunities for women in those 
groups.
One could also consider that such effect is linked to the cultural environm ent of the original household that renders 
returns less desirable, ie, young people are less keen to return to more “conservative” families.
33 Interaction effects showed no significant effects: for example we found no significance o f the covariate income 
interacted with the time spent outside home.
34 Recall also that the no job dumm y had a positive effect on outflows, and here it has a positive effect on returns.
35 Cf. the results reported in footnote 27 in relation to the estimate of the effect of potential income on returns home.
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Table 5 .4 -  Model o f return home for single and married people - United States -  Marginal
effects of selected coefficients
Single
Males
Married
Males
Single
Females
Married
Females
Income -0.000544 -0.000311 -0.000622 -0.000139
(percentile) [3.23]*** [4.75]*** [4.05]*** [2.60]***
Zero income dummy -0.017893 -0.006956 -0.03258 -0.00966
[1.22] [1.02] [2.82]*** [2.76]***
No Job 0.026069 0.007418 0.003675 0.000879
[2.27]** [1.37] [0.34] [0.27]
Unemployment (band) 0.012407 -0.000304 0.00191 0.000003
[2.79]*** [0.17] [0.46] [0.00]
Change in unemployment 0.029072 0.00114 0.012944 0.001716
[4.67]*** [0.38] [2.32]** [0.77]
Religious attendance ‘79 -0.008728 -0.001952 0.000909 -0.000999
[3.56]*** [2.12]** [0.44] [1.38]
Time since left home -0.088978 -0.019605 -0.078994 -0.019913
[12.81]*** [7.72]*** [13.23]*** [9.43]***
Time since left homeA2 0.006221 0.001092 0.005284 0.001248
[9.62]*** [4.88]*** [10.36]*** [7.03]***
AGE2021 0.004587 0.018917 0.012716 -0.006963
[0.33] [1.46] [1.07] [1.80]*
AGE2223 0.002932 0.017909 0.003102 -0.011294
[0.20] [1.48] [0.24] [2.74]***
AGE2426 0.019044 0.008993 0.051464 -0.011428
[1.08] [0.85] [3.00]*** [2.29]**
AGE2729 -0.011306 0.008428 0.024787 -0.018264
[0.48] [0.71] [0.95] [3.31]***
Observations 4521 6624 4662 10507
Average return rate 11.3% 3.6% 9.2% 3.2%
Source: A u thor’s calculations on NLSY. Ages in sample: 18-29. Marginal Effects of probit model. Absolute 
value of z statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sample sizes: 
single men 4521, married men 6624, single women 4662, married women 10507.
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Figure 5 .8 -  Shape of return rate as function of own income (US)
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a  single females □ married females
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income
Source: NLS. Author’s calculations on age group 18-29. The graph is a fit of return risk over 
a quadratic function of income percentile (plus a constant), calculated on the four separate 
regression samples.
Figure 5 .9 -  Shape of return rate as function of time since depa rture from home (US)
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Source: NLSY. Author’s calculations on age group 18-29. The graph is a fit o f return risk over a 
quadratic function of time since departure from home (plus a constant), calculated on the four 
separate regression samples.36
36 The graph shows that the curves for married men and married women are very sim ilar (married m en’s curve lying is 
slightly higher up to year 5); the risk for single men (continuous line) is higher than the risk for all females in most parts 
o f the curve, and has an increase in the 8+ years area, while the curve for single women (curve built with little triangles, 
the second curve from the top in the left-hand size of the graph) also rises in the 8+ years area.
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5.5.2 United Kingdom
Table 5.5 shows the estimates of selected covariates in the models for the four sub-groups 
for the United Kingdom.37
The fit of the model can be assessed either by looking at measures such as the pseudo R2, 
of 22% for single men (10% for married men), and around 15% for women,38 or, which we 
believe to be more appropriate for the purposes of our analysis here, by considering the 
estimates, ie their sign, significance, and particularly their importance, as reflected by the 
absolute and relative magnitudes. By looking at the coefficients and their significance, we see 
that, overall, income variables are not significant, except for single men (indeed one would 
expect single people to be more affected by income covariates), however the no job dummy is 
significant for married people. Also time since departure from home is highly significant. For 
both single men and women local unemployment variables are important too. In spite of 
relatively high pseudo R2, we would have hope for more coefficients to show significance to 
allow us to draw clearer conclusions.
The baseline group is people aged 18-19. We see that, for single people, the return rate 
increases for those in their early 20s, and then decreases slightly, especially for women. From 
age 24 onwards, the risk falls back to the baseline. For married people, the risk of return is very 
significantly reduced by age 24 and higher, which may mean that unions are more stable when
39the partners are older.
The effect of own income is large and significant for unmarried men, and the effect is 
negative as expected (a move by a decile up in the income distribution decreases return risk by 
0.6 percentage points), but no strong effects are apparent for the other groups. We have 
pictured the effect of income in Figure 5.10 to show the magnitude of the effects in a more 
immediate way, showing that the largest effect is indeed found for single men.
To compare our results to Ermisch (1999) more effectively, we also analysed the group of 
people aged less than 25. The reason why Ermisch considered this subgroup was that he 
observed that return rates were lower for people in the late 20s -  while his estimates for the 
sample of young people aged up to 29 years old were not very well determined, the estimates 
for the subgroup were more precise. Our results for this subsample, reported in Table 5.6, 
confirm his analysis, since we, too, find that own income is more significant and more important 
in the restricted sample (a move by one decile in earnings distribution would reduce return risk, 
by 1.9 percentage points).40
Not having a job is significant: married men are more likely to return home if they have no job 
(the effect is around 1.5 percentage points, which represents a doubling of the risk of return),
37 For the UK, too, we calculated form al LR tests of equality of coefficients between the single and the married sub­
samples. The test fo r men yields 70.05 (25 d.f.) and for women 49.26 (26 d.f.). W e can reject the null that the sub­
samples have equal coeffic ients at the 1% level.
38 Pseudo R2 are reported at the bottom of the table with full estimation results in Table 5.9 in the appendix.
39 Or at least, that when union dissolves at later ages, they are less likely to involve a return to the parental home. As 
explained earlier, this model only studies the risk that married people may return of home, not the risk of union 
dissolution, and therefore the results need to be interpreted carefully.
40 W e have explored th is issue in the other surveys too. For the other countries, there appear to be no advantages in 
analysing the sm aller sample, and such results are therefore not included here. For the US, the coefficients are 
im portant and very significant in the 18-29 sample and they don't become larger or more significant in the smaller 
sample. For Southern Europe, there are no improvement in the results.
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while married women have a lower risk of return if they do not have a job. Again, we observe 
that in relative terms this is an important effect, while, if only considering absolute levels, one 
could have disregarded it. Similarly to what we observed for own income, for the group including 
only youth below 25 years of age this covariate becomes more important (the coefficient 
doubles in size). However, both in the large and in the small sample, the significance is only as 
at the 10% (for a two-tailed test), so the doubling of the effect is actually accompanied by a 
much wider standard error, making it difficult to draw strong conclusions.
We find a significant effect of changes in unemployment rates for married men, but these 
seem to have an unexpected sign. It appears difficult to explain why the UK unemployment 
effects seem counter-intuitive, as higher regional unemployment rates seem to be associated 
with lower returns rates to the parental home for married men and for single women.
The estimate on time spent outside the parental home show that this is an important 
covariate, indicating that the risk of return decreases with time spent outside the parental home. 
Such effect is much more important for unmarried people than for married ones. A graphical 
representation of this relationship is given in Figure 5.11. The graph shows that the curves for 
married men and women are very similar, the risk for single men is higher than the risk for 
female, but only up to the 5-year region.
If we now compare the effects of the covariates with respect to the effect of the same 
covariates on outflow rates found in earlier chapters we observe that income is much less 
significant here. For the Marriage initial state, we observe that having no job increases return 
rates for men and reduces them for women -  it is interesting to point out that holding a job had 
very little effect (smaller effect than here, and only borderline significance, for men) on the risk 
of leaving into a Married destination.
Table 5 .5 -  Model of return home for single and married people aged 18-29 - United Kingdom -
Marginal effects o f selected coefficients
_______________________ Single Males Married Males Female Married Females
AGE2021 0.102507 -0.006427 0.064809 -0.004417
[3.87]*** [1.24] [3.11]*** [1.03]
AGE2223 0.145268 -0.009309 0.035432 -0.006595
[4.14]*** [1.97]** [1.62] [1.64]
AGE2426 0.05395 -0.016652 0.021244 -0.016059
[1.98]** [2.31]** [0.98] [3.39]***
AGE2729 -0.023941 -0.022375 0.033221 -0.019494
[0.70] [2.80]*** [1.27] [4.00]***
Income -0.000607 0.000032 -0.000113 -0.000078
(percentile) [1.68]* [0.45] [0.45] [1.14]
Zero income dummy 0.007613 -0.004666 -0.017792 0.003559
[0.42] [1.04] [1.29] [0.60]
No Job 0.031354 0.014978 -0.018222 -0.009017
[1.27] [2.01]** [0.94] [1.86]*
Unemployment current 0.013306 0.000462 -0.015434 0.000023
[1.16] [0.46] [1.60] [0.02]
Change in unempl. 0.010247 -0.005498 -0.01943 -0.00194
[0.79] [3.08]*** [1.76]* [1.13]
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Time outside parental -0.045774 -0.007511 -0.037479 -0.005506
Home [3.86]*** [2.62]*** [3.68]*** [1.87]*
Time outside parental 0.003077 0.00073 0.002963 0.000453
Home squared [2.08]** [2.27]** [2.31]** [1.29]
Observations 987 2156 1337 3279
Average return rate 9.7% 1.7% 6.2% 1.9%
Source: A u tho r’s calculations on BHPS. Ages in sample: 18-29. Marginal Effects of probit model. Absolute 
value of z statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sample sizes: 
single men 987, married men 2156, single women 1337, married women 3279.
Table 5 .6 -  Model o f return home for single and married people aged 18-24 - United Kingdom -
Marginal effects of selected coefficients
_______________________ Single Males Married Males Female Married Females
Income -0.001942 0.000307 -0.000403 -0.00033
(percentile) [2.49]** [1.51] [0.90] [1.51]
Zero income dummy 0.025807 -0.001665 -0.046875 0.003767
[0.78] [0.12] [2.48]** [0.24]
No Job 0.018617 0.034857 0.009085 -0.032418
[0.41] [1.79]* [0.34] [2.48]**
Average return rate 14.4% 3.3% 7.9% 3.7%
Source: A u tho r’s calculations on BHPS. Ages in sample: 18-24. Marginal Effects of probit model. Absolute 
value o f z sta tistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sample sizes: 
single men 611, married men 776, single women 815, married women 1440.
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Figure 5 .1 0 - Shape of return rate as function of own income (UK)
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Source: BHPS. Author's calculations on age group 18-29. The graph is a fit of return risk over a 
quadratic function of income percentile (plus a constant), calculated on the four separate regression 
samples.
Figure 5.11 -  Shape o f return rate as function of time since departure from home (UK)
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Source: BHPS. Author’s calculations on age group 18-29The graph is a fit of return risk over a 
quadratic function of time since departure from home (plus a constant), calculated on the four 
separate regression samples.
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5 5 3 Southern Europe
Given the small samples in each country, we aggregated the data into one group for men 
and one for women over the four countries, and tested for significance of various types of 
dummies. Our specification includes intercept country dummies and slope country dummies for 
income.41 The analysis is conducted only on single men and single women on the ECHP, 
because the return rates of married people are very small.
The fit of the model can be assessed either by looking at measures such as the pseudo R2, 
of around 14%,42 or the significance and size of the estimated coefficients. The small samples 
do show interesting results, eg for the no job dummy, however the evidence is mixed as far as 
the effect of own income is concerned.
In Southern Europe, return rates are significantly related to age: young people in their late 
teens return more than older males. This was already apparent in the shape of the curve in 
Figure 5.3.
Not having a job increases return rates significantly and strongly for men: the lack of a job 
increases returns by more than 5percentage points. The effect of income is mixed: for Greek 
and Portuguese men there is some evidence that higher income is associated with a higher 
probability of returning home, which is somewhat surprising. For women, we see some evidence 
that Italian women return home less when they are on higher incomes.
Women living on their own have a higher propensity to return home, which could be partly 
due to cultural factors, but so do women in large households, too. Dissatisfaction with the 
current accommodation is also significant, ie the accommodation being short of space increases 
return rates (for men). Italian people have the highest return rates amongst all youth in South 
Europe.
The estimate on time spent outside the parental home show that this is an important 
covariate, indicating that the risk of return decreases with time spent outside the parental home, 
particularly for women. This result is similar to what we observed for the UK and the US.
If we now compare the effects of the covariates with respect to the effect of the same 
covariates on outflow rates found in earlier chapters we observe that the no job dummy is now a 
significant covariate, while it was not significant in the determination of departure from the 
parental home.
Overall, the very low departure rates from home mean that the sample size where we can 
study returns home is somewhat small. Additionally, the limited length of the dataset and the 
apparent relatively lower quality of the data make the results for the ECFIP sample less 
satisfactory compared to the analysis conducted for the US and the UK, as the coefficients are 
less well determined, and adding further covariates does not improve the results.
41 For clarity, we do not have a country as a reference for the income covariate, but rather four coefficients on income, 
one for each country.
42 Pseudo R2 are reported at the bottom of the table with full estimation results in Table 5.10 in the appendix.
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Table 5.7 -  Model of return home for single people -  Southern Europe -  Marginal effects of
selected coefficients
Males Females
age -0.00589 -0.006179
[1.91]* [2.04]**
Income GREECE 0.001201 -0.000907
(percentile) [2.50]** [1.14]
Income ITALY -0.000732 -0.000966
(percentile) [1.12] [2.17]**
Income SPAIN 0.000566 0.000424
(percentile) [1.05] [0.74]
Income PORTUGAL 0.002066 -0.001587
(percentile) [2.84]*** [1.45]
NOJOB 0.056227 -0.014761
[2.11]** [0.65]
Accommodation short 0.049346 -0.0051
of space [2.43]** [0.27]
Single household 0.052492
[2.07]**
Household size 0.019927
[2.62]***
Time since departure -0.025201 -0.042963
[1.74]* [2.25]**
Observations 602 611
Average return rate 7.8% 7.7%
Source: A u thor’s calculations on ECHP. Ages in sample: 18-29. Marginal Effects of probit model. Absolute 
value o f z statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sample sizes: 
men 602, wom en 611.
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5.6 Discussion
The results presented earlier show that there are significant differences between countries. 
In most cases, however, the results confirm that young adults tend to return home when they 
are in financial difficulties, eg, unemployed or on low incomes. In this section we discuss the 
most interest results and relate our findings to the ones found in the literature.43
Effect of age
Return risk declines steadily from the age of 18 to the age of 30 for both genders in the US, 
but, in the UK, returns rates actually increase in the early-twenties for all unmarried people 
(especially for men), after which they decline. For UK married people, return rates decrease 
steadily with age. In Southern Europe, young people in their late teens return most often; rates 
then drop somewhat for older age groups.
We find that the age effect for the UK is significant: this result contrasts with that of Ermisch 
(1999), who did not detect any significant effect of age on returns in the age group 16-24. Such 
difference may be due to the fact that we also estimated the effect of time since departure from 
home, and very likely also to the fact that we estimated separate models for men and women.
Kerckhoff and Macrae (1992) found that children who had left at older ages were less likely 
to return home. This is consistent with our results, although not directly comparable.
Effect of own income
For the US we find strong negative income effects, which is consistent with the findings of 
DaVanzo and Goldscheider (1990). Our results, albeit significant, are not very strong for UK 
males over the whole sample, but they are significant in the sample of younger men. Overall, 
there is consistency with Ermisch (1999). Southern European males in Greece and Portugal 
have, counterintuitively, higher return rates when their income is higher, and, as expected, 
higher return rates when they have no job, while for Italian women the effect of income is 
negative as expected.
Effect of employment status
Not being employed increases the risk for US single men and Southern European men, and 
for the UK we only find borderline significance for married med. In women samples, however, 
not being employed does not increase return risk, and this is very clearly true for married 
women, for whom zero income and no job are not associated with high returns rates.44 After 
observing the net effect of income, employment and the zero-income dummy for the US, for 
women and to some extent for men, we observe that the highest risk of return belongs to those 
on low incomes.
43 One comm on finding in the other works, consistent with our own results, is that people in a relationship have much 
lower return rates. Erm isch (1999) thus chooses to exclude them from the empirical analysis, while the other 
researchers prefer to estimate a pooled model of married and single youth.
44 The dum m y for zero income used alongside income percentiles may be partly responsible for this unexpected result.
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The other works in the literature find some effect of unemployment, although they use 
different covariates than ours (we do not look at being unemployed but at “not being employed”, 
which may also include those who choose to be inactive). Ermisch (1999) found a positive effect 
of unemployment spells in the previous 12 months on the return rate.45 Kerckhoff and Macrae 
(1992) reported that the total number of months in unemployment since departure from home 
increases return rates, even if the size of the effect appears relatively small.
Effect of unemployment rate
The US equations show that the change in unemployment significantly affects return rates 
for single men and women. In other words, an increase in local unemployment rates over the 
year increases return rates, even after controlling for individual employment status. A 3- 
percentage-point increase in the local unemployment rate raises return rates for single men by 3 
percentage points (or 30% from a return rate of ca. 11%), which is substantial.
For the UK we found a significant effect of unemployment rates and their changes, but these 
seem to have an unexpected sign.
Cultural factors
The limited number of control variables related to culture tend to underline some importance 
of cultural schemes. The urban vs. country location dummy, for example, shows that US 
married women are more likely to return home if they live in an urban setting. Race and a 
religious upbringing are also significant covariates in the US.
Single vs married people
As explained in the introduction to this chapter, we analysed married people in order to get 
possible insights into the different behaviour of single and married people as a basis for further 
research. We observe important differences between the two groups in the US (the results for 
the UK are less well specified): the effect of income and of not having a job are always larger for 
single people than for married ones, and local unemployment rates and their changes have a 
large effect on single, but not on married people. This seems to indicate that economic factors 
do play a role in return homes of married people, but they are relatively less important than they 
are for single people.46
Comparison of determinants of return home with determinants of departure from home
It appears that economic and financial circumstances have a significant effect on young 
people’s return to the parental home. It appears that low income (which may be correlated with 
the risk of financial difficulties) is often associated with higher rates of return home.
45 He also pools gender together and does not test the equality o f coefficients between genders.
46 The caveat is that the observation of a married person back into the parental home is affected by income via the 
complex interrelation o f the effect of income on partnership dissolutions and, given that, the risk that the separated 
youth will return home.
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In the US, local unemployment rates and their changes are as important as they were in the 
model of departure from home, indicating that a deterioration in labour market condition has a 
strong effect on young people’s residential decisions. The unemployment rate, rather than 
simply reflect a lower probability of the youth being employed, however, could also capture 
effect of wages in the economy, so that higher local unemployment rates may increase return 
risk via lower wages (or worse work conditions).
All in all, the most significant results show that the determinants of returns home tend to 
mirror somewhat the determinants of departures from home for single people. Low income and 
lack of employment both increase returns home in a strong way, similarly to the strong and 
significant relationship that we observed in the analysis of departure rats. The main difference, 
however, is that while income and employment were relatively more important for married 
departures rather than for than single departures, it now appears that income and employment 
are stronger determinants of single people’s returns home than of married people’s return.
Difference between countries
Economic and financial circumstances have overall a significant and important effect on the 
process of return home for young people in the US, and we found rather large effects of income, 
unemployment and having no job.
Southern Europe’s result, however, appear to be not very well determined, with part of the 
difficulties being due to the small number of youth outside the parental home who live without a 
partner. We also suspect that the effects of income and unemployment in Southern Europe may 
not be as strong, given that they were not very large in determining departure from home in the 
first place.
For the UK, the results are found in the middle: a number of coefficients are significant or if 
borderline significance, but in general it appears that UK return rates are less strongly 
influenced by economic factors compared to the US.47
In order to compare statistically the results between countries, we have estimated a smaller 
standardised model for the UK and the US to test formally whether cross-country determinants 
are different.48
47 One may consider the ECHP results as prelim inary indications suggesting that in Southern Europe returns home may 
be an effective way of supporting the youth (given the effect of the no-job dummy, for example) and providing them with 
a safety net against unemployment. For Southern Europe, more suitable datasets may need to be acquired to study 
returns home, eg, one specially designed to focus on young people living on their own.
48 This analysis was d ifficu lt to make for Southern Europe, where the sample size is relatively small (we found that 
introducing the sam e covariates as for the UK and the US would lead to multicollinearity). For the US and the UK, the 
results point clearly towards the rejection of equality of coefficients. The results are as follows: Single men: LR chi2(13) 
=79.22 Prob = 0.0000; Single women LR chi2(13) =33.80 Prob =0.0004; Married men LR chi2(11) = 48.26 Prob = 
0.0000; Married women LR ch i2(11) = 43.99 Prob = 0.0000.
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5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, given the scope for improving on the limited literature on young adults’ return 
to the parental home, we firstly showed several basic statistics, we then estimated an empirical 
model on the US, the UK and four (pooled) Southern European countries and presented results 
that represent a progress on the existing knowledge. In the light of our hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4a
The probability of return to the parental home is the same across countries.
The first of our findings is that, while the average risk of return home is lower in Southern 
Europe compared to the US and the UK, this is a composition effect due to the larger share of 
married (or cohabiting) people, amongst those who are living outside the parental home, in 
Southern Europe than elsewhere, and to the fact that married people always have a lower risk 
of return home than those who are not in a relationship (ie, living alone or with friends). In fact, 
the risk of return of those who are not in a relationship is overall similar in Southern Europe 
compared to the US and the UK. Amongst those living with a partner, however, Southern 
Europe has the lowest return rates.
Therefore, we do find that the probability of return to the parental home is different across 
countries, although the risk of return of unmarried youth does not follow a clear North vs. South 
pattern.
Hypothesis 4b
Economic and financial circumstances are not determinants of young people’s return to
the parental home.
We then analysed the effect of economic variables on returns. We can reject the null since 
we found that the effect of income and the labour market is very significant in the US for all 
groups and for UK men, in spite of the results being not so well determined in other samples.
Hypothesis 4c
The determinants of young people’s return to the parental home are the same across
countries (with special consideration for economic and financial variables).
Our findings are consistent with the previous literature, but we find differences between 
genders (economic and labour market circumstances are more important for men than for 
women), which leads to the rejection of the pooled models used by other researchers, and also 
differences across countries, where the various covariates are not significant across all groups.
260
Our particularly well determined results for the US show that the effects of several covariates is 
strong and significant and somewhat different for each subgroup. In the UK the effect of 
unemployment goes in the opposite direction compared to the US. Overall, although the 
differences amongst countries in young people’s process of return home are at first sight less 
striking than the ones observed for departure from home, there are significant differences. In 
particular, not having a job has a large and significant effect for men in Southern Europe, while 
in the US and the UK lack of a job perse  is not the crucial factor for single men. Own income is 
very important in the US (and, to a smaller extent, in the UK), and so are local unemployment 
rates and their changes.
We can reject all of our hypotheses. We find that children’s income and labour market 
situation affect children's return rates, therefore showing that the opportunity to return to the 
parental home can play a significant role in the labour market. This result is extremely clear for 
the US and, in some cases, for the UK.
We observe that the effects of income and the labour market, highlighted in this chapter, 
tend to be less strong than the ones found in the previous chapters; in other words, there are 
more significant cross-country differences, and patterns, in the phenomenon of leaving the 
parental home. In terms of the effect of the economic variables on return home, our results point 
towards a stronger effect of income and employment in the US (and, to some extent, the UK) 
compared to Southern Europe.
For Southern Europe, the levels of return rates are similar to the return rates seen for other 
countries, but their determinants are not easy to be determined: one avenue of research could 
be the exploration of the determinants of returns using more suitable datasets, possibly panel 
surveys of young people who are living on their own.
In terms of policy implications, the evidence from the US shows that the family can represent 
a very important safety net for young people who live on their own. This is surprising in itself, 
given the high departure rates for US youth, which one could have interpreted as evidence of 
the desire of young people to become independent of their family very early and rely on one’s 
own means. Although one would need to see how many independent youth are unable to rely 
on the family as a safety net, the possible concern that high departure rates for young US 
people may lead to financial difficulties for the children is mitigated by the evidence that returns 
to the family do happen and they happen more when the youth is in an economically weak
49position.
49 Since the results fo r Southern Europe are somewhat not well determined, it is d ifficult to say whether in those 
countries, too, the fam ily acts as a safety net. The importance of the fam ily as a safety net for the home-leavers may 
answer some of the questions raised in Aassve et al. (2005) about the risk o f poverty for children once they have left the 
parental nest.
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5.8 Appendix
5.8.1 Full sets of results
Table 5.8 -  Model o f return home for single and married people - United States -  Marginal
effects
Single
Males
Married
Males
Single
Females
Married
Females
AGE2021 0.004587 0.018917 0.012716 -0.006963
[0.33] [1.46] [1.07] [1.80]*
AGE2223 0.002932 0.017909 0.003102 -0.011294
[0.20] [1.48] [0.24] [2.74]***
AGE2426 0.019044 0.008993 0.051464 -0.011428
[1.08] [0.85] [3.00]*** [2.29]**
AGE2729 -0.011306 0.008428 0.024787 -0.018264
[0.48] [0.71] [0.95] [3.31]***
Income -0.000544 -0.000311 -0.000622 -0.000139
(percentile) [3.23]*** [4.75]*** [4.05]*** [2.60]***
Zero income dummy -0.017893 -0.006956 -0.03258 -0.00966
[1.22] [1.02] [2.82]*** [2.76]***
student -0.044035 -0.003955 -0.017942 -0.006501
[4.85]*** [0.60] [2.12]** [1.34]
No Job 0.026069 0.007418 0.003675 0.000879
[2.27]** [1.37] [0.34] [0.27]
Unemployment (band) 0.012407 -0.000304 0.00191 0.000003
[2.79]*** [0.17] [0.46] [0.00]
Change in unemployment 0.029072 0.00114 0.012944 0.001716
[4.67]*** [0.38] [2.32]** [0.77]
Single household -0.014568 0.000877
[1.35] [0.09]
Household size 0.004141 0.005885 0.005318 0.003579
[1.22] [4.61]*** [2.19]** [3.15]***
Religious attendance ‘79 -0.008728 -0.001952 0.000909 -0.000999
[3.56]*** [2.12]** [0.44] [1.38]
urban 0.015654 0.005077 0.003902 0.011662
[1.47] [1.34] [0.40] [4.00]***
RACE_WHITE -0.008006 0.004711 0.023924 -0.000291
[0.29] [0.48] [1.17] [0.04]
RACE_B LACK -0.003661 0.016836 0.018224 0.020608
[0.13] [1.15] [0.74] [2.06]**
REG_NORTHCENTRAL -0.025046 -0.007033 -0.032135 0.002061
[2.17]** [1.48] [3.19]*** [0.49]
REG_SOUTH 0.000207 0.002533 -0.009632 0.008737
[0.02] [0.52] [0.97] [2.11]**
REG_WEST -0.008578 0.005538 -0.011071 0.006536
[0.68] [0.96] [1.02] [1.32]
YEAR_80 0.032065 -0.005995 0.020277 0.011298
[1.23] [0.47] [1.05] [1.10]
YEAR_81 0.078471 -0.000217 0.032886 0.022277
[2.79]*** [0.02] [1.64] [1.94]*
YEAR_82 0.072618 0.028207 0.028465 0.049241
[2.58]*** [1.49] [1.37] [3.60]***
YEAR_83 0.184338 0.061837 0.103297 0.061179
[5.24]*** [2.65]*** [3.86]*** [3.96]***
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YEAR_84 0.193809 0.053185 0.081497 0.07495
[5.57]*** [2.46]** [3.41]*** [4.70]***
YEAR_85 0.16157 0.041494 0.081285 0.097055
[4.67]*** [2.05]** [3.16]*** [5.51]***
YEAR_86 0.150536 0.081158 0.056026 0.1113
[4.12]*** [3.26]*** [2.10]** [5.70]***
YEAR_87 0.175237 0.066608 0.060183 0.102714
[4.31]*** [2.77]*** [2.15]** [5.10]***
YEAR_88 0.103555 0.037956 0.058973 0.092071
[2.63]*** [1.82]* [1.94]* [4.67]***
YEAR_89 0.174429 0.034864 0.058751 0.102883
[3.78]*** [1.66]* [1.90]* [4.76]***
YEAR_90 0.103552 0.061578 0.041783 0.057521
[2.25]** [2.43]** [1.20] [2.85]***
YEAR_91 0.197017 0.050682 0.027729 0.049509
[3.47]*** [1.99]** [0.68] [2.20]**
YEAR_92 0.09831 0.07722 0.11611 0.029358
[1.38] [2.41]** [2.11]** [1.03]
Time since left home -0.088978 -0.019605 -0.078994 -0.019913
[12.81]*** [7.72]*** [13.23]*** [9.43]***
Time since left homeA2 0.006221 0.001092 0.005284 0.001248
[9.62]*** [4.88]*** [10.36]*** [7.03]***
Pseudo R2 0.1547 0.1544 0.1387 0.1205
Observations 4521 6624 4662 10507
Average return rate 11.3% 3.6% 9.2% 3.2%
iource: A u thor’s calculations on NLSY. Ages in sample: 18-29. Absolute value of z statistic 
1 brackets. * s ign ificant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5 .9 -  Model o f return home for single and married people - United Kingdom -  Marginal effects
Single Males Married Males______ Female______ Married Females
AGE2021 0.102507 -0.006427 0.064809 -0.004417
[3.87]*** [1.24] [3.11]*** [1.03]
AGE2223 0.145268 -0.009309 0.035432 -0.006595
[4.14]*** [1.97]** [1.62] [1.64]
AGE2426 0.05395 -0.016652 0.021244 -0.016059
[1.98]** [2.31]** [0.98] [3.39]***
AGE2729 -0.023941 -0.022375 0.033221 -0.019494
[0.70] [2.80]*** [1.27] [4.00]***
Income -0.000607 0.000032 -0.000113 -0.000078
(percentile) [1.68]* [0.45] [0.45] [1.14]
Zero income dummy 0.007613 -0.004666 -0.017792 0.003559
[0.42] [1.04] [1.29] [0.60]
STUDENT 0.010784 0.006706 0.070847 0.040274
[0.53] [0.59] [3.19]*** [2.56]**
durables -0.0055 0.001137 -0.005219 -0.001086
[1.30] [0.84] [1.46] [0.94]
No Job 0.031354 0.014978 -0.018222 -0.009017
[1.27] [2.01]** [0.94] [1.86]*
Unemployment current 0.013306 0.000462 -0.015434 0.000023
[1.16] [0.46] [1.60] [0.02]
Change in unempl. 0.010247 -0.005498 -0.01943 -0.00194
[0.79] [3.08]*** [1.76]* [1.13]
Hhsize -0.016348 0.00354 0.000803 -0.004093
[2.60]*** [2.64]*** [0.15] [2.03]**
SINGLE HH -0.038395
[1.85]*
0.012278
[0.66]
Year 0.013197 -0.002885 -0.004602 0.002341
[1.70]* [1.77]* [0.73] [2.02]**
REG_RestofSE 0.142539 -0.008493 -0.048772 -0.002261
[1.50] [0.73] [1.63] [0.26]
REG_SW 0.1313 -0.002576 -0.038042 -0.006722
[1.55] [0.24] [1.47] [0.95]
REG_EAnglia 0.018526 0.000658 -0.019673 -0.005294
[0.27] [0.05] [0.48] [0.70]
REG_EMidlands 0.066838 -0.007847 -0.039605 -0.00463
[0.99] [1.01] [1.62] [0.59]
REG_WMidlands 0.082932 -0.006343 -0.020284 0.000711
[1.38] [1.34] [0.80] [0.08]
REG_NW 0.059481 -0.000072 -0.045472 -0.00142
[1.17] [0.01] [2.55]** [0.17]
REG_YorksHum 0.102489 -0.005949 -0.028527 -0.010307
[1.85]* [1.22] [1.16] [1.95]*
REG_Wales 0.195567 -0.006184 -0.001288 -0.003833
[2.33]** [1.25] [0.04] [0.48]
REG_Scotland 0.045904 0.001558 -0.021458 -0.005582
[0.89] [0.27] [0.89] [0.83]
REG_North 0.003906 -0.00121 -0.012511 -0.005667
[0.09] [0.43] [0.51] [0.80]
Time outside parental -0.045774 -0.007511 -0.037479 -0.005506
Home [3.86]*** [2.62]*** [3.68]*** [1.87]*
Time outside parental 0.003077 0.00073 0.002963 0.000453
HomeA2 [2.08]** [2.27]** [2.31]** [1.29]
Pseudo R2 0.2178 0.1035 0.1395 0.1541
Observations 987 2156 1337 3279
Average return rate 9.7% 1.7% 6.2% 1.9%
Source: A u thor’s calculations on BHPS. Ages in sample: 18-29. Marginal Effects of probit model. Absolute 
value of z statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
264
Table 5 .1 0 - Model o f return home for single people -  Southern Europe -  Marginal effects
Males Females
age -0.00589 -0.006179
[1.91]* [2.04]**
Income GREECE 0.001201 -0.000907
(percentile) [2.50]** [1.14]
Income ITALY -0.000732 -0.000966
(percentile) [1.12] [2.17]**
Income SPAIN 0.000566 0.000424
(percentile) [1.05] [0.74]
Income PORTUGAL 0.002066 -0.001587
(percentile) [2.84]*** [1.45]
NOJOB 0.056227 -0.014761
[2.11]** [0.65]
ITALY dummy 0.111554 0.052825
[3.05]*** [1.83]*
SPAIN dummy 0.044856 -0.043141
[1.15] [1.48]
PORTUGAL dummy -0.029136 -0.00998
[0.74] [0.30]
Accommodation short 0.049346 -0.0051
of space [2.43]** [0.27]
Single household 0.052492
[2.07]**
Household size 0.019927
[2.62]***
Time since departure -0.025201 -0.042963
[1.74]* [2.25]**
Pseudo R2 0.1409 0.1439
Observations 602 611
Average return rate 7.8% 7.7%
Source: A u thor’s calculations on ECHP. Ages in sample: 18-29. Marginal Ef
probit model. Absolute value o f z statistics in brackets. * significant at '
s ign ificant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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5.8.2 Descriptive statistics of covariates
Table 5.11 -  Sample means
(M eans o f covariates in sample used in empirical econometric analyses)
Abbreviations
time: tim e spent living outside the parental home
Income pctile: own standardised income (percentage corresponding to the percentile of income for each observation) 
no income: Zero own income dum m y 
un.: unemploym ent
un. changeREG : change in regional unemploym ent 
hhsize, hhsizeCR: household size 
SINGLEHH: single household 
Healthlevel
healthlim its Health lim its work
accomm _short: accom m odation short o f space
religion_att: Religious attendance is often (dummy)
religioat~79: Religious attendance in 1979
REG_NORTHC~L: North and Central States in the US
REG_SOUTH: Southern States in the US
REG_W EST: W estern States in the US (reference is East States)
US SINGLE MEN
Variable Mean Std. Dev .Min Max
time 3.629013 2.129268 .7957764 8.997833
AGE2021 .2002288 .4002173 0 1
AG E2223 .2533181 .4349613 0 1
AG E2426 .3130435 .463785 0 1
AG E2729 .1395881 .3465988 0 1
Income pctile 49.65904 31.11506 0 100
no income .0720824 .2586539 0 1
student .2377574 .4257585 0 1
No Job .2061785 .4046065 0 1
un. current 3.086041 1.110475 1 6
un .change .001373 .8025468 -4 4
SINGLEHH .4098398 .4918602 0 1
hhsizeCR 1.130892 1.418022 0 13
religioat~79 3.139359 1.683067 1 6
urban .8389016 .3676638 0 1
RACE W HITE .8574371 .3496666 0 1
RACE BLACK .1176201 .3221947 0 1
REG N O R TH C -L .2963387 .4566944 0 1
REG SOUTH .3201373 .4665825 0 1
REG W E ST .2224256 .4159231 0 1
YEAR 80 .0661327 .2485424 0 1
YEAR 81 .0874142 .2824734 0 1
YEAR 82 .0915332 .2883988 0 1
YEAR 83 .1034325 .3045578 0 1
YEAR 84 .1059497 .3078084 0 1
YEAR 85 .0993135 .2991167 0 1
YEAR 86 .0929062 .2903341 0 1
YEAR 87 .0823799 .274974 0 1
YEAR 88 .0736842 .2612862 0 1
YEAR 89 .0556064 .2291863 0 1
YEAR 90 .0443936 .2059915 0 1
YEAR 91 .0306636 .1724244 0 1
YEAR 92 .0173913 .1307393 0 1
YEAR 93 .0052632 .0723647 0 1
US MARRIED MEN 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
time 5.219421 2.683031 .8292236 12.21598
AGE2021 .0936056 .2913009 0 1
AG E2223 .1760322 .3808759 0 1
AG E2426 .3952899 .4889493 0 1
AG E2729 .3121181 .4633923 0 1
Income pctile 59.89104 29.2177 0 100
no income .044567 .2063665 0 1
student .0618572 .240914 0 1
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No Job .0988225 .2984458 0 1
un. current 3.12282 1.118554 1 6
un. change -.0493367 .7409431 -4 4
hhsizeCR 2.062752 1.140579 1 14
religioat~79 3.081085 1.720301 1 6
urban .7233567 .4473719 0 1
RACE W HITE .9029662 .2960259 0 1
RACE BLACK .0761663 .2652839 0 1
REG N O R TH C -L .3350723 .4720509 0 1
REG SOUTH .3496795 .4769042 0 1
REG W EST .1630645 .3694521 0 1
YEAR 80 .0313012 .1741436 0 1
YEAR 81 .0469519 .2115515 0 1
YEAR 82 .0606648 .2387322 0 1
YEAR 83 .0749739 .2633689 0 1
YEAR 84 .0843643 .2779541 0 1
YEAR 85 .0933075 .2908845 0 1
YEAR 86 .1076166 .3099187 0 1
YEAR 87 .1064242 .3084028 0 1
YEAR 88 .1021017 .3028045 0 1
YEAR 89 .0956924 .2941908 0 1
YEAR 90 .0769116 .266471 0 1
YEAR 91 .0560441 .230024 0 1
YEAR 92 .0339842 .181202 0 1
YEAR 93 .0126695 .1118521 0 1
US SINGLE W OMEN
Variable Mean Std. Dev .Min Max
time 3.872371 2.270599 .8503437 9
AGE2021 .2148646 .4107759 0 1
AG E2223 .2502894 .4332298 0 1
AG E2426 .320213 .4666123 0 1
AG E2729 .1136837 .3174635 0 1
Income pctile 48.60847 33.54657 0 100
no income .1530447 .3600723 0 1
student .2039824 .4030027 0 1
No Job .2806205 .4493544 0 1
un. current 3.158138 1.134636 1 6
un .change -.006483 .8480993 -4 4
SINGLEHH .2989118 .4578341 0 1
hhsizeCR 1.455429 1.571012 0 13
religioat~79 3.309099 1.735013 1 6
urban .8365362 .3698311 0 1
RACE W HITE .785367 .4106151 0 1
RACE BLACK .1822181 .3860689 0 1
REG N O R TH C -L .2935865 .4554574 0 1
REG SOUTH .3280852 .4695704 0 1
REG W E ST .2051401 .4038507 0 1
YEAR 80 .075712 .2645673 0 1
YEAR 81 .1016439 .3022144 0 1
YEAR 82 .1023385 .303128 0 1
YEAR 83 .10257 .3034316 0 1
YEAR 84 .109053 .3117418 0 1
YEAR 85 .1002547 .3003741 0 1
YEAR 86 .0993285 .2991373 0 1
YEAR 87 .0784904 .2689729 0 1
YEAR 88 .065756 .2478837 0 1
YEAR 89 .0449178 .2071476 0 1
YEAR 90 .0351933 .1842895 0 1
YEAR 91 .0185228 .1348478 0 1
YEAR 92 .0113452 .1059203 0 1
YEAR 93 .0037046 .0607593 1 _
US MARRIED W OMEN
Variable Mean Std. Dev .Min Max
tim e 5.394428 2.816377 .8695202 12.26918
AGE2021 .1394099 .3463901 0 1
AG E2223 .1987935 .3991111 0 1
AGE2426 .3503629 .4771061 0 1
AG E2729 .2516731 .4339948 0 1
Income pctile 41.53511 33.64446 0 100
no income .2154774 .4111725 0 1
student .0586295 .234941 0 1
No Job .3517768 .4775473 0 1
un. current 3.222264 1.154941 1 6
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un.change -.0482609 .7717003 -4 4
hhsizeCR 2.145631 1.154864 1 12
religioat~79 3.344613 1.736999 1 6
urban .7372985 .4401223 0 1
RACE W HITE .9006504 .2991449 0 1
RACE BLACK .0706004 .2561683 0 1
REG N O R TH C -L .3091715 .4621738 0 1
REG SOUTH .3652559 .4815245 0 1
REG W E ST .1728721 .3781545 0 1
YEAR 80 .0457159 .2088781 0 1
YEAR 81 .0606089 .2386228 0 1
YEAR 82 .0749364 .2633011 0 1
YEAR 83 .0895466 .2855446 0 1
YEAR 84 .0983128 .2977511 0 1
YEAR 85 .1045339 .3059663 0 1
YEAR 86 .1040626 .3053561 0 1
YEAR 87 .0960505 .2946744 0 1
YEAR 88 .0886983 .2843211 0 1
YEAR 89 .0750306 .2634532 0 1
YEAR 90 .0565558 .2310027 0 1
YEAR 91 .0426996 .2021885 0 1
YEAR 92 .0262042 .1597495 0 1
YEAR 93 .0096145 .0975855 0 1
U K -S IN G L E  MEN
Variable Mean Std. Dev .Min Max
tim e 3.287234 1.925939 .0416679 9.666666
AGE2021 .2117528 .4087577 0 1
AG E2223 .1783181 .3829744 0 1
AG E2426 .2998987 .4584456 0 1
AG E2729 .1793313 .383824 0 1
Income pctile 26.28673 27.69227 0 97
no income .3191489 .4663832 0 1
STUDENTt .3009119 .458887 0 1
durables 3.927052 1.567529 0 7
No Job .4204661 .4938841 0 1
un. current 8.266464 1.941273 3.4 12.3
un. changeREG -.4026342 .8413582 -2.1 1.8
hhsize 2.216819 1.557421 1 10
SINGLEHH .4903749 .5001608 0 1
REG London .0759878 .265113 0 1
REG _SW .1023303 .3032358 0 1
REG EAnglia .0557244 .2295051 0 1
REG EMidla~s .1266464 .3327451 0 1
REG W M idla~s .0607903 .2390664 0 1
REG _NW .106383 .3084835 0 1
REG YorksHum .1033435 .3045613 0 1
REG North .0506586 .2194107 0 1
REG _W ales .035461 .1850357 0 1
REG_Scotland .0891591 .2851177 0 1
year 94.52584 2.222897 91 98
U K -M A R R IE D  MEN
Variable Mean Std. Dev .Min Max
tim e 3.530529 1.877952 .0833321 10
AGE2021 .0619946 .2411999 0 1
AG E2223 .1410602 .3481618 0 1
AG E2426 .3966757 .4893175 0 1
AG E2729 .3849955 .4867036 0 1
Income pctile 42.46271 25.87022 0 100
no income .0925427 .2898556 0 1
STUDENTt .0157233 .1244307 0 1
durables 4.728661 1.111353 0 7
No Job .1469003 .354086 0 1
un. current 8.227673 1.953858 3.4 12.3
un. changeREG -.3132525 .8292244 -2.1 1.8
hhsize 2.770889 1.028832 1 8
REG London .0314465 .1745604 0 1
REG_SW .091195 .2879509 0 1
REG EAnglia .0548068 .227654 0 1
REG EMidla~s .114106 .3180114 0 1
REG W M idla~s .0992812 .2991064 0 1
REG_NW .0961366 .2948447 0 1
REG YorksHum .1410602 .3481618 0 1
REG_North .0624438 .2420143 0 1
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REG .W ales .0413297 .1990965 0 1
REG..Scotland .1024259 .3032757 0 1
year 94.5584 2.326294 91 98
U K -S IN G L E  
Variable
W OMEN
Mean Std. Dev .Min Max
tim e 3.480633 1.943498 .041666 9.416666
AGE2021 .2140719 .4103305 0 1
AG E2223 .1744012 .3795962 0 1
AG E2426 .2851796 .451669 0 1
AG E2729 .1901198 .3925424 0 1
Income pctile 25.46557 31.82057 0 100
no income .4461078 .4972733 0 1
STUDENTt .2657186 .4418805 0 1
durables 3.750749 1.541923 0 7
No Job .5628743 .4962168 0 1
un. current 8.524476 2.034609 3.4 12.3
un. changeREG -.3983533 .7789056 -2.1 1.8
hhsize 2.456587 1.47881 1 8
SINGLEHH .3173653 .4656252 0 1
REG London .0830838 .2761122 0 1
REG _SW .0815868 .2738367 0 1
REG EAnglia .0314371 .1745613 0 1
REG EMidla~s .0800898 .2715338 0 1
REG W M idla~s .0905689 .2871025 0 1
REG _NW .1010479 .301505 0 1
REG YorksHum .0980539 .2974989 0 1
REG North .0845808 .2783611 0 1
REG _W ales .0404192 .197014 0 1
REG_Scotland .1474551 .3546918 0 1
year 94.63473 2.275377 91 98
U K -M A R R IE D  W OM EN
Variable Mean Std. Dev .Min Max
tim e 3.772873 1.99718 .166666 10
AGE2021 .095151 .2934681 0 1
AG E2223 .1777981 .382401 0 1
AG E2426 .3690149 .4826116 0 1
AG E2729 .3208295 .4668666 0 1
Income pctile 40.48124 31.81165 0 100
no income .2339128 .4233819 0 1
STUDENTt .021348 .1445635 0 1
durables 4.745044 1.143576 0 7
No Job .3357731 .472332 0 1
un. current 8.231565 1.979147 3.4 12.3
un. changeREG -.3083562 .8438904 -2.1 1.8
hhsize 2.870082 1.081016 1 10
REG London .0335468 .180087 0 1
REG _SW .0872217 .2822027 0 1
REG EAnglia .0542848 .2266135 0 1
REG EMidla~s .1021653 .3029118 0 1
REG W M idla~s .10552 .3072691 0 1
REG _NW .0902714 .2866139 0 1
REG YorksHum .1225984 .3280256 0 1
REG North .0673986 .2507493 0 1
REG_W ales .05215 .2223634 0 1
REG_Scotland .1039951 .3053008 0 1
year _ ........ 94.5462 2.328875 91 98
Southern Europe ECHP- SINGLE MEN
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
time 2.061448 .7459923 1.25 4.5
AGE2021 .1565657 .363697 0 1
AG E2223 .1531987 .3604824 0 1
AGE2426 .2626263 .4404319 0 1
AGE2729 .3367003 .4729797 0 1
Income pctile 38.30135 35.14765 0 100
no income .3282828 .4699841 0 1
No Job .3468013 .476353 0 1
SINGLEHH .5 .5004214 0 1
hhsize 2.138047 1.650121 1 11
healthlevel 1.703704 .7614797 1 5
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accom m _short .2641196 .4412299 0 1
C O JT A L Y  .3080808 .4620893 0 1
CO_SPAIN .2390572 .4268672 0 1
CO_PORTUGAL .1632997 .3699504 0 1
Southern Europe ECHP - SINGLE W OM EN
Variable Mean Std. Dev .Min Max
tim e 2.032446 .706803 1.25 4.5
AGE2021 .1913478 .3936898 0 1
AG E2223 .2079867 .4062053 0 1
AG E2426 .2396007 .4271953 0 1
AG E2729 .2462562 .4311884 0 1
Income pctile 25.38602 30.88237 0 100
no income .4675541 .4993618 0 1
No Job .5074875 .5003604 0 1
SINGLEHH .4242928 .4946469 0 1
hhsize 2.066556 1.374371 1 11
healthlevel 1.575707 .7266422 1 5
accom m  short .2373159 .4257861 0 1
CO ITALY .2329451 .4230597 0 1
CO SPAIN .2445923 .4302033 0 1
CO PORTUGAL .1131448 .3170335 0 1
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6 Summary and Conclusions
The statistics presented at the beginning of this dissertation indicated an interesting field 
of research: there are large, unexplained differences in young people’s home leaving process 
within Europe.
In the literature review we highlighted the several gaps in the knowledge. A substantial 
effort has been put into understanding the areas that would benefit from an improved 
analysis. We concluded that there was a need for comparative research across countries and 
for a more careful handling of modelling issues, such as the use of potential income rather 
than actual income and the need to distinguish between different destinations (alone, as a 
student, or with a partner). We also found that very little had been written on the topic of 
young people’s return to the parental home. We decided not to set out to improve on the 
theoretical modelling, although we are aware that this is an area also calling for deeper 
research. Instead, we aimed at performing an insightful comparative analysis while avoiding 
some of the pitfalls that affects some previous research, namely, the mere use of potentially 
endogenous covariates (actual income) or the combining of destinations (that would lead to 
coefficients that cannot find an interpretation).
In Chapter 3 we analysed the ECHP dataset with the purpose of understanding the 
determinants of home leaving among young Europeans. The results showed a significant 
effect of income and employment status, particularly for Southern Europe, where, however, 
the magnitudes of the effects were found to be generally small in absolute level, but 
encouraging in relative levels. For other countries, the results were not very well determined, 
and we suspected that the quality of the data might be one of the reasons. We also put into 
question the grouping of countries that we had chosen, and raised question as to how clear- 
cut a grouping could be, given that, empirically, some countries appear to share features of 
two groups.
In Chapter 4 we therefore introduced better datasets for the United Kingdom and 
Germany from surveys that have been conducted for longer periods and that are of a 
significantly higher quality (low attrition and larger set of variables). We also considered a 
dataset for the United States in order to extend our comparison to North America. Our results 
indicated that the three countries share common features as to the process of young people’s 
departure from the parental home. In particular, we saw that income and labour market 
variables have a clear effect on the departure process. While actual income is significant and 
important, we also discovered how potential income is often a much more significant and 
important factor for destinations without a partner. (This result is in clear contrast to what we 
observed for Southern Europe.) We also clearly confirmed that the determinants of departure 
vary by gender and by destination. We hope that this draws a line in the applied research on 
young people’s departure from home to make it clear that destinations cannot be pooled.
In Chapter 5 we turned our attention to the issue of young people’s return to the parental 
home and undertook an analysis based on duration models for Southern Europe, the UK and
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the US. Given that the research in this area was very limited, we started by focusing on basic 
issues, such as a comparison of return rates in the different datasets, before moving on to the 
estimation of the econometric models. We showed that there are significant differences 
between countries and that the role of economic factors is, once again, crucial in several 
cases. Particularly for the United States, we saw that returns are very much affected by 
income, employment status and unemployment rates. The results were less well determined 
for Southern Europe, and it was not clear whether this may mean that the process of return 
home is not sensitive to economic factors, similarly to the way in which the effect of economic 
variables had little impact on departures from home for Southern Europeans.
Main findings
We have reached several findings that expand on the current body of knowledge and 
understanding of young people’s departure and return to the parental home. Such findings 
are best expressed within the framework of the objectives that we formulated at the outset 
under the form of hypotheses.
Our hypotheses
Chapter 1 presented several key hypotheses as a guideline for the rest of the dissertation. 
We reconsider these here, since the results found in our work can appropriately be presented 
under the headings of the hypotheses that we set out to address.
Hypothesis 1
The determinants of leaving home are the same for all destinations: leaving home
to live with a partner and leaving home to live without a partner are not distinct
destinations and can be pooled together.
The estimates of the coefficients for different destinations appear quite different in the 
multinomial logits, and the formal statistical Wald tests (of whether destinations can be 
combined) indicate that the coefficients of the covariates differ significantly by destination) In 
particular, the effects of economic variables differ significantly by destination, both in 
magnitude and sometimes also in sign (own current income has a stronger and more 
significant effect on married destinations than on alone destinations), proving that the 
dichotomous model commonly found in the literature is unsatisfactory and misleading. This 
indicates that the first hypothesis cannot be accepted and that the dichotomous model 
commonly found in the literature is therefore not appropriate. Excluding student departures in 
the estimation is also found to be acceptable.
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Student destinations are much less affected by current income than other destinations, 
and when an effect is found this is generally negative (own higher income reduces the risk of 
departures as a student, even after controlling for age); the effect of parental income is 
(typically) positive only on student destinations, but not on other destinations (for Southern 
Europe, the “expected” negative association between parental income and departure risk is 
negligible or non-existent).
Hypothesis 2
Young people’s departure from home in Southern European countries is affected 
by own and family current financial circumstances in the same way as in 
Central/Northern Europe and the US, ie, the effects of the covariates are not 
different from one another.
Hypothesis 3
Potential financial circumstances are less important to young people in Southern 
European countries than for youth in Central/Northern Europe and the US. (That is, 
the effect of potential income is small in Southern Europe and large elsewhere.)
In chapter 4 we estimated models on UK, US and German datasets and compared our 
results with those of the previous chapter (analysis on the ECHP). We have seen that current 
income and current employment status are significant, but not very important covariates, for 
Southern Europe. We do find that current economic variables are associated with higher 
departure rates in the US, UK and Germany, too, but the relationship is different, and to some 
extent we even encounter effects having opposite signs.
In the UK and the US, not having a job increases men’s probability of departure into alone 
destinations, and the effect is very close to the 5% significance level for German males. Own 
current income has a stronger, positive effect on married destinations than on alone 
destinations (plus, in some cases, own income is not significant on alone destinations). For 
women, the no job dummy has a positive and significant coefficient for German women 
(alone and married destinations), and we find positive (insignificant) coefficients for UK 
women.
This is the opposite of what we found for Southern Europe: Southern Europeans without a 
job were likely to delay departure; in Northern Europe and the US not having a job provides 
an incentive to departure.
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The effect of parental income is very weak, and we find a negative effect on the risk of 
departure in the South (Italy and Spain), and a positive effect in the North (UK and Germany).
Once we correct for the possible endogeneity of these results and estimate a model with 
potential earnings, we see that potential income has a positive effect of departure rates for 
men entering alone destinations, and this effect is quantitatively larger than the positive effect 
found when using actual income. For departure with a partner, potential income is still very 
significant and important for males in the US and Germany (irrespective of the destination) 
and for women in the US and Germany (but only if moving into married destinations). For 
Southern Europe we showed that the explanatory power of potential income is weak.
This implies that potential income is the driving factor towards men’s independence into 
alone destinations and, for the US and Germany, into married destinations for both genders. 
We seem to be able to reject hypothesis 2 in the light of the results we have found so far: 
current income is significant in all countries, but the effect is much smaller in the South than 
in the North. We can also reject hypothesis 3, because potential income is of little importance 
in Southern Europe (relative to current income) but in Northern Europe and the US potential 
income is more important than actual income.
Hypothesis 4a
The probability of return to the parental home is the same across countries.
Hypothesis 4b
Economic and financial circumstances are not determinants of young people’s
return to the parental home.
Hypothesis 4c
The determinants of young people’s return to the parental home are the same
across countries (with special consideration for economic and financial variables).
In chapter 5 we estimated an empirical model on the US, the UK and four (pooled) 
Southern European countries. We had noticed that there was considerable scope for 
improving on the limited literature on young adults’ return to the parental home, and we have 
presented several results that represent a significant progress on the existing knowledge.
The first of our findings is that, while the average risk of return home is lower in Southern 
Europe compared to the US and the UK, this is a composition effect due to the larger share 
of married (or cohabiting) people, amongst those who are living outside the parental home, in 
Southern Europe than elsewhere, and to the fact that married people always have a lower 
risk of return home than those who are not in a relationship (ie, living alone or with friends). In
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fact, the risk o f return of those who are not in a relationship is overall similar if we compare 
Southern Europe with the US and the UK. Amongst those living with a partner, Southern 
Europe has the lowest return rates.
Therefore, we do find that the probability of return to the parental home is different 
across countries, although the risk of return of unmarried youth does not follow a clear North 
vs. South pattern.
We then analysed the effect of economic variables on returns. We found that the effect of 
income and the labour market is generally significant across countries but not uniformly so.
Our findings are consistent with the previous literature, but we find differences between 
genders (economic and labour market circumstances are more important for men than for 
women), which leads to the rejection of the pooled models used by other researchers, and 
also differences across countries, where the various covariates show a more complex 
behaviour in youth in the US and UK compared to Southern European ones.
Overall, although the differences amongst countries in young people’s process to return 
home are at first sight less striking than the ones observed in the analysis of departure from 
home, there are indeed significant differences. In particular, not having a job has very large 
and significant effects for men in Southern Europe, while in the US and the UK this is not 
crucial for single men. Own current income is important in the US (with also very strong 
effects of change in unemployment rates) and in the UK. For Southern Europe, the levels of 
return rates are similar to the return rates seen for other countries, but their determinants are 
not easy to be determined.
We can reject all of our hypotheses related to the process of return home. We find that 
children’s income and labour market situation affect children’s return rates, therefore showing 
that the opportunity to return to the parental home can play a significant role in the labour 
market. This result is extremely clear for the US and, in some cases, for the UK.
However, from the evidence of estimates that vary significantly within each group, we also 
raised the question of whether our grouping of countries, partly based on previous economic 
and sociological literature and particularly Esping-Andersen’s taxonomy, was appropriate. 
The results show that Southern Europe is perhaps not as homogeneous as one would 
expect, as the estimates do vary amongst Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, and we noticed 
that Belgium, Austria and Ireland, from the descriptives and the estimation results, exhibit 
some of the features of Continental Europe and some of the features of the Southern 
European countries so that the distinction between Continental Europe and Southern Europe 
becomes somewhat blurred.
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Policy Implications
The results presented can be put into a wider context. The significant differences between 
countries, as explained in the initial chapters, led to the empirical analysis, which revealed the 
effects of various covariates on departures and returns.
Here, we want to underline why our results matter.
We highlighted the fact that there are large effects of employment and income on 
departure risk in the UK and the US, and this could be evidence of the higher mobility of the 
workforce. A significant effect of earnings and employment status along with high 
employment rates amongst the young reveals how young people’s access to the labour 
market is beneficial for a fast formation of new households and higher territorial mobility. 
Additionally, the UK and the US do not suffer from any obvious cultural or social factors 
(“constants” or “control factors”) that markedly hinder departures.
The risk in this scenario lies in the quality of living conditions o f the youth outside the 
parental home, the impact of more limited nurturing on their success in life, plus potentially 
lower care offered to older parents. To our knowledge, these issues have never been 
analysed in conjunction with the phenomenon of departure from home. We can gauge the 
importance of living conditions outside the parental home by looking at our results in the third 
empirical paper: youth on low incomes or in areas with high unemployment are the ones most 
likely to return to the parental home. This seems to imply that higher exit rates from the 
parental home do not necessarily imply worse, and permanent, living conditions for the youth, 
and the family still acts as an insurance mechanism in countries such as the US and the UK. 
The fact that we see high departure rates and high return rates in the same countries is a 
positive indicator that high departure rates are not a bad thing.
On the other hand, for countries with low departure rates, it is necessary to look at 
whether such departure rates are due to social and cultural factors and/or low employment 
and earnings. For some of the countries in this thesis we failed to find large effects of 
earnings on departures, but employment always had a significant effect, albeit sometimes 
only a small one. It appears, therefore, that higher youth employment, rather than higher 
income, would modestly increase transitions outside home. A better access of young people 
to the labour market and more youth employment would increase departures, while higher 
wages may not be the right answer. Since the marginal effect of employment status is not 
very large, however, we are left to conclude that unobservables (cultural and social factors) 
are still the most important factors in the South.
Does this matter?
Given the link between young people’s residential mobility and unemployment rates, we 
should worry about low rates o f household formation, as these may be part of the reason for 
low growth in some of Europe’s economies.
The importance of unobservables is a tricky issue for policy. If we do not know what 
determines departure rates, how can we affect the departure rate?
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A partial answer could come from the observation of the countries with higher departure 
and higher return rates. In those countries, the living arrangements when outside the parental 
home are of a less permanent nature: they involve cohabitation with friends, and with 
unmarried partners. Since the labour market (more flexibility into and out of jobs), the housing 
market (larger and more flexible rental market) and even the education system (“faster” 
tertiary education) require and facilitate such arrangements, young people are more willing to 
take risks and relocate. The possibility of returning into the parental home clearly provides 
them with a straightforward fallback solution. By contrast, the lower flows out of the parental 
home and back into it appear to be linked, in the South, to a more “permanent” view of 
departure from home.
Whatever the full answer can be, our results seem to point out that the demand side of the 
labour market would clearly not provide the full picture. It may well be true that the supply 
side of the labour market and the low rate of household formation share a significant amount 
of cultural “unobservable” factors.
Conclusions
Once we compare the evidence from Southern European countries from chapter 3 with 
the analyses on different datasets for the UK, the US and Germany in chapter 4, given our 
reservation on the quality of the ECHP for some datasets, particularly for the UK, our results 
suggest that in countries such as the UK, the US and Germany the decisions of young people 
to leave the parental home are much more dependent on income and labour market 
conditions compared to Southern Europe, and young people react fairly quickly to these 
economic factors. In many instances, however, the youth in these countries do not 
necessarily require a job and a good financial position before leaving home: “potential 
income” does a better job at explaining single departures than “current income”, although for 
departures into partnerships current income is just as important. In Southern Europe, by 
contrast, the low departure rates are only partly affected by income and work factors. 
Although we observe that youth with a job and an income have higher departure probabilities, 
the highest predicted probabilities, based on having the “right” covariates, are still relatively 
low, indicating that there is low variation in behaviour within Southern Europe. Such evidence 
is consistent with the existence of cultural factors that limit young people’s departure, as 
reflected in the low shares of youth who leave home to destinations other than marriage. 
These results are confirmed by the strength of flows back into the parental home in the US 
and the UK, where the labour market variables play again a very important role in the 
determination of returns home. Overall, the US and the UK, and to some extent, Germany, 
exhibit a high degree of movement into and out of different living arrangements, which is 
closely related to the labour market mobility. For Southern Europe, such flows are much 
smaller and only weakly related to income and employment.
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Future research
During the course of this research we have highlighted several possible directions where 
our work could be expanded. An expansion of the theoretical work in the area, possibly in the 
form of better modelling of the joint decisions of parents and children, could lead to clearer 
empirical specifications that can be used for applied work.
In our work, we did not focus on the effect of macro/regional variables other than the 
unemployment rate and its changes. Other labour market indicators, such as the flexibility of 
employment contracts, or information on the local housing markets (eg, the share of rented 
accommodation in each region or province) could be useful in further extensions of this work 
with datasets that offer suitable length and regional or local information. Another obvious area 
of extension is the inclusion of welfare variables in the analysis. The problem we encountered 
with our data is that, particularly for the ECHP, it is difficult to find variables with sufficient 
variation to enable us to capture the effect of, say, welfare support for young people. Data 
confidentiality in other panels (such as the NLSY, for researchers outside the United States) 
makes this analysis difficult for the US, too. It is possible, however, that regional policies (and 
their variations over time) in child support, welfare payments, unemployment benefit, etc., 
could be exploited to explore the link between policy and young people’s living arrangements.
Earlier we also pointed out that that our datasets refer to different periods in time, starting 
from 1980 for the US to the late 1990’s for the others, which makes the results not strictly 
comparable in that the determinants of departure and return may change not only between 
countries, but also over time. With our panels now reaching up to 20 years (SOEP) and 15 
years for the BHPS, and potentially other panels elsewhere, therefore offering information on 
trends beyond single economic cycles, one could focus on how the determinants of 
departure, or return, have changed overtime.
Finally, the ECHP dataset did not offer a sufficiently wide range of cultural variables for the 
study of young people’s behaviour. Given the role of “unobservables” in the determination of 
household formation in the South and the difficulty to observe such transition events, a useful 
investigation would involve probing for more qualitative information on young people and their 
families, perhaps using a dedicated survey, or a survey section like the one in the BHPS, 
focusing specifically on young people.
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